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I. INTRODUCTION
The inequitable distribution of environmental hazards and locally
unwanted land uses (LULUs) by race and class in the United States has
received much study, reaction, and opposition. Varying, and sometimes
competing, conceptions of environmental justice as an empirical, politi-
cal, legal, environmental, and economic issue have emerged. However,
little attention has been devoted to the use of local land use planning and
regulation as an environmental justice strategy! This lack of attention
ignores the inequitable distribution of land use regulatory patterns ac-
cording to the racial and socioeconomic composition of neighborhoods.
This article documents the disproportionately higher amount of industrial
and other non-residential land uses in census tracts where low-income
people of color live, based on a study of thirty-one census tracts in seven
cities nationwide. In addition, empirical evidence shows that environ-
mental justice advocates are beginning to move from reactive strate-
gies-essentially an "opposition" model of environmental justice-to
proactive planning and participation in policymaking. In this new land
use planning model of environmental justice, residents of minority and
low-income neighborhoods identify not only the activities they wish to
exclude from their neighborhoods, but also their visions for what they
wish to include in their neighborhoods; in other words, their visions of
the public good. A variety of land use regulatory tools implement the
land use goals of low-income and minority communities. The tools in-
clude changes to comprehensive plans, amendments to zoning codes and
maps, and the use of sophisticated, specialized, and flexible zoning tech-
!. Only five scholars have devoted any attention to land use planming or regulation as an
environmental justice strategy. See Robert W. Collin, Environmental Equity: A Law and Planning
Approach to Environmental Racism, 11 VA. ENVrL. J. 495, 537-38 (1992) (calling for commu-
nity-based environmental planning); Jon C. Dubin, From Junkyards to Gentrification: Eqplicating a
Right to Protective Zoning in Low-Income Communities of Color, 77 MINN. L. REV. 739, 740-44
(1993) (articulating a theory of a litigation-enforced constitutional and statutory right to protective
zoning for low-income communities of color); Yale Rabin, Eusive Zoning: The Inequitable Leg-
acy of Euclid, in ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 101 (Charles M. Haar & Jerold S. Kayden
eds., 1990) (using case studies to show that cities zone low-income communities of color for inten-
sive land uses, i.e., expulsive zoning); Jim Schwab, Land-Use Planning and Environmental Justice,
ENV'T & DEV. (Am. Planning Ass'n, Chicago, ill.), July 1995, at I (describing environmental justice
issues and merely identifying the need for local environmental and land use planning); Robert Sit-
kowski, Commercial Hazardous Waste Projects in Indian Country: An Opportunity for Tribal Eco-
nomic Development Through Land Use Planning, 10 J. LAND USE & ENV1L. L 239, 242-70 (1995)
(describing models of land use plaming to address hazardous waste projects in Indian country). No
one, however, has done a systematic quantitative comparison between zoning patterns in low-
income, high-minority neighborhoods and zoning patterns in high-income, low-minority neighbor-
hoods. In addition, authors have failed to define either specifics of a land use planning model that
will promote environmental justice or concrete and comprehensive land use regulatory mechanisms
that low-income and minority communities can use to seek their goals. For a well-described, proac-
tive planning approach to environmental permitting and administrative decision making at the fed-
eral level, see Gerald Torres, Environmental Burdens and Democratic Justice, 21 FORDHAM URB.
U. 431,456-59 (1994).
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niques like performance zoning, overlay zoning, conditional use permits,
special districts, negotiated zoning, and exactions.
The land use planning model of environmental justice is represented
by a movie: The Milagro Beanfield War.2 Directed and produced by
Robert Redfordand starring Sonia Braga, Chick Vennera, and Panama-
nian singer and politician Ruben Blades, The Milagro Beanfield War is
the story of a small, dying, Hispanic town in New Mexico. The movie's
connection to environmental justice is often ignored. The town stops a
major resort development--an unwanted land use that will harm the local
community and environment-when Joe Mondragon plants a beanfield
and diverts water from the development to the beanfield. As Joe's bean-
field comes to life, so does the local community. Only with alternative
plans for the use of the land and local natural resources does the town of
Milagro prevent the developer's LULU.
The Milagro Beanfield War explores many classic themes of envi-
ronmental justice. Powerful outside interests control and finance the
large development, which is supported by politicians from the Governor
to the Mayor. The proposed project not only threatens the environment
by using scarce water and destroying trees and natural landscape, but
also threatens to destroy the local community. The promise of jobs is
unmasked; instead of prospering, local residents would wait tables, clean
rooms, repair cars, and perform other low-wage service jobs for the
wealthy outside vacationers. The developer would buy the local property
at cheap prices. So-called economic vitality would bring death to the
town of Milagro and its way of life. Racism among the developers, poli-
ticians, and federal and state law enforcement officials runs rampant.
Some local Hispanics have been co-opted with economic and political
incentives. There are two armed stand-offs, one between the locals and
the U.S. Forest Service officials; the other between the locals and the
state police. The heroes are an unemployed rebel (Joe Mondragon, who
plants the beanfield), a Latina community activist and car mechanic, a
local Anglo progressive lawyer who is enticed to abandon his self-
serving cynicism, a sheriff, and a crazy old man (or is he really that crazy
after all?) who talks with saints and a dead friend. Longstanding personal
conflicts and local quirks are initial obstacles to united community or-
ganizing. Milagro's victory comes not from litigation to stop the devel-
opment, but from community activism led by members of the commu-
nity. Magic abounds, and miracles occur.
Environmental justice is about the growing awareness of, and re-
sponse to, the distributional inequities of environmental and land use
policy in the United States. In the 1980s and 1990s, grassroots commu-
2. THE MILAGRO BEANFIELD WAR (Universal City Studios, Inc. 1988) (adapted from JOHN
TREADWELL NICHOLs, THE MILAGRO BEANFIEiD WAR (1985)). Milagro means "miracle."
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nity organizers and civil rights activists,' civil rights lawyers,' govern-
ment agencies,' legal scholars.' and other academics7 began to study and
3. See generally CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM: VOICES FROM THE GRASSROOTS
9 (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1993) [hereinaftr CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM] (addressing
aspects of environmental racism and racial prejudice); UNEQUAL PROTECTION: ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE AND COMMUNITIES OF COLOR at xvii-xix (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1994) [hereinafter
UNEQUAL PROTECTION] (analyzing history of environmental racism and grassroots coalitions);
UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST COMMASSION FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, Toxic WASTES AND RACE A
NATIONAL REPO/r ON THE RACIAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITIES
WTt HAzARous WASTE SITES at xv (1987) [hereinafter UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST REPORT]
(concluding that race was a factor in location of hazardous waste facilities in the United States).
4. See generally Luke W. Cole, Empowerment As the Key to Environmental Protection: The
Need for Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619, 621 (1992) [hereinafter Cole,
Empowerment] (examining -environmental poverty law' in the context of lawyering for social
change and social justice"); Luke W. Cole, Environmental Justice Litigation: Another Stone in
David's Sling, 21 FORDHAM URB. L3. 523 (1994) [hereinafter Cole, Litigation] (proposing litigation
strategies for environmental justice cases).
5. See generally FLORIDA ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY AND JUSTICE COMMISSION, FINAL
REPORT (1997) [hereinafter FLORIDA REPORT] (studying and compiling information implicating
environmental justice concerns in Florida); U.S. ENVTL PROTECTION AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL
EQUITY: REDUCING RISKS FOR ALL COMMUNITIES (1992) [hereinafter EPA, ENVIRONMENTAL
EQUITY] (reviewing data on distribution of environmental exposures and risk across population
groups); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SITING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILLS AND
THEIR CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES
(1983) [hereinafter GAO REPORT] (describing racial and economic characteristics of communities
near hazardous waste landfills in southeastern states); Rodger C. Field, Siting Justice and the Envi-
ronmental Laws, 16 N. ILL. U. L REV. 639 (1996) (considering the effects of environmental justice
on industrial development); Historic Environmental Racism Task Force Submits Recommendations,
TEX. NAT. RESOURCES REP., Aug. 25,1993, at 7.
6. See generally KENNETH A. MANASTER, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND JUSTICE:
READINGS AND COMMENTARY ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND PRACTICE (1995) (asserting that an
environmental lawyer's role is to guard the environment and to serve justice); Regina Austin &
Michael Schill, Black Brown, Poor & Poisroned: Minority Grassroots Environmentalism and the
Quest for Eco-Justice, I KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 69 (1991) (addressing aspects of the environ-
mental justice problem); Vicki Been, Analyzing Evidence of Environmental Justice, 1 J. LAND USE
& ENVTL. L 1 (1995) [hereinafter Been, Analyzing Evidence] (highlighting methodological issues
researchers need to address); Vicki Been & Francis Gupta, Coming to the Nuisance or Going to the
Barrios? A Longitudinal Analysis of Environmental Justice Claims, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1997)
[hereinafter Been & Gupta, Coming to the Nuisance] (studying demographics of host communities);
Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods: Disproportionate Siting or
Market Dynamics?, 103 YALE LJ. 1383 (1994) [hereinafter Been, LULUs] (examining gaps in
research of how sites affect socioeconomic characteristics of communities); Vicki Been, What's
Fairness Got to Do With It? Environmental Justice and the Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses,
78 CORNELL L REV. 1001 (1993) [hereinafter Been, Fairness] (discussing difficulties in concept of
fair siting programs); Denis Binder, Index of Environmental Justice Cases, 27 URB. LAW. 163
(1995) (providing an index of environmental justice cases); Robert W. Collin, Review of the Legal
Literature on Environmental Racism, Environmental Equity, and Environmental Justice, 9 J. ENVTT.
L. & LmG. 121 (1994) (providing overview of legal literature); James H. Colopy, The Road Less
Traveled: Pursuing Environmental Justice Through Title Vi of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13
STAN. ENVTL. J. 125 (1994) (exploring use of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act to protect commu-
nities from environmental racism); Dubin, supra note I (articulating a theory of a litigation enforced,
constitutional and statutory right to protective zoning for low-income communities of color); Pamela
Duncan, Environmental Racism: Recognition, Litigation, and Alleviation, 6 TUL. ENVT LJ. 317
(1993) (suggesting means for abolishing environmental racism); Sheila Foster, Race(ial) Matters:
The Quest for Environmental Justice, 20 ECOLOGY LQ. 721 (1993) (arguing that civil rights propo-
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nents should utilize environmental law framework to combat environmental racism); Eileen (auna,
Federal Environmental Citizen Provisions: Obstacles and Incentives on the Road to Environmental
Justice, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1995) (examining problems faced by low-income and minority com-
munities when bringing citizen suits under complex environmental statutes); Stephen M. Johnson,
The Brownfields Action Agenda: A Model for Future FederallState Cooperation in the Quest for
Environmental Justice?, 37 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 85 (1996) (addressing whether the problem of
environmental justice should be addressed by federal or state govemment); Richard J. Lazarus,
Pursuing "Environmental Justice": The Distributional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw.
U. L. REv. 787 (1994) (offering a distributional perspective on environmental protection laws and
policies); Charles P. Lord & William A. Shutkin, Environmental Justice and the Use of History, 22
B.C. ENVTL AFr. L. REV. 1 (1994) (using historical analysis to explore two recent environmental
justice cases that perpetuated the problem); Bradford C. Mank, Environmental Justice and Discrimi-
natory Siting: Risk-Based Representation and Equitable Compensation, 56 OHIO ST. LJ. 329 (1995)
(disagreeing with the assertion that disparate impact is necessarily attributable to discrimination);
Olga L. Moya, Adopting an Environmental Justice Ethic, 5 DiCK. J. ENvTL. L & POL'Y 215 (1996)
(examining moral and ethical responsibility of environmental lawyers); Peter K. Reich, Greening the
Ghetto: A Theory of Environmental Race Discrimination, 41 U. KAN. L. REV. 271 (1992) (stating
that theories of equality, access to decision making, and community preservation offer recourse for
harm to racial minorities); Heidi Gorovitz Robertson, If Your Grandfather Could Pollute, So Can
You: Environmental "Grandfather Clauses" and Their Role in Environmental Inequity, 45 CATH. U.
L. REV. 131 (1995) (arguing that environmental advocates should seek to minimize protections
given to facilities by grandfather clauses); Symposium, Environmental Justice: A Growing Union,
96 W. VA. L. REV. 1015 (1994) (commenting that law professors play an important role by teaching
about environmental racism); Symposium, Race, Class, and Environmental Regulation, 63 U. COLO.
L. REV. 839 (1992) (identifying and discussing causes of environmental injustice); Symposium,
Urban Environmental Justice, 21 FORDHAM L J. 425 (1994) (identifying and discussing causes of
environmental injustice); Rachel D. Godsil, Note, Remedying Environmental Racism, 90 MICH. L.
REV. 394 (1991) (noting that racial minorities bear unequal burden of hazardous waste disposal).
7. See generally BRETT BADEN & DON COURSEY, THE LOCALITY OF WASTE SITES WrHIN
THE CITY OF CHICAGO: A DEMOGRAPHIC, SOCIAL, AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (Irving B. Harris
Graduate School of Pub. Policy Studies, Univ. of Chicago Working Paper Series 97-2, 1997) (ex-
ploring factors that explain the location of environmental waste sites in Chicago); ROBERT D.
BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (1990) (hereinaftr
BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE] (positing that black communities are targeted for sites due to eco-
nomic and political vulnerability); CONRON71NG ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM, supra note 3 (ad-
dressing environmental racism and racial prejudice); ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: ISSUES, POLICIES,
AND SOLUTIONS (Bunyan Bryant ed., 1995) (describing issues and policies of environmental jus-
tice); RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS: A TIME FOR DISCOURSE (Bunyan
Bryant & Paul Mohai eds., 1992) [hereinafter RACE AND INCIDENE] (describing changes in com-
munity resistance since the United Church of Christ Report); ANDREW SZAsZ, ECOpoPULISM:
TOXIC WASTE AND THE MOVEMENT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE (1994) (addressing the history
of toxic waste); Robert D. Bullard, Environmental Equity: Examining the Evidence of Environmental
Racism, 2 LAND USE FORUM 6 (1993) [hereinafter Bullard, Environmental Equity] (examining
patterns of discrimination in siting decisions); Robert D. Bullard, Race and Environmental Justice in
the United States, 18 YALE J. INT'L L. 319 (1993) [hereinafter Bullard, Race and Environmental
Justice] (focusing on connection between institutional racism and ecological disparities); Robert D.
Bullard, Solid Waste Sites and the Black Houston Community, 53 SOC. INQUIRY 273 (1983) [herein-
after Bullard, Solid Waste]; Terence J. Centner et al., Environmental Justice and Toxic Releases:
Establishing Evidence of Discriminatory Effect Based on Race and Not Income, 3 WIS. ENVTL. Li.
119 (1996) (revealing confusion about environmental problems faced by minorities); Thomas Lam-
bert & Christopher Boemer, Environmental Inequity: Economic Causes, Economic Solutions, 14
YALE J. ON REG. 195 (1997) (noting that environmental justice studies have not taken housing
markets into account); Kathryn R. Mahaffey et al., National Estimates of Blood Lead Levels, United
States, 1976-1980, 307 NEW ENG. J. MED 573, 578 (1982) (finding that black children are exposed
to higher levels of lead than white children or adults); Paul Mohai & Bunyan Bryant, Environmental
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demonstrate that low-income people and people of color bear a dispro-
portionately high burden of exposure to environmental hazards or un-
wanted land uses, particularly in the neighborhoods in which they live
and the environments in which they work.' Much of the attention has
focused on "environmental racism"-the discriminatory impact, and
arguably intentional discrimination, of environmental policy decisions on
people of color! The term "environmental justice," however, is used to
encompass class discrimination as well as racial discrimination,"° and
soften the divisive, emotionally charged connotation of the term "ra-
cism."" The term "environmental justice" also suggests actions that re-
spond to injustice, not merely identification of injustice." The response to
environmental justice has varied as widely as the range of conceptions
that underlie the term. 3 These responses have included litigation using
civil rights law and/or environmental law, opposition to administrative
permits, political protests, community organizing, legislative proposals,
Injustice: Weighing Race and Class As Factors in the Distribution of Environmental Hazards, 63 U.
COLO. L. REV. 921 (1992) [hereinafter Mohai & Bryant, Weighing Race & Class] (discussing recent
studies addressing the problem of race and class features in the distribution of environmental haz-
ards); Paul Mohai & Bunyan Bryant, Race, Poverty & the Distribution of Environmental Hazards:
Reviewing the Evidence, 2 RACE, POVERTY & ENV'T 3 (199111992) [hereinafter Mohai & Bryant,
Race, Poverty & Distribution] (discussing the results of studies addressing racially disproportionate
environmental hazard sitings).
8. See Carita Shanklin, Comment, Pathfinder: Environmental Justice, 24 ECOLx)GY L.Q. 333
(1997) (exploring the breadth and depth of materials on environmental justice).
9. See Austin & Schill, supra note 6. at 73; Robert D. Bullard, Anatomy of Environmental
Racism and the Environmental Justice Movement, in CONFRoImNG ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM,
supra note 3, at 15, 15-22 [hereinafter Bullard, Anatomy]; Karl Grossman, The People of Color
Environmental Summit, in UNEQUAL PROTECTION, supra note 3, at 272, 283-92. Civil rights leader
Benjamin Chavis coined the term "environmental racism." Poster, supra note 6, at 732; Grossman,
supra, at 278. See generally Edward Patrick Boyle, Note, It's Not Easy Bein' Green: The Psychol-
ogy of Racism, Environmental Discrimination, and the Argument for Modernizing Equal Protection
Analysis, 46 VAND. L. REV. 937 (1993) (examining whether new understandings about racism
require a modification of equal protection analysis).
10. Cf. Been, LULUs, supra note 6, at 1383; Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 621 (ex-
amining disproportionate burdens of pollution on low-income communities and poor people); Seth
D. Jaffe, The Market's Response to Environmental Inequity: We Have the Solution, What's the
Problem, 14 VA. ENVTL. U. 655, 658-59 (1995) (addressing how economic efficiency affects
environmental racism); Mohai & Bryant, Weighing Race & Class, supra note 7, at 921 (examining
race and class in addressing environmental justice problems associated with environmental hazard
siting).
11. See Lazanus, supra note 6, at 790; Gerald Torres, Race, Class, and Environmental Regula-
tion, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 839, 839-40 (1992) (calling for sensitivity to the needs of disparate cul-
tural groups in environmental regulations).
12. See MANASTER, supra note 6, at 155. The term "environmental racism" labels the actions,
motives, and/or institutional biases of polluters and decision makers. The term "environmental
justice" focuses on the goals of low-income and minority communities and activists, even if it does
not describe the specific content of those goals. See Been, Fairness, supra note 6; see also Gauna,
supra note 6, at 7-8.
13. For a discussion of the terms "environmental racism," "environmental equity," and "envi-
ronmental justice," see MANAsTER, supra note 6, at 155; Major Willie A. Gun, From the Landfill
to the Other Side of the Tracks: Developing Empowerment Strategies to Alleviate Environmental
Injustice, 22 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1227, 1227-28 (1996).
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an Executive Order, empirical studies, and scholarly writings." Minority
and low-income communities, like the fictional town of Milagro, N.M.,
are fighting back.
On the whole, though, the environmental justice movement and the
environmental justice literature have been reactive and remedial. It is
hardly surprising that neighborhood groups, civil rights activists, pro-
gressive lawyers, and grassroots environmentalists have responded to
decades of dumping hazards and LULUs in minority and low-income
communities with demands to stop and remedy the existing situations.
There is a continuing and pressing need to oppose current practices and
siting proposals that threaten these communities. Scholars have also
largely remained focused on environmental justice as a response to
power inequities, race and class discrimination, economic factors, and
inadequate environmental protections.
The next frontier for both the movement and the focus of environ-
mental justice scholarship, however, is land use planning by communi-
ties of color and low-income communities. Local neighborhoods can use
land use planning to articulate visions for what they want their commu-
nities to be, and negotiate land use regulations to implement these vi-
sions. In other words, they would not be merely late participants in using
existing rules to stop (or attempt to stop) current proposals for unwanted
land uses, but also pre-siting participants in developing the rules that will
determine what will and will not go in their neighborhoods. Land use
planning is prospective and proactive. It creates opportunities for resi-
dents, workers, and other members of local communities to decide and
seek what they want, not merely oppose what they do not want. The land
use planning and regulatory model, now emerging among a number of
low-income and minority communities, contributes to scholars' under-
standing of environmental justice problems. It also reflects the reality
that the law is about more than litigation, rights, courts, and jurispru-
dence. The law is about problem-solving, policy making, participation,
and regulation, all of which are part of the land use regulatory model."
14. See discussion irtra Part U.
15. Compare Dubin, supra note 1, at 779-800 (identifying statutory and constitutional rights
to protective zoning), with Torres, supra note 1, at 453-56 (recommending increased participation in
federal and state environmental regulation). For discussions of proactive, preventive approaches to
law, see Robert Blomquist, Government's Role Regarding Industrial Pollution Prevention in the
United States, 29 GA. L. REV. 349 (1995) (discussing preventionism as a cultural and policy idea
and the paradigm of pollution prevention, instead of pollution control); John J. Copelan, Jr. & Bar-
bara S. Monahan, Preventive Law: A Strategy for Local Governments in the Nineties, 44 SYRACUSE
L. Rev. 957, 957 (1993) (contrasting preventive law as a proactive approach with litigation as a
reactive approach); Stephen M. Johnson, From Reaction to Proaction: The 1990 Pollution Preven-
tion Act, 17 COLUM. J. ENV'L L 153 (1992) (discussing the proactive approach to pollution pre-
vention facilitated in part by the Pollution Prevention Act of 1990); Thomas R. Mounteer, The In-
herent Worthiness of the Struggle: The Emergence of Mandatory Pollution Prevention Planning As
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Part II of this article describes five different conceptions of envi-
ronmental justice that pervade the actions of activists and the writings of
observers:'6 (A) evidentiary, (B) power, (C) legal, (D) environmental, and
(E) economic.'7 Part HI demonstrates how each of these conceptions is
largely reactive and remedial. Each is part of an opposition model of
environmental justice, i.e., focused on opposition to specific LULUs.
Part III turns attention from the distribution of specific LULUs to
the distribution of land use regulatory patterns. It contains the results of
an empirical study of zoning in thirty-one census tracts in seven cities:
Anaheim, CA; Costa Mesa, CA; Orange, CA; Pittsburgh, PA; San Anto-
nio, TX; Santa Ana, CA; and Wichita, KS. These results show that low-
income, high-minority neighborhoods contain a greater percentage of
industrial and other intensive use zones than do high-income, low-
minority neighborhoods. This new evidence, not previously documented
in the literature, suggests the need for attention to land use planning and
regulation in low-income neighborhoods of color and for additional re-
search.
Part IV introduces an alternative model of environmental justice, a
planning model built on the idea that land use plans and regulations are
needed as emerging strategies for achieving environmental justice." Part
IV describes the nature of land use planning and regulation, and how the
planning model differs from the opposition model that currently domi-
nates the environmental justice movement and literature. Case studies
an Environmental Regulatory Ethic, 19 COLUM. J. ENvrL. L. 251 (1994) (advocating morality-based
pollution prevention planning).
16. The "divide" between actions and writings is ambiguous and subtle, at best, and illusory,
at worst. Writing about environmental justice could be an action responding to the problem of envi-
ronmental injustice (however the writer conceives of it), a description of others' actions and reac-
tions, or both.
17. A conception of environmental justice is a way that someone thinks about---or mentally
constructs and interprets-the problem of LULUs and pollution among low-income and minority
people. See, e.g., Been, Fairness, supra note 6, at 1001-06 (describing environmental justice as an
equality movement resulting from the disproportionate siting of LULUs in low-income and minority
neighborhoods). The way that one conceives of the problem tends to influence one's response. If for
example, a scholar finds the issue to be largely a puzzle about distributional patterns, the scholar is
likely to respond by studying the patterns. Id. at 1028-40. If a community activist thinks about
environmental justice as primarily an issue of power, as opposed to an issue of legal rights or envi-
ronmental protection, the activist is likely to respond with political, as opposed to legal or regulatory,
activity. See, e.g., Austin & Schill, supra note 6, at 74-75 (describing grassroots organizations and
their efforts to combat environmental racism through political tactics based on cultural identity).
Thus, conceptions of environmental justice influence responses to environmental justice.
The five conceptions discussed here are reflected in scholarship, grassroots activity, legal
developments, public interest lawyering, and the like in varying degrees. Uneven treatment of the
five conceptions in this article merely reflects different amounts of breadth and depth needed to
describe them adequately. There is no attempt to proportionately describe which type of people
embrace the different conceptions.
18. There is no single correct way of thinking about environmental justice and no single
effective strategy for seeking it. For expansion of this concept, see infra note 533.
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provide qualitative empirical evidence" that grassroots environmental
justice advocates and low-income and minority neighborhoods are be-
ginning to develop land use plans and regulations to address the over-
concentration of intensive land use designations in their communities and
to define how they would like to see land used. The planning model, with
its opportunities and challenges, is emerging at the local level.
Part V explores the various land use regulatory mechanisms that
environmental justice advocates can use to implement their visions and
plans. These mechanisms include comprehensive planning; zoning
amendments (both text amendments and map amendments, but primarily
down-zoning); flexible zoning techniques, including conditional uses,
overlay zones and special districts, performance zoning, buffer zones,
and floating zones; and exactions. Judicial protections of private property
interests, state laws that preempt local rejection of LULUs, and the reali-
ties of local land use politics limit these tools. Nonetheless, they can be
effective when used by a politically active and "negotiation-savvy"
neighborhood group with a vision for the local community.
Although this article represents a different way of thinking about
environmental justice than the current literature and many activists de-
scribe, it does not offer any panaceas or comprehensive answers to envi-
ronmental injustice. Many communities are looking for milagros (mira-
cles). Much of the current literature about environmental justice demon-
strates that no single legal or political strategy will solve the underlying
problems. Similarly, land use planning and regulation will not solve the
multiple, complex problems behind environmental justice concerns: ra-
cism; class inequities; land market dynamics; limited natural, human, and
financial resources; the failure of humans to be good environmental
stewards; the limits of our legal and political systems; greed; envy; and
malice. Land use planning and regulation should be one of several
mechanisms we can use as we struggle to learn and embrace what is
good and right.
II. ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AS A REACTION TO ENVIRONMENTAL
INJUSTICE
The range of responses to environmental injustice in the United
Statese reflects the variety of conceptions of environmental justice, as
19. Qualitative evidence consists of facts and data that are not quantitative. This evidence may
include histories (or narratives) of specific communities' problems or legal and political struggles,
the results of in-depth interviews, and descriptions of people, groups, events, and the like. See dis-
cussion infra Parts IV.C.1-5.
20. Although environmental injustice and justice have important international dimensions, this
article concentrates solely on environmental injustice and justice in the United States. The impact of
U.S. laws and policies on U.S. communities receives more in-depth treatment here than would be
possible if the article had included the global perspective. For discussions of international environ-
mental justice issues, see Dana Alston & Nicole Brown, Global Threats to People of Color, in
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well as the complexity of the issues. This article is about the siting of
LULUs, which is a major issue in low-income and minority communi-
ties, a core focus of the environmental justice movement, and is ripe for
new ideas about harm prevention, especially through land use planning
and regulation. However, an initial background about environmental
justice, in its wide diversity and complexity, aids understanding of the
relevant land use issues.
There is confusion about the exact nature of environmental harms or
burdens that are distributed inequitably. Exposure to toxic or hazardous
substances has received the greatest attention among scholars and activ-
ists.' This exposure not only comes from neighborhood facilities, like
hazardous waste incinerators, petrochemical refineries, lead smelters,
solid waste landfills, and radioactive waste disposal sites, but also from
lead in home pipes and paint, pesticides in fields where farmworkers
work, urban automobile and stationary source emissions that pollute in-
ner city air, and fish from local waters that contain toxic pollutants.'
Others have focused on the siting of locally unwanted land uses in
low-income and minority neighborhoods. 3 The environmental justice
scholar or activist who focuses on LULUs is less concerned with evi-
dence of actual health effects or exposure to known harmful substances
than with the actual siting of land uses that pose risks either to the health
CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM, supra note 3, at 179, 179-94; Harvey Alter, Halting the
Trade in Recyclable Wastes Will Hurt Developing Countries, in AT ISSUE: ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE 108 (Jonathan Petrikin ed., 1995); John Bellamy Foster, The Global Policies of the United
States Are Environmentally Unjust, in AT ISSUE: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, supra, at 100; Richard
D. Glick, Environmental Justice in the United States: Implications of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, 19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 69 (1995).
21. See, e.g., BULLARD, DUMPING IN DXIE, supra note 7, at 1-21; Austin & Schill, supra note
6, at 69; Bullard, Anatomy, supra note 9, at 15, 26-29 & tbl. (focusing on industrial toxins, air
pollution, and water pollution as byproducts of landfills, pollution by industry, and hazardous waste
treatment); Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 621-31; George Friedman-Jiminez, M.D., Achiev-
ing Environmental Justice: The Role of Occupational Health, 21 FORDHAM URB. Li. 605 (1994);
Marion Moses, Farmworkers and Pesticides, in CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM, supra
note 3, at 161.
Hazardous substances are materials that present a threat to human health or the environment.
See 42 U.S.C. § 6903(B)(5) (1994). They are often ignitable, corrosive, chemically reactive, toxic, or
explosive. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.20-.24 (1997) (providing the regulatory definition of the character-
istics of hazardous waste). Substances are toxic if low levels of exposure to them cause adverse
human health or environmental effects, including cancer, damage to the cardiovascular and respira-
tory systems, neurological disorders, and reproductive damage. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL,
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POUCY 463-64 (2d ed. 1996).
22. See sources cite supra note 21.
23. See, e.g., MANASTER, supra note 6, at 153-239-, Been, LULUs, supra note 6; Bullan,
Environmental Equity, supra note 7, at 6; Robert D. Bullard, Residential Segregation and Urban
Quality of ife, in ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE. ISSUES, POUCIES, AND SOLUTIONS 76-77, supra note
7 [hereinafter Bullard, Residential Segregation]; Centner et al., supra note 7, at 128-30. But see
Robertson, supra note 6, at 139 (arguing that, compared to existing sources of pollution and envi-
ronmental harm, very few new polluting facilities are sited in minority and low-income neighbor-
hoods).
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and safety of the residents or to the quality of neighborhood life.2 Thus,
while hazardous waste incinerators and toxic dumps are both LULUs and
sources of exposure to hazardous substances, an emphasis on the distri-
bution of LULUs would not include workplace exposures to toxins but
would include the siting of prisons, group homes, non-toxic but noisy or
unsightly industrial facilities, freeways, and other land uses unwanted by
the surrounding neighbors. 2
Some environmental justice activists and scholars look at the envi-
ronmental harm as the degradation or exploitation of natural resources,
such as the impact of industrial mining and timbering on Hispanic farm-
ers and ranchers in southern Colorado, the impact of water policy on
people of color,' and the limited access of low-income and minority
people to public beaches.' Others believe that any exposure to risk of
environmental harm is itself a type of harm. They reject risk management
and distribution, and instead call for the elimination of pollution alto-
gether." The final "environmental harm" that receives attention is proc-
ess-oriented: the real harm is the lack of full participation, information,
and self-determination for low-income and minority communities in en-
vironmental decision making."
To some degree, these various ideas about environmental harm are
not mutually exclusive. In fact, the First Annual People of Color Envi-
ronmental Leadership Summit's Principles of Environmental Justice
24. See, e.g., Bullard, Residential Segregation, supra note 23, at 7645.
25. See Been, Fairness, supra note 6, at 1001-06.
26. See, e.g., Devon Peia & Joseph Gallegos, Nature and Chicanos in Southern Colorado, in
CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM, supra note 3, at 141 (examining the environmental,
economic, and sociological impact of strip-mining in Colorado's San LIis Valley); James Brooke, In
a Colorado Valley, Hispanic Farmers Try to Stop a Tinber Baron, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1997, at
A10 (describing the protest of a group of Hispanic Colorado residents to a proposed logging opera-
tion which potentially threatens area farmers' access to water through increased soil erosion and
earlier snow melt).
27. See, e.g., SANTOS V. GOMEz & ARLENE K. WONG, PACFIC INST. FOR STuDIES IN DEv.,
ENV'T, & SEC., OUR WATER, OuR FUTuRE: TiE NEED FOR NEw VOICES IN CALIFORNIA WATER
POUCY I (Working Paper No. 97-02, 1997) (commissioned by EDGE: The Alliance of Ethnic and
Environmental Organizations) (discussing concerns of people of color with respect to California
water rights).
28. See, e.g., Marc R. Poirier, Environmental Justice and the Beach Access Movement of the
1970s in Connecticut and New Jersey: Stories of Property and Civil Rights, 28 CONN. L. REV. 719,
745-47,811-12 (1996).
29. See, e.g., SZASZ, supra note 7, at 137; Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 644; First
Nat'l People of Color Envtl. Justice Leadership Summit, Principles of Environmental Justice, RAC
POVERTY, & ENV'T, Fall 1991, at 31-32 [hereinafter People of Color, Principles of Environmental
Justice]; Gauna, supra note 6, at 27.
30. See Bullard, Anatomy, supra note 9, at 18-19, Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 628,
646, 674-79; Gauna, supra note 6, at 27-29; People of Color, Principles of Environmental Justice,
supra note 29, at 31; Reich, supra note 6, at 277. But see Naikang Tsao, Ameliorating Racism: A
Citizen's Guide to Combating the Discriminatory Siting of Toxic Waste Dumps, 67 N.Y.U. L REV.
366, 368-78 (criticizing process-oriented approaches to addressing environmental injustice).
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contains all of them.3 ' However, those who speak and write about envi-
ronmental justice should be scrupulously clear about what problems they
are discussing. Indiscriminate inclusiveness tends to confuse the dis-
course, with different people talking about different problems under the
overly-broad truism that societal racism and classism result in many
harms to minorities and the poor. More importantly, the same response
may not be appropriate for different types of harms. For example,
changes in landfill siting processes to involve potentially affected neigh-
borhoods will do little to affect the impact of existing landfills on the
neighborhoods in which they exist." Pollution prevention strategies will
not necessarily resolve over-exploitation of natural resources harming
low-income communities or communities of color. Therefore, although
many types of environmental harms deserve attention, this article focuses
on the siting of LULUs. Many of the controversies receiving the most
attention from activists, media, government, and scholars concern pro-
posed new or modified toxic land uses in close proximity to the homes of
people of color and low-income people.
There is also confusion about what the environmental justice
movement is trying to achieve. Environmental justice has elements of
both environmentalism and civil rights. Merely labeling the environ-
mental justice movement as the juncture of grassroots environmentalism
and the civil rights movement, however, reveals very little about the
goals and strategies of environmental justice advocates. With respect to
the definition of goals, noted environmental justice scholar Vicki Been
has pointed out that valence terms like "fairness" are vague and general.'
Behind calls for "fairness," "justice," and "equity" are divergent concep-
tions about what is fair, just, and equitable." Furthermore, some in the
environmental justice movement have argued not for fairness in the dis-
tribution of environmental harms, but for the elimination of the risk of
environmental harm for all people-a universal human right to live,
work, and play in communities without exposure to environmental
31. People of Color, Principles of Environmental Justice, supra note 29, at 32; see Omar
Saleem, Overcoming Environmental Discrimination: The Need for a Disparate Impact Test and
Improved Notice Requirements in Facility Siting Decisions, 19 COLUM. J. ENVrL. L. 211, 216-17
(1994) (discussing the First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit).
32. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 6, at 158 (arguing that existing sources of pollution am
often exempted from tougher new environmental laws).
33. Binder, supra note 6, at 163, 163 (recognizing "the coalescence of the environmental and
civil rights movements in the overlapping ara of environmental justice"); Cole, Litigation, supra
note 4, at 523-26; Steven Paul McSloy, Closing Remarks, Breaking the Power of the Power Bro-
kers, 9 ST. JoHN's J. LEGAL CoMEN. 669, 670 (1994). However, for an argument that the envi-
ronmental justice movement, while drawing on both environmental and civil rights movements, must
necessarily emerge as a distinctly different movement, see Poirier, supra note 28, at 800-02. For an
argument that the environmental justice movement and the mainstream environmental movement
must integrate, see A. Dan Tarlock, City Versus Countryside: Environmental Equity in Context, 21
FORDHAM URB. LJ. 461 (1994).
34. Been, Fairness, supra note 6, at 1007.
35. Id.
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risks. ' Thus, thinking of environmental justice as environmentalist civil
rights does not identify whether the goal is to prevent identifiable racism
or classism in environmental decision making, or to correct past racism
or classism, or to prevent or correct disparate impacts across race or
class, or to ensure full access of minorities and the poor to decision
making, or to prevent or eliminate pollution, or any number of other pos-
sible goals. For example, Richard Lazarus states the environmental jus-
tice problem as one of unequal distribution of the burdens and benefits of
environmental protection policy!' In contrast, Been focuses on seven
different, and likely competing, theories about the fairness of the sub-
stantive inputs, substantive outputs (i.e., results), and process of LULU
siting decisions. Peter Reich urges three principles to eliminate envi-
ronmental racism: (1) "the equality principle," which would protect mi-
norities from disproportionate exposure to environmental hazards; (2)
"the access principle," which would remove or minimize barriers to pub-
lic participation in environmental decision making; and (3) "the commu-
nity preservation principle," which would recognize and avoid the dis-
ruption and psychological stress of minority neighborhoods stemming
from proximity to environmental hazards.' Many different goals and
theories exist.
With respect to the identification of strategies, the term "civil
rights" is equally unhelpful. The civil rights movement historically has
organized communities, engaged in political protest and civil disobedi-
ence, lobbied for public benefits, participated in policy formulation, im-
plementation and enforcement, educated the public, and pressured pri-
vate economic actors.' Civil rights strategies are litigated under a wide
36. See Cole, Empowermen, supra note 4, at 644-45; People of Color, Principles of Envi-
ronmental Justice, supra note 29, at 3 1-2.
37. Lazarus, supra note 6, at 793.
38. Been identifies seven different possible theories about fairness in the siting of LULUs:
First, fair siting could mean that LULUs are evenly apportioned among all neighbor-
hoods. Second, fair siting might mean that neighborhoods in which a LULU is not sited
must compensate the host community for its damages. Third, fairness could require "pro-
gressive siting," in which wealthier neighborhoods reeive a greater number of LULUs,
or pay a greater share of a host community's damages, than poor or minority neighbor-
hoods. Fourth, fairness could demand that all communities receive an equal number of
vetoes that they could use to bid against other communities for the privilege of excluding
a LULU. Fifth, fair siting might require that those who benefit from a LULU bear its
cost. Sixth, fairness could simply require that the siting process involve no intentional
discrimination against people of color. Seventh, fair siting could require a process that
shows equal concern and respect for all neighborhoods.
Been, Fairness, supra note 6, at 1008 (footnotes omitted).
39. Reich, supra note 6, at 287-90.
40. See generally THOMAS R. BROOKS, WALLS COME TUMBLING DOWN: A HISTORY OF THE
CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 1940-1970 (1974) (describing events in the history of the African Ameri-
can civil rights movement); THE EYES ON THE PRIZE: CIVIL RIGHTS READER (Claybome Carson et
al. eds., 1991) (compiling original materials and personal narratives from participants of the black
freedom struggle).
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range of theories-federal and state, constitutional and statutory." Just as
there is no single civil rights strategy, there is no single environmental
justice strategy.
What, then, are the primary conceptions of environmental justice?
This article groups the conceptions generally into five categories: (A)
evidentiary, (B) power, (C) legal, (D) environmental, and (E) economic.
Despite the differences among the categories, all constitute ways of
thinking about environmental justice as a response or reaction to existing
or imminent injustice. These responses are, respectively, (A) to study the
distribution and causes of environmental injustices, (B) to engage in po-
litical activism, (C) to use the law to protect the rights of the subordi-
nated, (D) to increase or improve enforcement of environmental laws,
and (E) to use market mechanisms to correct market inequities.
A. Study Responses (Evidentiary Conceptions)
Some view the problem of environmental injustice as an evidentiary
question.' Under this conception, the first steps to addressing environ-
mental justice are to identify and document its existence and its causes.
What reliable evidence do we have that environmental benefits and bur-
dens are distributed inequitably according to race and class in the United
States? Are the inequities greater according to race or to class or to some
combination of the two? What are the causes of these inequitable distri-
butions? When do the injustices arise? Are the causes contextual, varying
from case to case, hazard to hazard, or neighborhood to neighborhood?
41. See generally ROY L. BROOKS ELt AL., CIVIL RIGHTS LmGATION: CASES AND
PERSPECTIVES (1995) (documenting issues from several sociological perspectives on civil rights
litigation).
42. See, e.g., GAO REJOR'r, supra note 5 (presenting data on the correlation between race,
income and the location of hazardous waste landfills in the EPA's Region ); RACE AND
INCIDENCE, supra note 7 (compiling fourteen articles assessing statistical data regarding race, pov-
erty and the occurrence of environmental hazards); UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST REPORT, supra note
3, at xii-xiv (presenting findings from two studies on the correlation between demographic patterns
and commercial and non-commercial waste sites); Been, LULUs, supra note 6, at 1384-86 (asserting
that research showing a correlation between hazardous waste site selection based on race and/or
class discrimination fails to consider evidence relating to market dynamics affecting communities
hosting locally undesirable land uses); Been & Gupta, Coming to the Nuisance, supra note 6, at 9
(analyzing evidence of race and class composition in areas where locally undesirable land use sites
are located); Bullard, Environmental Equity, supra note 7, at 324-27 (arguing that empirical evi-
dence establishes a relationship between environmental inequity and race); Bullard, Race and Envi-
ronmental Justice, supra note 7, at 319-27 (expanding on the argument presented in Bullan, Envi-
ronmental Equity, supra note 7, that communities with large minority populations are victimized by
environmental racism); Mohai & Bryant, Race, Poverty & Distribution, supra note 7, at 3, 24-27;
Mohai & Bryant, Weighing Race & Class, supra note 7, at 921-32 (assessing data relating to haz-
ardous waste siting as it correlates to race and/or income). Those who think of environmental injus-
tice as something to study could include scholars whose livelihoods depend on studying social
phenomena, the curious, those who delay action by appointing committees and commissioning
studies, believers in the power of information and education to achieve social change, and instru-
mentalists who seek to use the data in responsive actions. Nonetheless, study is a response to envi-
ronmental injustice as much as litigation, lobbying, protesting, or negotiating.
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Those who ask these questions typically have three purposes in
mind. First, well-documented evidence of inequitable distribution of en-
vironmental harms is useful in responding to and resisting these prob-
lems. For example, studies may be used as evidence of disparate impact
in civil rights litigation, support for legislation or regulatory policies,
documentation of reasons for denying a permit, indication of a need for
tougher enforcement of existing regulations, or information for members
of a community about the problems and risks they face. Second, precise
identification of the cause(s) of environmental injustice will inherently
suggest which strategies might be the most effective in remedying and
preventing the injustices. Third, study of environmental injustice adds
much to our understanding of the rather murky juncture of the streams of
environmental regulation, market dynamics, and racism and civil rights.
1. Early Studies
One of the most significant early distributional studies arose after
civil rights protests against a decision to locate a polychlorinated by-
phenyl (PCB) landfill in mostly African American Warren County, North
Carolina.c The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) undertook an
investigation of the distribution of the four major hazardous waste land-
fills in the Southeast." The GAO found that of the four offsite hazardous
waste landfills ' in the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's)
eight-state Region IV," three were in communities in which African
Americans were a majority of the population. At the time, only about
one-fifth of the population of Region IV was African American.' In ad-
dition, the percentage of people below the poverty level in these four
communities ranged from twenty-six percent to forty-two percent."
The GAO study, although the first of its kind, was quite limited in
both geography and type of environmental hazard: four major hazardous
waste landfills in eight states. In 1986, the United Church of Christ's
Commission for Racial Justice undertook a significant, agenda-setting
national study of demographic patterns associated with commercial haz-
43. GAO REPORT, supra note 5. at 2.
44. Id. The landfills addressed in the GAO Report consist of the following sites: Chemical
Waste Management, Sumter County, Alabama; industrial Chemical Company, Chester County,
South Carolina; SCA Services, Sumter County, South Carolina; and Warren County PCB Landfill,
North Carolina. ld.
45. Offsite landfills are those that are not part of or contiguous to an industrial facility. See id.
at 1.
46. Region IV encompasses Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Caro-
lina, South Carolina, and Tennessee.
47. Id. The percentages of African Americans in the censs-identified townships or subdivi-
sions where the landfills were located were 90% (Sumter County, Ala.), 66% (Chester County,
S.C.), 52% (Sumter County, S.C.), and 38% (Warren County, N.C.). Id. at 4.
48. Bullard, Environmental Equity, supra note 7. at 8.
49. GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 4.
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ardous waste facilities and uncontrolled toxic waste sites." The study,
issued in 1987, found that three out of every five African Americans and
Hispanic Americans nationwide were living in communities with uncon-
trolled toxic waste sites.," Race was the most significant variable in the
distribution of commercial hazardous waste facilities, more important
than home ownership rates, income, and property values:
Communities with the greatest number of commercial hazardous
waste facilities had the highest composition of racial and ethnic resi-
dents. In communities with two or more facilities or one of the na-
tion's five largest landfills, the average minority percentage of the
population was more than three times that of communities without fa-
cilities (38 percent vs. 12 percent).52
Predominantly African American or Hispanic communities contained
three out of the five largest commercial hazardous waste landfills in the
United States, accounting for an estimated forty percent of the total
commercial landfill capacity nationwide.'
2. Additional Studies
The United Church of Christ Report called for more epidemiologi-
cal and demographic research on the distribution of environmental haz-
ards.' and many have responded." Several significant law review articles
have listed and summarized the large number of studies documenting the
racial and class distribution of environmental hazards and/or LULUs."
The studies cover hazards such as air pollution, lead poisoning, noise
pollution, pesticide exposure, rat bites, solid waste landfills, toxic and
hazardous waste sites (including landfills; treatment, storage, and dis-
posal facilities; and incinerators), toxic fish consumption, workplace
hazards, and occupational disease.' Some studies analyze national or
50. UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST REPORT, supra note 3, at xiii.
51. Id. at xiv.
52. id. at xiii (footnote omitted). Even in communities with one commercial hazardous waste
facility, there were, on average, twice as many minority people as in communities that did not have
any such facility. Id.
53. Id. at xiv.
54. Id. at xvi.
55. See infra Part IV.C.1-5. In addition, the United Church of Christ Commission for Racial
Justice revisited its report in 1994, using data updated to 1993 from the 1990 census, and found
essentially the same disproportionately high percentages of minorities in areas with hazanous waste
facilities. See BENJAMIN A. GOLDMAN & LAURA FITION, Toxic WASTES AND RACE REVISITED: AN
UPDATE OF THE 1987 REPORT ON RACIAL AND SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF
COMMUNrnES WITH HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES at i (1994).
56. See Been & Gupta, Coming to the Nuisance, supra note 6, at 4-5 & n.14; Cole,
Empowerment, supra note 4, at 622-30 & nn.8-18, 27; Mohai & Bryant, Weighing Race & Class,
supra note 7, at 926 & tbl. (listing studies).
57. See Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 622-24; Mohai & Bryant, Weighing Race &
Class, supra note 7, at 926 & tbl.1 (listing studies analyzing types of environmental hazards and
their correlation to race and class). Bunyan Bryant also argues that communities of color and low-
income communities get less than their fair share of (research) money, and that the working poor
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multi-city data, others analyze distributional data for particular metro-
politan areas," and still others provide detail-rich, contextual case studies
of particular communities that face high burdens of environmental harms
or LULUs.w
Among the national studies, the United Church of Christ Report
documented the location of commercial hazardous waste sites and un-
controlled toxic waste sites, which pose both a risk of exposure to haz-
ardous or toxic substances and a risk of actual harm to health!' In con-
trast, other national studies have documented actual exposure to health-
related environmental harm. For example, data from the National Health
and Nutrition Examination Survey showed that the percentage of African
American children, six months to five years old, with elevated blood lead
levels was six times higher than that of white children of the same ages.'
The percentage of children whose families' annual incomes were under
$6,000 and who had elevated blood lead levels was between two and
have less health care insurance protection proportionate to the amount of toxic-induced or -
aggravated health problems they suffer. Bunyan Bryant, Issues and Potential Policies and Solutions
for Environmental Justice: An Overview, in ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: ISSUES, POUCIES, AND
SOLUIroNs, supra note 7, at 8, 8.
58. See, e.g., UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST REPORT, supra note 3,at 18-21 & fig.A-I & tbl.B-8
(analyzing data from several cities around the United States); Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle,
Unequal Protection: The Racial Divide in Environmental Law, A Special Investigation, NAT'L LJ.,
Sept. 21, 1992, at SI (examining how federal environmental law has reacted to polluters in predomi-
nantly minority and/or low-income communities throughout the United States); Mahaffey et al.,
supra note 7, at 573 (reporting findings of blood lead levels in children relative to race and family
income from sixty-four sampling areas across the United States).
59. See, e.g., ERIC MANN, LA.'s LETHAL Ati: NEw STRATmGIEs FOR POuCY, ORGANIZING,
AND ACTION (1991) (focusing on environmental hazards in Los Angeles, California); Bullan, Solid
Waste, supra note 7; Paul Mohai & Bunyan Bryant, Environmental Racism: Reviewing the Evidence,
in RACE AND INCIDENCE supra note 7, at 163, 169-74 (presenting evidence from a Detroit area case
study on environmental racism); Patrick C. West, Invitation to Poison? Detroit Minorities and Toxic
Fish Consumption from the Detroit River, in RACE AND INCIDENCE, supra note 7, at 96-97 (assess-
ing environmental hazards in Detroit potentially caused by "greening" the Detroit River waterfront);
Patrick C. West et al., Minority Anglers and Toxic Fish Consumption: Evidence from a Statewide
Survey of Michigan, in RACE AND INCIDENCE, supra note 7, at 100-12 (discussing minority expo-
sure to contaminated fish in the Detroit River).
60. See, e.g., BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE, supra note 7, at 45-78 (presenting case studies
assessing environmental disputes and resolution methods in five predominantly black communities,
Bullard, Race and Environmental Justice, supra note 7, at 329-33 (discussing an incinerator in Los
Angeles and a lead smelter in Dallas); Marcia Coyle, Say "No" to Cancer Alley, NAT'L L., Sept.
21, 1992, at S5 (examining environmental hazards in Wallace, Louisiana, a poor community of 750
residents, 98% of which are African American); Seth Mydans, Tribe Smells Sludge and Bureaucrats,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20,1994, at A8 (reporting on a sewage sludge dump on the Tones Martinez Desert
Cahuilla Indian Reservation). See generally UNEQUAL PROTECTION, supra note 3 (compiling articles
examining race, income and the distribution of environmental hazards); Moya, supra note 6, at 221-
26 (identifying and examining environmental injustices in eleven communities across the United
States).
61. UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST REPORT, supra note 3, at xii.
62. Mahaffey, supra note 7, at 573,578.
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four times higher than for children of the same race whose families' an-
nual incomes were over $6,000.'
A further contrasting nationwide study, the National Law Journal
study," focused not on exposure to pollutants or siting of hazards, but on
government enforcement of environmental laws designed to reduce risk
of exposure and risk of harm among already-sited facilities that contain
or emit pollutants. The study found, among other facts:
Penalties under hazardous waste laws at sites having the greatest
white population were 500 percent higher than penalties at sites with
the greatest minority population.... For all the federal laws aimed at
protecting citizens from air, water, and waste pollution, penalties in
white communities were 46 percent higher than in minority commu-
nities.... Under the giant Superfund cleanup program, abandoned
hazardous waste sites in minority areas take 20 percent longer to be
placed on the national priority action list than those in white areas.
A representative local study, Robert Bullard's study of solid waste
disposal facilities in Houston from the late 1920s to the mid-1970s,
found that African American neighborhoods housed more than seventy-
five percent of the city's solid waste disposal facilities." In a case study,
Marcia Coyle described Formosa Plastics Corporation's attempt to locate
a rayon pulp processing plant, in Wallace, Louisiana, that had the capac-
ity to expand to a polyvinyl chloride plant.f Wallace is part of the area
known as "Cancer Alley"--for the large number of polluting chemical
and oil facilities along a 100-mile stretch from New Orleans to Baton
Rouge." This case study is one example of many that identifies the envi-
ronmental hazards which have been or are being sited in specific low-
income and minority communities."
3. Race and Income
One of the most important issues arising in many of the studies is
whether race or income is more significant in the distribution of envi-
ronmental injustice." Race often is the more important factor.7' Mohai
and Bryant have compared twenty-two studies of environmental injustice
63. Id.
64. Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 58, at SI.
65. Id. at S2.
66. ROBERT D. BULLARD, INVISIBLE HOUSTON: THE BLACK EXPERIENCE IN BOOM AND BUST
71-73 (1987) [hereinafter BULLARD, INVISIBLE HOUSTON).
67. Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 58, at S5.
68. See id.
69. See sources cited supra note 58 (referring to case studies focusing on environmental haz-
ards, and race and socioeconomic dynamics within select communities).
70. See sources cited supra note 58 (referring to articles comparing race and income as the
two factors influencing the sitings of environmental hazards).
71. Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 625; see BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE, supra note 7;
Grossman, supra note 9. at 283-92. See generally Foster, supra note 6, at 731-32 (providing a
conceptual background of environmental racism).
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across race and/or income.' Of sixteen studies that examined both race
and class as factors in the distribution of environmental hazards, inequi-
table distribution by race was present in fifteen studies and inequitable
distribution by income was present in thirteen studies." Only ten studies
analyzed which of the two was more important: race was more important
in seven, while income was more important in three.' Six studies ana-
lyzed only one of the factors. Five of these six did not analyze race, of
which four showed inequitable distribution by income. One of the six
studies analyzing only one factor did not analyze income but showed
racial inequities. '
Some have mistakenly treated the question of whether race or in-
come is more important in patterns of environmental injustice as a ques-
tion of causation: 6 It is a question of distribution, more precisely the na-
ture of the distribution, not a question of what causes the distribution. In
other words, just because LULUs are distributed inequitably by race does
not necessarily mean that racism is the cause.
To be sure, inequitable distribution by race tends to support a causal
theory of racism. On the other hand, some might think that inequitable
distribution by class suggests that market dynamics cause environmental
injustice. However, mere correlation of hazards to a particular factor
does not prove that discrimination on the basis of that factor in siting
those hazards caused the inequitable distribution. For example, even if
income were the more important factor, decision makers might be moti-
vated by racism, and may merely use income as a surrogate for race,
either out of a desire to avoid liability for more overt racism or out of a
vague perception that lower income levels often correlate to racial mi-
nority status. Siting by income levels also might reflect class prejudices,
not market dynamics. Even if race were demonstrably more important
than class, environmental injustice might be the result of a subtle mixing
of both racism and classism. Also, inequitable distribution of environ-
mental hazards by race might not be due to racist siting decisions, but
instead the result of segregation and discrimination in housing markets,
72. Mohai & Bryant, Weighing Race & Class, supra note 7, at 926 & tbl.l. Mohai and Bryant
compared only 17 separate studies, but one of these studies covered five separate hazards, each
analyzed for inequitable distribution by race and class and each reported in Mohai & Bryant's table.




76. See, e.g., Bullard, Anatomy, supra note 9, at 21-22 (arguing that racism has created dispa-
rate living conditions); Centner et al., supra note 7, at 125 (asserting that discriminatory siting of
hazardous waste sites is not supported by statistics, and that other factors such as transportation,
housing, jobs and general market dynamics influence siting decisions); Foster, supra note 6, at 728
(arguing that the "Not In My Backyard" syndrome, or public opposition to the siting of locally
unwanted land use sites, has led to a disproportionate number of sitings in predominantly minority
communities).
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existing zoning laws, the combination of lack of mobility (due to housing
discrimination and income levels) and the decline of neighborhoods (due
to discrimination in zoning, municipal services, and lending practices),
past siting decisions which create presumptions that additional hazards
are compatible land uses, lack of political power and voice among certain
racial or ethnic groups, failure or inability of neighborhoods to organize
politically, lack of access to information about environmental or land use
decisions, or the need to be close to work environments (i.e., race differ-
entials in location of employment or transportation alternatives or both).
Even if racial discrimination pervades siting decisions, who is dis-
criminating? Is it the establisher or operator of the facility--perhaps a
private entity? Or the local land use authority? Or perhaps it is the state
environmental regulatory authority? Or the federal environmental regu-
latory authority? What about our political, economic, and social systems,
which are embedded with institutional racism? Maybe it is some combi-
nation of these sources? The distributional studies, while supporting as-
sumptions and fears that environmental racism and classism exist, simply
do not offer concrete, generalizable proof of the causes for the inequita-
ble distribution of environmental harms and LULUs. This observation
does not mean that the racism haunting so many other aspects of our
society is not also present in environmental issues. However, if we are to
remedy and prevent racism, or possibly classism, in environmental deci-
sion making, we need to understand not only its ultimate manifestations
but also its root sources.
4. Methodologies and Controversy
Recent studies, using increasingly sophisticated means of identify-
ing communities and changes in those communities over time, have
called into question some of the more significant distributional studies on
which the environmental justice movement has relied. One of the most
important developments in distributional studies has been to use census
77. We ae likely to understand the causes of environmental injustice only by engaging in
context-specific, detail-rich, longitudinal (i.e., historical, over time) case studies that document all
the factors that have gone into the existence of environmental hazards and LULUs in particular
neighborhoods. The causes are more complex, interrelated, and perhaps insidious than aggregate
data studies can show. For an excellent argument for the need to synthesize generalizable theories
about the impact of law with detailed contextual case studies, see RDBERT C. EWJCKSON, ORDER
WITHOtr LAW 1-11, 137-55 (1991). Ellickson's book is a particularly illuminating example of this
synthesis. Another good example is Nancy Obermeyer's study of the siting of a nuclear power
generating facility adjacent to the Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore. NANCY J. OBERMEYER,
BUREAUCRATS, CLIENTS, AND GEOGRAPHY: THE BAiLLY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT BATTLE IN
NORTHERN INDIANA (1989). She related empirical case study research to organizational theory, Max
Weher's theory of bureaucracy, to show how a regulatory agency is often captured by a powerful
client to ensure the agency's organizational survival but occasionally reacts to an organized public
group to reestablish the agency's public legitimacy. id.; see also Lord & Sutkin, supra note 6, at I
(urging the use of historical study in examining environmental justice burdens and benefits).
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tracts as the unit of analysis, instead of zip codes or concentric circles
around selected sites.'
Census tracts are preferable to zip codes .... Census tracts are drawn
up by local committees, and are intended to reflect the community's
view of where one neighborhood ends and another begins. Zip codes
are drawn to enhance the efficiency of mail delivery; they are not in-
tended to reflect neighborhoods. Concentric circles are unlikely to
bear much relationship to the community's views of its borders,
which are often linked to natural or physical boundaries such as wa-
terways, highways, or major roads.79
Researchers who have used census tracts as the unit of analysis have
raised questions about the United Church of Christ Report. Researchers
at the Social and Demographic Research Institute (SADRI) of the Uni-
versity of Massachusetts examined the racial and socioeconomic charac-
teristics of communities containing commercial hazardous waste facili-
ties, just as the United Church of Christ study did. However, they used
the more community-based census tracts as the unit of analysis, instead
of zip codes, which the United Church of Christ study had used.' The
SADRI study showed that the differences between percentages of Afri-
can Americans in host tracts and percentages of African Americans in
non-host tracts were not higher with any statistical significance.' The
percentage of Hispanics was important, although employment in industry
was the most significant predictor of whether a tract contained a waste
site.' Thus, the SADRI analysis contradicts the United Church of Christ
analysis." Vicki Been, however, examined both studies, and using logis-
tical analysis of census tracts and controlling for population density,
found that the percentages of minorities, employment in manufacturing,
and unemployment percentages were each significant factors in predict-
ing the presence of a waste site. " The Been study, therefore, reached
different results than the SADRI study.
Researchers at the University of Chicago's Irving B. Harris Gradu-
ate School of Public Policy Studies have also discovered that studies of
78. See Been, Analyzing Evidence, supra note 6, at 4-5; Been & Gupta, Coming to the Nui-
sance, supra note 6, at 10-13; Paul Mohai, The Demographics of Dumping Revisited: Examining the
Impact of Alternate Methodologies in Environmental Justice Research, 14 VA. ENvTL LJ. 615,
618-19 (1995); Rae Zimmerman, Issues of Classification in Environmental Equity: How We Man-
age Is How We Measure, 21 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 633, 652 (1994); John Fahsbender, Note, An
Analytical Approach to Defining the Affected Neighborhood in the Environmental Justice Context, 5
N.Y.U. ENVTL. LJ. 120-121, 131. 138 (1996).
79. Been & Gupta, Coming to the Nuisance, supra note 6. at 11-12.
80. Andy B. Anderson et al., Environmental Equity: Evaluating TSDF Siting over the Past
Two Decades, WAsTE AGe, July 1994, at 84.
81. Id. at88.
82. Id. at 88-90.
83. But see Been, Analyzing Evidence, supra note 6, at 4 & n.18 (noting criticisms of SADRI
research).
84. Id. at 5-6.
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Chicago census tracts with Superfund list sites (CERCLIS' sites),
RCRA"6 treatment, storage and disposal (TSD) facility sites, RCRA haz-
ardous waste generators, and historical hazardous waste sites did not
confirm traditional assumptions about the location of environmental haz-
ards in African American neighborhoods.' Although historical solid
waste sites, primarily historical landfills, tended to exist in African
American neighborhoods in 1990, hazardous sites (CERCLIS and
RCRA) were not located in predominantly African American areas." In
1990, all waste sites, including hazardous sites were in areas with higher
percentages of Hispanics, lower population densities, and proximity to
highways and waterways." According to the authors, most of the His-
panic neighborhoods with waste sites had increases in Hispanic popula-
tion after the sites were already located in those neighborhoods. Also
significantly contrary to traditional assumptions, most of the waste sites
in 1990 were located in higher income, not lower income, areas.' The
authors attributed this fact to recent redevelopment of warehouse areas
for loft apartments and condominiums for affluent professionals wishing
to live near the river!' In fact, the Chicago study also examined the char-
acteristics of neighborhoods with waste sites in 1960, and found that
waste sites, particularly hazardous waste sites, were located at that time
in census tracts with lower median household income, low population
density, and proximity to commercial waterways." The sites in 1960 af-
fected African American communities only to the extent that they were
lower-income neighborhoods." "Environmental injustice in 1960 pre-
dominantly took the form of locating industrial areas in poorer commu-
nities." However, those areas have become gentrified, resulting in the
counter-intuitive correlation of higher income status and waste sites in
1990.
One of the significant aspects of the Chicago study, other than its
use of census tracts, was its analysis of site location and demographic
data from the past (1960) and comparison of that information to the then
present situation (1990). Vicki Been has contended that one of the weak-
nesses of earlier environmental justice studies was that they did not "es-
tablish that the host communities were disproportionately minority or
85. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Information Sys-
tem. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42
U.S.C. § 9601-9675 (1994 & Supp. 11996).
86. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1994 &
Supp. 111996).
87. Baden & Coursey, supra note 7, at 39-40.




92. Id. at 38.
93. Id. at 25.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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poor at the time the sites were selected." Without longitudinal studies-
studies of the demographics of, and LULU sitings in, particular neigh-
borhoods over time-researchers cannot prove that inequitable distribu-
tions of hazards and LULUs result from racial or class discrimination in
the siting process itself7 Even for studies that prove a correlation be-
tween race or income and the distribution of LULUs, market dynamics
might play a role either instead of or in addition to discriminatory siting
practices." In other words, people of color and low-income people might
move to neighborhoods with LULUs after they are sited there, because
of the availability of cheap housing in those neighborhoods, racial dis-
crimination in housing markets, residential segregation patterns, and
other market forces." In addition, neighborhoods over time might in-
crease in concentrations of minorities or poor people due to the departure
of the most market-mobile residents--"the least poor and those least
subject to discrimination"°°--as the neighborhood declines in environ-
mental quality, zoning, municipal services, and mortgage and investment
lending availability.' Therefore, according to Been, studies must focus
on demographic characteristics of areas at the time that siting decisions
are made, and how those demographic characteristics change after
siting."
Been reexamined the GAO study'" and the Bullard study'" by ana-
lyzing demographic data of the LULU-host neighborhoods prior to the
LULU siting, to the extent that such data was available, and recent
demographic data of those same neighborhoods." She found that LULUs
were sited in communities that were disproportionately minority and
low-income at the time of the siting.'" In the extension of Bullard's
study, Been discovered that the community became even more minority
and low-income over time, suggesting a significant exacerbation of the
siting injustices by market forces." The extension of the GAO study,
however, showed no effect of market forces on the distribution of envi-
ronmental harms and LULUs." Thus, longitudinal analysis confirmed
the burden of the actual siting decisions, not just the LULUs themselves,
on people of color and low-income people.
96. Been, LULUs, supra note 6, at 1384.
97. See id. at 1384-85.
98. Id. at 1385-86, 1388-92.
99. Id. at 1388-89.
100. Id. at 1390.
101. Id. at 1389-90.
102. Id. at 1384-87.
103. GAO REPORT, supra note 5.
104. Bullard, Solid Waste, supra note 7.
105. Been, LULU, supra note 6, at 1386-87, 1398-1406.
106. id. at 1387.
107. id. at 1386-87.
108. Id. at 1398-1406.
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James T. Hamilton of Duke University also evaluated demographics
at the time of hazardous waste processing facility sitings, expansion
plans, and reduction plans in the 1970s and early 1980s.'" He found: (1)
both race and median household income were statistically significant in
predicting sitings of hazardous waste processing facilities; (2) race and
income were not statistically significant in predicting expansion of ex-
isting facilities; (3) facilities were less likely to plan to reduce their ca-
pacity as their counties' minority population increased; and (4) percent-
age of registered voters (a measure of political efficacy) was statistically
significant in predicting expansion and reduction plans,"'
Perhaps the most significant recent study, Vicki Been and Francis
Gupta's Coming to the Nuisance or Going to the Barrios? A Longitudi-
nal Analysis of Environmental Justice Claims,"' used census tracts as the
unit of analysis in longitudinal analysis to isolate siting decisions from
market dynamics. Been and Gupta performed "a nationwide study of the
demographics of the 544 communities that in 1994 hosted active com-
mercial hazardous waste treatment storage and disposal facilities
[TSDFs].""2 Although the areas hosting TSDFs were disproportionately
African American and Hispanic, facilities that began operating between
1970 and 1990 were not disproportionately sited in African American
areas. 3 Thus, while disproportionate siting of TSDFs in African Ameri-
can areas may have happened before 1970, it had not occurred in the
twenty-seven years preceding the Been and Gupta study."'4 The Hispanic
population of an area was statistically significant, however, in predicting
siting from 1970 to 1990."' Furthermore, "the analysis shows that the
very poor are not hosting a disproportionate share of facilities, and in-
deed, that neighborhoods with high levels of poverty appear to repel,
rather than attract, facilities. Instead, it is working class or lower middle
class neighborhoods that bear a disproportionate share of facilities.""
Finally, the results of the study did not support a market dynamic theory,
instead showing that communities did not significantly increase their
percentages of minority or low-income residents after siting."" Thus,
Hispanics, but not African Americans or the poor, bore the burdens of
TSDF sitings in the twenty-seven years preceding the study; African
Americans bore the burdens of living near pre-1970 TSDFs, whether due
to siting or market dynamics; and in the twenty-seven years preceding
109. James T. Hamilton, Politics and Social Costs: Estimating the Impact of Collective Action
on Hazardous Waste Facilities, 24 RAND. J. EcON. 101, 101 (1993). Hamilton used both 1970 and
1980 census data for counties. Id. at I 11.
110. Id. at 106-20.
11i. Been & Gupta, Coming to the Nuisance, supra note 6.
112. Id. at 9.
113. Id. at 9, 30-31.
114. Id. at 32-33.
115. Id. at 9,30-34.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 9,34.
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the study, market dynamics did not play a significant role in the racial or
socioeconomic demographics of communities hosting TSDFs.
5. The Need for More Study
The evidentiary conception, as reflected mostly in distributional
studies, contributes much to both the pursuit and understanding of envi-
ronmental justice. Nonetheless, it is marked by varying results, contro-
versies over methodologies, and inadequate proof of the causes of the
inequities. Much additional study remains to be done.
In addition, many of the studies are reactions either to communities'
complaints about existing hazards and LULUs or to previous studies. Of
course, researchers have every reason to examine claims of inequitable
distributions of waste sites, toxic substances, air pollutants, lead, and the
like. Initial research naturally leads to further research. However, most of
the studies reflect only a single perspective: identification of a particular
hazard or LULU, followed by analysis of the racial and socioeconomic
characteristics of the communities encumbered with that hazard or
LULU. Alternative perspectives would include: (1) identification of par-
ticular neighborhoods by racial and socioeconomic characteristics, fol-
lowed by analysis of all the land use patterns and health risks within
those neighborhoods;" ' (2) qualitative studies of specific siting proc-
esses; (3) historical studies of changes within particular neighborhoods,
perhaps in light of demographic, economic, and political trends;"9 and (4)
qualitative studies of minority and low-income neighborhoods' efforts to
define their communities and the results of those efforts.' In other
words, studies that use the communities, instead of the hazards or LU-
LUs, as the independent variable would supplement existing studies and
may help us understand better the nature, dimensions, and causes of en-
vironmental injustice. They may also help communities identify methods
of achieving long-range land use goals, and not just prevent or remedy
specific projects.
B. Political Activism (Power Conceptions)
1. Environmental Injustice As a Lack of Power
Although distributional studies have not identified the causes of
environmental injustice, many people argue that such injustice is the
result of a lack of power among people of color, low-income people, and
118. See generally discussion nfra Part II.C (detailing such racial and socioeconomic charac-
teristics). For an excellent empirical study of land use patterns in El Paso County colonias along the
Texas-Mexico border, see Jane E. Larson, Free Markets Deep in the Heart of Texas, 84 GEO. LJ.
179(1995).
119. See Lord & Shutkin, supra note 6, at 1.
120. See infra notes 150, 287, 565 and accompanying text.
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their respective communities.'2 ' This lack of power-a result of racism
and classism, lack of financial resources, language barriers, residential
and workplace segregation, and lack of political mobilization--contrib-
utes to environmental injustice in three ways. First, environmental justice
advocates contend that the powerful often exploit the powerlessness of
poor and minority communities by making them the targets of LULUs.' "
Government and industry decision makers conclude that they will re-
ceive less opposition if they put the LULUs in poor and minority neigh-
borhoods than if they put them in more politically active and economi-
cally powerful higher-income, white neighborhoods."n
Second, according to political conception, low-income people and
people of color did not play a part in designing the environmental regu-
latory system, which institutionally discriminates against them.'"' Luke
Cole has identified several features of this system that keep low-income
and minority communities powerless."z The mainstream environmental
movement, composed primarily of lawyers and scientists and over-
whelmingly white and middle-class, emerged as a powerful force in the
late 1960s and early 1970s. ' It was responsible for an extensive array of
environmental legislation'"' that created a complex regulatory process
emphasizing legal and technical expertise.2 In fact, Cole calls the main-
121. See Conner Bailey et al., Environmental Justice ad the Professional, in ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE: ISSUES, POuCIES, AND SOLUTIONS, supra note 7, at 35, 35; Bullard, Anatomy, supra note
9, at 23-24; Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 642-52.
122. CERRELL ASSOCS., CAL. WASTE MANAGEMENT BD., POLITICAL DImcuLEs FACING
WASTE-TO-ENERGY CONVERSION PLANT SITING 17-30 (1984) (identifing types of communities
that are less likely to oppose siting of waste incinerators and recommending selection of sites in
these areas); SZASZ, supra note 7, at 75 ("As facility siting became more difficult in the 1980s, some
policy analysts began to advocate a strategy of siting in communities that are least capable of politi-
cally resisting or most amenable to accepting some form of financial compensation in exchange for
accepting the facility.'); Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 628; Rabin, supra note I (document-
ing the expulsive zoning practice of allowing and encouraging nonresidential uses in minority
neighborhoods); Tsao, supra note 30, at 366-68; Godsil, supra note 6, at 399.
123. The "Not in My Backyard" ("NIMBY") tactics of low-minority, high-income neighbor-
hoods in opposing LULUs may be a significant contribution to placement of LULUs in high-
minority, low-income neighborhoods. See Gauna, supra note 6, at 32-33; Robert Mata, Hazardous
Waste Facilities and Environmental Equity: A Proposed Siting Model, 4 FORDHAM URB. U. 375,
391 (1994).
124. See Bullard, Residential Segregation, supra note 23, at 78; Cole, Empowerment, supra
note 4, at 636-39.
125. Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 639-41.
126. See Bullard, Anatomy, supra note 9, at 22; Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 635-36,
640; Decohn Ferris & David Hahn-Baker, Environmentalists and Environmental Justice Policy, in
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSnCE: ISSUES, POLICIES, AND SOLUTIONS, supra note 7, at 66,69-72.
127. See generally JOHN P. DwYER & MARIKA F. BERGSUND, FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAWS ANNOTATED (1994) (illustrating the large amount of environmental legislation enacted in the
last three decades).
128. Emphasis on legal and technical issues can hide the political nature of the issues and
discourage participation from those with very real personal and political stakes but little legal or
technical expertise. Bailey et al., supra note 121, at 44. "Legal and technical debates are the forte of
the professional, but are of secondary importance to strengthening the voice of affected communi-
ties." Id.; see Bullard, Anatomy, supra note 9, at 22, Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 635-36.
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stream environmental movement the "legal-scientific movement."'" He
argues that not only did the major environmental law groups ignore and
exclude members of grassroots communities, but they also launched a
system that was highly inaccessible to the non-lawyer and non-
scientist. '"°
The environmental regulatory system has institutionalized the power
of the mainstream national environmental groups, such as the Natural
Resources Defense Council, Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund (formerly
known as the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund), and the Environmental
Defense Fund. "' These groups are major power brokers in negotiations
with government and industry over environmental legislation, regula-
tions, and permits. They have also shaped environmental law through
litigation.'" As Cole writes: "Lawsuits are now the primary, and some-
times only, strategy employed by mainstream groups. '' 3
According to critics of the mainstream environmental groups, these
groups have exercised their power without representing or including the
perspectives of grassroots activists in poor and minority communities.
The legal-scientific movement has emphasized protecting nature with its
aesthetic, recreational, and biological values, whereas people at the
grassroots want to emphasize protecting humans and human communi-
ties." The legal-scientific movement has also remained narrowly focused
on environmental matters, whereas low-income people and people of
color see environmental problems as part of a larger social justice
agenda."" The resulting regulatory system attempts to control pollution
129. Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 635,642.
130. Bullard, Anatomy, supra note 9, at 22; see Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 636-38.
131. See Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 634-36.
132. Id. at 636.
133. Id. Nonetheless, some groups like Greenpeace or the Nature Conservancy could be con-
sidered "mainstream" environmental groups, but do not rely heavily on litigation to achieve their
goals.
134. Id. at 639-40; see also Bulard, Anatomy, supra note 9, at 22. The conflict between tradi-
tional environmental goals and social justice goals was highlighted by California Supreme Court
Justice Tobriner when he referred to "the conflict between the environmental protectionists and the
egalitarian humanists; a collision between the forces that would save the benefits of nature and those
that would preserve the opportmity of people in general to settle." Associated Home Builders v.
City of Livermore, 557 P.2d 473, 488 (Cal. 1976) (reviewing validity of a no-growth voter initia-
tive).
135. See Bullard, Anatomy, supra note 9, at 23-24; Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 640-
41; Gauna, supra note 6, at 27-29. One powerful example is the BFI recycling plant in the primarily
Hispanic Gardens neighborhood on the Eastside of Austin. Not only does a neighborhood of color
disproportionately bear the cost of recycling (including rats, roaches, blowing paper, noise, traffic,
and a plant fire), but it bears the costs of environmental degradation as well: In Eastside, community
groups strongly supported environmentalists' initiatives to protect water quality. Later, however, the
environmentalists did not come to the support of the Eastside residents. Kayte VanScoy, Residents Say
Recycling Plants Constitute Enviro-racLsm: Eastsiders Decry BFI (visited Nov. 10, 1998)
<htp://www.auschron.com/isRndvol6/issue39/pols.council.html>. Furthermore, some environmental
groups have blamed immigrant groups for US. environmental problems, exploiting legitimate con-
cerns about environmental protection to spread racist and xenophobic fears. Immigration and Envi-
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through technology and risk assessment: polluting facilities use tech-
nologies to reduce emissions of harmful pollutants to levels that scien-
tific experts and political policy makers decide pose a sufficiently low
risk to human health." In contrast, environmental justice advocates,
skeptical of decisions about how much pollution is "safe," seek pollution
prevention: elimination or prohibition of pollution so that there is no risk
to human health.' " The environmental regulatory system attempts to
control polluters through law: regulation and litigation." However, many
low-income and minority people distrust the law, have very little access
to the legal system, and do not have the special expertise that environ-
mental law emphasizes."' Reliance on legal solutions tends to disem-
power subordinated communities and people, who may come to depend
on lawyers, let lawyers control their struggle, and ignore needed commu-
nity organizing by relying on litigation." Reliance on legal solutions also
tends to ignore the larger power dimensions of the problem: "Using a
legal strategy, rather than a political one, would likely fail these commu-
nities: a legal victory does not change the political and economic power
relations in the community that led to the environmental threat in the first
place.''
Environmental justice advocates perceive that the traditional envi-
ronmental regulatory system has worked all too well."'4 The system views
the cause of pollution as a "single bad actor," whose pollution exceeds
socially acceptable levels and therefore must be controlled through
regulation and civil and criminal enforcement." However, environmental
justice advocates believe that the normal operation of U.S. political, so-
cial, and economic systems produces pollution.'" They point to the le-
gality of pollution that does not exceed legislated (or regulated) levels,
the lack of effective civil rights tools to challenge institutional biases,
ronment Campaign Factsheet #4, E-mail from Political Ecology Group to Conference "env.justice"
(Jan. 7, 1997) (on file with author).
136. Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 644. Science and technology am heavily value-
laden. Bunyan Bryant argues that scientific researh is often detertmined by a political economy in
which governments and corporations, but not local communities, set the agendas. Bryant, supra note
57, at 11-13. Professional and technical people have a vested interest in pollution control strategies
that emphasize risk management and risk assessment Id. at 15-23. He also notes that the govern-
ment often will not regulate a substance at a particular level unless it has scientific proof that the
substance causes harm to human health. Id. at 9-10. Scientific certainty and proof of causality are
policy requirements that are used to rationalize government inaction, but people of color and low-
income people are "the recipients of uncertainty." Id. at 9-11.
137. Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 644-45; see also SzAsZ, supra note 7, at 137; Bry-
ant, supra note 57, at 9-12 (urging a more precautionary principle of protecting health even in the
absence of scientific certainty and proof that substances harm health).
138. Cole, Enpowerment, supra note 4, at 635-36.
139. Id. at 635-36, 647-48, 650-51.
140. Id. at 649-54.
141. Id. at 648-49.
142. See id. at 643.
143. Id. at 642.
144. Id. at 642-43; see also Bryant, supra note 57, at 15-23.
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and the effectiveness of many high- and middle-income, white neighbor-
hoods in using environmental laws to keep out LULUs, which then are
located in low-income, minority neighborhoods.' " Thus, Cole argues, the
environmental regulatory system perpetuates political inequity and
causes environmental injustice.146
Third, low-income people and people of color historically have had
very few real options to prevent exposure to environmental harms and
LULUs. According to noted economist Albert Hirschman, the two ways
that people express dissent in social organizations, including political
society, is to exercise voice by expressing their dissatisfaction or pro-
testing to those with authority, or to exit by leaving the environment or
situation, often physically.'" Low-income and minority communities
have often been excluded from participating in decisions about the pres-
ence of LULUs and environmental hazards in their neighborhoods, either
by decision makers or by lack of political organization and
involvement.'" Thus, they have not had an effective voice in the envi-
ronmental and land use decision making process. People of color and
low-income people have also not been able to "vote with their feet" by
moving to other neighborhoods or communities because housing dis-
crimination, exclusionary zoning patterns, redlining, and other market
forces limit their residential mobility.' Their lack of power has kept
them subjected to unwanted hazards and facilities. Furthermore, some
145. Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 643-44, 646-47. The use of NIMBY (Not In My
Back Yard) strategies by those with power arguably hurts those without power, turning into a
PIBBY (Place In Blacks' Back Yard) situation. Id. at 646-47. The environmental laws provide tools
that can perpetuate existing power inequities. Id.
146. Id. at 643.
147. See generally ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO
DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
148. See Torres, supra note 1, at 450 ('It is lack of informed participation and legal or regula-
tory experience that leaves many communities helpless against an agency's decision to locate a solid
waste facility in their community."); see also Bullard, Anatomy, supra note 9, at 18-19 (suggesting
systematic exclusion of people of color from governmental boards, commissions, and agencies that
make siting and zoning decisions); Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 628, 646, 674-79 (arguing
that poor people remain grossly underrepresented in the political processes of siting polluting facili-
ties and documenting the refusal of the Kings County Planning Department, California, to translate
into Spanish a 1,000-page Environmental Impact Report on toxic waste incinerators even though
70% of local residents spoke Spanish); James S. Freeman & Rachel D. Godsil, The Question of Risk:
Incorporating Community Perceptions into Environmental Risk Assessments, 21 FORDHAM URB.
LJ. 547, 553 (1994); Reich, supra note 6, at 277; Saleem, supra note 31, at 236-45 (positing that
federal notice requirements regarding waste facilities am ineffective and undermine participation in
the siting process); Eleanor N. Metzger, Comment, Driving the Environmental Justice Movement
Forward: The Need for a Paternalistic Approach, 45 CASE W. RES. L REV. 379, 385-88 (1994).
149. Bullard, Anatomy, supra note 9, at 21-22; Bullard, Residential Segregation, supra note 23,
at 78-81; Gauna, supra note 6, at 32-33. For evidence of the persistence of racial segregation, see
DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE
MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993) (describing practices of redlining, racial steering, and failure
of institutions to support recently integrated neighborhoods with credit); RESIDENTIAL APARTHEID
THE AMERICAN LEGACY (Robert D. Bullard et al. eds., 1994) (describing the lack of access to finan-
cial institutions for people of color and the direct relationship of redlining to neighborhood decline).
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argue that the lack of power and resources will often lead people of color
and low-income people to embrace industrial and toxic activities and
land uses that they believe will provide much-needed jobs and tax reve-
nues."s This economic vulnerability invites "environmental job black-
mail,"'' by which impoverished communities trade health and environ-
mental harms for employment and economic growth. '" However, the
promised economic benefits may not materialize or may be less than
imagined.
The political conception of environmental justice insightfully names
power as a key element to overcoming injustice and boldly critiques tra-
ditional ways of approaching both environmental and civil rights prob-
lems. However, the political conception is itself subject to critique. For
example, mainstream environmentalism and grassroots social justice
activism arguably are not nearly so much at odds as some argue. " Fur-
thermore, a merger of environmental and civil rights agendas could be
far more effective at achieving the goals of both camps than emphasizing
conflicts and differences."' Environmental litigation can be an effective
political tool, despite its limitations.'" Professional community organiz-
ing has the potential to be as paternalistic and controlling of the struggles
of people affected by environmental injustice as does environmental or
civil rights lawyering. In addition, environmental justice activists tend to
reject that a low-income or minority community could reasonably choose
to accept LULUs rather than fight the existing power distribution. This
assumption is reductionist. It moves the environmental justice movement
away from the empowerment of self-determination and towards an in-
strumentality of radical pollution prevention politics. The result could be
that residents of neighborhoods have no effective voice for their own
goals but instead have a voice directed and developed by professional
activists or a limited cadre of grassroots leaders. The political conception
of environmental justice has both potential and limits.
150. Even when people of color gain political power, as manifested in holding elected local
office, economic empowerment eludes them. See generally IN SEARCH OF THE NEW SOUTH: THE
BLACK URBAN EXPERIENCE IN THE 1970S AND 1980S (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1989) (describing case
studies of several major Southern cities showing the persistence of residential segregation, redlining,
declining infinstrucatue, unemployment, inadequate public transportation, discriminatory real estate
practices, and social and physical deterioration of central city ghettos);, SZASZ, sUPra note 7, at 109 (ad-
dressing how the poor have less economic power to prevent facilities from siting in their communities).
151. See Guana, supra note 6, at 32-33 (discussing "environmental jobmail" as a form of
environmental blackmail).
152. See Austin & Schill, supra note 6, at 70; Bullard, Anatomy, supra note 9, at 18-19; Gauna,
supra note 6, at 38-39; Boyle, supra note 9, at 974-77.
153. Austin & Schill, supra note 6, at 70.
154. See infra notes 226-27 and accompanying text.
155. See infra notes 439-53 and accompanying text.
156. See infra notes 194-222 and accompanying text.
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2. Activism and Empowerment
For those who see power inequities as the core of environmental
injustice, the necessary response is political activism or community
empowerment.'- Instead of top-down approaches that perpetuate existing
power relationships, environmental justice advocates seek to change
power relationships by using grassroots ("bottom-up") political tools.
The number of grassroots groups throughout the United States that are
combining civil rights and environmental goals in the quest for environ-
mental justice is large and growing.'" Circumstances that threaten family,
home, and community thrust the typical organizer of an environmental
justice group into leadership. Many of these organizers are women. The
groups often have multi-issue agendas. The movement as a whole is ra-
157. See Bullard, Anatomy, supra note 9, at 33-39; Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 661-
73. But see Metzger, supra note 148, at 389-96 (arguing for short-term paternalistic government
policies because affected communities lack the information, education, and ability to organize
quickly).
158. Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 648-49. Terms like "grassroots" and "politically
active" can have more than one meaning. Grassroots environmental justice groups are generally
local not only in membership but also in leadership and activity. They differ from other interest
groups that political scientists describe as engaging in grassroots lobbying, which involves national
professional staff of the interest groups mobilizing their members (i.e., local citizens) to contact
public officials--a top-down, centralized approach. See Burdett A. Loomis, A New Era: Groups and
the Grass Roots, in nnSr GROUP POLTcs 169, 169 (Allan J. Cigler & Burdett A. Loomis eds.,
1983). Although environmental justice groups have formed national networks, lobbied for national
environmental justice policy, and brought environmental justice issues to the attention of the national
media, the American public, and the federal government, their actions are primarily focused on the
welfare of specific communities (e.g., particular neighborhoods or work environments), and are led
by members of those communities. See Robert D. Bullard, Environmental Justice for All, in
UNEQUAL PROTECTON, supra note 3, at 3, 7 [hereinafter Bullard, Environmental Justice for All]
(describing the First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit, a national move-
ment for environmental justice); Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 639-40 (positing that third
wave environmentalists have an immediate and material stake in environmental problems). In fact,
even at a purely neighborhood-based level, some environmental justice groups have rejected hierar-
chical group decision making structures. Instead these groups selected either consensus-based,
leaderless forms (often impractical) or a committee-based structure in which all members have input
at the committee level, but overall group leadership comes from an executive committee of elected
representatives from the committees. Collette, supra note 3, at 3, 5. In addition, most of the political
participation by local communities on environmental justice issues is community initiated, not gov-
ernment sponsored and government managed. See Lynn W. Bachelor & Bryan D. Jones, Managed
Participation: Detroit's Neighborhood Opportunity Fund, 17 J. APPLIED BEUMV. So. 518, 519
(1981) (analyzing government-sponsored participatory structures designed to elicit neighborhood
input into city policy but often limiting such input to "safe" issues, and contrasting these structures
with "authentic grass-roots organizations").
159. Bullard, Anatomy, supra note 9, at 24; Ken Geiser & Gerry Waneck, PC~s and Warren
County, in UNEQUAL PRoTSCnON, supra note 3, at 43, 48-49. In 1993, the Citizens Clearinghouse
for Hazardous Wastes estimated the number of grassroots environmental justice groups at 7,000
nationwide. Dorceta E. Taylor, Environmentalism and the Politics of Inclusion, in CONFRONTrNG
ENVIRONMENTAL RActsM, supra note 3, at 53, 53-54. In October 1991, representatives of more than
300 environmental groups of color attended the First National People of Color Environmental Lead-
ership Summit in Washington, D.C. See Bullard, EnvironmentalJusticeforAll, supra note 158, at 59.
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cially diverse.'" Many of these groups use "confrontational direct action
strategies similar to those used in earlier civil rights conflicts."'"' In fact,
some authors trace the origins of the environmental justice movement to
a specific political protest response. 2 In 1982, both African American
and white protesters organized a campaign to stop the location of a PCB
landfill in predominantly African American Warren County, Pennsylva-
nia.' Although the campaign ultimately failed to stop the siting of the
disposal facility, it resulted in the arrest of more than 500 civil rights
protesters, drew national attention to environmental injustice, and in-
spired the first studies of racial inequities in the distribution of environ-
mental hazards.
3. Types of Activism
The use of terms like "political activism" and "community
empowerment" begs two questions. First, what actions qualify as politi-
cal activism or community empowerment?'" Second, for what purposes
are people of color and low-income people active or empowered?'"
A wide range of strategies or actions may be relevant here. One
significant, common response to environmental injustice is community
organizing.'" Community organizing is the process of informing affected
160. Bullard, Anatomy, supra note 9, at 30, Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 636-37;
Taylor, supra note 159, at 56-57. For A discussion of the role of women of color and feminist per-
spectives in grassroots environmental justice activism, see Celene Krauss, Women of Color on the
Front Line, in UNEQUAL PROTECION, supra note 3, at 256, 256; Cynthia Hamilton, Concerned
Citizens of South Central Los Angeles, in UNEQUAL PROTECTION, supra note 3, at 209, 216. As
Hamilton notes: "Minority women.., are responding not to 'nature' in the abstract but to their
homes and the health of their children." Id. at 210.
161. Bullard, Anatomy, supra note 9, at 24.
162. See Tortes, supra note 1, at 434-35; Godsil supra note 6, at 394. But see Bullard, Envi-
ronmental Justice for All, supra note 158, at 3-4 (suggesting that the environmental justice move-
ment began in late 1960s when predominantly African American Texas Southem University students
rioted over the drowning of an eight-year-old African American girl at a garbage dump in the middle
of African American neighborhood, and when the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. was murdered
after going to Memphis to seek better working conditions for African American garbage workers);
Cole, Litigation, supra note 4, at 523 (tracing environmental justice movement to a Texas civil rights
case challenging the siting of a solid waste facility in a mostly African American Houston neighbor-
hood); Ferris & Hahn-Baker, supra note 126, at 67-68 (stating that environmental justice visibly
emerged in the late 1970s when civil rights leaders began discussing environmental concerns with
environmental leaders).
163. See Geiser & Waneck, supra note 159, at 43 (analyzing the relationship of PCBs and the
Warren County controversy); Torres, supra note 1, at 434-35; Godsil, supra note 6, at 394.
164. Luke Cole defines "empowerment" as "a process which enables individuals to participate
effectively in collective efforts to solve common problems." Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at
661.
165. See infra notes 239-80 and accompanying text (discussing the goals of empowerment).
166. See Citizens' Clearinghouse for Hazardous Waste, Six Steps to Action, J. PESTCIDE
REFoRM. Fall 1989, at 13 ('History shows us that the only effective way to resolve a toxic problem
is for citizens to join together. By doing so, they create enough pressure on government and corpo-
rations to ensure that the needs and concerns of people are addressed."); see also Bullard, Anatomy,
supra note 9, at 33; Will Collette, What Works and What Doesn't, in HE BEST OF ORGANIZING
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people (e.g., neighborhood residents), organizing them into a group to
identify goals and responses, and mobilizing them to act." For example,
Mothers of East Los Angeles (MELA) began because California
Assemblywoman Gloria Molina told Juana Beatriz Guti6rrez about a
plan by the California Department of Corrections to build a state prison
in East Los Angeles." Gutidrrez, who was a homemaker, mother of nine,
and Neighborhood Watch Program organizer, held a meeting of other
Neighborhood Watch block captains and neighborhood religious leaders
in her home. At this meeting, the participants formed an organization to
oppose the prison. The group began to grow through word of mouth,
contacts between Assemblywoman Molina's office and community and
business leaders, petitions circulated among neighborhood church pa-
rishioners, weekly candlelight vigils, well-organized and well-prepared
lobbying campaigns, the framing of the issue as protection of children's
safety, and a priest's suggestion of the organization's name: "Mothers of
East Los Angeles."''
TOOLBOX (1993) at 2, 3 (hereinafter Collette, What Works and What Doesn't]; Hamilton, supra note
160, at 207-08.
167. See Collette, What Works and What Doesn't, supra note 166, at 2 C'Organizing is bringing
people together for a common purpose and for mutual support to get the power they need to take
control of their lives."); see also Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 669; Will Collette, Making
That First Contact, in THE BEST OF ORGANIZING TOOLBOX, supra note 166, at 4, 4. For recruitment
of members, the Citizens' Clearinghouse for Hazardous Waste suggests developing a simple fact
sheet for potential members, selecting a name with which people can identify, going door-to-door to
talk with people one-on-one, and informing the public at large. The development of goals and action
plans should focus on three questions: (1) What do the group members want? (2) Who can give it?
(3) How can the group make them do it? Id.
168. Gabriel Gutidrrez, Mothers of East Los Angeles Strike Back, in UNEQUAL PROTcrION,
supra note 3, at 220, 220.
169. Id. In the last two decades, many residents of low-income and minority communities have
engaged in grassroots community organizing to respond to environmental injustices. See Bullard,
Anatomy, supra note 9, at 24. For example, African American citizens of Richmond, California,
formed the West County Toxics Coalition to address toxic emissions from a cluster of 350 facilities
that handle hazardous waste. Id. at 29. In response to a Greenpeace organizer's tip about a Chemical
Waste Management proposal to build a toxic waste incinerator at a Class I toxic landfill in 95%
Hispanic Kettleman City, California, local residents formed a community group, El Pueblo para el
Airm y Agua Limpio (People for Clean Air and Water). Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 674.
Residents, mostly women, of an almost exclusively minority South Central Los Angeles neighbor-
hood founded Concerned Citizens of South Central Los Angeles to oppose a municipal solid waste
incinerator slated for their neighborhood. See Bullard, Anatomy, supra note 9, at 28; Hamilton, supra
note 160, at 207-19. Members of the Rosebud Reservation in South Dakota organized the Good
Road Coalition to fight a proposed 6,000-acre municipal landfill on Sioux lands. Bullard, Anatomy,
supra note 9, at 29. An example of a group that began with professional public interest organizers
who mobilized a local community is People United for a Better Oakland (PUEBLO), which initially
was a project of the Oakland-based Center for Third World Organizing (CTWO). See Francis Cal-
potura & Rinku Sen. PUEBLO Fights Lead Poisoning, in UNEQUAL PROTECtON, supra note 3, at
234 (describing PUEBLO's organizing strategy and efforts to combat lead poisoning). However,
failure to address the economic concerns of low-income people of color can prevent their mobiliza-
tion against environmental hazards, especially when neither civil rights leaders nor environmental
leaders make the connections between the two movements clear, tangible, and immediate. See Con-
19981 ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND LAND USE REGULATION 35
Education is another type of response." It involves the relationship
between information and power."' Environmental justice advocates typi-
cally both educate the affected community and involve the affected
community in fact-gathering. They use the information to build the
movement (i.e., gather members and outside supporters), understand the
risks and harms the community faces, make decisions about strategies,
educate and persuade the public and decision makers (e.g., government
policy makers), and support their cases against the LULUs. When com-
munity residents are the experts, both telling their experiences and in-
formation in their own words and engaging in problem-solving research,
they are empowered.'" This empowerment comes from the validation of
their experiences, their participation in public debate and policy making,
and the impact of their perspectives on others.
In MELA's battle against the proposed prison in East Los Angeles,
the group members educated themselves about the political and legal
processes involved in prison siting and impressed state legislators with
their knowledge. They not only educated themselves, but also persis-
tently educated state officials, the media, and the public about their
struggle.'" Members of Kettleman City's El Pueblo para el Aire y Agua
Limpio (People for Clean Air and Water) wrote letters, almost all in
Spanish, to the Kings County Planning Department about a proposed
toxic waste incinerator. These letters expressed the local residents' con-
cerns and their own stories of health symptoms they experienced in con-
nection with an existing toxic waste dump operated by the incinerator
proponent. The letters also questioned the Environmental Impact Report
(EIR) process and the Planning Department's refusal to translate the
documents into Spanish, even though seventy percent of the local resi-
dents spoke Spanish in the home. This strategy of community residents
educating the decision makers affined the power of the community's
ner Bailey et al., Environmental Politics in Alabama's Blackbelt, in CONFRONTING
ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM, supra note 3, at 107, 107.
170. Bullard. Anatomy, supra note 9, at 33; Hamilton, supra note 160, at 213.
171. Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 668-69 As noted by Cole: "By increasing the com-
munity's knowledge, and others' knowledge of the community's problems, the community's persua-
sive power is necessarily suengthened." Id. at 668.
172. Luke Cole persuasively argues for the value of community residents telling their experi-
ences and knowledge in their own words, a strength that can be threatened by reliance on legal and
scientific "expertise" that either conflicts with their perspectives or shifts their struggle to arenas
where they have little power or input. Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 649-52. 662-63, 668-
69, 675-79. Bunyan Bryant also persuasively argues that community residents can and should
participate in scientific research, thus demystifying expertise for them, using their intelligence and
concern, and shifting environmental problems from technical or academic matters to political
concerns. See Bryant, supra note 57, at 13 (describing several examples of trained community
residents engaging in studies of the health impacts of toxic substances); see also Geiser & Waneck,
supra note 159, at 49 (discussing citizen groups using power to advocate progressive solutions to
toxic chemical contamination).
173. Guti6rrez, supra note 168, at 224-27.
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own expertise and its own voice.7 A different type of community educa-
tion is occurring among the Environmental Health Coalition and local
grassroots groups in San Diego, CA. They are using community right-to-
know laws to inform themselves about toxic air emissions from indus-
tries and military installations, which could pose high risks of cancer.
They have settled a lawsuit that forces the San Diego County Air Pollu-
tion Control District to notify them about emissions.' This example
highlights the importance of using open records and community right-to-
know laws'7 to obtain information about pollution and of strengthening
and enforcing those laws.'"
Another method of political activism is to use institutional political
processes to influence and persuade policy makers." Environmental jus-
tice activists have lobbied public officials individually, spoken at public
hearings, participated in joint conferences with environmental agencies,
circulated petitions, and worked at election campaigning to defeat oppo-
nents of their cause and elect sympathizers. They have sought to influ-
ence specific siting or permitting decisions, enforcement of environ-
mental laws, and general policies that would better protect low-income
and minority communities. They have directed their activity at local,
state, and federal officials of all types, and have often also tried to influ-
ence corporate decision makers to agree voluntarily to stricter environ-
mental standards.
A few of the many successes of political activism by environmental
justice advocates illustrate the variety of activities. Houston's Northeast
Community Action Group brought intense political pressure to bear on
local and state government bodies that were responsible for permitting a
proposed solid waste facility in an African American neighborhood.'7 ' As
a result, the city council voted to prohibit city-owned garbage trucks
from dumping at the landfill and to restrict the construction of solid-
waste sites near public facilities like schools and parks." Furthermore,
the Texas Department of Health revised its landfill permit application
requirements to include detailed land use, economic impact, and soci-
174. Cole, Epowerment, supra note 4, at 674-79. In addition, the educational methods em-
ployed by El Pueblo reached a wide public audience and pushed the dispute onto prime-time news-
casts. See Bullard, Anatomy, supra note 9, at 32.
175. Working Group on Community Right-to-Know, WORKING NOTES ON COMMUNITY RIGHfT-
TO-KNOW (U.S. Pub. Interest Research Group Educ. Fund, Wash., D.C.), Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 1.
176. E.g., Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-
11050 (1994); California Public Records Act, CAL GOVT. CODE §§ 6250-6270 (1982 & Supp.
1997).
177. See Geiser & Waneck, supra note 159, at 49; Outlook for 1997: A Full Year, WORKING
NOTES ON COMMUNITY RIGTrr-To-KNow (U.S. Pub. Interest Research Group Educ. Fund, Wash.,
D.C.), Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 1, 1,3.
178. See Bullard, Anatomy, supra note 9, at 33; Hamilton, supra note 160, at 213.
179. Bullard, Anatomy, supra note 9, at 33.
180. Id.
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odemographic information for proposed sites."' MELA, in its opposition
to a prison in its community, lobbied state legislators and circulated anti-
prison petitions, gathering as many as 900 signatures on one Sunday
alone.'" Concerned Citizens of South Central Los Angeles made an issue
of a proposed solid waste incinerator in a low-income neighborhood of
color in local elections. The group contributed to the defeat of pro-
incinerator city council president Pat Russell and the election of envi-
ronmental advocate Ruth Galanter.'" The Southwest Organizing Project
(SWOP), a community-based social justice organization in Albuquerque,
sent a letter to the EPA Administrator about the EPA's role in environ-
mental injustice, gave the Administrator tours of polluted low-income
and minority communities, lobbied federal officials for regulations to
protect those communities, and lobbied national environmental groups to
share power over the environmental agenda.'" When a multi-racial coali-
tion, a local chapter of Citizens for a Better America, organized a grass-
roots effort to oppose the federal siting of a nuclear waste depository in
an African American area of Halifax County, Virginia, more than 1,400
residents attended a public meeting to express their opposition. In the
face of organized opposition, the Department of Energy decided to re-
move Halifax County from its list of potential nuclear waste sites.'" The
Good Road Coalition of the Rosebud Reservation convinced a majority
of residents to defeat both a landfill proposal and candidates who sup-
ported the proposal in a tribal election."
Despite the success of many environmental justice groups in the
political arena, decision makers do not always listen to conventional po-
litical messages from low-income people and people of color.' Those
who typically have had little influence through traditional political means
often use extra-institutional responses, like lawful public protest and
181. Id. at 33-34.
182. Gutidrrez, supra note 168, at 223-26. After seven years of conflict between California
Governor Pete Wilson and MELA, Governor Wilson signed a bill in 1992 that killed the prison
proposal. Id. at 233.
183. Hamilton, supranote 160, at 213.
184. Richard Moore & Louis Head, Building a Net That Works: SWOP, in UNEQUAL
PROTECTION, supra note 3, at 191,200-02.
185. Robert W. Coffin & William Harris, Sr., Race and Waste in Two Virginia Communities, in
CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM, supra note 3, at 93, 98-100. However, Residents In-
volved in Saving the Environment (RISE) used similar tactics--225 citizens attended a public hear-
ing and 947 citizens signed a petition opposing a landfill in a predominantly African American
neighborhood-but were unable to persuade the King and Queen County, Virginia, Board of Super-
visors to reject the facility. Id. at 95-96.
186. Bullard, Anatomy, supra note 9, at 37-38.
187. See, e.g., Collin & Harris, supra note 185, at 95-96 (describing unsuccessful opposition to
a landfill siting through traditional hearing system): Grossman, supra note 9, at 287-88 (describing
unsupportive atmosphere of Washington, D.C. in the 1980s and early 1990s); Mydans, supra note
60, at AS (describing unsuccessful attempts by Native Americans to use agency channels to protest a
human waste dump).
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demonstrations, civil disobedience, and violent protest.'" MELA held
weekly candlelight vigils, which included marches on the Olympic
Boulevard bridge that attracted more than 3,000 participants.'" Protestors
against dumping PCBs at a landfill in predominantly African American
Warren County, North Carolina, blocked roads with their bodies to pre-
vent trucks from carrying PCB-laden soil to the site, and over 500 pro-
testors were arrested." Similarly, members of the Torres Martinez Desert
Cahuilla Indian Tribe created a blockade on the edge of a sewage sludge
disposal site on their California desert reservation to prevent as much as
1,000 tons of sewage sludge per day from reaching the site, having re-
ceived little help from officials at the Bureau of Indian Affairs.'"
Perhaps one of the most extreme power-based responses to envi-
ronmental justice is rioting, such as the riots by Texas Southern Univer-
sity students in the late 1960s over the drowning of an eight-year-old
African American girl at a garbage dump in the middle of an African
American neighborhood.'" Protests not only challenge the existing power
structure and pressure decision makers, but also educate the public about
environmental justice issues, as illustrated by the national attention re-
ceived by the Gulf Coast Tenants Organization's Great Louisiana Toxics
March through the Cancer Alley area of Louisiana.'
4. Litigation As a Political Tool
Litigation also has the potential to be a political tool. Many envi-
ronmental justice groups have brought lawsuits. Robert Bullard's study
of nine grassroots environmental groups showed that six groups used
litigation as a reform tactic.'" What is unclear, though, is whether envi-
ronmental justice groups are using litigation for empowerment or merely
as a legal answer to a political problem.
Luke Cole, one of the nation's leading public interest environmental
justice lawyers,'"m has analyzed the strategic and tactical problems of liti-
188. See Bullani, Anatomy, supra note 9, at 33; Hamilton, supra note 160, at 213. "In the
1990s, activists of color continue to campaign, match, and protest against environmental racism."
Ferris & Hahn-Baker, supra note 122, at 68.
189. Gutifrrez, supra note 168, at 224.
190. Geiser & Waneck, supra note 159, at 43-44.
191. Mydans, supra note 60, at AS.
192. See Bullard, supra note 158, at 3. See generally JOE R. FEAGIN & HARLAN HAHN,
GHErTo REVOLTS: THE POLTICS OF VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN CITIES (1973) (discussing riots as
modes of political influence, aimed not only at gathering attention to a problem but also at chal-
lenging existing institutional power structures). Nonetheless, violent responses to environmental
injustice are fighting one wrong with another Fortunately, nearly all documented protests by envi-
ronmental justice activists have been non-violent.
193. See Ferris & Hahn-Baker, supra note 126, at 69.
194. Bullard, Anatomy, supra note 9, at 35.
195. Cole is General Counsel of the Center on Race, Poverty & the Environment, and a staff
attorney with the California Rural Legal Assistance. He represented El Pueblo para el Aire y Agua
Limpio in the Kettleman incinerator dispute. See supra note 169.
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gation from a community empowerment, or environmental poverty law-
yering, perspective.'" He argues that a victory in a lawsuit will not
change the political and economic relationships that created the envi-
ronmental injustice, and therefore a legal response to environmental in-
justice may be inappropriate for a political problem.'" In Cole's view, the
use of litigation tends to disempower low-income people and people of
color. It moves the struggle from the streets, where people have power,
to the courts, where polluters can afford the best legal and scientific ex-
pertise and where historically minorities and the poor have experienced
oppression, intimidation, and distrust.'" It also takes the struggle away
from the people and gives it to the lawyer who may paternalistically im-
pose on the people ideas and actions that come from the lawyer's per-
spective.'" According to Cole, litigation tends to focus on serving indi-
vidual clients, rather than building, educating, and empowering groups.
If victims of environmental injustice win a lawsuit, they may not be or-
ganized to take advantage of it or may not have any lasting political
struggle around which to build a long-term community power base.'
Finally, use of the law tends to legitimize existing power relationships
and institutional structures and may deter low-income and minority peo-
ple from exploring actions that challenge the current social structure. '
There is, however, a tension between Cole's critique of litigation as
an environmental justice strategy and the empirical reality that many
environmental justice groups choose to bring lawsuits.' Cole recognizes.
that litigation may be a legitimate choice if part of a general
empowerment strategy. He proposes a model of environmental justice
lawyering that is community-based, builds the victims' control over their
struggle and capacity to solve their own problems, favors group repre-
sentation (as opposed to individual representation), treats legal tactics as
means for empowerment (not as ends in themselves), and uses non-legal
tactics.' Legal tactics are acceptable only if they educate people, build
196. See Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 661-73 (analyzing the impact of pollution on
underrepresented communities and positive effect that legal community can have); see also Cole,
Litigation, supra note 4, at 524 (weighing costs and benefits of litigation). For an example of envi-
ronmental poverty lawyering with an emphasis on community empowerment, see Dale H. Seamans,
A Unique Community Law Partnership: Environmental "Network" Lends Voice to Neighborhood
Concerns, MASS. L. WKLY., Jan. 29, 1996, at B 1.
197. Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 648-49.
198. Id. at 647-48,650.
199. Id. at 649-50.
200. Id. at 651-52, 663-67. But see Moya, supra note 6 (urging lawyers to adopt an environ-
mental justice ethic as part of a larger plan to achieve environmental justice).
201. Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 651.
202. Id. at 652.
203. See Cole, Litigation, supra note 4, at 524.
204. Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 652, 654-68. Nonetheless, many grassroots groups,
people of color, and low-income people are highly skeptical of lawyers, fear or resent the control
that lawyers exercise, and believe that legal tactics should be avoided or carefully controlled. See
SOtrHWST NETWORK FOR ENVTL. & ECON. JUSTICE & ENVTL. LAW INST., WORKING WITH
LAWYERS: A GUIDE FOR COMMUNITY RESIDENTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ACTIVISTS
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the environmental justice movement and community groups, and address
the root of the problem, rather than merely a symptom.' Cole's model
reflects the most compelling and influential current theories of public
interest lawyering.'
Litigation can serve several political functions.A First, some low-
income people and people of color may feel more empowered by appro-
priating some of the social system's power, particularly through the law
and the courts, and working within the system, than by fighting the entire
power structure.' Second, a lawsuit may be a visible manifestation of a
community's struggle around which community organizing activities
may take place." Although some community members may view litiga-
tion as an opportunity or necessity to turn over responsibility for their
problems to a lawyer,t ° others may be attracted to a group that is boldly
fighting for the community's rights in the courts, especially if the entire
group is actively involved in directing and participating in the
(1997); CITIZEN'S CLEARINGHOUSE FOR HAZARDOUS WASTES, A USER'S GUIDE TO LAWYERS
(1985); Marcia Coyle & Claudia MacLachlan, Getting Victimized by the Legal System, NAT'L. L.,
Sept. 21, 1992, at $8. Environmental justice advocates have expressed the same concerns to law
schools that have begun environmental justice clinics. See Open Letter from Bay Area Environ-
mental Justice Activists to Environmental Law Clinic Proponents at Boalt Hall Law School, Golden
Gate Law School & Stanford Law School (Dec. 20, 1993) (on file with author) [hereinafter Open
Letter to Environmental Clinics].
205. Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 668-70.
206. For further information on approaches to public interest lawyering, see GERALD P. LPm,
REBELUOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACIICE (1993); Derrick
A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation
Litigation, 85 YALE U. 470 (1976); Joel F. Handler, Community Care for the Frail Elderly: A
Theory of Empowerment, 50 OHIO ST. U. 541 (1989); Gerald P. LUpez, The Work We Know So
Little About, 42 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1989); Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE
U. 1049 (1970); Lucie E. White, To Learn and Teach: Lessons from Driefontein on Lawyering and
Power, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 699.
207. Bell, supra note 206, at 513.
208. People of color have relied heavily on legal rights to fight oppression. See PATRICIA J.
WII.JAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 163-64 (1991) (expressing the growth of rights for
African Americans as a process of empowerment). Legal representation can empower people with-
out power. See Austin Sarat, "... The Law Is All Over": Power, Resistance and the Legal Con-
sciousness of the Welfare Poor, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 343, 363-64 (1990). For a view that those
who challenge the conventional power structure (i.e., reform movements) either are integrated into
that structure as it changes incrementally or are suppressed, see JEFFREY BURTON RUSSELL, DISSENr
AND ORDER IN THE MIDDLE AGES: THE SEARCH FOR LEGmMATE AUTroirT 101-02 (1992).
Dissent and order, acceptable reform and unacceptable reform, are the same evolving movement in
healthy tension. Id.
209. Cole, Litigation, supra note 4, at 542 (describing publicity benefits of lawsuits generally
and the local and national attention that the Kettleman City incinerator struggle received after the
filing of a civil rights and environmental suit). In addition, a publicity-generated lawsuit may inspire
other similar communities. Id. A client may identify similarly situated people, such as neighbors, and
meet with them about the problem, thereby building a group. Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at
666.
210. Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 650 n.l16, 661-66 & n.182. In addition, there may
be a similar temptation to allow the movement to be shaped and directed by professional community
activists or organizers.
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litigation."' Third, a lawsuit, if conducted according to Cole's public
interest lawyering model, could involve affected people in the solution of
their problem by relying on them to make decisions about litigation strat-
egy and tactics, share their expertise on the environmental injustices they
experience, gather facts, develop contingency plans for various out-
comes, and do a variety of other tasks like media work and community
education.2 Fourth, litigation can educate the community, policy mak-
ers, and the public about environmental injustices and the rights of those
affected. " Fifth, publicity surrounding litigation not only educates peo-
ple about the particular conflict and encourages others .to fight against
environmental injustice, but it also puts pressure on corporate and gov-
ernment decision makers. 14 Sixth, litigation may be a rallying point for
attracting other groups' support, such as the assistance of civil rights
groups for an environmental justice civil rights case?' Seventh, litigation
may educate the courts about environmental injustices and facilitate
changes in legal doctrine that are more favorable to the environmental
justice movement.216 Eighth, environmental justice groups bring lawsuits
so that they can participate in government decisions or have access to
information about the impacts or potential impacts of various projects;
they often base these suits on statutes that require public participation,
environmental impact study, or information disclosure.2 ' Ninth, both the
credible ability to threaten litigation and the development of legal doc-
trine that favors environmental justice claims enhance the bargaining
power of grassroots community groups in non-judicial, political arenas.t5
Similarly, lawsuits may bring the polluter and/or government agency to
the bargaining table with the affected community residents.219 Tenth,
"[b]ringing a civil rights suit against local government officials can be
very satisfying for the community group involved, because it calls the
problem what it is: a violation of civil rights. It is one high-profile way of
saying that the official being sued is engaging in racist practices.'" Fi-
nally, despite Cole's concerns that lawsuit victories may derail organiz-
ing and empowerment efforts,"' some groups may be energized and em-
211. Id. at 661-68.
212. See id. at 661-63, 665.
213. Id. at 664, 668-69; Cole, Litigation, supra note 4, at 542-43.
214. Cole, Litigation, supra note 4, at 542.
215. Id. at 543.
216. id. at 543-44.
217. Id. at 528-30.
218. This is known as "bargaining in the shadow of the law." Robert Cooter et aL, Bargaining
in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, I I J. LEGAL STUD. 225, 225-26
(1982); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Komhauser. Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of
Divorce, 88 YALE LJ. 950,968-69 (1979).
219, The Coalition for Community Action in Alsen, Louisiana (part of Cancer Alley) brought a
lawsuit against Rollins Environmental Services incinerators, which was settled out-of-court for an
average of $3,000 per resident and reduced emissions from the Rollins facilities. Bullard, Anatomy,
supra note 9, at 27-28,37.
220. Cole, Litigation, supra note 4, at 541-42.
221. Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 651.
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powered by a victory and especially by the prevention or elimination of
the environmentally harmful LULU.' Thus, litigation is sometimes a
powerful political response to environmental injustice.
5. Networks and Coalitions
Environmental justice advocates typically enhance their political
responses by developing networks and coalitions among environmental
and social justice groups, as well as with political, business, and civic
leaders.' Coalitions involve separate groups that cooperate and support
one another on specific issues or conflicts, often in a particular commu-
nity (even if not all the groups in the coalition exist in that community).'
Networks, on the other hand, are multi-issue, regional or national asso-
ciations of grassroots groups, united to share information, advance the
environmental justice movement generally, and seek a range of govern-
ment policies and processes.'m An example of coalition building is the
work of Concerned Citizens of South Central Los Angeles in obtaining
the support and cooperation of various groups in opposing a solid waste
incinerator. The group of mainly women of color maintained control of
their struggle while forging alliances with Greenpeace, Citizens for a
Better Environment, the National Health Law Program, the Center for
Law in the Public Interest, and two white Westside "slow growth"
groups.' Historically, environmental justice groups were more likely to
receive support from social justice groups than from mainstream envi-
ronmental groups. However, increasingly groups in the affected neigh-
borhood lead environmental justice struggles, while a diverse range of
groups--social justice and environmental, minority and white, low-
income and high-income, grassroots and professional, local and na-
tional--support and assist in the struggle. ' The support of these groups
can be quite valuable. For example, MELA relied on the technical ad-
222. See, e.g., National Oil Refinery ACTION! Network/Communities for a Better Environ-
ment, Sun Oil Reaches Good Neighbor Agreement with NeighborslWorkers 12-30-97 (visited Nov.
11, 1998) <http://www.igc.org/cbesf/flash.html> [hereinafter NORAN/CBE, Sun Oil]; Chester
Residents Concerned for Quality Living, Federal Court Gives Green Light to Environmental
Racism Suit Against PA DEP (visited Nov. I1, 1998) <http://www.enviroweb.org/pen/crcql/
lawsuit_victory l.html>.
223. See SzAsz, supra note 7, at 70-71, 74-76; Gauna, supra note 6, at 11.
224. See SzAsz, supra note 7, at 74-76.
225. Id.
226. Hamilton, supra note 160, at 212-13. For an example of a grassroots group that gathered
the support of state and local politicians, business leaders, community leaders, and religious leaders,
see Colln & Harris, supra note 185, at 100 (describing organizational efforts of Citizens for a Better
Environment against proposed waste dump).
227. See Bullard, Anatomy, supra note 9, at 24, 30-33; Gauna, supra note 6, at 78-79. Envi-
ronmental justice groups also work collaboratively with university centers, such as the Deep South
Center for Environmental Justice at Xavier University in New Orleans, and law school clinics, such
as those at Boalt Hall, Golden Gate, and Stanford Law Schools. See Beverly Wright, Environmental
Equity Justice Centers: A Response to Inequity, in ENvIRoNMENrAL JusnIC: ISSUES, POLICIES,
AND SOLUTIONS, supra note 7, at*57, 63-65; Open Letter to Environmental Clinics, supra note 204.
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vice, expert testimony, lobbying, research, and legal assistance of groups
like Greenpeace, the Natural Resources Defense Council, the Citizens'
Clearinghouse on Hazardous Waste, and the Western Center on Law and
Poverty. =
Networks can be equally valuable. 1990 and 1991 were especially
important years for building networks among environmental justice ad-
vocates. In 1990, the University of Michigan School of Natural Re-
sources held a nationally important conference of leading scholars, ac-
tivists, and government officials concerned with environmental justice
issues, resulting in the establishment of an environmental justice working
group within the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.' Also in 1990,
the Southwest Organizing Project (SWOP) sponsored the People of
Color Regional Activist Dialogue for Environmental Justice (RAD), at-
tended by one hundred activists from eight Southwestern states.2"' Out of
RAD came the Southwest Network for Environmental and Economic
Justice (SNEEJ), and the Southwest Training and Action Institute.
23'
SNEEJ consists of grassroots groups from throughout eight Southwestern
states; it facilitates the exchange of ideas and experiences among activ-
ists, and provides for mutual support and consideration of regional per-
spectives on local struggles.2 ' With the strength of numbers greater than
any individual group, SNEEJ also lobbies for national policies, both leg-
islative and regulatory, that will promote environmental justice.' The
Institute studies environmental justice issues, gathers and disseminates
technical information, and trains leaders of grassroots groups.' In addi-
tion to SNEEJ, other regional networks include the Indigenous Environ-
mental Network and the Southern Community Labor Conference for
Environmental Justice.'
At a more national level, the First National People of Color Envi-
ronmental Leadership Summit was held in Washington, DC in October
1991.' More than 600 people of color, representing more than 300
groups, attended the conference and labeled the impact of environmental
racism on people of color as "environmental genocide."237 The partici-
pants issued a set of seventeen principles of environmental justice, fo-
228. Bullard, Anatomy, supra note 9, at 32.
229. Ferris & Hahn-Baker, supra note 126, at 69; see also Maria Ramirez Fisher, Comment, On
the Road from Environmental Racism to Environmental Justice, 5 Viii. ENVTL. LJ. 449, 467-74
(1994) (urging the formation of coalitions between grassroots groups and mainstream environmental
organizations).
230. Moore& Head, supra note 184, at 191.
231. Id. at 192.
232. id. at 192-94.
233. Id. at 200-02
234. id. at 194. Leadership development includes training on the history and culture of the
Southwest and the interrelationship between economic and environmental issues. id.
235. See Ferris & Hahn-Baker, supra note 126, at 69.
236. Grossman, supra note 9, at 272.
237. Id. at 272-73; see Bullard, Environmental Justicefor All, supra note 158, at 7.
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cusing on both environmental and social justice goals for government
policy, economic markets, and societal attitudes and actions." By or-
ganizing into networks, grassroots groups are enhancing their
empowerment strategies so that they influence the national agenda.
6. Goals of Empowerment
The second question concerning the meaning of "community
empowerment" and "political activism" asks: For what purposes are
people of color and low-income people active or empowered? Is their
only goal to remedy or prevent environmental injustices, or do they have
broader, more visionary goals? In other words, are they empowered only
to keep out of their neighborhoods, workplaces, and other common areas
what they do not want, or are they empowered to define and achieve
what they do want in their communities?
By and large, grassroots environmental justice activists' political
responses have been reactions to proposed or existing environmental
hazards, usually LULUs.' Bullard's case studies of nine grassroots envi-
ronmental justice groups show that all were formed in response to com-
munity disputes over either existing or proposed facilities in low-income
or minority neighborhoods.' In many ways, suggestions that these
communities should think more broadly or in more visionary terms are
unfair and unrealistic. These people are fighting for their lives, families,
homes, and neighborhoods against existing or impending environmental
harms; they are reacting to crisis situations." Furthermore, community
organizing and political activity may be easier when the community has
a concrete and immediate danger to fight or conflict to address.'
Nevertheless, environmental injustice is a political problem in part
because people of color and low-income people have not played a role in
developing the general policies that govern the siting of LULUs, pollu-
tion standards, community participation, and neighborhood land use pat-
terns . ' One type of political response to environmental injustice is to
lobby for generally applicable and prospective rules and policies to pro-
tect all minority and low-income communities from pollution and LU-
238. Grossman, supra note 9, at 272-75.
239. See Poirier, supra note 28, at 798 ("These movements typically originate in issues specific
to a particular geographic location or a particular land use controversy."); see also Bullard, Anatomy,
supra note 9, at 27-28, 37 (Coalition for Community Action response to existing incinerators in
Alsen, Louisiana); Collin & Harris, supra note 185, at 95-96 (citizen group petitioned Board of
Supervisors to reject proposed landfill); Guti6rrez, supra note 168, at 220, 221-25 (MELA reaction
to proposed state prison).
240. Bullard, Anatomy, supra note 9, at 24-39 & tbl. 1.
241. See Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 639-40 (comparing the motivations of the
"mainstream environmentalists," mainly lawyers, responding to the social ferment of the sixties, with
the motivations of non-lawyers directly affected by environmental problems in iheir communities).
242. Id.
243. Id. at 647-49.
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LUs. Environmental justice groups are increasingly engaged in this type
of lobbying-especially as they become better organized, more estab-
lished, more vocal, and better connected to one another in regional and
national networks? '
For example, environmental justice activists in Florida sought leg-
islation to create the Florida Environmental Equity and Justice Commis-
sion, which studied whether minority communities bear a greater con-
centration of environmental hazards than the general population. The
Commission proposed changes in statewide policies to address environ-
mental justice needs.' Other states have acted as well, enacting statutes
that prohibit over-concentration of LULUs in any host communities (i.e.,
geographic dispersion requirements),24 statutes that require agencies to
consider the impacts of their environmental decisions on host communi-
ties and on the input of those communities,' and joint resolutions that
call for environmental justice.' Many other state legislatures have con-
sidered environmental justice bills.'
Legislation has also been introduced in Congress. These bills in-
clude the Environmental Justice Act of 1992, ° the Environmental Justice
244. It is unclear whether political leaders will believe their self-interest will be served by
supporting the environmental justice movement. Compare Guti6rrez, supra note 169, at 222-25
(detailing the assistance given to California Assemblywoman Gloria Molina by the Mothers of East
Los Angeles), with Randy Lee Loftis, Controversy in the Air: Civil Rights Act Invoked in Protest
over Chemical Plant Plan, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 9, 1997, at 24A (reporting the hostility of
Louisiana Governor Mike Foster to the environmental justice movement's opposition to a Shintech
polyvinyl chloride plant in an African American area already hosting several chemical plants). For
an argument that politicians may support social justice causes, despite political costs, because of
personal moral views about the public good, see Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Beyond Self-
Interest: Policy Entrepreneurs and Aid to the Homeless, 18 PotL'Y STUD. J. 47, 48 (1989).
245. See 1994 Fla. Laws ch. 94-219; FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 5; Environmental Equity &
Justice Commission, ENVTL. JUSTICE WATCH! (Legal Envtl. Assistance Found. (LEAF), Tallahas-
see, Fla.), Feb. 28, 1995, at 2 (LEAF wrote the Model Legislation Environmental Equity and Justice
Act, which formed the basis for the Florida statute).
246. See, e.g., 1993 Ark. Act 1263; see also Mary Lou Gallagher, New York City Fair Share
Process, 58 PLANNING 13 (1992) (discussing New York City's charter provision for the equitable
siting of public facilities).
247. See 1993 La. Act § 767; 1997 Md. Laws ch. 741.
248. See, e.g., H.R. Res. 662, 1994 Reg. Ses. (Mich. 1994); H.RJ. Res. 146, 1993 Reg. Sess.
(Tenn. 1993); H.RJ Res. 529, 1993 Reg. Sess. (Va. 1993).
249. See, e.g., S. 713, 1997 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 1997); H.R. 2572, 43d Leg., 1st Reg. Ses. (Ariz.
1997); S. 451, 1997-98 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1997); S. 1348, 1997 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1997); S. 1354, 1997
Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1997); H.R. 945, 1997 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1997); H.B. 518, 1997-98 Reg. Sess. (1L.
1997); H.B. 447, 1997 Reg. Ses. (Miss. 1997); H.R. 238, 98th Gen. Assembly, Ist Reg. Sess. (Mo.
1997); S. 2096, 220th Ann. Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 1997); S. 5594, 220th Ann. Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 1997);
H.R. 726, 100th Gen. Assembly, (Tenn. 1997); S. 1049, 75th Reg. Ses. (Tex. 1997); S.B. 7576,
219th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1996); S.B. 6583, 219th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess.
(N.Y. 1996); H.R. 2321, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 1996); H.R. 3224,1995-96 Reg. Sess. (I01. 1995);
H.R. 1049, 1995 Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1995); S. 3393,219th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1995);
S. 2252, 219th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1995); S.B. 434, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Wisc.
1995); see also KATHLYN GAY, POt.LrION AND THE PowERLEss 108-09 (1994).
250. H.R. 2105, 103d Cong. (1993).
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Act of 1993, ' the Environmental Health Equity Information Act of
1993,t " the Department of the Environment Act of 1993,03 the Depart-
ment of Environmental Protection Act,' the Public Health Equity Act,2 '
and the Environmental Risk Evaluation Act of 1995.' These bills have
simultaneously received praise as national attempts to address environ-
mental injustice, and criticism as being largely procedural and symbolic
without effective and timely implementation mechanisms or reform of
state and local siting policies.' Congress has not yet passed a compre-
hensive environmental justice act. '
Environmental justice advocates have had more success in lobbying
the Executive Branch than achieving federal legislation. In response to
the rising environmental justice movement, the EPA formed the Envi-
ronmental Equity Workgroup in the early 1990s.' In 1992, the Work-
group issued a report assessing the evidence that poor and minority
communities are at greater risk of exposure to environmental hazards
than more affluent white neighborhoods.' The report received wide-
spread criticism from environmental justice advocates, who contend that
the EPA views environmental justice as primarily a public relations
problem for government officials to manipulate and favors mere redistri-
bution of risk (environmental equity), instead of pollution reduction (en-
vironmental justice)." The EPA has created several agency offices to
address environmental justice concerns: the EPA Office of Environ-
mental Equity, the National Environmental Justice Advisory Council,
and the Office of Solid Waste and the Emergency Response Environ-
mental Justice Task Force. ' On February 11, 1994, President Clinton
issued Executive Order 12,898, creating an Interagency Working Group
on Environmental Justice to coordinate environmental justice policy
251. S. 1161, 103d Cong. (1993).
252. H.R. 1925, 103d Cong. (1993).
253. S. 171, 103d Cong. (1993).
254. H.R. 3425, 103d Cong. (1993).
255. S. 1841, 1O3d Cong. (1994).
256. S. 123, 104th Cong. (1995).
257. See iUnda D. Blank, Comment, Seeking Solutions to Environmental Inequity. The Envi-
ronmental Justice Act, 24 ENvTi. L. 1109, 1120-21 (1994) (commending the aims of the EJA of
1992, but arguing that it fails to effectively address the real problems associated with environmental
justice); Claire L Hasler, Comment, The Proposed Environmental Justice Act: "I Have a (Green)
Dream," 17 U. PUGE SOUND L REv. 417,451-57 (1994) (arguing the EJA of 1992 avoids many of
the issues associated with environmental justice concerns).
258. Public interest groups are also lobbying Congress for legislation to expand the public's
right to information about toxic substances and products. See Outlook for 1997: A Full Year, supra
note 177, at 1-3.
259. Carol E. Dinkins, Impact of the Environmental Justice Movement on American Industry
and Local Government, 47 ADMIN. L. REv. 337, 338 (1995).
260. EPA, ENVIRONMENrAL EQUrIY, supra note 5, at 11-24.
261. See Robert D. Bullard, Conclusion: Environmentalism with Justice, in CONFRONTING
ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM, supra note 3, at 195, 195; Gauna, supra note 6, at 27-29.
262. Dinkins, supra note 259, at 339-40.
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among federal agencies. The Order required every federal agency to de-
velop an agency-wide environmental justice strategy within ten months
and to report periodically to the Working Group on its implementation of
the strategy.' The Order further directed agencies to gather data on dis-
parate environmental risks and health effects, assess programs for impact
on minority and low-income populations, and improve public participa-
tion and access to information related to federal programs and policies. '
It is unclear whether the Executive Order achieved its intended ef-
fect on substantive policy decisions. The fate of the proposed Louisiana
Energy Services (LES) uranium enrichment plant near Homer, Louisi-
ana, illustrates the ambiguity. On May 1, 1997, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission's (NRC) Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ALSB) de-
nied a license for the LES plant. The denial was partly because both the
license application and the NRC staffs review of the application did not
comply with Executive Order 12,898.2 The ALSB mandated that NRC
staff re-investigate the impact of the project on African American resi-
dents surrounding the proposed plant, and examine whether racial dis-
crimination played a role in the selection of the site.' " The NRC, how-
ever, reversed the ALSB on the environmental justice issue, on the basis
that the only applicable law in the case was the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA),' which the NRC held could not be used as
a tool for inquiry into racial discrimination.' The NRC stated that the
Executive Order created no new rights or remedies and therefore could
not form the basis of a "non-discriminatory directive" on which the
ALSB could require inquiry into whether LBS officials intended to dis-
criminate on the basis of race.' According to the NRC, the ALSB had
"no clear legal basis or clearly discernible objective" in reviewing
siting decisions for racial discrimination, but upheld the ALSB's re-
quirement that the NRC staff consider the social impacts of the proposed
plant on the surrounding neighborhood, particularly pedestrian traffic
and property values.Y The NRC decision was a stunning blow to the
meaningful implementation of the Executive Order and to the local
community's attempt to have input into the placement of a uranium en-
richment plant in their midst. The NRC's insistence that NEPA was the
only applicable law ignored the applicability of federal civil rights stat-
utes, such as Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,m which prohibits
263. Exec. Order No. 12,898,3 C.F.R. 859 (1995), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1994).
264. Id.
265. In re Louisiana Energy Servs., L.P., 45 N.R.C. 367,367 (1997) (final initial decision).
266. Id. at 390-97.
267. Pub. L. No. 91-190,83 StaL 852 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 432 1-4370e (1994)).
268. In re Louisiana Energy Servs., L.P., 47 N.R.C. 77, 100-06 (1998).
269. Id. at 102.
270. Id. at 101.
271. Id.
272. Pub. L. 88-352, § 601, 78 Star. 241, 252 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994)).
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racial discrimination in federal programs and funding.' In addition, if
the decision to site the LES plant near Homer, Louisiana, were based on
intentional racism, the federal approval of the siting decision could be a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.7 '
Ultimately, though, LES withdrew its application for a permit and license
for the uranium enrichment plant, bowing to local opposition and charges
of environmental injustice.' The NRC refused to reconsider its far-
reaching statements about the Executive Order and dismissed the case as
moot.' Thus, the opponents of the plant defeated it, but the long-term
impact of the Executive Order is in question."
Environmental justice activists are also increasingly participating in
administrative rulemaking on environmental matters. The New York
City Environmental Justice Alliance, supported by forty other civil rights
and, environmental groups from New York City, submitted comments
favoring the EPA's proposal for stricter air pollution standards governing
ozone and particulate matter, and pointing to the higher incidence of
asthma in inner cities due to ambient air pollution.' Communities for a
Better Environment have petitioned the EPA to list dioxin on the Toxics
Release Inventory (TR, and various groups regularly comment on the
EPA proposed rules and programs that relate to the availability of infor-
mation about toxic pollution. '
Finally, as demonstrated later in this article, environmental justice
advocates are also beginning to seek land use regulations that will protect
low-income and minority neighborhoods against LULUs and other envi-
ronmental harms.' However, the political conception of environmental
justice remains largely focused on preventing harms. More often than
not, what a community is seeking is defined in the negative-no dumps,
no more group homes, no dirty air, no racism in enforcement practices-
instead of in the positive-zoning and financing for small business de-
velopment, more parks, clean air, or neighborhood participation in en-
forcement decisions. Communities "fight back," instead of "fight for."
Of course, the distinction between the two is sometimes not so clear,
273. See infra notes 299-338 and accompanying text.
274. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see infra notes 288-98 and accompanying text (discussing
constitutional protections against environmental racism); see also Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 16
(1948) (holding government enforcement of private discrimination is state action in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause).
275. In re Louisiana Energy Servs., L.P., 47 N.R.C. 113, 114(1998) (order).
276. In re Louisiana Energy Servs., 47 N.R.C. at 114.
277. However, responding to the Executive Order, the EPA has successfully put pressure on the
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection to deny a permit for a sewage sludge treatment
works in a Newark neighborhood of color. See Michael B. Gerrard & Monica Jahan Bose, The
Emerging Arena of "Justice," N.Y. LJ., July 25, 1997, at 3.
278. Justice in the Air?, 120 MOBILIZING THE REGION I (Apr. 4, 1997) (visited Oct. 21, 1998)
<http:J/www.tstc.org/bulletin/1997040/mtrl2005.htm>.
279. See Working Group on Community Right-to-Know, supra note 175, at 1, 3.
280. See infra Part V.
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occasionally even merely semantical. For example, community organiz-
ing to stop air pollution and community organizing to achieve clean air
may be quite similar, although the latter would likely be far more crea-
tive and have a far broader agenda than the former. The former, fighting
against a public "bad," would rightly target polluters and government
agencies that permit pollution, whereas the latter, fighting for a public
"good," would do the same but also seek non-polluting technologies,
push for cleanup of the local air basin, and consider what the local
neighborhood could do to contribute to improved air quality. A commu-
nity that is under siege from pollution and LULUs will naturally react,
but long-term empowerment will come from participating in, and influ-
encing, generally applicable policy that will shape all sorts of future ac-
tions and conflicts that could affect that community.
C. Rights Protection Responses (Legal Conceptions)
Environmental justice activists have not confined themselves to
political strategies but have also used the law both to protect the rights of
those harmed by environmental injustices and to remedy those harms'
Environmental justice scholars have also devoted much attention to judi-
cial remedies.'m As Denis Binder has written, the amount of initial envi-
ronmental justice literature seemed to exceed greatly the number of pub-
lished court opinions on the issue.m However, "[e]nvironmental justice
issues often lurk in the background of cases, but are not necessarily pres-
ent on the surface,"' and the amount of environmental justice litigation
has grown significantly in the last few years. In addition, legal strategies
often overlap with political and enforcement strategies, such as when
grassroots groups lobby for legislation or regulations (i.e., laws of gen-
eral applicability) or push for enforcement of existing laws to a particular
proposal or facility.'
The legal theories behind environmental justice litigation reflect the
convergence of environmental law and civil rights law.' Under this con-
281. Cole, Litigation, supra note 4, at 523-26.
282. Collin, supra note 6, at 134. See generally Binder, supra note 6 (providing a list of envi-
ronmental justice cases); Cole, Litigation, supra note 4 (discussing judicial remedies for siting dis-
putes); Colopy, supra note 6 (discussing Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as a judicial rem-
edy); Michael Fisher, Environmental Racism Claims Brought Under Title Vi of the Civil Rights Act,
25 ENVrL. L 285 (1995) (opining that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is a viable judicial
remedy); Gauna, supra note 6 (analyzing citizen suits under environmental statutes); Stephen M.
Johnson, NEPA and SEPA's in the Quest for Environmental Justice, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 565
(1997) (discussing NEPA and SEPAs as judicial remedies); Lazarus, supra note 6, at 827-42 (out-
lining various judicial remedies); Reich, supra note 6 (concluding federal law offers inadequate
remedies); Godsil, supra note 6, at 408-27 (exploring the Civil Rights Act and the Equal Protection
Clause as judicial remedies).
283. Binder, supra note 6, at 163.
284. Id. at 164.
285. See supra Part I.B (discussing political activism); infra Part I.C.3 (discussing statutory
rights to enforcement of environmental laws); see also Cole, Litigation, supra note 4, at 524-25.
286. Cole, Litigation, supra note 4, at 530.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
ception, environmental injustice violates the rights of minorities and the
poor. The causes of action are based on five different types of rights: (1)
the constitutional right against intentional racial discrimination; (2) the
statutory and regulatory right against racial discrimination, whether by
intentional action or unjustifiable and measurable impact; (3) the statu-
tory right to have the substantive environmental law applied and en-
forced; (4) the statutory right to certain procedures, participation, and
information in environmental decision making; and (5) the right to com-
pensation for harms caused by others. Each type of right and applicable
causes of action will be described. There are far too many cases, how-
ever, to describe all of them, and thorough analyses of individual cases
exist elsewhere in the literature.'
1. Constitutional Rights
An obvious source of legal relief for claims of environmental racism
is the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.!" Commu-
nity groups and individuals have brought numerous suits against gov-
ernment decision makers for decisions to approve the siting of LULUs in
minority areas, arguing that these racially discriminatory decisions vio-
lated the plaintiffs' equal protection rights.' Government actions based
on race, a suspect classification, are subject to strict scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause, requiring the government to prove that its ac-
tions were "narrowly tailored" to meet a "compelling governmental pur-
pose[]." m However, to establish a successful equal protection claim that
triggers strict scrutiny, a plaintiff must prove that the government deci-
sion makers intentionally discriminated on the basis of race, not merely
287. See id. at 527 & n.16; Collin, supra note 6, at 134-41; Colopy, supra note 6, at 145-50.
Binder compiled an excellent index of environmental justice cases from 1886 to 1992. Binder, supra
note 6, at 165-67. By cases, I do not mean exclusively published opinions, which far too often am
the primary or sole focus of law review articles. Sometimes the mere filing of a lawsuit or the set-
tement of a pending suit may protect the rights of the plaintiffs, especially if it is part of an overall
grassroots organizing and empowerment plan. See, e.g., Vemice D. Miller, Planning, Power and
Politics: A Case Study of the Land Use and Siting History of the North River Water Pollution Con-
trol Plant, 21 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 707,721 (1994); NORAN/CBE, Sun Oil, supra note 222.
288. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Equal protection claims may be brought under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (1994), which provides a federal cause of action for deprivation of federal constitutional rights
under color of state law.
289. See, e.g., Lake Lucerne Civic Ass'n. v. Dolphin Stadium Corp., 801 F. Supp. 684, 699,
701 (S.D. Fla. 1992); R.LS.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144, 1149 (E.D. Va. 1991); East Bibb
Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n. v. Macon-Bibb County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 706 F. Supp.
880, 881 (M.D. Ga.), affd, 888 F.2d 1573, op. amended & superseded on denial of reh'g, 896 F.2d
1264 (1 1th Cir. 1989); Coalition of Bedford-Stuyvesant Block Ass'n. v. Cuomo, 651 F. Supp. 1202,
1208 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673, 675
(S.D. Tex. 1979); Harrisburg Coalition Against Ruining the Env't v. Volpe, 330 F. Supp. 918, 926-
27 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
290. E.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
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show the discriminatory impact of their decision."' Virtually no plaintiff
in any of the many different environmental justice civil rights cases na-
tionwide has prevailed on an equal protection claim; none has been able
to meet the Supreme Court's intent requirement.'m Legal scholars agree
that absent the overruling of Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights,
which established the intent requirement, or a rare case in which a plain-
tiff can uncover evidence of discriminatory intent in government deci-
sion making, the Equal Protection Clause offers little promise of success
for environmental justice claims.' Federal legislation to replace the dis-
criminatory intent standard with a disparate impact test for environ-
mental permitting decisions is not politically viable. Even if such leg-
islation were passed, it could be subject to protracted litigation over its
constitutionality as an exercise of congressional power to implement the
Fourteenth Amendment pursuant to Section Five of the Amendment.'
In some jurisdictions, a more viable alternative to a federal equal
protection claim is an equal protection claim under the state constitution.
Peter Reich has demonstrated that several states use a disparate impact
analysis for their more broadly-interpreted equal protection guarantees.m
He speculates that many environmental justice suits, based on well-
established evidence of "actionable disparate impact," " could be suc-
cessful if they included state constitutional equal protection claims and
were brought in states with "expansive judicial interpretations of equal
protection. ' '
291. E.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-
65 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,239 (1976).
292. Cole, Litigation, supra note 4, at 538-39. However, if denial of municipal services or
provision of substandard municipal services to minority neighborhoods based on intentional racial
discrimination is considered an environmental justice issue, some equal protection claims have been
successful. See, e.g., Ammons v. Dade City, 783 F.2d 982,987-88 (QIth Cir. 1986); Dowdell v. City
of Apopka, 698 F.2d 1181, 1185-86 (1ith Cir. 1983); Baker v. City of Kissimmee, 645 F. Supp.
571, 579 (M.D. Fla. 1986). But see Wilkerson v. City of Coralville, 478 F.2d 709, 711 (8th Cir.
1973) (viewing city's refusal to annex an impoverished area as not violating the Equal Protection
Clause).
293. See Cole, Litigation, supra note 4, at 538-41 & nn.87-88; Colopy, supra note 6, at 351-
52; Pamela Duncan, Environmental Racism: Recognition, Litigation, and Alleviation, 6 TUtL ENVrL
LJ. 317, 341-53 (1993); Lazarus, supra note 6, at 829-34; Reich, supra note 6, at 290-97; see also
Been, Fairness, supra note 6, at 1004. However, filing equal protection claims may have political
value to emphasize that the particular govemment action is a violation of minorities' civil rights.
Cole, Litigation, supra note 4, at 540-44; Godsil, supra note 6, at 420-21.
294. See Reich, supra note 6, at 294-97. For criticisms of existing equal protection analysis, see
Boyle, supra note 9, at 950-67; Leslie Ann Coleman, Comment, It's the Thought That Counts: The
Intent Requirement in Environmental Racism Claims, 25 ST. MARY's LJ. 447, 471-75 (1993).
295. See Boeme v. Floics, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2171-72 (1997) (invalidating the Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act as beyond congressional Section Five power to implement the Fourteenth
Amendment); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XlV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce,
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.").
296. See Reich, supra note 6, at 301-05 & n. 18 1 (citing cases from Arkansas, California, Con-
necticut, West Virginia, and Wyoming).
297. Id. at 304.
298. Id. at 305.
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2. Statutory Civil Rights
Environmental justice plaintiffs can also bring civil rights claims
under Tide VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964;' Tide VIII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968;' and 42 U.S.C. § 1982."' For a variety of reasons
discussed below, federal civil rights statutes and the regulations that im-
plement them offer greater legal protections against racial disparities in
environmental burdens and harms than does the federal Equal Protection
Clause.'
Tide VI provides: "No person in the United States shall, on the
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." It is essen-
tially a prohibition on federal funding of programs that discriminate on
the basis of race. As with the Equal Protection Clause, litigants suing
under Title VI itself must prove intentional racial discrimination.' Many
federal agencies, however, have adopted implementing regulations that
prohibit funding of programs with racially discriminatory effects or im-
pacts.! The U.S. Supreme Court has suggested that litigants suing under
Title VI regulations need only show unjustified disparate impact' but
the availability of a disparate impact private cause of action under Title
VI regulations remains uncertain.' To establish a prima facie case that a
federally funded program or activity violates Title VI regulations, the
plaintiff must provide evidence of definite and measurable disparity in
299. Pub. L. 88-352, § 601, 78 Stat. 241, 252 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994)).
See generally Steven A. Light & Kathryn R.L. Rand, Is Title VI a Magic Bullet? Environmental
Racism in the Context of Political-Economic Processes and Imperatives, 2 ICH. J. RACE & L. 1
(1996) (discussing the effectiveness of Title VI as a litigation strategy to fight environmental ra-
cism).
300. Pub. L 90-284, § 801, 82 Stat. 73, 81 (1968) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631
(1994 & Supp. U 1996)).
301. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1994).
302. See Cole, Litigation, supra note 4, at 530-31; Colopy, supra note 6, at 152.
303. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
304. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287,293-94 (1985).
305. E.g., 7 C.F.R. § 15.3(b)(2) (1998) (Department of Agriculture); 10 C.F.R. § 1040.13(c)-
(d) (1998) (Department of Energy); 24 C.F.R. § 1.4(b)(2)i), (3) (1998) (Department of Housing and
Urban Development); 32 C.F.R. § 195.4(2) (1997) (Department of Defense); 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b)
(1997) (Environmental Protection Agency); 43 C.F.R. § 17.3(bX2)-(3) (1997) (Department of Inte-
rior); 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2)-(3) (1997) (Department of Health and Human Services); 49 C.F.R. §
21.5(bX2)-(3) (1997) (Department of Transportation).
306. See Choate, 469 U.S. at 293-94.
307. See Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 927 (3d Cir.
1997) (holding that plaintiff's argument that disproportionate siting according to racial composition
of the neighborhood violates Title VI regulations could maintain a private cause of action, and that
plaintiffs need only prove disparate impact, not discriminatory intent), vacated and remanded with
instructions to dismiss, 119 S. CL 22 (1998); see also South Bronx Coalition for Clean Air, Inc. v.
Conroy, 20 F. Supp.2d 565, 572 (recognizing lingering questions about Title VI disparate impact
private causes of action).
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the program's impact, sufficiently substantial to raise an inference that
the impact is the result of racial discrimination.' The defendant then
may rebut the prima facie case by showing that its program has a legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory purpose.' The plaintiff has the ultimate burden
of proving illegal discrimination and must show that there is a less dis-
criminatory alternative that adequately serves the defendant's legitimate
interests. 3
0
In addition to the disparate impact standard, Title VI offers several
advantages to environmental justice plaintiffs. The courts recognize an
implied private cause of action for individuals who have suffered dis-
criminatory impact that violates Title VI regulations.'" Plaintiffs can sue
either the federal funding agency, which has provided federal financial
assistance to a discriminatory program, or the fund recipient itself, which
has discriminated through the impact of its program."' Aggrieved per-
sons can seek redress through federal litigation, an administrative com-
plaint process, or both.!' However, there is generally no requirement that
a plaintiff exhaust his or her administrative remedies before filing a suit
under Title VI regulations!"
Nonetheless, Title VI plaintiffs encounter some hurdles. Those who
choose to file administrative complaints, in contrast to (or in addition to)
litigating, are not entitled to any particular formal means of participating
in the administrative process?" Particularly relevant to those who raise
environmental justice claims, the EPA has not given Title VI enforce-
ment a high priority, although the EPA under the Clinton administration
is devoting more attention to Title VI environmental justice concerns
than it has historically."' Those who sue must establish a sufficient nexus
between the environmental injustice and federal funding.!" To have
standing, they might also have to show that they were the intended bene-
ficiaries of the federal funds." Plaintiffs also must prove the disparate
308. See NAACP v. Medical Ctr., Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1332-34 (3d Cir. 1981); Scelsa v. City
Univ. of N.Y., 806 F. Supp. 1126, 1141 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
309. Medical Or., 657 F.2d at 1333.
310. ld.at 1336 n.17.
311. Serf, 132 F.3d at 937; see Colopy, supra note 6, at 156; Lazarus, srpra note 6, at 835. The
U.S. Supreme Court, however, has not squarely resolved the issue, and uncertainty persists. See
cases cited supra note 307.
312. See Colopy, supra note 6, at 157; Fisher, supra note 282, at 317.
313. See Colopy, supra note 6, at 168-80; Fisher, supra note 282, at 313.
314. See Colopy, supra note 6, at 156-57 (citing Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S.
677, 707 n.41 (1979)); see also Fisher, supra note 282, at 313 & n.137 (citing Guardians Ass'n v.
Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 593-95 (1983)).
315. See Fisher, supra note 282, at 316 & n.154 (citing Cannon, 441 U.S. at 706 n.41).
316. See Colopy, supra note 6, at 180-88; Fisher, supra note 282, at 313-16.
317. See Lazarus, supra note 6, at 835. Most state environmental programs receive federal
funding, thereby providing the required nexus. ld. at 836.
318. See Colopy, supra note 6, at 166-67; Fisher, supra note 282, at 317-19. The standing
requirements in suits against federal funding recipients remain unclear, but environmental justice
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impact?" and that it was unjustified.!" They may also encounter difficul-
ties proving causation. For example, in a recent celebrated environmental
justice case, a Michigan state judge rejected the disparate impact chal-
lenge to a state agency's pattern of granting permits to polluting facilities
in minority areas of Genesee County. 2 The theory failed because the
plaintiffs did not prove that the state permitting process, which failed to
consider the race of the siting community, caused either the concentra-
tion of pollution in the area or the location of African Americans near the
polluting facilities.' 2 Most of the polluters were located in those areas
before they developed significant African American populations, and
most of the pollution in the area was due to sources other than the per-
mitted polluting facilities.' Finally, unless the violation is intentional
thereby allowing damages recovery, plaintiffs successful under Title VI
are entitled only to declaratory and injunctive relief.3 Despite these hur-
dles, though, Title VI holds much promise as an effective civil rights tool
against environmental injustice, even if initially actual cases and benefi-
cial results have been slow in coming:'
Title VII prohibits racial discrimination "against any person in
the.., sale or rental of a dwelling or in the provision of services or fa-
cilities in connection therewith,"'32 and the refusal "to sell or rent.., or
otherwise make unavailable, or deny, a dwelling to any person because
of race."32 In addition, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 states that all U.S. citizens
plaintiffs should not have difficulty with the intended beneficiary doctrine because all local residents
ar beneficiaries of federal funds to their state's and locality's environmental programs. Id.
319. Fisher, supra note 282, at 322-28. Proving disparate impact involves questions concerning
(1) the units of measure and comparison for establishing the disparity, (2) how tangible the impact
must be (Mere proximity to a polluting facility? Decline in the enjoyment or value of property?
Measurable physical harm?), and (3) the availability of nondiscriminatory alternatives that ade-
quately meet the program's legitimate objectives. Id.
320. See Colopy, supra note 6, at 160; Fisher, supra note 282, at 321; see also Coalition of
Concerned Citizens v. Damian, 608 F. Supp. 110, 127 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (holding that although
plaintiffs established prima facie case of disparate impact, the government officials successfully
responded with legitimate reasons for location).
321. NAACP-Flint Chapter v. Engler, No. 95-38228-CV, at 35-36 (Mich. Cir. CL 1997) (tran-
script of decision read from the bench), rev'd on other grounds, NAACP-Flint Chapter v. Governor,
No. 205264 (Mich. C. App. Nov. 24, 1998) (unpublished opinion).
322. Engler, No. 95-38228-CV at 35-36. However, the trial judge sua sponte held for the
plaintiffs on substantive and procedural environmental claims under state constitutional and statutory
law. Id. at 17, 39-45. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial judge lacked
the authority to consider the issues sua sponte. Governor, No. 205264, at 1-2,4.
323. Engler, No. 95-38228-CV at 35-36.
324. See Colopy, supra note 6, at 165; Fisher, supra note 282, at 328-31.
325. See Cole, Litigation, supra note 4, at 531-34; Lazarus, supra note 6, at 836-39. Bat see
Light & Rand, supra note 299, at 5 (expressing caution about the effectiveness of Titie VI suits and
arguing in support of the need for political and economic strategies). See generally Colopy, supra
note 6, at 158-181 (exploring ways in which Title VI can be used to protect minority communities
from environmental racism); Fisher, supra note 282, at 311-12 (arguing that it is possible to use
Title VI to solve the problem of environmental discrimination).
326. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1994).
327. Id. § 3604(b).
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"shall have the same right... to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and
convey real and personal property."'' A Title VIII claim does not require
proof of intentional discrimination; disparate impact is sufficient. ' A
Title VHI claim thus follows the same general pattern as a Title VI
claim: a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of disparate impact, the
defendant rebuts with nondiscriminatory justification(s), and the plaintiff
responds with evidence of less discriminatory means that adequately
satisfy the legitimate reason(s) for the defendant's action!" Although
Title VIn, unlike Title VI, does not require a federal funding nexus, it
does require that the impact relate to fair housing opportunities."' How-
ever, Luke Cole has suggested that building on Title VII's application to
local government zoning, environmental justice advocates could use Ti-
tle VIII to attack land use decisions, such as the siting of LULUs in mi-
nority neighborhoods, that have the effect of increasing segregation by
triggering "white flight."m Title VIII has rarely been used in environ-
mental justice cases so far.m Section 1982 has also not been widely used
in environmental justice suits, but Richard Lazarus suggests that envi-
ronmental justice advocates could use it to challenge government actions
that depreciate the value of property owned by African American citi-
zens. ' However, Lazarus believes that the courts are likely to resolve
uncertainties about whether disparate impact is enough under section
1982 in favor of requiring proof of intentional discrimination.!
Use of civil rights statutes to pursue environmental justice claims
reflects a theory that the unequal distribution of environmental burdens
violates minorities' civil rights." However, this strategy, unlike the use
of the Equal Protection Clause, also reflects the view that not only bad
motives by government decision makers, but also official actions that
have racially differential effects violate minorities' civil rights.' This
theory addresses, at least partly, institutional discrimination which may
persist despite the motives and behavior of individual actors. '
328. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1994).
329. See Cole, Litigation, supra note 4, at 534-35; see also Lazarus, supra note 6, at 839-40.
330. Cole, Litigation, supra note 4, at 534-35.
331. See id. at 535; Lazarus, supra note 6, at 840.
332. Cole, Litigation, supra note 4, at 535-37. In the context of this discussion, "white flight"
refers to the departure of whites from the neighborhood.
333. Id. at 534.
334. Lazarus, supra note 6, at 842.
335. Id. at 842-43.
336. See Cole, Litigation, supra note 4, at 530-31.
337. Id.
338. See Colopy, supra note 6, at 188-89.
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3. Statutory Rights to Enforcement of Environmental Laws
Statutory substantive environmental law rights' are rights embed-
ded in federal and state environmental statutes that allow citizens to sue
to enforce those statutes.' Olga Moya and Andrew Fono succinctly de-
scribe citizen suits:
There are two types of citizen suits. First is the "enforcing" citizen
suit. Here, a citizen files suit against a party who is alleged to have
violated environmental laws or regulations. The second type is an
"agency-forcing" citizen suit. Here, an individual sues a government
agency that is alleged to have failed to aggressively pursue its non-
discretionary duties.m'
Private citizens essentially act as "private attorneys general,"
compensating for government underenforcement of environmental laws
by pursuing civil actions against alleged polluters and suing government
officials to compel them to perform non-discretionary duties' 0 Courts
may compel polluters to comply with the statutory or regulatory re-
quirements (e.g., an air emission limit or a standard for storage of
wastes), force polluters to clean up contaminated areas (e.g., remediation
of soil and groundwater contaminated with hazardous wastes), impose
administrative, civil, and criminal sanctions on polluters, direct govern-
ment agencies to act, and award attorneys' fees to successful litigants.3
Most major federal environmental statutes contain citizen suit pro-
visions.' Generally, a plaintiff who wants to bring an environmental
citizen suit must give at least sixty days notice of intent to bring the suit
339. Here, "substantive" means rights under environmental statutes to pollution control (i.e., by
enforcement of environmental statutes and regulations against polluters or by challenges to agencies
for failure to implement environmental statutes properly), in contrast with private citizens' rights to
participate in or receive information about environmental decision making (i.e., strictly procedural
rights). See Fisher, supra note 282, at 306-09 (discussing how lawsuits under environmental statutes
are allowing communities to compel compliance with the law, and how NEPA's procedural reme-
dies offer only a reprieve, rather than a remedy). But see Cole, Litigation, supra note 4, at 527-28
(arguing that environmental statutes and rights are procedural in focus).
340. E.g., Clean Water Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994); Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act § 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1994); Clean Air Act § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1994); Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act § 310, 42 U.S.C. § 9659
(1994).
341. OLGA L. MOYA & ANDREW L. FONO, FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: THE USER'S
GuiDE 27 (1997).
342. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 737-38 (1972) (discussing standing and the
ability of the Sierra Club to act as a "private attorney general").
343. Gauna, supra note 6, at 4; see also Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 737-38.
344. See MoYA & FONO, supra note 341, at 26-28.
345. E.g., Toxic Substances Control Act § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (1994); Clean Water Act §
505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994); Safe Drinking Water Act § 1449, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (1994 & Supp.
It. 1996); Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4911, 6972, 7604, 9659 (1994); Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986,42 U.S.C. § 11046 (1994).
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to the alleged violator, the state, and the EPA.' In addition, citizen suits
often are barred if the EPA or the state has commenced and is diligently
prosecuting enforcement against the alleged violators.' Although envi-
ronmental groups' use of citizen suits historically has not benefited low-
income and minority communities,' the environmental justice move-
ment increasingly uses environmental law citizen suits to combat envi-
ronmental injustice.' In fact, Cole places suits under environmental stat-
utes at the top of his hierarchy of environmental justice litigation strate-
gies!-'
However, Eileen Gauna has identified several obstacles to the ef-
fective use of citizen suits by grassroots environmental justice groups.
First, a group with limited resources and technical and legal knowledge
may have difficulty detecting and proving industry noncompliance with
applicable environmental laws, which may be embedded in statutes,
regulations, permits, administrative or court orders, or even state and
local implementing plans."' The group would need reliable data about
industry activity sufficient to prove a violation, and information about
applicable legal requirements, which may be far from clear.!" Second,
citizen suits are expensive and require mobilization of resources and par-
ticipation. ' Third, fee-shifting provisions which provide for the award of
attorneys' fees to the prevailing party may provide an incentive to bring
citizen suits in general, but not enough of an incentive in the typical envi-
ronmental justice context. Recovery of fees occurs at the end of a suc-
cessful enforcement action, and cannot be adjusted for the contingency
nature of environmental civil suits, thus deterring both private attorneys
and legal services groups from fronting the high litigation costs of citizen
suits." Fourth, successful groups generally cannot receive damages. Al-
though some environmental groups receive the benefit of civil penalties
by developing environmental mitigation projects that can be funded with
penalties collected from citizen suits, low-income and minority commu-
nities have limited capacity to develop these projects." Fifth, the ability
to bring a suit may be limited until, or if, the government takes action,
346. Gauna, supra note 6, at 44 & n.153. The courts strictly interpret the notice provisions of
environmental statutes. See Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 32-33 (1989).
347. Gauna, supra note 6, at 44 n. 154.
348. Fisher, supra note 282, at 302-03; Gauna, supra note 6, at 5.
349. Cole, Litigation, supra note 4, at 526-28 (suggesting a litigation hierarchy for use in
environmental siting cases); Fisher, supra note 282, at 306-07. One example of a promising success
is NAACP-Flint Chapter v. Engler, holding that the Michigan Constitution requires the state envi-
ronmental agency to conduct risk assessments that consider cumulative impacts on the health of
local residents when permitting facilities. NAACP-Flint Chapter v. Engler, No. 95-38228-CV, at 39-
43 (Mich. Cir. CL 1997).
350. Cole, Litigation, supra note 4, at 526.
351. Gauna, supra note 6, at 43-46, 50-57, 63-64.
352. Id. at 45-47, 50-56, 63-64.
353. Id. at 44-46,73-74.
354. Id. at 76-79.
355. Id. at 47-48.
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thus making the environmental justice group dependent on government
enforcement decisions.' Sixth, the standards that regulated entities must
meet may not adequately protect low-income or minority communities. '
Seventh, the government often has discretion about the application of
environmental laws and the content of environmental standards and
regulations. Agency-forcing suits apply only to non-discretionary duties
and as a practical matter, often involve efforts to force the agency to set
standards when it has failed to do so at all.'m In fact, decisions about
whether to consider environmental justice and equity factors in environ-
mental decisions is discretionary and generally cannot be forced directly
through citizen suits. ' Finally, the technical complexity of citizen suits
has the potential to derail political goals and activities of grassroots
groups.' Nevertheless, Gauna, while urging reforms, also urges envi-
ronmental justice advocates to use citizen suits to vindicate the rights of
low-income and minority people to have the environmental laws en-
forced.:"
4. Participatory Rights Under Environmental Statutes
Federal and state environmental statutes have not only substantive
pollution control and cleanup standards that may be enforced by private
citizens, but also procedural requirements. These procedures ensure that
government agencies consider the environmental consequences of their
activities and that the public can participate in environmental decision
making and have access to information. '
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)W and state envi-
ronmental policy acts (SEPAs)' lie at the core of the public's right to
356. Id. at 61-62,64,74-75 (examining CERCLA, which prevents an enforcement action until
the EPA has issued an order that is not complied with, and RCRA, in which a citizen suit is barred if
the EPA or State initiates proceedings).
357. Id. at 48-50.
358. Id. at 70-76.
359 . Id.
360. Id. at 39-40 (noting that environmental justice suits typically begin as political and eco-
nomic struggles, not legal ones).
361. Id. at 86-87.
362. See generally Reich, supra note 6, at 297-98,305-11 (addressing the avenues of access for
minorities through federal translation requirements and the broad scope of SEPA access mandates).
363. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1994 & Supp. L
1996).
364. NEPA and SEPAs provide the public with access to information and analysis of the envi-
ronmental impacts of the government's decisions. For examples of SEPAs, see CAL. PUB. RES.
CODE §§ 21000-21177 (West 1996 & Supp. 1998); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-I to -lh (West
1995 & Supp. 1998); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-981 to -990 (1995 & Supp. 1998); HAW. REV. STAT. §§
343-1 to -8 (1993 & Supp. 1997); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 13-1 1-1-1 to 13-15-10-6 (Michie 1996); MD.
CODE ANN., NAT. RES. I §§ 1-301 to -305 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 1997); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 30, §§ 61-62H (West 1992 & Supp. 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 116D.01-.07 (West 1997);
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 75-1-101 to -324 (1997); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 8-0101 to -0117
(McKinney 1997 & Supp. 1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113A-1 to -10 (1997); P.R. LAWS ANN. lit.
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governmental study and consideration of the environmental impacts of
its decisions, participation in the study and consideration process, and
access to the resulting information and analysis. Under NEPA, a federal
agency must prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for
"major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment."' The agency prepares an Environmental Assessment
(EA) to determine if the proposed action is a major federal action and has
a significant impact on the environment.s' The EA, which is a less de-
tailed document than the EIS, includes a brief discussion of the need for
the proposed action, any alternatives to the action, and environmental
impacts of both the action and its alternatives. ' If an EIS is not required,
the agency issues a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI).' If an
agency must prepare an EIS, however, it must issue public notice in the
Federal Register that it intends to prepare an EIS, and solicit public input
concerning the scope of the study.' The EIS is a detailed study of the
direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts of the proposed action on the
environment, unavoidable adverse effects of the proposed action, and
possible alternatives to the proposal, including mitigation measures and
the alternative of "no action." Public hearings are not required unless
the agency's regulations so provide, but the agency must publish notice
of the draft EIS and circulate it to any interested person, as well as gov-
ernment agencies that have jurisdiction or expertise over the subject."'
After receiving comments, the agency prepares, circulates, and gives
public notice of the final EIS, which must include responses to all of the
comments the agency received.m
SEPAs provide a similar process for state and local government
actions, but often are more stringent and guarantee greater public partici-
patory rights than NEPA.' 3 SEPAs often apply to a wider range of pri-
vate activities than does NEPA, because of the wide range of private
activities subject to state and local permitting requirements, including
12, §§ 1121-1142 (1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAws §§ 34A-9-1 to -13 (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1998);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 43.21C.010-.914 (West 1998); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 1.11 (West 1996).
365. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). Major federal actions include federally funded projects and deci-
sions by federal agencies to grant permits to regulated private activities. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (1997).
366. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(b).
367. Id. § 1508.9 (establishing the requirements for an environmental assessment (EA)).
368. Id. § 1501.4(e) (setting forth that a FONSI is issued when the agency decides not to pre-
pare a statement based on the environmental assessment).
369. Id. §§ 1501.7, 1503.1(aX4).
370. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (listing congressionally mandated components of an EIS); 40
C.F.R. §§ 1508.8, 1508.25 (expanding on which effects the EIS should address and the scope of the
coverage of the EIS).
371. 40C.F.R. §§ 1501.7(a)(1), 1502.9(a), 1502.19, 1506.6, 1503.1.
372. Id. §§ 1502.9, 1502.19, 1503.4(a), 1506.6(b), 1506.9, 1506.10.
373. Johnson, supra note 282, at 566-67; Reich, supra note 6, at 305-07.
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land use permits. "7 State and local agencies often must consider a broader
scope of impacts than the federal government, including health, eco-
nomic, social, and cultural impacts& SEPAs "require a more thorough
review process with additional opportunities for participation" than does
NEPA.' These requirements include more circulation of draft studies,
more public notices, more hearings, and greater public and government
review opportunities&n SEPAs are broadly interpreted to encourage and
facilitate public participation.' For example, in one instance a particular
SEPA was interpreted as including the requirement that environmental
impact documents be translated into Spanish for the siting of a toxic
waste incinerator in a community that was almost forty percent monolin-
gual Spanish-speaking. ' Although some federal agencies provide non-
English translations of environmental studies and documents, NEPA
does not require it."m Finally, some SEPAs are not only procedural but
also substantive: agencies are required to avoid negative environmental
impacts." In contrast, NEPA is solely a procedural statute; once a federal
agency studies and considers environmental impacts, it is not prohibited
from proceeding with its proposed action even if it will greatly harm the
environment.'
NEPA and SEPAs provide valuable means of seeking environ-
mental justice goals through the participation of low-income and minor-
itypeople in governmental decisions and by attacks on the environmental
decision making process.m Stephen Johnson has summarized the advan-
374. Cf. Johnson, supra note 282, at 567, 595 (describing Congress's initial vision that NEPA
serve as a model for state environmental review laws, and the current situation where state laws can
be used as a model for NEPA).
375. Id. at 566-67; see Reich, supra note 6, at 311-13 (arguing that these factors allow for
consideration of the action's impact on community preservation).
376. Reich, supra note 6, at 307.
377. Id.
378. Id. at 307-11.
379. El Pueblo Pam el Aim y Agua Limpio v. County of Kings, [1992] 22 ENVrh. L. REP.
(Envt. L. Inst.) 20357, 20358 (Cal. Super. Ct, Dec. 30, 1991) ("[The residents of Kettleman City's]
meaningful involvement in the CEQA review process was effectively precluded by the absence of
the Spanish translation"). This environmental justice case involved a significant victory for the
residents of Kettleman City to participate meaningfully in the environmental study process and local
decision making about the incinerator, as well as a strategic advance for the rights of low-income
and minority people to participate in environmental decision making generally. See Cole, Litigation,
supra note 4, at 528-30; Reich, supra note 6, at 308-11. However, the court held that the EIR,
although written in technical language, was understandable by interested laypersons. El Pueblo,
[19921 22 ENvTh L REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20358.
380. Johnson, supra note 282, at 602.
381. Id. at 597-99; see, e.g., California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), CAL. PUB. RES.
CODE § 21002.1(b) (West 1996).
382. Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1980) (empha-
sizing the procedural nature of duties imposed on agencies by NEPA, and the discretion agencies
must have in the face of judicial scrutiny).
383. Cole, Litigation, supra note 4, at 528 (placing use of participatory and procedural rights in
environmental law--"environmental law, with a twist"--high in the hierarchy of environmental
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tages of NEPA (and implicitly the similarly structured SEPAs) to the
environmental justice movement:
NEPA's public participation provisions empower communities by
enabling them to provide input into the federal government's deci-
sion-making process and to educate the government about the dispa-
rate impacts proposed actions may have on communities.... [Tihey
also give the communities valuable information about public health
and safety and the government's decision-making process. If the gov-
ernment decides to take an action that disparately impacts a minority
or low-income community, community leaders can use the informa-
tion they receive through the NEPA review process to organize the
community against the government action.
The NEPA review process can also advance environmental jus-
tice by delaying the federal government in taking actions that could
disparately impact communities. The delay provides communities
more time to organize their opposition to the government actions. The
cost of the environmental review process might also derail govern-
ment projects, including those which could have a disparate impact
on communities.
Finally, in many cases, NEPA requires the federal government
to consider certain health and socioeconomic impacts of proposed ac-
tions before taking the actions. Through this process, the government
should be able to identify whether proposed actions will have a dispa-
rate impact on minority or low-income communities. The government
can then avoid taking those actions.'"
Beyond NEPA and SEPAs, environmental justice advocates might
seek to enforce environmental participatory, procedural, and informa-
tional rights through open meetings laws that require government meet-
ings to be open to the public, open records laws that give private citizens
access to government documents, and procedural requirements of spe-
cific environmental statutes that either require or allow public participa-
tion and input in decisions made under those statutes. ' In addition, the
justice litigation strategies). Peter Reich believes that SEPAs are superior to NEPA for addressing
environmental injustice because of the limited scope of NEPA as a guarantor of access; however,
Stephen Johnson's concern that SEPAs do not apply to federal action leads Johnson to encourage the
use of NEPA as it exists now, and advocate reforms of NEPA to make it more like progressive
SEPAs. Compare Reich, supra note 6, at 306-07, with Johnson, supra note 282, at 566-69. How-
ever. a recent Nuclear Regulatory Commission finding asserts that NEPA does not authorize inquiry
into whether racial animus motivated a siting decision. In re Louisiana Energy Servs., L.P., 47
N.R.C. 77, dismissed as moot, 47 N.R.C. 113 (1998).
384. Johnson, supra note 282, at 571 (footnotes omitted).
385. MANASrER, supra note 6, at 133-52 (discussing access to environmental decisions and
data); see Coalition of Concerned Citizens Against 1-670 v. Damian, 608 F. Supp. 110 (S.D. Ohio
1984) (involving a community group's challenge via Federal-Aid Highway Act public involvement
requirements); NAACP-Flint Chapter v. Engler, No. 95-38228-CV, at 43-45 (Mich Cir. CL 1997)
(holding that governments and residents of localities adjoining the jurisdiction in which polluting
facility is to be sited have state constitutional and statutory right to participate in decisions about
siting), rev'd on other grounds, NAACP-Flint Chapter v. Governor, No. 205364, at 1-2,4 (Mich. C.
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Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA)'
and similar state and local lawse" require that facilities with hazardous or
toxic substances notify local communities of the presence of those sub-
stances and promptly report any releases, such as spills or emissions, of
those substances into the environment. These laws are designed to in-
form local residents of toxics in their neighborhoods, help prepare them
to respond to accidents, and immediately notify them of any potentially
harmful accidents. One recent environmental justice litigation success
involved a suit by low-income residents of north central Denver neigh-
borhoods against the Vulcan Chemical Company for failure to notify
local authorities after a rail car spill of muriatic and hydrochloric acid.'
A federal judge ruled that EPCRA allows citizens to sue a company for
its failure to notify and to obtain civil penalties of up to $25,000 per
day.' According to a lawyer for the grassroots groups involved in the
action against Vulcan Chemical, the lawsuit sent a message to hazardous
materials handlers that neighbors have a right to the reporting of spills
and will demand it.' The lawyer also stated that it possibly could deter
companies from storing or transporting as many toxic chemicals in
neighborhoods. " ' Similarly, grassroots groups in San Diego, by bringing
litigation that was ultimately settled, forced the San Diego County Air
Pollution Control District to publish multilingual notices in fourteen
community newspapers about toxic air emissions from area industries
and military installations.' The District also had to mail additional in-
formation to residents living in the zones of highest cancer risk. The
plaintiffs brought this suit under the California Toxics Hotspots Act!'
Through enforcement of community right-to-know laws, environmental
justice groups act on procedural rights that enable them to monitor envi-
App. 1998) (holding that trial court lacked the authority to consider the issues sua sponte when
plaintiffs failed to plead the claims).
386. 42U.S.C.§§ 11001-11050(1994).
387. See Alan E. Seneczko, The Right-to-Know and the Trucking Industry: Regulating Regula-
tions, 14 TRANSP. LJ. 347, 359-61 & nn.39 & 48 (1986).
388. Neighbors for a Toxic Free Community v. Vulcan Materials Co., 964 F. Supp. 1448, 1448
(D. Colo. 1997). The U.S. Supreme Court has recently cast doubt on the long-term impact of this
Colorado case and grassroots groups' ability to recover damages for past violations of EPCRA. In
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, the court held that Citizens for a Better Environment,
an environmental justice group, lacked standing to sue under EPCRA for "historical" violations of
the Act because none of the possible relief would remedy the harm of late reporting of spills. 1 18 S.
Ct 1003, 1020 (1998).
389. Neighbors for a Toxic Free Community, 964 F. Supp. at 1449-54.
390. Federal Judge Gives Residents of Poor Neighborhoods the Right to Sue Company for
Failing to Report Chemical Spill, NEWS RELEASE (Ecological Consultants for the Pub. Interest),
Apr. 30, 1997.
391. Id.
392. See News & Notes, WORKING NOTEs ON COMMUNITY RIGHT-To-KNow, supra note 175,
at 1.
393. d.
394. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13390-13396 (West 1992 & Supp. 1998).
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ronmental harms in their neighborhoods, holding both the government
and possible polluters accountable.
5. Common Law Rights
Finally, seekers of environmental justice rights use common law
remedies to seek redress for harms to people and property caused by an-
other private person or entity!" The legal theories of liability for envi-
ronmental harms, on which environmental-justice toxic tort claims are
based, are strict liability, negligence, negligence per se, trespass, battery,
and nuisance.'
Deriving from the English case of Rylands v. Fletcher," the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts section 519 recognizes strict liability for
harm to other people or their property from abnormally dangerous (ultra-
hazardous) activities." In determining what activities are abnormally
dangerous or ultrahazardous, courts balance six factors related to the
utility of the activity and the risk and degree of harm: (1) the existence of
a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land, or chattels of an-
other, (2) the likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(3) an inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(4) the extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage; (5)
the inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on;
and (6) the extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by
its dangerous attributes.' Some courts have found the storage, disposal,
and even use of hazardous and toxic substances to be abnormally dan-
gerous and thus a basis for strict liability. ' while other courts have re-
395. See Duncan, supra note 6, at 355-57; Melissa Thorme, Local to Global: Citizen's Legal
Rights and Remedies Relating to Toxic Waste Dumps, 5 TUL ENvTL. J. 101, 115-21 (1991). See
generally Troyen A. Brennan, Environmental Torts, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1993) (examining envi-
ronmental tort litigation and its social utility).
396. See Wedein v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 887, 907 (D. Minn. 1990) (recognizing battery
claims), vacated in part, 793 F. Supp. 898 (D. Minn. 1992) (vacating ruling to certify class action
claims involving distinct and completed phases); Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 647 F. Supp.
303, 308 (W.D. Tenn. 1986) (predicating right to recover damages on common law tort claims),
affd in part, rev'd in part, 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988) (overturning issues relating to jurisdiction,
class action, causation, and damages); Bagley v. Controlled Env't Corp., 503 A.2d 823, 826-27
(N.H. 1986) (analyzing negligence per se); Duncan, supra note 6, at 355 (giving an overview of
toxic tort claims based on nuisance, trespass, negligence, and strict liability); Thorme, supra note
395, at 115-21 (discussing common law tort claims).
397. 3 L.R.-E. & L App. 330,342 (1868).
398. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1965).
399. Id.§ 520.
400. Sterling, 647 F. Supp. at 311-16 (finding strict liability for contamination of neighboring
wells due to operation of a 242-acre burial site for chemical wastes from manufacturing plant);
Luthringer v. Moore, 190 P.2d 1, 8 (Cal. 1948) (finding strict liability for harm from fumigating a
small shop with hydrocyanic acid gas, a deadly chemical); New Jersey v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d
150, 157-60 (NJ. 1983) (finding strict liability exists for pollution of creek from mercury processing
operations of chemical corporation). As stated by the New Jersey court "[lt is time to recognize
expressly that the law of liability has evolved so that a landowner is strictly liable to others for harm
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jected this proposition.' The idea that low-income and minority plain-
tiffs harmed by toxic uses of nearby property are entitled per se to re-
cover on an ultrahazardous activity theory is complicated by some
courts' acceptance of hazardous substances and waste as normal in an
industrial society and particularly in neighborhoods that contain several
intensive uses.
Negligence and negligence per se are alternative general toxic tort
causes of action. For example, one court held a chemical corporation
liable on a negligence theory for contaminating neighboring property
owners' home wells with migrating chemicals from a 242-acre burial
site."2 The court held that the corporation owed a duty "to protect others
from unreasonable harm arising from the dumping of... chemicals"''
and breached its duty by its failure to investigate the conditions of the
site selected, install proper monitoring mechanisms, use state-of-the-art
methods of operation, and respond to leaks adequately.' In another case,
the owner and developer of a planned residential community, which
dumped oil, grease, and other waste materials onto its property, was held
liable for soil and groundwater contamination on adjoining property.'
The actions constituted negligence per se because the defendant failed to
obtain a permit for hazardous waste disposal, a violation of state law.'
When a defendant intentionally pollutes and that pollution comes
into contact with a plaintiff's property or person, the plaintiff may have a
cause of action in trespass or battery, respectively.
To recover in trespass, a plaintiff must show: (1) An invasion affect-
ing an interest in the exclusive possession of the property, (2) an in-
tentional doing of the act which results in the invasion, (3) reasonable
foreseeability that the act done could result in an invasion of plain-
tiff's possessory interest, and (4) substantial damage to the res, or
property.4
caused by toxic wastes that are stored on his property and flow onto the property of others." Ventron,
468 A.2d at 157.
401. Avemco Ins. Co. v. Rooto Corp., 967 F.2d 1105, 1109 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding storage of
hydrochloric and sulfuric acid not ultrahazardous, even though disgruntled former employee illegally
spilled 6,000 gallons of acid); Axawana Mills Co. v. United Tech. Corp., 795 F. Supp. 1238, 1251-
52 (D. Conn. 1992) (holding neither operation of metal finishing business nor storage and use of
hazardous materials is abnormally dangerous per se); Fritz v. E.L DuPont De Nemours & Co., 75
A.2d 256, 261 (Del. 1950) (finding use of chlorine gas at manufacturing facility not abnormally
dangerous in light of the well-recognized industrial use of the property).
402. Sterling, 647 F. Supp. at 306, 316-17.
403. Id. at 316.
404. Jd. at 316-17.
405. Bagley v. Controlled Env't Corp., 503 A.2d 823, 824 (N.HL 1986).
406. Bagley, 503 A.2d at 827.
407. Thorme, supra note 395, at 118 & n.104 (citing Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So. 2d
523,523-24 (Ala. 1979)).
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In Bradley v. American Smelting & Refining Co.," a copper smelter's
emission of particulate matter, including arsenic and cadmium, into the
air and onto the plaintiff's property was actionable trespass, as well as
nuisance.a In Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co.,"0 trespass occurred when
an aluminum reduction and manufacturing plant emitted invisible fluo-
ride gases and particulates into the air and onto neighboring property,
making it unfit for raising livestock.' Thus, an actionable trespass may
be a direct or indirect invasion of property by substances which, although
concrete, may be microscopic. A court, however, may require a showing
of actual damages,"2 and there are many recognized defenses to trespass
claims."3
A defendant may be liable for battery if the defendant disposes of a
toxic material with the intent to cause an offensive or harmful contact
with the plaintiff or knows that the contact is substantially certain to oc-
cur.""' Neighbors of an Army ammunition plant defeated summary judg-
ment on a battery claim against a tenant who disposed of highly toxic
substances directly above a regional aquifer." The claim was not dis-
missed because there was evidence that the tenant "knew that its conduct
was substantially certain to cause an offensive or harmful contact.""'
Nuisance law is a frequently discussed basis for remedying envi-
ronmental wrongs.4'7 Two types of nuisance actions exist: private and
public."' A private nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a plain-
tiff's right to the use and enjoyment of his or her property.""' A public
408. 709 P.2d 782 (Wash. 1985).
409. Bradley, 709 P.2d at 788.
410. 342 P.2d 790 (Or. 1959).
411. Martin, 342 P.2d at 791-92.
412. Bradley, 709 P.2d at 791-92. But see Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 647 F. Supp. 303,
317-19 (W.D. Tenn. 1986) (allowing in a trespass action, not only actual damages to real property,
but also consequential and special damages related to emotional distress, fear of falling property
values, and fear of potential health hazards), affid in part, rev'd in part, 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir.
1988) (overturning issues relating to jurisdiction, class action, causation, and damages).
413. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 167-213 (1965).
414. See Werlein v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 887,907 (D. Minn. 1990), vacated in part, 793
F. Supp. 898 (D. Minn. 1992) (vacating ruling to certify class action claims involving distinct and
completed phases).
415. Werlein, 746 F. Supp. at 907.
416. Id. at 907.
417. See Duncan, supra note 6, at 355-56. See generally Andrew Jackson Heimert, Keeping
Pigs Out of the Parlor: Using Nuisance Law to Affect the Location of Pollution, 27 ENvTL L 403
(1997) (discussing the origins of nuisance law and its use against pollution); Ronald Rychlak. Corn-
mon-Law Remedies for Envirownental Wrongs: The Role of Private Nuisance, 59 MisS. LJ. 657
(1989) (focusing on the attractive features of nuisance law as a remedy for environmental wrongs);
Thorme, supra note 395, at I 15-18. Nuisance law was the basis of a lawsuit challenging the siting of
a PCB landfill in Warren County, North Carolina, an issue that played a formative role in the devel-
opment of the environmental justice movement. See Warren County v. North Carolina, 528 F. Supp.
276,280 (E.D.N.C. 1981).
418. Thormesupranote395,at 115.
419. Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 647 F. Supp. 303,319 (W.D. Tenn. 1986), affd in part,
rev'd in part, 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988).
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nuisance is an "unreasonable interference with a right common to the
general public."'  Among the activities found to interfere with private
property rights, thereby constituting private nuisances, have been the
operation of a chemical waste burial site that contaminated plaintiffs'
home water wells,' 1 the maintenance of a hazardous waste dump site that
exploded into an unquenchable blaze,n and the operation of a large ce-
ment plant that emitted dirt, smoke, and vibrations.' Fear of future in-
jury alone, however, cannot support a private nuisance action:' None-
theless, a plaintiff who can prove that a LULU or environmentally harm-
ful activity actually interferes with his or her use or enjoyment of his or
her property can recover damages for emotional distress, inconvenience
and disruption of daily life, and the enhanced risk of disease. '
To establish a public nuisance claim, a private plaintiff must dem-
onstrate a special injury that is different in kind, not just degree, from
that suffered by other members of the public.'' For example, evidence
that plaintiffs suffered leukemia and other illness from exposure to water
contaminated by defendants was sufficiently distinct from general public
harm to support a public nuisance claim.' However, claims of aggra-
vated allergies and respiratory disorders from air pollution emitted by a
fiberglass manufacturing plant were insufficient because plaintiffs al-
leged injury to the air quality and health of citizens of the entire county.'
Toxic tort claims might effectively remedy the physical and prop-
erty harms caused by environmental injustice.' The common law rights
protected here, however, are largely rights to compensation for the harm,
and typically not rights to prevent the harm. Preliminary injunctions to
prevent a polluting facility from starting its operations and purportedly
committing toxic harms are not generally available because of the diffi-
culty in establishing imminent irreparable harm.' Thus, common law
rights do little directly to keep LULUs out of minority and low-income
neighborhoods initially. Plaintiffs might be able to obtain an injunction
to prevent future harm from an existing activity that they have proved
420. RMATEMENT (SFoND) TORTS § 821B (1979).
421. Sterling, 647 F. Supp. at 319-23.
422. Wood v. Picillo, 443 A.2d 1244, 1245 (R.L 1982).
423. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870,871 (N.Y. 1970).
424. Koll-Irvine dr. Property Owners Ass'n v. County of Orange, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 664, 667-
68 (CL App. 1994) (discussing the operation of jet fuel storage tanks at airport).
425. Sterling, 647 F. Supp. at 320-23.
426. Koll-Irvine, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 666.
427. Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219,1232-34 (D. Mass. 1986).
428. Venuto v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 99 Cal. Rptr. 350, 358 (CL App. 1971).
429. Thorme, supra note 395, at 115.
430. Id. at 152 n.94; see also Koll-Irvine, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 667-68 (holding the fear of future
injury not actionable); Nicholson v. Connecticut Half-way House, Inc., 218 A.2d 383, 386 (Conn.
1966) (noting that fear of future criminal activity from proposed halfway house for prison parolees
could not justify granting an injunction). But see Freedman v. Briarcroft Property Owners, Inc., 776
S.W.2d 212,216 (Tex. CL App. 1989) (allowing an injunction to prevent a threatened injury).
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harms them.0 ' Courts, however, are increasingly willing to allow eco-
nomically beneficial but environmentally harmful activity to continue
and instead require operators of these nuisances to compensate sur-
rounding property owners.' Furthermore, even toxic tort plaintiffs who
seek compensatory damages, instead of abatement of the tortious activ-
ity, often encounter difficulties proving causation, i.e., linking evidence
of health effects to the specific pollutant or industrial activity."3 Even if
compensatory and punitive liability for toxic wastes and hazardous land
uses at common law indirectly discourage would-be polluters, this
method of controlling or preventing environmental injustices is ineffi-
cient and uncertain.'' Plaintiffs must have the resources to litigate these
claims; even if an attorney will take a toxic tort case on a contingency fee
basis, the costs of gathering and presenting evidence of the harm and its
cause can be great03 Court decisions about which activities are action-
able torts are ad hoc, fact specific, and unpredictable. ' Judicial standards
to protect low-income and minority neighborhoods from toxic torts could
take decades to develop case-by-case. Courts will likely be reluctant to
declare a LULU a nuisance if it has received approvals from federal or
state environmental agencies under applicable laws. Finally, victims of
environmental injustice may receive very little actual compensation.
Toxic tort suits "have disempowered and disillusioned many low-income
communities and communities of color. While some community mem-
431. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 166 (7th Cir. 1979).
432. E.g., Baldwin v. McClendon, 288 So. 2d 761,767 (Ala. 1974); Boomer v. Atlantic Ce-
ment Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 872-74 (N.Y. 1970); Jost v. Dairyland Power Coop., 172 N.W.2d 647,
653-54 (Wis. 1969). If the court decides that the challenged activity has greater social utility than
the court's perception of the harm, it may determine that the activity is not a nuisance. Thorme,
supra note 395, at 118.
433. Thorme, supra note 395, at 115 n.89.
434. Brennan, supra note 395, at 6-7. As stated by Brennan: "Empirical evidence suggests that
environmental torts suits ... send a weak deterrent signal." Id." at 6. For skepticism about the impact
of common law rules on human behavior, see ELLICKSON, supra note 77 (discussing alternative,
informal norms to dispute resolution); Richard A. Epstein, The Social Consequences of Common-
Law Rules, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1717 (1982) (discussing the need to be cautious when assigning social
and economic consequences to common law rules because of institutional and intellectual restraints);
John Griffiths, Is Law Important?, 54 N.Y.U. L REv. 339, 343-54 (stating that direct effects of
legal rules on human behavior is empirically questionable at best, and indirect effects ae difficult to
ascertain). For discussion of the limits of the adjudicative process, see James A. Henderson, Jr.,
Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from the Rule of Law, 51 IND. L3. 467, 495-501
(1976).
435. Vincent Robert Johnson, Ethical Limitations on Creative Financing of Mass Tort Class
Actions, 54 BROOK. L REv. 539, 545-48 (1988).
436. See Elinor P. Schroeder, Legislative and Judicial Responses to the Inadequacy of Compen-
sation for Occupational Disease, 49 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 151, 162 (1986) C'[Tihe very nature
of the common law dictates that tort rules will change slowly, sporadically, and inconsistently."); see
also Henderson, supra note 434, at 468; Thorme, supra note 395, at 118. Compare State Dep't of
Envtl. Protection v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150, 160-64 (NJ. 1983) (holding the storage of toxic
wastes is an abnormally dangerous activity for which storage facility is strictly liable), with Arawana
Mills Co. v. United Tech. Corp., 795 F. Supp. 1238, 1252 (D. Conn. 1992) (storage of hazardous
materials is not an abnormally dangerous for strict liability purposes).
437. See Warren County v. North Carolina, 528 F. Supp. 276, 285 (E.D.N.C. 1981).
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bers may in the long run receive compensation for their injuries, many
plaintiffs in such suits see little money, if any at all, in these suits, which
often last for years."'e Therefore, common law rights have limited utility
for the environmental justice movement.
6. The Reactive Nature of Rights
Legal conceptions of environmental justice--whether grounded in
constitutional law, statutes, or common law, and whether concerning
civil rights, environmental rights, or tort rights-are essentially
reactive.' Legal rights depend considerably on judicial enforcement." °
Joel Handler has written:
Our legal system is not proactive. In order for the system to work
there must be a complaining client. People have to know that they
have suffered a harm, they have to blame someone rather than them-
selves for that harm, they have to know how to pursue the remedy,
they have to have resources to pursue the remedy, and the potential
benefits of winning have to outweigh the potential costs. All of these
conditions are essential; if there is a failure to satisfy any one condi-
tion, then the remedy will fail."'
Legal actions develop in response to violations of those rights, or at
least in response to threats to those rights. There must be a claimant who
is willing and able to bring a lawsuit, and the court's action is limited to
responding to the particulars of the claims presented."' Litigation, in
contrast to proactive zoning regulation, results in fewer restraints on
harmful land uses and is rarely an early preventive strategy." Through
litigation, the law develops incrementally, based on case-by-case, fact-
specific decisions." Court orders are poor tools to develop policy, as
courts are ill-equipped to balance competing policy goals, consider po-
litical factors, and control the unintended consequences of litigation out-
438. Cole, Litigation, supra note 4, at 545 n.5.
439. See William A. Shutkin & Charles P. Lord, Environmental Law, Environmental Justice
and Democracy, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 1117, 1119(1994) (positing that citizen suits are ex post facto
remedies).
440. See S. Mark White, State and Federal Planning Legislation and Manufactured Housing:
New Opportunities for Affordable, ingle-Family Shelter, 28 URB. LAW. 263, 271-72 (1996) (char-
acterizing litigation over exclusionary zoning as reactive, adversarial, and supervised by courts, in
contrast with proactive planning and policy development by local governments).
441. Joel F. Handler, Dependent People, the State, and the ModerniPostmodern Search for the
Dialogic Community, 35 UCLA L. REV. 999, 1019 (1988).
442. MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 4(1988).
443. See Shelley Ross Saxer, When Religion Becomes a Nuisance: Balancing Land Use and
Religious Freedom When Activities of Religious institutions Bring Outsiders into the Neighborhood,
84 Ky. U. 507, 512 (1995-96); Tores, supra note 1, at 451 ("[Bjy the time a lawsuit is filed, it is
often too late for the minority community to participate in the political process in any meaningful
way. Political choices have already been made; bargains struck.').
444. See Schroeder, supra note 436, at 162 (cautioning that changes are slow in developing and
sporadic in nature).
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comes."' Lawsuits to enforce rights, even if successful, do not necessar-
ily result in improved conditions, justice, or empowerment of the subor-
dinated."6 In fact, litigation may take the struggle away from the people
involved and move it to the disempowering forum of legal expertise.'
Finally, research suggests that litigatiob is a poor agent of social
change.'
D. Heightened Enforcement Responses (Environmental Conceptions)
Although the vast majority of environmental justice writing reflects
a social justice conception of the topic,"' some authors view the problem
as primarily an environmental problem, requiring either more careful
regulation or greater enforcement of existing regulation. ' This view
takes several different forms.
Some suggest that federal laws designed to control and prevent haz-
ardous and toxic pollution have been regulatory failures, never having
been implemented effectively or enforced thoroughly."' Thus, more
stringent and consistent enforcement of existing laws would reduce the
environmental burdens that low-income and minority communities expe-
rience. A closely related perspective maintains that environmental justice
groups should use citizen suits to compel implementation and enforce-
ment of existing environmental laws and regulations.' While the former
perspective urges the agencies to enhance enforcement, the latter calls
for grassroots litigation to force agencies to implement the laws fully.
However, both reflect some degree of faith in existing environmental
laws as a means of securing healthy and safe environments for low-
income people and people of color.
Others believe that increased participation by low-income people
and minorities in government environmental decision making will ad-
445. Susan V. Demers, The Failures of Litigation As a Tool for the Development of Social
Welfare Policy, 22 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 1009, 1010 (1995).
446. Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 648-49, Torres, supra note 1, at 450-51.
447. Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 647-52. Nonetheless, litigation may be a useful
political tool, if properly constrained. id. at 654,667-68.
448. See generally JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A
THEORY OF LAW REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1978) (examining the attempts of social move-
ments to use court action to achieve concrete changes); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW
HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991) (arguing that courts am not effective
tools for social change).
449. See, e.g., Bullaid, Anatomy, supra note 9, at 23-24; Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at
640-41; Gauna, supra note 6, at 27-29.
450. Despite the importance of the environmental conception of environmental justice as a
distinct way of thinking about the issue, very little has been written about environmental justice from
this point of view.
451. See SzASz, supra note 7, at 137-38; Colin Crawford, Strategies for Environmental Jus-
tice: Rethinking CERCLA Medical Monitoring Lawsuits, 74 B.U. L. Rnv. 267, 276-77 (1994) (dis-
cussing problematic, costly, and inefficient CERCLA litigation); Lazarus, supra note 6, at 816-19;,
Robertson, supra note 6, at 134-40.
452. See supra notes 339-60 and accompanying text.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
dress and prevent environmental injustices.' This perspective closely
relates to political conceptions of environmental justice, ' but it also has
faith in the system of federal and state environmental regulation, if prop-
erly informed and influenced by the historically excluded, to achieve
environmental justice.
Others have faith in the role of lawyers in achieving both environ-
mental protection and environmental justice goals. They argue that attor-
neys have a duty to advise and assist their clients to pursue environmen-
tally sound actions.' The wise and ethical attorney will "inform clients
that environmental justice changes are forthcoming ... [and] assist the
client in seeking site or operational alternatives with results that fall
within the bounds of environmental justice."
Some believe that grassroots activists' critiques of traditional envi-
ronmental law' are misplaced: greater efforts to achieve "consistent,
equal enforcement of existing laws and regulations... regardless of the
racial, ethnic, or socioeconomic status of a community'" should be fa-
vored over attempts to protect low-income and minority communities,
and additional scientific research assessing human health risks of expo-
sure to pollutants should be favored over rejection of science-based risk
assessment and precautionary protective measures.' Similarly, Dan
Tarlock calls for integration of the environmental justice movement into
the mainstream environmental movement in the pursuit of sustainable
development, and in particular, sustainable cities. He argues that the
environmental justice movement's civil rights orientation and suspicion
of regulatory power and methods-including risk assessment and man-
agement, cost-benefit analysis, and market incentives--are too narrow
and ineffective, as is the cautious rejection of all LULUs. ' Instead, envi-
ronmental law, currently moving in the direction of sustainable develop-
453. See Rodolfo Mata, Environmental Equity: The Next Generation of Facility Siting Pro-
grams, 16 CHiCANO-LATINO L. REv. 1, 37 (1995); Torres, supra note 1, at 453-54; Heather E. Ross,
Note, Using NEPA in the Fight for Environmental Justice, 18 WM. & MARY J. ENVrL. L. 353, 373-
74(1994).
454. See supra notes 98-241 and accompanying text.
455. See generally MANASTER, supra note 6 (addressing the lawyer's role in balancing client
needs and environmental justice); Moya, supra note 6, at 217-18, 263-66 (calling on attorneys to
perform pro bono environmental work and the ABA to adopt the Environmental Bill of Rights).
456. Moya, supra note 6, at 263.
457. See supra notes 102-24.
458. John R. Kyte, Comment, Environmental Justice: The Need for Equal Enforcement and
Sound Science, 11 J. CoNTmp. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 253,279 (1994).
459. Id. at 257, 272-73, 276-79 (1994); see also Gauna, supra note 6, at 18 (reporting EPA's
response to environmental justice criticisms of its enforcement patterns).
460. Tarlock, supra note 33, at 464-66, 469; see also Collin, supra note 1, at 544-46 (urging
merger of environmentalism and concepts of equity as represented by environmental justice).
461. Tarlock, supra note 33, at 463-66.
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ment theory and practice, has the capacity to reconcile protection of the
natural environment with human needs and interests, including fairness.'
Tarlock's vision, like many others in the environmental concept of
environmental justice, offers the advantage of seeking reconciliation of
traditional environmental goals with the distributive concerns of envi-
ronmental justice advocates. Although some have argued that the main-
stream environmental movement historically ignored the concerns of
low-income and minority communities,.' perpetual conflict between the
two may limit the effectiveness of both." Protection of ecosystems and
biodiversity is not necessarily in conflict with protection of human
health, even though reconciliation of ecological needs and human needs
may require careful and sometimes difficult balancing of competing val-
ues. " In addition, observations that residents of low-income and minor-
ity neighborhoods are more concerned about immediate health hazards
than biological, recreational, or aesthetic goals' risk becoming reduc-
tionist assumptions that low-income people or people of color possess
only anthropocentric values and cannot possess ecocentric or biocentric
values. Instead, environmentalism is alive and well within low-income
and minority communities.'
The environmental model of environmental justice ignores several
important factors, though, that limit its effectiveness. First, scarce gov-
ernment agency resources, political pressures, scientific and legal uncer-
tainty, and the problem of agency capture result in limited implementa-
tion of environmental policy, at best, and implementation failure in some
cases. ' Reliance on agency enforcement of environmental laws may not
462. Id. at 491-92; see also THE ECOLOGICAL CrrY: PRESERVING AND RESTORING URBAN
BIODIVERITY 10-14 (Rutherford H. Platt et al. eds., 1994).
463. See supra notes 113-20.
464. Poirier, supra note 28, at 800-02; Tarlock, supra note 33, at 465-66.
465. Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Conserving Habitats and Building Habitats: The Emerging
Impact of the Endangered Species Act on Land Use Development, 10 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 4 (1991);
Tarlock, supra note 33, at 486.
466. See Bullard, Anatomy, supra note 9, at 22; Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 639-40.
467. Cad Anthony, Why African Americans Should Be Environmentalists, RACE, POVERTY &
THE ENVT., April 1990, at 5, 5-6; Karl Lin, Inner Cities to Join Ecology Debate, RACE, POVERTY
& THE ENV'T, July 1990, at 1, 11; Stephen J. Newell & Corliss L. Green, Racial Differences in
Consumer Environmental Concern, 31 J. CONSUMER AFF. 53 (1997) (noting no significant differ-
ences in environmental attitudes based solely on income or race, but lower levels of concern among
African Americans with lower levels of education and income and significant differences in envi-
ronmental attitudes based on education level generally); Julie Anderson, Environmental Coalition
Picks Board Members, Group Aims to Improve Inner City, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, June 21, 1996,
at 13SF; Caroline Keough, Seniors Find Home in Barrio Chicano Federation, Others Contribute to
Make Villas, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Aug. 8, 1996, at B6; Teaching Inner-City Kids About the
Environment, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Sept 24, 1992, at B05; Melinda Voss, Beauty Spots Transform a
Neighborhood, DES MOINES REG., Oct 4,1996, at 1.
468. See Barry Boyer & Errol Mcidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary
Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 833, 837 (1985);
Howard Latin, Regulatory Failure, Administrative Incentives and the New Clean Air Act, 21 ENV'Lt.
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always protect against environmental harm. ' Second, initial empirical
evidence suggests that the EPA enforces environmental laws less rigor-
ously and quickly in communities of color than in white communities. '
In the absence of concrete proposals about how to make enforcement and
implementation fairer, criticisms that the environmental regulatory sys-
tem is inherently biased remain unanswered. Third, to the extent that the
environmental concept of environmental justice depends on existing
regulatory standards and processes to prevent or remedy injustice, it is
reactive in the administrative arena, much in the same way that the rights
concept is reactive in the judicial arena or the power concept is reactive
in the political arena. The local community waits for either a proposed
LULU siting to evaluate its environmental impact through the permitting
process, or evidence that an existing LULU is violating regulatory stan-
dards, such as compliance monitoring and administrative, civil, and
criminal enforcement. If, on the other hand, the environmental concept
calls for redefinition of regulatory standards and processes to reflect en-
vironmental justice concerns-such as levels of acceptable risk, local
participation, and sustainable development goals"-it is a proactive ap-
proach.
E. Market Responses (Economic Conceptions)
One of the most controversial views of environmental injustice as-
serts that it is an economic, or market, problem.' Several significant
variations on the market theory exist. One perspective posits that LULUs
are distributed inequitably by income, not by race." Another perspective
holds that minority and low-income people voluntarily move to neigh-
borhoods already containing LULUs because property and rents are
cheaper-an action called "coming to the nuisance."'' 4 A third perspec-
tive states that racial disparities in LULU locations derive from discrimi-
nation in the operation of the private market, not in government decision
making.' A fourth perspective finds that regardless of the causes of en-
L. 1647, 1666-77 (1991); Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of
Federal Environmental Law, 54 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROwS. 311,314(1991).
469. Reliance on agencies may be more effective than reliance on the courts. See Tarlock,
supra note 33, at 465, 469; Torres, supra note 1, at 450-53, 456.
470. Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 58, at S I.
471. Mata, supra note 123, at 447-65; see Tones, supra note 1, at 453-61.
472. See, e.g., Been, LULUs, supra note 6, at 1384-93; Lambert & Boemer, supra note 7, at
197. Even more controversial is a perception that there is no injustice in the distribution of LULUs.
This theory is built on the idea that LULUs are necessary, they are distributed efficiently according
to land costs, and economic efficiency is the proper determinant of distributive justice.
473. See Jaffe, supra note 10, at 658-59.
474. See Been, LULUs, supra note 6, at 1385; Lambert & Boemer, supra note 7, at 197.
475. See Been, LULUs, supra note 6, at 1390-92 (explaining that the market disfavors the poor
by favoring existing distribution of economic resources, and disfavors people of color through racial
discrimination in residential markets); see also Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimi-
nation in Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARv. L. REV. 817, 818-20 (1991). See generally MASSEY
& DENTON, supra note 149 (arguing that racial residential segregation is the principal structural
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vironmental injustice, the means for compensating host neighborhoods
exist and offer an equitable and efficient solution to distributional ineq-
uities.' A final market perspective contends that prospective landowners
and developers, who themselves may not have been involved in the ini-
tial siting of LULUs, lack the economic incentives to clean up and revi-
talize industrial and contaminated sites in low-income and minority
neighborhoods."
Environmental justice advocates criticize the economic approach as
both immoral and a disregard for the racial and power aspects of envi-
ronmental injustice.' However, if market dynamics or economic factors
are important to the distribution of LULUs, policies that ignore these
factors will fail.' More importantly, the supposed tension between eco-
nomics and race as the explanation for environmental injustice may be a
false dichotomy. Either multiple factors, such as racism, classism, market
dynamics, and/or political inefficacy, may be interrelated causes, or mar-
kets themselves may contain institutional or subconscious racism, in
which case market discrimination would be the cause.4w In any event, not
all economic responses to environmental injustice simply call for paying
poor people to endure exposure to toxic land uses.
One proposed type of response to market forces in LULU siting is
government regulation. This response is built on either the idea that the
market, although efficient, is not fair (market injustice)," or the idea that
the market is not efficient because bargaining inequities prevent local
communities from forcing LULU owners to internalize the social costs of
their facilities (market inefficiency).' The market injustice view empha-
sizes discrimination in housing, lending, and other markets; lack of eq-
uitable distribution of resources with which to participate in the market;
and limited access to economic opportunity. ' Because the market will
not produce fair outcomes, the government must regulate private behav-
ior to prevent discriminatory market outcomes, such as private actors
feature of American society responsible for the perpetuation of urban poverty and represents a pri-
mary cause of racial inequality in the United States).
476. See Vicki Been, Compensated Siting Proposals: Is It Time to Pay Attention?, 21
FORDHAM URB. LJ. 787, 788 (1994) (hereinafter Been, Compensated Siting Proposals].
477. See Joel B. Eisen, "Brownfields of Dreams"? Challenges and Limits of Voluntary Cleanup
Programs and Incentives, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 883, 914.
478. See BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE, supra note 7, at 91 (stating that advancing the eco-
nomic approach without thought to racial and power aspects may lead to discrimination); Lambert &
Boemer, supra note 7, at 200-01 (reporting criticisms of authors' market studies of environmental
justice).
479. Been, LULUs, supra note 6, at 1385-86.
480. Id. at 1384.
481. Jaffe, supra note 10, at 655-56,659-60.
482. Id. at 656.
483. See supra notes 121-25; see also Been, LULUs, supra note 6, at 1388-92 (maintaining
that racial discrimination in the sale and rental of property can place people of color in less desirable
areas and this, in turn, can lead to discrimination in development and enforcement of zoning and
environmental laws).
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favoring low-income or minority neighborhoods for LULU sites, or the
market funneling of poor people and people of color to areas around
LULUs.,
The market inefficiency argument maintains that low-income and
minority host communities do not have the bargaining power to force
proponents of LULUs to internalize the social costs associated with the
resulting pollution and other impacts on the neighborhood and property
values.' Responsive policies would boost the bargaining power of host
communities either by providing information, access to the regulatory
process, and legal and technical assistance, or by giving them legal and
regulatory tools with which to prevent sitings, thus bringing the develop-
ers to the community's bargaining table.' These tools might include
command-and-control regulation of LULU sitings, ' common law reme-
dies for harms suffered, ' statutorily mandated negotiations, or compen-
sation with participation by the host community or those who would be
exposed to risk.' Much of the economics-oriented discussion about
market inefficiency focuses on compensation of affected people and
communities as a way of addressing the problem of externalities, which
are costs imposed by the LULU on others-for example, neighbors. '
Externalities may be both inefficient and inequitable.' The market effi-
ciency theory rests on the assumption that some people or communities,
if adequately compensated,' will rationally choose to accept LULUs. '
That choice, however, may be rational only in the sense that the recipi-
ents so lack economic resources and power that they are willing to ex-
pose themselves to harm for money, which implicates the market justice
problem and the specter of "environmental job blackmail."' Vicki Been
484. See Lambert & Boemer, supra note 7, at 212-13.
485. Jaffe, supra note 10, at 656,660.
486. Id. at 660.
487. Lambert & Boemer, supra note 7, at 224-25.
488. Id. at 223-24.
489. Id. at 226-27; see also Mank, supra note 6, at 424 (stating that legislatures should adopt
proposals to allow the communities in the affected areas to select representatives to negotiation and
compensation committees rather than expand the ability of minority groups to bring suits clalming
substantive fairness).
490. See generally Been, Compensated Siting Proposals, supra note 476 (analyzing whether
the difficulties of siting LULUs efficiently and fairly can be resolved by adequately compensating
individuals for the burdens the LULU imposes); Lambert & Boemer, supra note 7 (discussing the
need to develop policies that compensate individuals living near industrial sites as a way to secure
environmental justice); Mank, supra note 6 (proposing a risk-based way to represent and compensate
those affected by a siting decision). Compensation can take different forms: direct money payments,
mitigation of the LULU's effects, or community services and infrastrUcture. SZASZ, supra note 7, at
108-09.
491. Been, Compensated Siting Proposals, supra note 476, at 791.
492. The compensation may take the form of "a remedy, a preventative measure, or a reward."
Id. at 792.
493. See id. at 790; Jaffe, supra note 10, at 659-60.
494. Gauna, supra note 6, at 38-39;, see Boyle supra note 9, at 975-76; see also SZASZ, supra
note 7, at 109-10 (criticizing distributional implications of compensation proposals).
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has noted that compensated siting programs are, as a matter of practical
reality, well established but could be objectionable if they (1) violate
social norms against the commodification of exposure to health risks; (2)
exploit general distributional inequities in society; (3) fail to adequately
protect future generations; and (4) result in agreements that are far from
truly informed and voluntary.' In addition, compensated siting programs
have failed to be successful in siting LULUs.'
However, market-oriented responses to environmental injustice also
include policies to foster economic empowerment in low-income and
minority communities. One theory finds that improvements in employ-
ment, residential and economic mobility, local infrastructure and public
services, and economic growth will either enhance the ability of poor and
minority communities to fight environmental injustices or decrease the
likelihood that their neighborhoods will be chosen for LULUs.' Rachel
Godsil and James Freeman have proposed a model of community-based
economic development to promote the overall health and sustainability
of low-income communities of color, including job creation, wise land
use patterns, community empowerment, and economic self-sufficiency.'
Another theory asserts that existing toxic and industrial sites will be
cleaned up and redeveloped into economically productive, clean uses
only if developers have economic incentives to do so.' This theory finds
its outlet in the current fascination among policy makers, the private
sector, lawyers, and scholars with "brownfields redevelopment. " "A
brownfield is best defined as abandoned or underutilized urban land
and/or infrastructure where expansion or redevelopment is complicated,
in part, because of known or potential contamination.'1 State brown-
495. Been, Compensated Siting Proposals, supra note 476, at 824-25.
496. Id. at 824; see also Eisen, supra note 477, at 997 (stating that negotiated compensation
statutes have been generally unsuccessful in attempting to facilitate the siting of hazardous waste
plants and facilities).
497. Rachel D. Godsil & James S. Freeman, Jobs, Trees and Autonomy: The Convergence of
the Environmental Justice Movement and Community Economic Development, 5 MD. J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 25, 28 (1993-94); see Been, LULUs, supra note 6, at 1392; see also Bailey et al.,
supra note t2t, at 117 (concluding that the black population does not fight environmental injustices
because many rank issues of education, race relations and unemployment of higher priority than
issues of hazardous waste); Roger H. Bezdek, The Net Impact of Environmental Protection on Jobs
and the Economy, in ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: ISSUES, POLICiES AND SOLUTIONS 86 (Bunyan
Bryant ed., 1995) (arguing that environmental protection has positive economic and job impacts but
in the absence of intentional efforts to capture these benefits for the poor and minorities, these eco-
nomic benefits will largely flow to higher income whites). See generally Gunn, supra note 13, at
1267-71 (discussing ideas for training and employment of low-income, minority community resi-
dents in environmental remediation).
498. Godsil & Freeman, supra note 497, at 28.
499. Douglas A. McWilliams, Environmental Justice and Industrial Redevelopment: Econom-
ics and Equality in Urban Revitalization, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 705, 752 (1994); see Johnson, supra
note 6, at 99 (stating that private and public institutions are reluctant to attempt redevelopment
because of the associated high costs).
500. Eisen, supra note 477, at 890-93.
501. Id. at 890 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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fields cleanup programs offer land owners "relaxed cleanup standards,
streanlined administrative procedures, and releases from future liability
to spur developers to clean up and reuse brownfield sites. " However,
Joel Eisen has shown that these programs often trade increased health
risks to low-income and minority communities with little local participa-
tion and only questionable actual job creation and urban revitalization.'
Il. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF INEQUITABLE DISTIBUTION OF LAND USE
REGULATORY PATrERNS
A. Land Use Regulatory Patterns: The Ignored Environmental Justice Issue
The five dominant conceptions of environmental justice--eviden-
tiary, power, legal, environmental, and economic-have insufficiently
considered land use planning and regulation. In addition to sparse atten-
tion to planning concepts and no attention to the strategic use of regula-
tory tools, very little systematic documentation of the unequal distribu-
tion of land use regulation on the basis of race and class exists.'
The use of zoning and other land use regulatory mechanisms--re-
quirements of large lots, minimum floor space, and significant setbacks;
low-density zoning; and restrictions on multi-family housing--to ex-
clude low-income people who cannot afford large single-family homes
on large lots (exclusionary zoning) has been well documented.' Exclu-
sionary zoning has had the effect of contributing to and perpetuating
residential segregation not only by class but also by race.s' In addition,
Yale Rabin has focused scholarly attention on expulsive zoning, the
practice of local governments rezoning neighborhoods of color to allow
incompatible and noxious land uses, thereby displacing ("expelling")
some residents and replacing them with new industrial and commercial
activities that threaten the health, safety, quality, and character of the
502. Id. at 886-87.
503. Id. at 886-88. But see Johnson, supra note 6 (finding that federal/state cooperation on
brownfields can serve as model for future federal/state environmental justice initiatives).
504. See discussion infra Parts IV and V.
505. But see, e.g., City of Austin Planning, Envtl. & Conservation Servs. Dep't, Plan. Div.,
East Austin Land Use/Zoning Report (last modified Mar. 6, 1997) <http://www.ci.austin.tx.us/
landuse/eajtexthtm> (releasing study showing that the largely-minority populated East Austin has a
significantly higher percentage of industrial zoning than other areas of city). The zoning report
complements an earlier study showing higher usage of hazartous substances in East Austin than in
other areas of Austin. Ralph K.M. Haurwitz et al., An Industrial Chokehold: Toxic Hazards Abound
in East Austin, and It's No Coincidence, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, July 20, 1997, at Al.
506. See PATICK J. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLs §§ 3.01-.02 (E Damian
Kelly ed., 1998); KENNLEH H. YoUNG, ANDERSON'S AMEiCAN LAW OF ZONING §§ 8.01-.03 (4th
ed. 1996); see also Dubin, supra note 1, at 741 & n.8 (stating that racially-segregated residential
patterns remain as a result of discriminatory zoning and land use planning).
507. ROHAN, supra note 506, § 2.01[t, at 2-6; Dubin, supra note 1, at 740-41 (discussing
Yale Rabin's observation that residents who are not protected against expulsive zoning are often
victims of reduced safety and quality of their neighborhoods).
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neighborhood.'a Rabin documented his analysis of expulsive zoning with
twelve case studies of zoning changes in different cities nationwide that
had the effect of displacing minority residents." However, Rabin's study
did not attempt to quantify the distribution of zoning patterns in low-
income neighborhoods of color and compare those distributions with
zoning patterns of high-income white neighborhoods in the same cities.
The distributional studies that have emerged in the environmental justice
literature have focused on specific LULUs, not on land use regulatory
patterns.510 This article documents land use regulatory patterns--the per-
centages of area designated for different land uses-in thirty-one census
tracts in seven cities nationwide. Low-income, minority communities
have a greater share not only of LULUs, but also of industrial and com-
mercial zoning, than do high-income white communities.
B. Methodology
The study measures the percentages of area in census tracts that
local zoning ordinances have designated for each type of land use. It
contains data from thirty-one census tracts in seven cities: Anaheim,
California; Costa Mesa, California; Orange, California; Pittsburgh, Penn-
sylvania; San Antonio, Texas; Santa Ana, California; and Wichita, Kan-
sas.
1'
508. Rabin, supra note 1; see Dubin, supra note 1, at 742.
509. Rabin, supra note 1,at 108-18.
510. See, e.g., BULLARD, INVISIBLE HOUSTON, supra note 66, at 71-72 (addressing garbage
incinerators and landfills in Houston); GAO RpORT, supra note 5 (addressing major hazardous
waste landfills in Southeastern United States); ANN MAXWELL & DANIEL IMMERGLUCK,
LIQUORLINING: LIQUOR STORE CONCENTRATION AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT IN LOWER-
INCOME COOK COUNTY NEIGHBORHOODS (1997) (addressing liquor stores in Chicago); UNrrED
CHURCH OF CHRIST REPORT, supra note 3 (addressing commercial hazardous waste facilities and
uncontrolled toxic waste sites); Anderson et al., supra note 80, at 83 (addressing commercial haz-
ardous waste facilities and uncontrolled toxic waste sites); Baden & Coursey, supra note 7 (ad-
dressing Superfund, TSD, hazardous waste generating, and historical hazardous waste sites in Chi-
cago); Been & Gupta, Coming to the Nuisance, supra note 6, at 9 (addressing commercial hazardous
waste treatment storage and disposal facilities nationwide).
511. See appendix infra p. 140. Unless expressly noted, information from this study and ad-
dressed in the following text is presented in the appendix to this article. All data in this section
comes from the 1990 U.S. Census. Two census tracts analyzed fall outside the political jurisdiction
of the applicable named cities but are completely surrounded by the cities: Terrell Hills, which is a
separately incorporated city sunounded by the City of San Antonio, Texas, and is census tract
#1204; and Eastborough, which is a separately incorporated borough surrounded by the City of
Wichita, Kansas, and is census tract #74. For purposes of this study, these two "pocket" cities are
treated as part of their respective ambient cities. For all practical purposes, these "pocket" cities are
not suburban fringe cities, but instead are predominantiy white, upper-income neighborhoods within
the ambient city's geographic and psychological boundaries. Because these neighborhoods are
separately incorporated, their residents do not have to pay taxes to fund the ambient cities' urban
programs and are not controlled by the land use and other municipal decisions of the ambient cities'
governing bodies. However, these "pocket" city residents participate in the political, economic, and
civic life of the larger ambient city. For a discussion of local political boundaries and race, see Rich-
ard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 1843 (1994).
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The cities were selected on the basis of several criteria:
1. Geographic diversity. Pittsburgh is in the Northeast; Wichita
is in the Midwest; San Antonio is in the South/Southwest; and Anaheim,
Costa Mesa, Orange, and Santa Ana are on the West Coast.
2. Population diversity!" San Antonio, with a population of
935,933, is the tenth largest city in the United States. However, it is part
of the thirtieth largest standard metropolitan statistical area, which has a
population of 1,302,099. Thus, most of the population in the San Antonio
metropolitan area is within the City of San Antonio itself. Pittsburgh, on
the other hand, is the fortieth largest city with a population of 369,879.
Yet, it is within the nineteenth largest metropolitan area, containing a
population of 2,242,798. A small percentage of the total Pittsburgh met-
ropolitan area population resides within the City of Pittsburgh. Wichita is
a medium-size city, ranking fifty-first in city population (304,011) and
seventy-fifth in metropolitan area population (485,270). The four re-
maining cities-Santa Ana (population of 293,742), Anaheim (popula-
tion of 266,406), Orange (population of 110,658), and Costa Mesa
(population of 96,357)-are part of the second largest metropolitan area
in the United States, covering more than 14.5 million people who live in
Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bemadino, and Ventura counties.
All four cities are in Orange County, which has a population of more
than 2.4 million people. Thus, they are medium to small cities in a large
metropolitan area.
3. Racial diversity. Two cities have very high percentages of
people of color. Santa Ana has 76.6% people of color, predominantly
Hispanic and Asian, and San Antonio has 63.6% people of color, pre-
dominantly Hispanic. Anaheim has 43.4% people of color, and Orange
has 31.9% people of color. Both of these cities have significant Hispanic
and Asian populations. Pittsburgh has 28.5% people of color, predomi-
nantly African American. Costa Mesa has 27.6% people of color, pre-
dominantly Hispanic. Wichita has 19.5% people of color, predominantly
African American.
4. Land use development diversity. Pittsburgh is an old city that
developed along natural features, particularly the convergence of three
rivers. Wichita is a traditional Midwestern grid-pattern city. San Antonio
has an old but partially redeveloped core, barrios, and new suburban and
outer-ring office development, but most of the greater metropolitan area
lies within the city boundaries. The four California cities are mostly
512. For rankings of cities by population, the populations of metropolitan areas, and rankings of
metropolitan areas by population, see WeiSER'S 11 NEW RIVERSIDE DESK REFERENCE 13-15, 77-
78(1992).
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twentieth-century edge cities,"'3 parts of the Orange County metropolitan
area which has no central core.
5. Spatial segregation by race and class. Each of the cities has
at least one census tract with a high (or in one case, a moderately high)
percentage of minorities and a high percentage of low-income persons,
and at least one census tract with a low percentage of minorities and a
low percentage of low-income persons, thus allowing for measurement
of whether low-income communities of color bear a higher percentage of
non-residential zoning designations than white, wealthy communities.
6. Study feasibility. The author had means of readily obtaining
the zoning maps and codes of each of these cities.
Census tracts were chosen by reviewing 1990 U.S. Census Bureau
census data on the racial composition, median household income, and
percentage of persons below the poverty level for all the census tracts of
each city."4 Census tracts were chosen for being either significantly
above or significantly below the racial and class composition of the city.
All high-income, low-minority census tracts selected for this study had
less than 50% of the respective city's percentages for people below pov-
erty and people of color, except Anaheim Tract #219.04. This tract had
22.10% people of color, which was 50.9% of Anaheim's percentage of
people of color (43.4%), but less than 32% of Anaheim's high-minority
census tracts (i.e., 874.02 and 874.03) that were studied. Thus, the per-
centage of people of color in tract 219.04 was significantly less than the
percentage in Anaheim's high-minority tracts.
In absolute, as opposed to relative, measures, all high-income, low-
minority tracts in all cities had less than 27% people of color, and eight
out of the twelve tracts had 14% or less. The high-income, low-minority
tracts had less than 8% people below poverty, and nine out of twelve
tracts had 4.5% or less.
All low-income, high-minority tracts were more than 150% of their
respective city's percentages of people below poverty and people of
color, except for two tracts in San Antonio and three tracts in Santa Ana.
These five exceptions had less than 150% of the respective city's per-
centages of people of color due to the high number of people of color in
those cities. Each of the five tracts had more than 85% people of color,
and three of the tracts had 92% or more.
In absolute measures, all low-income, high-minority tracts in all
cities had more than 45% people of color, and sixteen out of the nineteen
513. For a discussion of edge cites, see JOEL GARREAU, EDGE CITY: LIFE ON THE NEW
FRONTIER (1991); JON C. TEAFORD, POST-SUBURBIA: GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN THE EDGE
CITIES (1997).
514. Census tracts are the most appropriate unit of analysis for environmental justice distribu-
tional studies. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
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tracts had more than 69%. All low-income, high-minority tracts had
more than 15% people below poverty, and thirteen out of nineteen tracts
had 33% or more.
After data on the racial composition, median household income, and
percentage of persons below the poverty level were gathered from the
1990 U.S. Census data for each census tract, the census tracts were iden-
tified on U.S. Census Bureau maps. Zoning maps for the areas corre-
sponding to the census tracts were obtained from local zoning authori-
ties, and census tract boundaries were correlated to the zoning maps. For
each census tract, the areas of zoned land on the map were measured
using fine hand measurement tools according to each land use designa-
tion (e.g., R-l, R-2, C-1, LI), and the percentage of the total area within
the entire census tract zoned for each separate land use designation was
calculated.
C. Data and Analysis
The census data and percentages of each census tract designated for
particular zoning are listed in the tables in the Appendix to this article.
However, data for aggregated zoning designations-single-family resi-
dential, multi-family residential, commercial, industrial, planned devel-
opment, and other-are provided in the tables in this section, following
the textual discussion of the data.
The data shows that low-income, high-minority neighborhoods in
the cities studied are subjects of more intensive zoning, on the whole,
than high-income, low-minority neighborhoods. This conclusion is sup-
ported by data from across the various types of cities studied, regardless
of the cites' geographic features, spatial development, population, politi-
cal characteristics, and the like. With respect to industrial zoning--the
most intensive land use-thirteen out of nineteen low-income, high-
minority census tracts had at least some industrial zoning, and in seven
of those census tracts, the city had zoned more than 20% of the tract for
industrial uses. In contrast, only one of the twelve high-income, low-
minority census tracts contained any industrial zoning at all, only 2.84%
of the tract.
More specifically, Santa Ana tract #744.03, an area of 4,862 people,
of whom 74.9% are Hispanic, is 90.54% zoned for industrial use. Nearly
70% of Orange tract #762.04, about 50% of both Pittsburgh tract #2808
and San Antonio tract #1105, and 36.59% of San Antonio tract #1307.85
are zoned for industrial use." Moreover, although the study did not in-
clude a quantified spatial distribution analysis of the industrial uses in
515. The population figures for these tracts are: Orange tract # 762.04: 3,413 people (66.7%
Hispanic); Pittsburgh tract #2808: 3,072 people (87.8% African American); San Antonio tract
#1105: 2,935 people (96.6% Hispanic); San Antonio tract #1307.85: 2,761 people (70.4% Hispanic
and 20.0% African American).
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comparison to the residential uses, a visual survey of the zoning maps
reveals that industrial use designations are close to residential use desig-
nations, often either across the street or in the same block.
The zoning of low-income neighborhoods of color for industrial
uses places highly intensive activities near local residents' homes, creat-
ing the very sort of incompatibility of uses that zoning is designed to
prevent." ' For example, among the "as of right" permitted uses in Pitts-
burgh tract #2808 are ammonia and chlorine manufacturing, automobile
wrecking, blast furnace or coke oven, chemical manufacturing, iron and
steel manufacturing and processing, airplane factory or hangar, brewery,
poultry slaughter, and machine shop, and among the conditional uses are
atomic reactors, garbage and dead animal reduction, rubbish incineration,
radio and television transmission and receiving towers, and storage of
explosives and inflammables. 7 The City of San Antonio allows acety-
lene gas manufacturing and storage, arsenals, blast furnaces, boiler
works, cement or paving material mixing plants, creameries with on-
premises livestock, forge plants, metal foundries, paper and pulp manu-
facturing, rock crushers, junk storage, tar roofing manufacturing, and
yeast plants, among others, in two of the census tracts studied."' Al-
though nearly two-thirds of Orange census tract #762.04 is zoned for
industrial manufacturing (M2), the City requires many of the most inten-
sive uses to obtain conditional use permits, thus at least theoretically
allowing some level of monitoring and control of the impacts. Neverthe-
less, some of the conditionally permitted uses in Orange's M2 district are
hazardous waste facilities, refuse transfer stations, blast furnaces and
coke ovens, mineral extraction and production, and various types of
chemical production.!' Santa Ana has zoned nearly 90% of census tract
#744.03, containing nearly 5,000 residents, for light industrial activity.
Although Santa Ana's light industrial zoning designation excludes haz-
ardous and solid waste facilities and some hazardous industrial activities
like acid manufacturing, gas and acetylene manufacturing, and metal
smelters, it does not exclude large-scale industrial facilities that can
overwhelm nearby residential uses, the use of toxic substances in light
industrial activities, unsightly storage facilities and warehouses, or a high
concentration of waste-producing facilities like automotive repair and
service sites.'
516. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386 (1926); Fifth Annual Re-
port of the Council on Environmental Quality 51-54 (1974), reprinted in ROBERT R. WRIGHT &
MORTON GITELMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND USE 776 (5th ed. 1997).
517. PrITSBURGH, PA., ZONING CODE §§ 967.02, 967.05, 969.02, 969.05 (1996) (uses & use
exceptions for M3 and M4 districts).
518. SAN ANTONIO, TEx., UNIFIED DEV. CODE § 35-3606 (1997) (permitted uses in L district).
519. ORANGE, CAL., MUN. CODE § 17.20.030 (Nov. 1996) (permitted industrial uses).
520. SANTA ANA, CAL., MUN. CODE §§ 41-472,41-489.5 (1997) (uses permitted and excluded
in MI district).
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Commercial uses are also located in greater concentrations in low-
income, high-minority neighborhoods than in high-income, low-minority
neighborhoods. In ten out of the nineteen low-income, high-minority
census tracts, at least 10% of the area is zoned for commercial use, and in
seven of those tracts, at least 20% of the area is zoned for commercial
use. In contrast, only two of the twelve high-income, low-minority cen-
sus tracts had at least 10% of the area zoned for commercial use, and
none had more than 20% commercial zoning.
Although the term "commercial" conjures up images of office
buildings and retail stores which may create parking and scale/shadow
impacts on neighboring residences but generally do not pose health haz-
ards, the cities studied allow in their various commercial districts uses
that are far more intensive than offices and stores. For example, nearly
50% of Wichita tract #41 is zoned Central Business District, in which
limited and general manufacturing, vehicle storage yards, warehousing,
welding and machine shops, and vehicle repair uses are allowed by right,
and solid waste incinerators, mining and quarrying, rock crushing, and
oil and gas drilling are conditional uses.!" In about 30% of San Antonio
tract #1307.85, permitted uses include electro-plating, brewery, chicken
hatcheries, poultry slaughter and storage, machine shop, and certain
kinds of manufacturing, such as ice cream, ice, brooms, mattresses, paper
boxes, candy, cigars, and refrigeration.5 Santa Ana's General Commer-
cial (C2) districts may contain automotive garages, blueprinting and
photo-engraving businesses, metal shops, automotive equipment whole-
salers, research laboratories, farm products wholesalers, and tire recap-
ping businesses, and the Central Business (C3) district may contain all of
these land uses except automotive garages.'s These "commercial" land
uses may involve storage and processing of hazardous or toxic materials,
generation of large amounts of waste, emission of fumes, odors, and air-
borne particulates, and imposition of large, unsightly structures on local
neighborhoods.
Zoning codes burden low-income communities of color with inten-
sive use designations. When one combines commercial and industrial
uses and rounds the combined figure to the whole percent, at least one-
quarter of the area in each of eleven census tracts-all of them low-
521. WICHITA & SEDGWICK COUNTY, KAN., UNIFIED ZONING CODE § m-B.16(b), (c) (1997)
(permitted and conditional uses in CBD district).
522. SAN ANTONIO, TEX., UNIFIED DEV. CODE § 35-3605 (1997) (permitted uses in I, J, and K
districts).
523. SANTA ANA, CAL., MUN. CODE §§ 41-377, 4i-395 (as of right uses in C2 and C3 dis-
tricts). Nearly 20% of Santa Ana census tract #750.02 is zoned either C2 or C3.
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income, high-minority,'--is zoned for one of these two intensive uses,
even though nearby parcels are zoned for residential uses.
On the other hand, high-income, low-minority neighborhoods are
the beneficiaries of single-family residential zoning and open-space
zoning. Over 75% of the area in each of six high-income, low-income
tracts studied is zoned for single-family residences. If open space, a
country club, and a private university (with significant open space) are
included with single-family residential zoning, eleven of the twelve high-
income, low-minority tracts have more than 75% of their respective areas
zoned for these low-intensity land uses. The remaining tract, Costa Mesa
#638.02, has more than 75% of the tract zoned for low-intensity land
uses if the definition of low-intensity land uses includes not only single-
family residences but also a private school, a post office, a fire station,
and parks, all of which are highly compatible with single-family residen-
tial uses and rarely, if ever, considered LULUs. In other words, all of the
high-income, low-minority tracts have at least three-quarters of the total
land uses in each tract designated as non-intensive land uses.
In contrast, the only low-income, high-minority census tract with
more than 75% of the area zoned for single-family residential or open
space uses is Pittsburgh census tract #2609.98--one tract out of nineteen.
Although zoning for single-family residences or open space may pre-
clude affordable housing needed by low-income people, the contrast in
zoning patterns highlights the disparate impact of zoning designations on
low-income people of color.
524. These eleven tracts are nearly 60% of the low-income, high-minority tracts studied. No
high-income, low-minority tracts had such high percentages of area devoted to commercial and
industrial uses.
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LEGEND FOR TABLES AND GRAPHS
Symbol
* High-income, low-minority census tract
# Low-income, high-minority census tract
SFR Single-family residential (includes low-density residential)
MFR Multi-family residential (includes two-family residential, duplex residential,
manufactured housing, mobile home residential, and medium- and high-density
residential)
C Commercial (includes business and professional)
I Industrial
PD Planned Development
O Other (includes open space, park/recreation, country club, public use, government
center, and special [Pittsburgh])
TABLE 1: ANAHEIM, CALIFORNIA, PERCENT OF CENSUS TRACTS BY
AGGREGATED ZONING DESIGNATIONS
Tract SFR MFR C I PD 0
219.04* 94.98 4.84 0.17 0 0 0
874.02 # 22.74 25.42 16.99 23.74 I1.12 0
874.03 # 57.9 12.50 22.59 334 3.63 0
TABLE 2: COSTA MESA, CALIFORNIA, PERCENT OF CENSUS TRACTS BY
AGGREGATED ZONING DESIGNATIONS
Tract S MFR C II IPD 10
638.02* 57.82 5.05 16.67 0 0 20.46
637 # 32.25 25.51 28.68 4.79 0 8.78
TABLE 3: ORANGE, CALIFORNIA, PERCENT OF CENSUS TRACTS BY AGGREGATED
ZONING DESIGNATIONS
Tract SFR R I C II I PD 10
219.12 25.89 0 0 2.84 49.83 21.44
762.04 # 0 8.08 20.46 68.84 0 2.61
TABLE 4: PrIBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA, PERCENT OF CENSUS TRACTS BY
AGGREGATED ZONING DESIGNATIONS
Tract SFR MFR C I PD 0
1401.98 * 42.57 7.02 0 0 2.96 47.44
1404 * 66.02 23.41 0.73 0 0 9.84
1106 * 6.82 22.28 0 0 0 70.90
509 # 0 57.74 0 1.94 0 40.33
510# 0 4.63 0 0 57.19 38.19
1016# 0 31.71 0 0 56.71 11.58
2609.98# 50.64 1.70 1.35 1.21 0 45.10
2808 # 5.94 13.88 0.74 50.11 12.28 17.05
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TABLE 5: SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS, PERCENT OF CENSUS TRACTS BY AGGREGATED
ZONING DESIGNATIONS
Tract SFR MFR C I PD 0
1204* approx. 0 approx. 0 0 0
99.00 1.00
1914.02 * 95.22 1.98 2.81 0 0 0
1915.02 * 89.92 6.07 4.00 0 0 0
1105 # 9.79' 34.92 6.43 48.30 0 0.56
1305 # 38.39 48.22 11.72 1.64 0 0.04
1307.85 # 14.52 15.72 33.17 36.59 0 0
1702# 69.70 5.67 24.50 0 0 0.14
TABLE 6: SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA, PERCENT OF CENSUS TRACTS BY
AGGREGATED ZONING DESIGNATIONS
Tract SFR MFR C I PD 0
753.03 * 81.05 1.59 16.67 0 0 0.69
744.03 # 3.43 2.82 0.65 90.54 2.56 0
749.01 # 17.88 33.46 16.77 0 18.45 13.43
750.02 # 0 12.43 48.30 0 13.20 26.07
TABLE 7: WICHITA, KANSAS, PERCENT OF CENSUS TRACTS BY AGGREGATED
ZONING DESIGNATIONS
Tract SFR MFR C I PD 0
73.01 * 67.95 5.59 9.77 0 0 16.68
74* 100.00 0 0 0 0 0
8 # 0 94.36 5.65 0 0 0
41 # 0 6.77 70.68 22.55 0 0
78 # 68.03 19.59 5.85 6.52 0 0
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TABLE 8: INDUSTRIAL ZONING BY CENSUS TRACTS
City Census Tract Percent of per- Percent of low- Percent of tract
sons of color income persons zoned for in-
dustrial use
Anaheim 219.04 Low Low 0
874.02 High High 23.74
874.03 High High 3.34
Costa Mesa 638.02 Low Low 0
637 Medium High 4.79
Orange 219.12 Low Low 2.84
762.04 High High 68.84
Pittsburgh 1401.98 Low Medium- 0
1404 Low Low 0
1106 Low Low 0
509 High High 1.94
510 High High 0
1016 High High 0
2609.98 High High 1.21
2808 High High 50.11
San Antonio 1204 Low Low 0
1914.02 Low Low 0
1915.02 Low to Medium Low 0
1105 High High 48.30
1305 High High 1.64
1307.85 High High 36.59
1702 High High 0
Santa Ana 753.03 LOw Medium 0
744.03 High High 90.54
749.01 High High 0
750.02 High High 0
Wichita 73.01 Low Low 0
74 Low Low 0
8 High High 0
41 High High 22.55
78 High High 6.52
D. Caveats and the Call for Further Studies
The data presented here simply shows that land use regulatory pat-
terns are not evenly distributed in seven cities between high-income
white neighborhoods and low-income minority neighborhoods. A greater
percentage of low-income high-minority neighborhoods are zoned for
525. High median household income.
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commercial and industrial uses, which are more intensive than residen-
tial. Readers should take caution not to read more into the study than it
provides.
The study does not address whether race or income is more impor-
tant in the uneven distribution of land use regulation.' It does not at-
tempt to isolate the race and income variables, and statistically correlate
the results to either. Nor does it compare high-income white tracts with
high-income minority tracts, low-income white tracts with low-income
minority tracts, high-income minority tracts with low-income minority
tracts, or high-income white tracts with low-income white tracts. And it
certainly does not examine the land use patterns of middle-class tracts or
moderately mixed-race tracts.
The study does not attempt to correlate zoning patterns with the
presence of any particular LULUs or environmental hazards. It is possi-
ble that a census tract with significant industrial and commercial zoning
could have no hazardous waste sites, for example. It is also possible that
a census tract that is zoned primarily single-family residential could
contain a major LULU, like a solid waste dump. These scenarios would
probably be rare, and the neighborhoods with more intensive land uses
would likely have more LULUs or environmental hazards. ' However,
this study does not address that issue.
This study is not a longitudinal study.' It does not analyze when the
current zoning patterns emerged, if and how zoning patterns changed
over time, and how the racial and class composition of the census tracts
changed over time. In other words, we do not know if the cities engaged
in expulsive zoning by changing the zoning to permit intensive uses in
low-income, minority neighborhoods,' ' or if low-income, minority peo-
ple moved to industrial or mixed-use neighborhoods because of cheaper
housing costs, residential segregation, discrimination in private markets,
proximity to work, or similar reasons." °
The study does not attempt to identify causes of the inequitable dis-
tributions of land use regulation. The possibilities are far-ranging: inten-
tional discrimination by government decision makers, institutional dis-
crimination embedded in the land use regulatory system, market forces,
personal choices about priorities and values, lack of political power or
526. See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
527. See Bullard, Residential Segregation, supra note 23 at 77; cf. Moore & Head, supra note
184, at 198. In addition, lack of zoning controls altogether may contribute to the presence of envi-
ronmental hazards. Robert D. Bullard blames Houston's lack of zoning for the presence of environ-
mental hazards in African American neighborhoods. See BULLAt , INVISIBLE HOUSTON, spra note
66, at 60-63; Robert D. Bullard, Endangered Environs: The Price of Unplanned Growth in Boom-
town Houston, CAL. SocioLoGisT, 1984, at 85; see also supra note 505 (East Austin, Texas, zoning
disparities mirror disparities in presence of hazardous substances).
528. See Been, LULUs, supra note 6, at 1384-85.
529. See Rabin, supra note 1,at 101-03.
530. See Been, LULUs, supra note 6, at 1385.
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resources, or most likely some complex and variable combination of
many or all of these. Land use patterns are built on dozens or even hun-
dreds of decisions--both public and private-made over a long period of
time as a result of the interaction of various political, social, and eco-
nomic forces. The failure to isolate one or more causes does not preclude
identification of a distributional problem or attempts by neighborhood
groups and environmental justice activists to change existing land use
patterns.
Finally, this study does not establish a national pattern. The number
of cities studied, seven, is simply too small to prove that zoning in the
United States is inequitable with respect to race and class. Furthermore,
it is meaningless to compare zoning in a census tract in one city with
zoning in a census tract in another city, because the zoning is a result of
decisions made by local land use regulatory authorities, which differ
from city to city. In fact, this study shows that San Antonio zoned census
tract #78 primarily single-family residential with a small amount of
multi-family residential and a significant amount of commercial zoning,
whereas Wichita zoned census tract #8 almost entirely multi-family resi-
dential with little commercial zoning, and Orange has a large amount of
industrial zoning in census tract #762.04. All of these census tracts are
low-income communities of color. Therefore, land use regulation does
not inevitably lead to high levels of commercial and industrial zoning in
low-income and minority neighborhoods. Instead, comparisons must be
between census tracts within each city, and a national trend would
emerge only if a significant number of cities have inequitable zoning
distributions. Perhaps most importantly, national trends are only margin-
ally relevant to addressing overly intensive zoning (or expulsive zoning)
of low-income communities of color. Instead, the existing patterns and
the neighbors' concerns and land use goals are inherently local (indeed,
specific to the neighborhood in question) and the regulatory authority is
local. Changes will occur locality by locality, neighborhood by neigh-
borhood, and not at a national level.
Study of the race and class distribution of land use regulatory pat-
terns is only in its infancy. Research should go in two somewhat diver-
gent directions simultaneously to fill the knowledge gap. One direction is
toward more comprehensive and more rigorous statistical studies of the
distribution of zoning in many different types of census tracts in many
different cities. These studies would validate the findings of this study
across a broader sample of cities than the seven selected for this study.
These studies could also establish which variables correlate most closely
to various distributional patterns. Some of the variables that should be
analyzed are race, median household income, percentage of tract resi-
dents below the poverty level, the degree of political participation among
census tract residents, geographic and natural characteristics of the tracts,
type of land use regulatory system, historical development patterns, size
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of city, whether suburban development is within the city's political
boundaries or within separate political (and therefore zoning) jurisdic-
tions, the city-wide percentage of minorities and low-income people, and
the city-wide percentage of minority and low-income voters. A second
direction for empirical research on zoning distribution is toward more
detail-rich, longitudinal, qualitative case studies of land use histories of
specific neighborhoods. These studies would identify how zoning for
neighborhoods changed over time, how actual land uses and develop-
ment in the neighborhoods changed over time, and what factors and
forces influenced each."' The case study method accounts for variations
in land use decisions from locality to locality, and should include a syn-
thesis of generalizable theories and the empirical context of specific ex-
amples.'n
Nevertheless, this empirical study demonstrates that inequitable
land use regulatory patterns exist. The current conceptions of environ-
mental justice do not effectively address these patterns.
IV. LAND USE PLANNING & REGULATION: ANOTHER VISION OF
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
A. Land Use Planning & Regulation
Land use planning and regulation offer an alternative, or perhaps
more accurately, an additional'" way of thinking about environmental
justice than the five conceptions described in Part I of this article. Public
planning and regulation of local land uses combine study, politics, and
legal mechanisms. However, planning and regulation are, by their nature,
531. Studies of two communities of color that have been zoned for industrial uses reveal very
different histories. East Austin, Texas, was planned in 1928 to be a "Negro district" and to contain
most of the city of Austin's industrial zoning, which was reflected in Austin's first zoning map in
1931. Local residents now seek rezoning to eliminate the industrial uses. See Scott S. Greenberger,
City's First Zoning Map Plotted Neighborhood of Minorities' Hazards, AUSTIN AM.-STATEsmAN,
July 20, 1997, at Al. However, the Logan neighborhood of Santa Ana, California, was settled and
developed as a primarily Mexican American residential neighborhood and was zoned for residential
use until 1929. When the Santa Fe Railroad was put through Santa Ana in the late 1920s, the neigh-
borhood was mostly rezoned to heavy industrial (M-2) but remained almost exclusively residential
until 1953. In 1953, the zoning code prohibited new residential development in the Logan neighbor-
hood which led to a mixing of industrial and commercial uses among the residential uses by the late
1970s. During the 1980s, zoning was determined parcel by parcel through a conditional use permit
process until local residents asked for elimination of the zoning uncertainty associated with parcel-
by-parcel decisions. Now, 59% of all landowners and 49% of all residential landowners prefer their
properties to be zoned industrial. CITY OF SANTA ANA, LOGAN NEIGHBORHOOD LAND USE &
ZONING REPORT 1-2,5-6 (1998).
532. See supra note 77.
533. No single conception of environmental justice and injustice is correct, and no single strat-
egy will be completely effective. See Tortes, supra note 11, at 847. Each different model is yet
"another stone in David's sling." Cf. Cole, supra note 4. Furthermore, Szasz argues that it is rarely
effective for environmental justice advocates to concentrate political activity in a single zone of
politics (e.g., Congress, federal administrative official, media). SzAsZ, supra note 7, at 164. Land
use regulation is a local, prospective zone of politics for environmental justice activity.
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primarily prospective, rather than remedial. Neighborhood residents that
engage in land use planning and develop proposed land use regulations
for their neighborhood proactively seek to prevent LULUs before the
siting process ever begins. Furthermore, they define not only what they
do not want in their neighborhood but also what they do want.
Planning is the process of identifying goals for the future, develop-
ing policies or plans for achieving these goals, and fashioning specific
mechanisms for implementing these plans.' It also contains phases of
pre-plan study and post-plan monitoring and feedback.' The American
Planning Association has defined planning as "a comprehensive, coordi-
nated and continuing process, the purpose of which is to help public and
private decision makers arrive at decisions which promote the common
good of society.' Some of the public interest goals served by planning,
at least theoretically, are health, safety, convenience, efficiency, natural
resource conservation, environmental quality, social equity, social
choice, amenity, and morals.'
Planning has historically meant many different things. At one time,
the emphasis was on physical planning of street layouts, building loca-
tions, the division of land for distribution, and overall city design. In
the latter part of the nineteenth century and the first five to seven decades
of the twentieth century, public planning or urban planning essentially
went in two directions. Comprehensive planning was concerned with
utopian visions of how cities in general, or specific cities, should look in
the long run.' More practical planning focused on specific problems that
dominated the public agenda of the times: health and safety issues like
public sanitation, tenement housing conditions, and sewage in the latter
half of the 19th century;' aesthetic considerations of the City Beautiful
movement at the turn of the century, such as parks, civic centers, streets,
and transportation;,'I the economic and social problems presented by
534. See THE PRACTICE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT PLANNING 10-11 (Frank S. So & Judith
Getzels eds., 2d ed. 1988).
535. Id.
536. American Plan. Ass'n, Policies and Commentary, PLANNING, July 1979, at 24B.
537. See F. STUART CHAPIN, JR. & EDWARD J. KAISER, URBAN LAND USE PLANNING 48 (3d
ed. 1979).
538. See YOUNG, supra note 506, § 1.04, at 9-10; see also THE PRACTICE OF LOCAL
GOVERNMENT PLANNING, supra note 534, at 20-26.
539. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & A. DAN TARLOCK, LAND-UsE CONTROLS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 362 (1981).
540. See YOUNG, supra note 506, § 1.04, at 10 (noting the reform movements centered on
tenement conditions); see also THE PRACTICE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT PLANNING, spra note 534,
at 26-29 (describing the major cities' post-Civil War housing problems and related statutory re-
sponses).
541. See YOUNG, supra note 506, § 1.05, at 10-11 (explaining the aesthetic focus in urban
planning from 1890-1910); see also THE PRACTICE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT PLANNING, supra note
534, at 30-32, 61-64 (describing the creation of a park system and the emerging emphasis on aes-
thetics in urban planning during the turn of the century).
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uncoordinated development and inadequate municipal services in the
face of urbanization in the early twentieth century;' and the problems of
poverty, slums, and housing shortages and conditions from the 1930s
through the 1960s.' Today, however, planning generally means devel-
opment of a short- or medium-range general plan for a city or region that
is both comprehensive and rational, yet accounts for the reality of poli-
tics, market economics, and limited information." The comprehensive
plan or general plan' is designed to provide for orderly, efficient, and
just local development and adequate services and infrastructure.' Far
from a static utopian vision, it is flexible and evolves.
This article focuses on land use planning, one of the elements of
comprehensive planning. Comprehensive plans contain many different
elements related to the general physical development of the city or re-
gion. For example, California requires that every general plan contain
seven elements: land use, circulation, housing, conservation, open space,
noise, and safety.w Any general plan that does not sufficiently address
each element is legally insufficient.' All of the elements, however, are
interrelated, and land use is at the core of the planning process.' Local
542. See YOUNG, supra note 506, § 1.06, at 11-12 (describing the "City Practical" movement);
see also THE PRACTICE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT PLANNING, supra note 534, at 32-38, 64-66 (dis-
cussing city planner's responses to the heavy urbanization of the early twentieth century including
zoning and planning enabling acts).
543. See YOUNG, supra note 506, § 1.07, at 12-13 (discussing 1930s planning); see also THE
PRACTICE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT PLANNING, supra note 534, at 38-46, 66-67 (discussing the
socioeconomic concerns of urban planning in the mid-twentieth century).
544. See ELLICKSON & TARLOCK, supra note 539, at 362-63 (recognizing the shift by the late-
1970s to responsive, short- and mid-range planning); YOUNG, supra note 506, § 1.03, at 7 (defining
"planning"). But see THE PRACTICE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT PLANNING, supra note 534, at 13, 60
(stating that comprehensive or general plans should he long range and "slightly utopian" but ac-
knowledging that static visions of a utopian future were not useful in describing how to reach those
goals). Despite the textbook view of planning as long range and utopian, many planners are practical
about the political, economic, and social environments in which they operate and adapt accordingly.
See Anthony James Catanese, Learning by Comparison: Lessons from Experience, in PERSONALITY,
POLITICS, AND PLANNING 179, 180-83 (Anthony James Catanese & W. Paul Farmer eds., 1978);
William Fulton, Visionaries, Deal Makers, lncrementalists: The Divided World of Urban Planning,
GOVERNING, June 1989, at 52.
545. Plans that are both general and comprehensive for a particular city or region, across the
many elements related to physical development-land use, transportation, environment and natural
resources, infrastructure, housing, historic preservation, and the like--have many different names:
general plans, comprehensive plans, master plans, official plans, urban plans, city plans, develop-
ment plans, growth management plans, policy plans, and many others. See THE PRACTICE OF LOCAL
GOVERNMENT PLANNING, supra note 534, at 60 (discussing general development plans); Sabo v.
Township of Monroe, 232 N.W.2d 584, 594 n.14 (Mich. 1975) (characterizing the terminology used
to describe these documents). The term "comprehensive plan" is used in this article.
546. See Sabo, 232 N.W.2d at 594 & n.14; YOUNG, supra note 506, § 1.03, at 6-8.
547. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65302 (West 1987 & Supp. 1997).
548. See, e.g., Twain Harte Homeowners Ass'n v. County of Tuolumne, 188 Cal. Rptr. 233,
254-55 (Ct. App. 1982) (finding that county's general plan failed to meet land use element by not
sufficiently stating building intensity); Save El Tom Ass'n v. Days, 141 Cal. Rptr. 282, 287-88 (CL
App. 1977) (finding that city's zoning plan failed to contain all elements of open space requirement).
549. THE PRACTICE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT PLANNING, supra note 534, at 13,60,72.
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public authorities implement their comprehensive plans primarily
through land use controls, particularly subdivision regulations and zon-
ing.' Land use planning is also a central feature of district planning,
which is the process of developing goals, policies, and specific plans for
distinct neighborhoods or districts within a city or urban area and relating
those specific plans to the larger (city, urban, or regional) comprehensive
plan."' Furthermore, the primary concerns of grassroots advocates about
the presence of LULUs in low-income neighborhoods and neighbor-
hoods of color are land use concerns that require attention to local land
use plans."
This article also focuses on land use regulation. Land use planning
and land use regulation are analytically distinct, yet closely related parts
of the land use control process in the United States: the plan articulates
the general principles and policies that will guide local development and
regulations, particularly zoning ordinances (or a zoning code that organ-
izes the ordinances), and gives effect to those principles through detailed
legal controls over private and public land use activity.' The relationship
between planning and regulation varies considerably from locality to
locality. On one hand, zoning implements planning, ' and most state
zoning enabling statutes require that local zoning be in accordance with a
comprehensive plan.m ' On the other hand, many plans are not reflected in
zoning regulations and therefore are difficult to enforce,.' and many
550. Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 507 P.2d 23, 27-28 (Or. 1973). See generally THE
PRACTICE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT PLANNING, supra note 534, at 198-284 (describing subdivision
regulation and zoning); YOUNG, supra note 506, § 1.12, at 18 (explaining the rationale behind, and
the necessity of implementing plans through legal controls).
551. See THE PRACTICE OF LocAL GOVERNMENt PLANNING, supra note 534, at 95-116 (de-
scribing the practice of district planning).
552. See generally Been, LULUs, supra note 6 (examining locally undesirable land uses in
minority neighborhoods). However, members of minority and low-income communities may also
have concern about lack of input into or disparate treatment by local plans for transportation, hous-
ing, use and protection of natural resources, neighborhood infrastructure, municipal services, avail-
ability of open space, and the like. See generally GOMEZ & WONG, supra note 23 (water); CHARLES
M. HAAR & DANIEL WILuAM FESSLER, THE WRONG SIDE OF THE TRACKS (1986) (municipal serv-
ices); THE ECOLOGICAL CITY, supra note 462 (valuable urban ecosystems in central cities); JUST
TRANSPORTATION: DISMANTING RACE AND CLASS BARRIERS TO MOBILITY (Robert D. Bulilard &
Glen S. Johnson eds., 1997) (transportation); MAXWELL & IMMERGWCK, supra note 510 (liquor
store concentration); Kenneth W. Bond, Toward Equal Delivery of Municipal Services in the Central
Cities, 4 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 263, 265-67, 286 (1976) (municipal services and infrastructure);
Emily Gunon, Toxic Soil Has Plans for Tiny Park on Hold, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, Sept. 28,
1997, at DI (open space and parks, and transportation).
553. Fasano, 507 P.2d at 27; YOUNG, supra note 506, § 1.12, at 18-19.
554. YOUNG, supra note 506, § 1.13, at 19.
555. Id. § 5.03, at 360; see Charles M. Haar, In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan, 68
HARV. L. REv. 1154, 1154-56 (1955) (discussing te interelationship between state enabling acts
and the comprehensive plan); see also CAL. GOvT. CODE ANN. § 65300 (West 1987).
556. See ELLICKSON & TAJLocX, supra note 539, at 362-63; YOUNG, supra note 506, § 1.12,
at 18.
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zoning regulations are adopted with very little real planning.' Nonethe-
less, land use planning and land use regulation are intertwined in an im-
perfect, yet persistent symbiotic relationship.
Land use regulations are legal mechanisms, often enacted by local
government, " that restrict the use of privately owned land in the interest
of the public health, safety, morals, and welfare.?' Thus, land use regula-
tion is an exercise of the state's delegated police power. Land use regu-
lation has existed in the United States since the colonial period, when it
was used to ensure orderly development of cities and to promote eco-
nomic growth.' ° Land use regulation also, from its early history, pre-
vented incompatible, noxious uses from interfering with the private en-
joyment of property, private property values, and public health and
safety." In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court of the anti-regulatory Lochner
era used common law nuisance doctrine to uphold the constitutionality of
an early zoning ordinance in the landmark case, Village of Euclid v. Am-
bler Realty Co.' The Court analogized regulatory prohibitions of non-
residential uses in residential neighborhoods and building structures that
did not conform to height limits, construction standards, and setbacks to
nuisance law restraints on valuable uses in inappropriate locations and
circumstances.'n Furthermore, land use regulation embodies social val-
ues, ranging from promotion of residential enclaves "where family val-
ues, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make
the area a sanctuary for people,"" to the similar but more sinister at-
tempts to exclude people who are different, particularly those who are
people of color, low-income people, non-traditional families, the relig-
ious faithful, the mentally disabled, the homeless, prison parolees, and
the like.' Land use regulation also serves to protect the environment and
557. See YOUNG, supra note 506, § 1.13, at 19.
558. But see FRED BOssELMAN ET AL., FEDERAL LAND USE REGULATION (1977) (depicting the
increasing federalization of land use controls); Arnold, supra note 465, at 2-3 (noting the centraliza-
tion of land use regulatory powers by state and federal governments).
559. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 2.32, at 53 (3d ed. 1993).
560. See John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern Takings Doc-
trine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1257-80 (1996) (discussing the colonial governments' many rea-
sons for extensively regulating land use).
561. MANDELKER, supra note 559, § 2.05, at 22.
562. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
563. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 387-90.
564. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1,9(1974).
565. Several casebooks describe exclusionary zoning and cite numerous articles documenting
the practice. See, e.g., DAVID L CALIJES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND USE 431-34 (2d
ed. 1994); ROHAN, supra note 506, § 2.01[IJ, at 2-3 to -6; § 3.04, at 3-171; § 3.05, at 3-221 to -320
(household membership, age, educational uses, housing for students, religious uses, and social wel-
fare facilities, among others); Dubin, supra note 1, at 741 & n.8 (referencing scholarship on exclu-
sionary zoning and racial segregation).
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conserve or allocate scarce natural resources,' and to define the evolving
boundaries of private property rights.5'
The primary methods of land use regulation are zoning ordinances,
subdivision regulations, building and design codes, and official maps.' "
Subdivision regulations apply to any division of land into parcels, lots, or
other smaller units, and allow localities to control the location and design
of streets, drainage and sewers, utilities, parks, common areas, and other
infrastructure. They also give localities leverage to require subdivision
developers to pay fees or donate land or facilities for this infrastructure.'
Building and design codes govern the construction, materials, design, ar-
chitecture, signs, and other physical features of buildings&" ' Local govem-
ments adopt official maps to indicate the publicly planned locations of
streets, parks, public buildings, fire and police stations, and other commu-
nity facilities. Zoning, however, is the core of land use regulation. 2 Zon-
ing divides a locality into geographic districts (zones) and imposes differ-
ent land use controls on each district 3 These controls dictate allowable
uses of land and structures, building bulks, lot size and shape, placement of
buildings on lots, and density and intensity of land uses and structures.7'
The traditional categories of land uses are residential, commercial, indus-
trial, and agricultural. Modem zoning schemes, however, are quite com-
plex with many subcategories of uses, for example: overlay zones, incen-
tive zoning, parking and sign regulations, performance and environmental
566. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1007-08 (1992) (holding
that the South Carolina Beachfront Management Act prohibited development of oceanfront property
to protect fragile ecosystem); Goddard v. Board of Appeals, 433 N.E.2d 98, 99 (Mass. App. CL
1982) (upholding ordinance requiring landowner to obtain special permit to develop in wetlands
area); D & R Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Greene County, 630 S.W.2d 236, 237 (Mo. CL App. 1982)
(approving of lot size requirements to prevent pollution of water reservoirs); Albano v. Mayor and
Township Comm., 476 A.2d 852, 857 (NJ. Super. C. App. Div. 1984) ("Land use regulations
should take into account ecological and environmental concerns."). See generally ELuCKSON &
TARLoCK, supra note 539, LINDA MALONE, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION OF LAND USE (1990);
A. Dan Tarlock, Local Government Protection of Biodiversity: What Is Its Niche?, 60 U. CFt. L.
REV. 555, 574-83 (1993) (discussing environmental protection zoning); John M. Winters, Environ-
mentally Sensitive Land Use Regulation in California, 10 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 693 (1973) (focusing
on the environmental impact of certain California land use regulations).
167. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1033 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (finding that expectations about
pnyate property rights and government regulation evolve as conditions change, including the fragil-
ity of ecosystems); Joseph L. Sax, Some Thoughts on the Decline of Privae Property, 58 WASH. L.
REV. 481,481-82 (1983) (positing that as land use regulation has become more restrictive, property
owner's rights are being redefined and adversely affected).
568. See ELCKSON & TARLoCK, supra note 539, at 36; YOuNG, supra note 506, § 1.12, at
18-19.
569. THE PRACTICE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT PLANNING, supra note 534, at 198-200.
570. Id. at 200.
571. See id. at 268.
572. Id. at 251.
573. Id.
574. ELtuCKsoN & TARLOCK, supra note 539, at 36; THE PRACrTCE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
PLANNING, supra note 534, at 251.
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standards, negotiated zoning techniques like planned-unit developments,
transferable development rights, and many others. '
The planning and opposition models of environmental justice share
some characteristics. Both are largely concerned with questions of fair-
ness (however defined) and goals of achieving safe and healthy commu-
nities. Both involve empirical, political, legal, environmental, and eco-
nomic factors. Both attempt to prevent environmental hazards and LU-
LUs in low-income and minority neighborhoods, albeit in different ways.
And both are struggles for grassroots participation in policymaking and
in political, economic, and legal decisions that affect these neighbor-
hoods.
The models also differ in some important ways. In the opposition
model, grassroots activists react to existing LULUs or proposed sitings.
In many cases, they may seek remedies for past or ongoing harms or
government and corporate decisions that pose the risk of harm. Thus, the
opposition model is largely reactive, retrospective, and remedial, al-
though perhaps necessarily so. In the planning model, local residents
develop land use plans and regulations that either address broader prob-
lems than a single LULU or reflect goals for future land use patterns in
the neighborhood. To some extent, these plans and regulations capture an
element of the community's self-identity-a high-density community of
affordable housing; an historic neighborhood of single-family residences
and small retail businesses; a neighborhood of single- and multi-family
housing with many small parks and playgrounds and few through-streets;
an area in which industrial activities remain on the east side of the river.
These plans and regulations also are in place to govern future land use
decisions, including proposals for LULU sitings. In these ways, the plan-
ning model is proactive, prospective, and visionary.
Opponents of existing or proposed LULUs often are political out-
siders, entering the decision making process after relationships have been
established between the facility owner or operator and government offi-
cials. Theirs is the struggle of people without power who are taking on
and fighting established exercises of power. Some environmental justice
activists reject governmental decision making, economic markets, and
the legal system as inherently subordinating and victimizing the poor and
minorities. In many ways, low-income people and people of color who
seek to influence land use planning and regulation start out similarly by
struggling against the powerful. Their goal, however, is to exercise
power within the existing land use regulatory system. They want to par-
ticipate in the process, empowered by their definition of land use goals
and hopefully successful implementation of these goals through zoning
and other regulations. They want to participate at the land use negotiating
575. See EJicXSoN & TARLocK. supra note 539, at 56-57, 61; THE PRACTICE OF LOCAL
GovERNMENT PLANNING, supra note 534, at 25 1.
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table in matters that concern them, along with government officials, de-
velopers, property owners, environmentalists, and other interested people
and groups. They want to serve on advisory boards, zoning commissions
and boards of appeal, city councils, and other decision making bodies.
Finally, the opposition model identifies and seeks to exclude harm-
ful activities and LULUs. The planning model identifies and seeks to
allow (i.e., include) desirable land uses. The contrasts between these two
models are summarized below:
Characteristics of Two Models of Environmental Justice









B. Strategic Advantages, Efficacy, and the Public Good
Land use planning and regulation offer several advantages for
achieving environmental justice goals. First, an owner or operator of a
prospective LULU would have much more difficulty obtaining approval
for siting the LULU in a minority or low-income neighborhood, if the
comprehensive plan and zoning ordinances prohibited the LULU in that
neighborhood than if they allowed the LULU, either by right or condi-
tionally. Assume that a waste company wants to locate a hazardous waste
incinerator in a low-income, Hispanic neighborhood. If the city zoning
code prohibits hazardous waste incinerators in every zone except 1-3, and
the zoning map does not designate any land in the target neighborhood as
1-3, the waste company will need a zoning amendment, as well as use-
specific environmental permits. If the city's comprehensive plan pro-
vides for non-industrial uses only in the neighborhood or explicitly states
that waste facilities are not appropriate for that neighborhood, the waste
company also will need an amendment to the comprehensive plan. The
waste company nonetheless might have enough political and economic
power to obtain all the needed approvals, but it will face several obsta-
cles. The zoning code text and map and the comprehensive plan will
create a presumption that the hazardous waste incinerator is not appro-
priate for the neighborhood. This presumption will take on a certain legal
and political reality. The waste company will have to expend more po-
litical capital to overcome the presumption. The neighbors will have
[Vol. 76:1
19981 ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND LAND USE REGULATION 97
more opportunities to defeat the incinerator. Not only might the federal
or state environmental agencies deny the permits, but the local land use
authority, perhaps more attentive to local neighborhood concerns, might
deny the land use approvals. Furthermore, the neighbors will have more
government approvals to challenge in litigation. If each approval is nec-
essary to the siting of the project and a court were to hold any approval
to be invalid, the project would fail. The neighbors can bring land use
claims, as well as civil rights and environmental law claims, to challenge
any objectionable land use approvals. For example, they can argue that
rezoning to allow the incinerator is inconsistent with the comprehensive
plan, irrationally allows a use that is incompatible with surrounding uses,
constitutes spot zoning, and violates procedural requirements. When
neighborhoods engage in land use planning and regulation, they create
the rules with which prospective LULUs must comply, rather than
merely reacting to specific LULU siting proposals that have already sur-
faced and obtained a certain amount of legitimacy before opposition can
arise. These pre-established rules can make LULUs less likely to receive
approval and challenges to any such approvals more likely to be success-
ful.
Second, land use planning and regulation create greater certainty
about what land uses will or will not be allowed in a neighborhood.
When local land use regulations allow LULUs, either by right or condi-
tionally, neighborhood residents face uncertainty about whether or not
their neighborhood will be the object of a LULU siting proposal (or a
proposal to site another LULU in their neighborhood if they already have
one or more). Once a proposal has been made, neighborhood residents
face the further uncertainty regarding whether or not they will be suc-
cessful in defeating the proposal. Similarly, the owner or operator faces
uncertainty about whether local residents will attempt to defeat the proj-
ect as inappropriate for the neighborhood even though the local land use
regulations permit it and the owner or operator has invested significant
amounts in that specific site proposal. Both sides have significant eco-
nomic costs (inefficiency), psychological costs (anxiety), and relational
costs (suspicion and animosity) resulting from uncertainty about the pro-
priety of the LULU in the neighborhood. However, if local residents
have been involved in land use planning and development of regulations
for their neighborhood and have carefully identified what uses are appro-
priate for differing areas of their neighborhood, the level of certainty
increases substantially. Proponents of LULUs may nonetheless seek
amendments to or relief from applicable land use prohibitions, and
neighborhood residents may nonetheless oppose LULUs permitted by the
regulations. But in most circumstances, the content of the land use plans
and regulations, when developed with meaningful neighborhood partici-
pation, provide generally reliable information on which both sides can
make decisions. This information fosters efficiency, comfort, and trust.
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Third, land use planning and regulation improve the community's
capacity to achieve its goals. Typically, members of neighborhoods have
community goals that extend far beyond excluding a particular LULU
from the neighborhood. They often have goals about parks and other
recreational uses, open space, traffic patterns and safety, availability of
grocery stores or medical facilities, maintenance of property and cleanup
of nuisances, public infrastructure such as streets, sidewalks, and drain-
age, public areas or commons, social or cultural centers, historic preser-
vation, community identity, economic development, public transporta-
tion, and many other matters. Land use plans contain these goals, and
land use regulations facilitate efforts to reach the goals by defining the
permissible land uses in the neighborhood. '
In many ways, land use planning is like preventive medicine. Eating
well, exercising regularly, developing a healthy emotional outlook, and
avoiding harmful activities do not guarantee that you will never be sick,
nor do they mean that you should not react to the initial signs of illness
or existing health problems. Nevertheless, these proactive strategies cer-
tainly reduce your chance of illness and make life healthier and more
enjoyable. Similarly, land use planning and regulation will not always
preclude the siting of LULUs or the need to oppose proposals or existing
sites. However, communities that develop a healthy vision of their
neighborhoods and enact that vision in land use regulations will more
likely prevent LULUs and other environmental harms than if they had
simply waited to react. The empirical evidence presented in Part In
shows a wide difference in zoning patterns between low-income com-
munities of color and high-income white communities.' Whether caused
by intentional discrimination, institutional inequities, market forces, or
some other factor(s), these disparities indicate that low-income people of
color have very little effective input into the land use planning and regu-
latory process. They also suggest that environmental justice advocates
may want to consider additional strategies that focus on community-
based planning initiatives and zoning proposals.
C. Empirical Evidence of Land Use Planning in the Environmental
Justice Movement
The land use planning model of environmental justice is increas-
ingly developing within the environmental justice community as low-
income neighborhoods of color seek to define and protect their commu-
nities through land use regulation. This section presents five brief case
576. THE PRACTICE OF LOCAL GovERNMEwr PLANNING, supra note 534, at 61, 73. Although
some local neighborhoods overwhelmingly may seek residential zoning, others might lack consensus
or may embrace industrial zoning as consistent with their vision of the neighborhood. See supra note
531 (comparing East Austin in Austin, Texas, with the Logan neighborhood in Santa Ana, Califor-
nia). Empowerment to define and seek land use goals is the objective.
577. See supra Pat II.C-D.
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studies of grassroots environmental justice land use strategies. These
examples cover a range of goals and tactics, as well as locations: (1) re-
zoning to limit industrial and commercial uses in East Austin neighbor-
hoods of Austin, Texas; (2) rewriting Denver, Colorado's industrial
zoning code by a North Denver community group; (3) the St. Paul, Min-
nesota, West Side Citizens Organization's seeking and obtaining passage
of a city-wide ordinance banning metal shredders; (4) the adoption of a
comprehensive land use and development code by the Confederated
Tribes of the Colville Reservation in Washington; and (5) involvement of
grassroots groups from San Antonio, Texas barrios in the formulation of
overlay zoning to protect the Edwards Underground Aquifer.
1. East Austin Rezoning
One approach seeks change to existing zoning either through re-
zoning of individual parcels or application of various "flexible zoning
techniques" to an entire neighborhood. The East Austin area of Austin,
Texas, is a good example.
The residents of East Austin are primarily African American and
Hispanic.' Land uses are industrial, commercial, and residential, inter-
spersed among each other.'8' The area was planned in 1928 as a "Negro
district" that would host most of Austin's industrial uses next to housing
for African Americans."' The City's first zoning map in 1931 reflected
this plan. In addition, Austin had cumulative zoning in East Austin until
the mid-1980s, allowing residences to be built on property designated for
residential uses (i.e., allowing the less intensive land uses in zones where
more intensive uses were allowed). ' Thus, Austin engaged not in "ex-
pulsive zoning"--the assault on minority and low-income neighborhoods
by zoning that allows intensive uses ---but in "repulsive zoning"-the
intentional and simultaneous placement of people of color and intensive,
even harmful land uses next to, or among, one another.'
Because local zoning allowed industrial uses on many parcels in
East Austin, few to no obstacles existed to land uses such as a power
plant, at least two trash recycling plants, a gasoline tank farm, and in-
578. See infra notes 626-60 and accompanying text.
579. Scott S. Greenberger, A Legacy of Zoning Bias: East Austinites Seek to Reform Land Use
Rules of 1931, AUSTIN AM.-STATEsmAN, July 21, 1997, at At.
580. Despite the presence of industrial uses, the neighborhood retains "a distinctive residential
character," and "a remarkably rich social fabric thrives." Haurwitz et al., supra note 505, at Al.
581. Greenberger, supra note 579.
582. Id.
583. Rabin, supra note l,at 101.
584. The inspiration for the label "repulsive zoning" comes from a comment by Becky Helton,
a librarian with the Austin History Center, which houses the 1928 city plan for Austin that was the
genesis for East Austin's zoning injustices. See Greenberger, supra note 531, at Al ("It's repulsive."
(quoting Becky Helton)).
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dustrial facilities that use and emit hazardous and toxic substances.'
Responding to complaints by neighborhood residents about specific land
uses and the overall pattern of industrial zoning, the City of Austin con-
ducted a study in 1997 showing that the area had a significantly higher
percentage of industrial zoning than other areas of the city.' The zoning
report complemented an earlier study showing higher usage of hazardous
substances in East Austin than in other areas of the city.'
Neighborhood residents demanded reform of the area's zoning, and
the City Council responded with two types of reform. The first is the
designation of a large area of East Austin as the East Austin Overlay
Combining District.' Fourteen enumerated land uses and any land use
for which a hazardous materials permit is required by the Austin Fire
Department are defined as conditional uses if they are within the East
Austin Overlay Combining District.s The ordinance does not change the
underlying zoning designation of any parcel. However, new industrial or
commercial uses or changes to existing industrial or commercial uses in
East Austin, if falling within the list of conditional uses, would require a
permit from the Planning Commission under zoning procedures designed
to give local residents an opportunity to study and object to the proposed
uses.s These procedures include notification of property owners and
registered neighborhood associations living within 300 feet of a proposed
site plan, and a public hearing at which concerned neighborhood resi-
dents could speak."' The ordinance also contains a requirement that city
staff report annually to the City Council about both the impact of the
ordinance on the local neighborhood-addressing such things as the
number of conditional use permits approved and denied, the change in
the number of residential units constructed in the area, and other factors
related to quality of life and the environment-and the impact of the or-
dinance on the property interests of industrial and commercial landown-
ers--the change in the total appraised value of all affected development
585. Greenberger, supra note 579 (discussing how industry, specifically a recycling plant,
negatively affects the residents of east Austin); Haurwitz et al., supra note 505, at Al (claiming that
minority communities live among more toxic waste sites and other environmental hazards than other
neighborhoods); Eunice Moscoso & Ralph K.M. Haurwitz, PODER's Woes Bigger Than Springs,
Birds, AUSTIN AM.-STATESmAN, July 21, 1997, at A4 (listing old tank farm site and fuel storage
terminals as areas where more toxic chemical materials exist than anywhere else in the city).
586. See supra note 505 (discussing a City of Austin planning study).
587. Haurwitz et al., supra note 505, at Al.
588. AUSTIN, TEX., ORDINANCE 970717-F, § 13-2-190 (1997).
589. Id. § 13-2-191(A)-(C). The fourteen enumerated land uses are agricultural sales and
services (except nurseries), basic industry, construction sales and services, general warehousing and
distribution, kennels, light manufacturing, limited warehousing and distribution, recycling centers,
resource extraction, vehicle storage, building maintenance services, laundry services (except where
the proposed use is 5,000 square feet or less), equipment sales, and equipment repair services.
590. Id. § 13-2-191(B).
591. Id. § 13-2-191(D); see also CTY OF AUSTIN, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERs: EAST AUSTIN
OVERLAY DIsmTlr (1997) (fact sheet on file with author).
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and other factors related to economic development and employment op-
portunities."
In addition to the neighborhood-wide designation of certain uses as
conditional uses, the City Council rezoned individual parcels from in-
dustrial to either commercial or residential uses. For example, the City
Council rezoned the site of the BFI recycling plant-which posed prob-
lems of blowing trash, rats, noise, traffic, and a five-alarm fire--from
limited industrial to limited office. Similarly, the Council rezoned the site
of the Balcones recycling plant, of which neighbors complained about
aesthetics, noise, and traffic, from limited industrial to residential."' The
rezoning does not automatically shut down the existing uses of these
properties, but prevents expansion of their uses or any new industrial
uses unless the new owner resumes the exact same land use activity
within ninety days. Furthermore, the City Council rezoned a number of
residential lots to residential designation eliminating the option of con-
version to industrial or commercial use."' Local residents, although criti-
cal of the lack of support from traditional environmental groups, contend
that their primary concern is not with whether their industrial and com-
mercial neighbors are polluters but instead lies with the amount of in-
dustrial land use in their residential neighborhood."
2. Revision of Denver Industrial Zoning Code
In contrast to the East Austin activists, environmental justice advo-
cates and leaders of low-income and minority neighborhoods in Denver,
Colorado, took a different approach to the saturation of neighborhoods
positioned near industrial uses.' They sought to rewrite the city's indus-
trial zoning code, and the changes they achieved affected the entire city.
In October 1987, a coalition of grassroots groups, mixed-race but
composed primarily of Hispanic residents of three neighborhoods
(Elyria, Globeville, and Fwansea), formed an organization called
"Neighbors for a Toxic Free Community." The group identified the ar-
chaic content of the industrial zoning code as one reason for the exis-
tence of so many LULUs in their neighborhoods. The coalition, armed
with hard data on the saturation of LULUs in low-income minority
neighborhoods, successfully obtained support from the local housing
authority, schools, and political leaders, including a state senator. In 1989
592. AUSTIN, TEx., ORDINANCE 970717-P, Part 2 (July 1, 1998).
593. Greenberger, supra note 579; see VanScoy, supra note 135.
594. Greenberger, supra note 579.
595. See VanScoy, supra note 135 (contending that traditional zoning which alternated between
industrial and residential prompted the residents' protests); see also Haurwitz et al., supra note 505,
at Al ("East Austin residents do not want to evict all industry; that would be illegal, if not impossi-
ble. Rather, they want a more balanced land-use policy and a greater voice in decisions.").
596. Except where noted separately, all information concerning this case study is from two
telephone interviews with Lorraine Granado of the Colorado People's Environmental and Economic
Network (COPEEN) (July 21 and 22, 1997).
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and 1990, the activists and city officials developed several amendments
to the industrial zoning code, which the City Council approved unani-
mously. These amendments include requirements that buffers separate
industrial uses from residences, that local residents be notified about and
have an opportunity to comment on applications for industrial uses or
hazardous materials storage, and that the Zoning Administrator have the
authority to deny a permit based solely on the area's undue saturation
with uses that manufacture, use, or store hazardous materials. In addition,
an environmental review committee was established to review proposed
land uses that involve hazardous materials and can withhold a permit if it
agrees unanimously to do so.
Despite limited enforcement, these amendments made a difference
in one case. The Denver Board of Adjustment for Zoning Appeals re-
versed the Zoning Administrator's grant of a conditional use permit for
Laidlaw Environmental Services to operate a solid waste transfer station
in an 1-2 zone.' A neighborhood group, Park Hill for Safe Neighbor-
hoods, with the help of the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund and the Land
and Water Fund, opposed the permit. The groups argued for the denial of
the permit because of an undue concentration of neighborhood uses
having hazardous substances, not merely releasing hazardous wastes.
The Board of Adjustment agreed with their arguments,' and a Colorado
District Court affirmed the Board's decision.'" The court deferred to the
Board's interpretation of the industrial zoning code's undue concentra-
tion provision as reasonable, within its authority, and supported by the
evidence."
3. St. Paul Ban on Metal Shredders
When the political and economic climate make it difficult for grass-
roots environmental justice groups to seek comprehensive rezoning of
neighborhood parcels (East Austin rezoning), neighborhood-wide zoning
text amendments (East Austin overlay zoning), or city-wide zoning text
amendments (Denver revised industrial zoning code), groups may in-
stead focus on one particularly troublesome land use. In the face of a
proposed metal shredder to be located in the mixed-race, low-income
West Side of St. Paul, Minnesota, local residents formed Neighbors Or-
ganized to Stop the Hazards of All Metal Shredders! (NO SHAMS!). The
group proposed amendments to the city's zoning code text and compre-
hensive plan to prohibit large metal shredders anywhere in the city and to
allow small metal shredders only at recycling processing centers. The
597. In t Bd. of Adjustment for Zoning Appeals of the City & County of Denver, Findings of
Fact & Conclusions as to Law, No. 72-95 (Sept. 19, 1995).
598. Id. at 1-2.
599. Laidlaw Envtl. Serv., Inc. v. Board of Adjustments, No. 95-CV-4631 (Colo. Dist. CL, July
2, 1996).
600. Id. at 2-3.
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City Council adopted the amendments on September 24, 1997.' The
group felt that the political climate of concern for business development
and activity would not support a complete rezoning of neighborhoods
affected by industrial development along the river, as well as gentrifica-
tion of those areas.e However, the group also completed an environ-
mental inventory of the neighborhood to be used in making its case for
environmental justice, and will continue to address various environ-
mental and land use issues facing West Side residents. '
4. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation Land Use and
Development Code
One issue receiving little attention in the literature on environmental
justice or land use regulation is how low-income and minority communi-
ties that lack zoning altogether address the lack of control over LULUs.'
The problem arises in rural areas and on Indian reservations.s
Some of the low-income and minority areas that have lacked land
use codes and plans are establishing these plans. For example, the Con-
federated Tribes of the Colville Reservation adopted a comprehensive
Land Use and Development Code in January 1991.' The Code estab-
lishes nine zoning districts, each with permitted uses, conditional uses,
prohibited uses, density provisions (including setbacks), and off-street
parking requirements. ' It provides governing authorities-such as the
Land Use Review Board, Planning Director, Land Use Administrator,
and Colville Business Council-standards and procedures for special use
and conditional use permits, major and minor subdivisions, nonconfor-
mities, appeals, variances, code interpretations, hearings, and enforce-
ment. Comprehensive land use codes like the Colville Tribe's code
allow a community to identify the land uses it desires, prohibit those it
does not desire, and define appropriate land uses before proposals for
intensive uses ever arise. The Tribe has used its land use code to prohibit
601. Development of the Anti-Shredder Movement, NO SHAMS! NEWSltrER (Neighbors
Organized to Stop the Hazards of All Metal Shredding! (NO SHAMS!), Saint Paul, MN), May 3,
1997, at 1; Recommendations: Metal Shredder Zoning & Compreh. Plan Amends, REPoRTBRIEF
(City of St. Paul Dep't. of Planning & Econ. Dev., Div. of Planning ) (1997).
602. Telephone interview with Lee Olson, NO SHAMS! (Aug. 9,1997).
603. id.; Letter from Sherilyn Young, NO SHAMS!, to Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold (Aug. 10,
1997) (on file with author).
604. But see Larson, supra note 118, at 182 (discussing the lack of zoning and land use plan-
ning in Texas-Mexico border colonias). This statement assumes that there am areas that lack land
use controls of any sort, not only public controls like zoning, but also private controls like covenants
and effective mechanisms for enforcing nuisance laws.
605. See Larson, supra note 118, at 182, 197-99; Environment: A Survey of Twentieth-Century
Issues, AM. INDIAN Q., June 1, 1995, at 423; Ralph Frammolino, Lawmakers and Indians Wage War
over Dump, L.A. TIMES, July 5, 1990, at B 1.
606. CONFEDERATE TRIBES OF THE COLVILLE RESERVATION, LAND USE & DEV. CODE (Jan.
1991).
607. Id. ch. 50.3.
608. Id. ch. 50.4-50.9.
103,
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development that would interfere with tribal subsistence hunting and
fishing, but has encountered disputes concerning its jurisdiction over
land owned by people who are not Tribe members and over its jurisdic-
tion to zone when the surrounding counties have no zoning.a
Tribal efforts increasingly focus on land use regulation to protect
the environment and promote economic development. One study in par-
ticular highlights the variety of different regulatory schemes used by
tribes." A proposed model tribal environmental review code also con-
tains provisions for land use planning and regulation.""
5. Edwards Underground Aquifer Overlay Zone
Finally, leaders of low-income and minority neighborhoods may
become involved in land use regulation and planning for areas of the city
other than their own neighborhoods and contribute their vision of the
overall community's public interest. In particular, leaders of Citizens
Organized for Public Service (COPS), and its sister organization, Metro
Alliance, representing the low-income, Hispanic South and West sides of
San Antonio, formed a coalition with environmentalists and neighbor-
hood groups from the high-income, non-minority North side to achieve
the passage of zoning protections for the Edwards Underground Aquifer
Recharge Zone."2 The Edwards Underground Aquifer is the ecologically
sensitive source of drinking water for the San Antonio metropolitan area.
The Recharge Zone is an area that allows water to seep from the surface
into the underground aquifer. Contamination from run-off on the surface
in the recharge zone threatened the quality of water in the aquifer.
On January 12, 1995, the San Antonio City Council approved new
provisions to the Zoning Code that established an overlay zone restrict-
ing two types of development through per se prohibitions, conditional
use permit requirements, and density limits: (1) general land develop-
ment resulting in impervious cover (primarily buildings and paving)
609. See John Craig, Non-Indian Launches Suit over Authority of Tribe, SPOKESMAN-REv.
(Spokane, Wash.), Mar. 17, 1998, at BI; John Craig, Ferry Considers Suing Tribe over Zoning,
Dispute Centers on Jurisdiction over Property Owned by Non-Indians, SPOKSMAN-REv. (Spokane,
Wash.), Dec. 20, 1997, at B3; John Craig, Governments Try to Settle Differences with Indians,
Colville Tribes' Moratorium on Development Sparks Dispute, SPOKESMAN-REV. (Spokane, Wash.),
Mar. 7, 1997, at B5; John Craig, Couples Sue County, Tribes over Land-Use Regulations,
SPOKESMAN-REv. (Spokane, Wash.), Apr. 21, 1994, at B3.
610. Sitkowski, supra note 1, at 259-69.
611. A Model Tribal Environmental Review Code (obtained from <http://www.undnodak.edul
telp/modelcode.hml> on June 27, 1997, but subsequently removed) (on file with author).
612. See Tom Bower, Aquifer Rules Approved, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEwS, Jan. 13, 1995, at
IA; Rick Casey, The Political Import ofAqwifer Ordinance, SAN ANTONIO ExPR-NEws, Jan. 15,
1995, at 2A; Rick Casey, "Ms. Cuss," "Mr. Cool" Forge Safe Water Pact, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-
NEWS, Nov. 6, 1994, at 2A; Interview with Danielle Milam & Gene Dawson, Co-Chairs, San Anto-
nio Water Quality Task Force (Mar. 28, 1996); Interview with Ruben Solis & Chavel Lopez, South-
west Workers Union (Mar. 26, 1996). Unless specifically noted, all information concerning this case
study came from these three articles and two interviews.
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which contributes to run-off of chemicals and constrains the natural wa-
ter filtering process of the recharge zone's soil; and (2) land uses in-
volving hazardous or toxic substances or other potential pollutants that
could contaminate the aquifer!" The zoning amendments resulted from a
compromise between development interests and environmental interests.
COPS, Metro Alliance, and other groups from low-income neighbor-
hoods supported the amendments, even though these regulations would
effectively prevent San Antonio's wealthy, non-minority Northwest side
from bearing its share of industrial and some commercial uses. The new
overlay zone would also tend to make the area even more exclusive by
limiting housing development and requiring large lots. The grassroots
social justice activists apparently believed that their constituents were
unlikely to afford Northwest homes or have the political power to shift
industrial uses to the Northwest, regardless of the overlay zone's addi-
tional restrictions. They instead were interested in keeping the San Anto-
nio drinking water supply clean and plentiful, as well as forming an on-
going, but loose working relationship with environmentalists to address
the environmental conditions of South Side, West Side, and East Side
neighborhoods.
Even though the COPS/Metro Alliance leaders joined the policy
negotiations late, they sought and obtained several important provisions.
These provisions included deadlines for the agreement, the assistance of
an outside environmental attorney to plan around potential legal con-
straints, and public input and review of development-restriction waivers
that could be granted by the San Antonio Water System. With their own
social justice and public participation goals, leaders of low-income His-
panic neighborhoods became significant players in San Antonio envi-
ronmental and land use policy. Perhaps the best indicator of the long-
term impact of this strategy was a series of neighborhood planning
meetings to address the environmental conditions and land use goals
surrounding watersheds in four low-income minority neighborhoods.""4
Grassroots groups are engaging in prospective, proactive policy devel-
opment in San Antonio, as well as in Austin, Denver, St. Paul, and the
Colville Reservation. Each community pursues a different strategy and a
different configuration of goals, but all use land use planning and regu-
latory tools.
V. LAND USE REGULATORY MECHANISMS
The empirical evidence of low-income and minority communities'
activism to change local land use policies reflects some of the range of
local regulatory tools that are available for achieving environmental jus-
tice goals. Comprehensive plans, zoning ordinances and amendments to
613. San Antonio, Tex., Ordinance No. 81491 (Jan. 12, 1995).
614. Patrick Driscoll, Ideas Floated on Water and San Antonio's Future, SAN ANTONIO
ExPREss-NEwS, Mar. 10, 1996, at Al.
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zoning ordinances, flexible zoning techniques, and exactions are legal
mechanisms which can be used to implement communities' planning.
Land use regulation not only concerns ethical choices made individually
and socially,6" but it is also an evolving area of law, adaptable to new
social problems and shifting social, economic, and political forces.!' To
date, environmental justice scholarship has devoted little attention to
exploring specific land use regulatory tools.
A. Comprehensive Plan
The first land use regulatory mechanism is the comprehensive plan.
Zoning regulations that implement low-income and minority neighbor-
hoods' goals may be legally ineffective if they are not preceded by
amendments to the city's comprehensive plan to reflect those goals. The
zoning enabling legislation of most states requires that all zoning regula-
tions be in accordance with a comprehensive plan."' Although most
courts do not require that a formal written plan precede zoning ordi-
nances,618 many state statutes require local governments to adopt written
comprehensive plans and prohibit zoning regulations inconsistent with
those plans."' More importantly, many municipalities have adopted some
form of comprehensive plan.' To the extent that new zoning regulations
reflecting low-income and minority neighborhoods' goals are inconsis-
tent with the written comprehensive plan, a court might invalidate them
as not in accordance with a comprehensive plan.' Moreover, courts are
615. See TIMOTHY BEATLEY, EThIcAL LAND USE: PRwNpPLns OF PouCY AND PLANNING 4-5
(1994).
616. See WRIGHT & GrrELMAN, supra note 516, at 1-14.
617. YOUNG, supra note 506, § 5.03, at 360.
618. See e.g., Theobald v. Board of County Comm'rs, 644 P.2d 942, 949 (Colo. 1982); Furtney
v. Simsbury Zoning Comm'n, 271 A.2d 319, 325 (Conn. 1970); Dawson Enters., Inc. v. Blaine
County, 567 P.2d 1257, 1262 (Idaho 1977); Iowa Coal Mining Co. v. Monroe County, 494 N.W.2d
664, 669 (Iowa 1993); Nottingham Village, Inc. v. Baltimore County, 292 A.2d 680, 687 (Md.
1972); State ex reL. Chiavola v. Village of Oakwood, 886 S.W.2d 74, 78 (Mo. CL App. 1994);
Kozesnik v. Township of Montgomery, 131 A.2d 1, 7 (NJ. 1957); Allred v. City of Raleigh, 173
S.E.2d 533,536 (N.C. CL App. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 178 S.E.2d 432 (N.C. 1971); Udell v.
Haas, 235 N.E.2d 897, 901 (N.Y. 1968); Tulsa Rock Co. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 531 P.2d
351, 357 (Okla. CL App. 1974); Cleaver v. Board of Adjustment, 200 A.2d 408, 413 (Pa. 1964);
Hadley v. Harold Realty Co., 198 A.2d 149, 152 (R.L 1964); West Hill Citizens v. King County
Council, 627 P.2d l002, 1005 (Wash. CL App. 1981); Bell v. City of Elkhom, 364 N.W.2d 144, 148
(Wis. 1985). But see Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 507 P.2d 23, 28 (Or. 1973) (requiring
proof that a change conforms to the comprehensive plan).
619. ARJZ. REV. STAT. § 9-462.01F (1995); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65860 (West 1997); FLA.
STAT. § 163.3194 (1990); IND. CODE. § 36-7-4-201 (1995); KY. REV. STAT. § 100.213 (Michie
1993); ME. RFV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 4961-A(l)(A) (West 1996); NEB. REV. STAT. § 23-114.03
(1997); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-62 (West 1991); OR. REv. STAT. § 197.010(3) (1989).
620. For a discussion of the increasing importance of both mandatory planning and written
plans, see CALUES, FT AL., supra note 565, at 372-73.
621. See, e.g., Parks v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 425 A.2d 100, 103 (Conn. 1979); Green v.
County Council, 508 A.2d 882, 891 (DeL Ch. 1986); Moore v. Maloney, 321 S.E.2d 335, 338 (Ga.
1984); La Bonta v. City of Waterville, 528 A.2d 1262, 1265 (Me. 1987); Udell, 235 N.E.2d at 905.
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more likely to uphold spot zoning-the rezoning of a small parcel of land
for a use classification that differs from surrounding parcels-if the re-
zoning is consistent with a comprehensive plan.'
Comprehensive plans generally contain elements of land use, trans-
portation, and community facilities, and may contain elements of com-
munity design, open space, noise, housing, recreation, and environmental
factors. Low-income and minority communities wanting to redefine
land use, transportation, or recreation and open space patterns in their
neighborhoods should seek to amend their cities' comprehensive plans.
Failure to do so could subject more specific zoning amendments to legal
challenge as inconsistent with the land use or other patterns contained in
the comprehensive plan. These communities may be able to take advan-
tage of state statutory rights to participate in local planning and provi-
sions that allow frequent amendment of plans.'
B. Amendments to Zoning
Despite the importance of comprehensive planning as a policy goal
and a legal requirement, the crux of land use regulation for environ-
mental justice will be the amendment of existing zoning codes. Most
low-income and minority communities that suffer or risk exposure to
environmental harms exist in areas with zoning classifications that cur-
rently permit intensive uses.6' Because people of color and the poor live
near and among a higher proportion of industrial and commercial uses
than do white, high-income people,6' an appropriate land use regulatory
response for cities would be to change the permitted uses in those areas
to correspond more closely to the residents' desired neighborhood envi-
ronment, as well as their health and safety needs.
Cities make two types of amendments to zoning regulations: zoning
text amendments and zoning map amendments. Text amendments
change the text of the zoning code;6' zoning map amendments change
However, where courts find comprehensive plans in zoning regulations they may find that the
amendment itself results in a plan that achieves the required planning goals. See, e.g., 1000 Friends
of Oregon v. Board of County Comm'rs, 575 P.2d 651, 656-57 (Or. Ct. App. 1978) (finding that
compliance achieved where government demonstrates that the amendment results in a plan which
conforms with planning goals).
622. See, e.g., Holmgren v. City of Lincoln, 256 N.W.2d 686, 691 (Neb. 1977); Watson v.
Town Council, 805 P.2d 641, 645 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991); Cleaver, 200 A.2d at 415.
623. ROHAN, supra note 506, § 32A.04[l][b][ii], 32A-41.
624. E.g., ARmZ. REv. STAT. § 9-461.05(E) (seeking maximum public participation); CAL.
GoVT. CODE § 65351 (allowing opportunities for public involvement); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
100.193 (consulting with public and giving notice); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-22.2-9(c)(2) (1991) (giv-
ing public notice and soliciting comments); UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-27-303 (1995) (holding public
hearing and giving reasonable notice).
625. See ROHAN, supra note 506, § 32A.04[i 1][b][vii], at 32A-47.
626. See supra Part III.C.
627. Id.
628. ROHAN, supra note 506, § 39.01[t], at 39-3.
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the zoning district designations of particular parcels or areas of the city'
An additional mode of amendment is a comprehensive revision of both
the text and the map, covering a large part of the city or regulatory juris-
diction.'O
Text amendments change what uses, heights, densities, and the like
are permitted in particular districts, but do not change which property is
in what district. 3' For example, a city council or county commission
might amend the zoning code expressly to prohibit ready-mix concrete
plants in 1-2 (heavy industrial) districts,' or to change quarrying and
extractive-type activities from "of right" uses in agricultural districts to
conditional uses.e In each of these cases, the designations of districts on
the map did not change, but what was allowed in those districts changed
through amendments to the permitted, conditional, and excluded uses
that applied to all parcels bearing those designations. In addition, text
amendments might have jurisdiction-wide (i.e., multi-district) applica-
bility, as in the case of removing recycling operations from permitted
uses in solid waste floating zones,' or classifying all airports, both
commercial and non-commercial, as conditional uses in any district."
Residents of low-income neighborhoods and neighborhoods of color
might use zoning text amendments to remove intensive uses from use
districts in which those intensive uses are inappropriate in their view,
without ever changing the district designation of any particular parcel.
For example, a neighborhood with a checkerboard pattern of commercial
uses might seek an amendment to the zoning code to prohibit electro-
plating, solid waste incinerators, and machine shops in commercial
zones.'" No parcel would lose its commercial use designation, but the
range of permissible uses for commercial parcels would shrink. Simi-
larly, the neighborhood might ask the city to change a permitted "of
right" use, such as metal foundries in industrial districts, to a conditional
use, so that anyone seeking the use would have to obtain a conditional




631. See, e.g., Marcus Assoc. v. Town of Huntington, 382 N.E.2d 1323, 1323 (N.Y. 1978)
(upholding the validity of a text amendment to use restrictions applicable to certain districts which
limited the number of occupants and uses of a building or premises); Town of Sandgate v. Coleha-
mer, 589 A.2d 1205, 1207, 1213 (VL 1990) (holding that a text amendment which prohibited storage
of inoperable cars after a certain period was valid).
632. See Rockville Fuel & Feed Co. v. City of Gaithersburg, 291 A.2d 672, 673-74 (Md.
1972).
633. See County Comm'rs. v. Aundel Corp., 571 A.2d 1270, 1272 (Md. 1990), vacated, Amn-
del Corp. v. County Comm'rs, 594 A.2d 95 (Md. 1991).
634. See Free State Recycling Sys. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 885 F. Supp. 798,802-05 (D.
Md. 1994).
635. See Von Lusch v. Board of County Comm'rs, 330 A.2d 738,741 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975).
636. See supra notes 517-20.
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Zoning text amendments have some legal advantages over zoning
map amendments. Because text amendments are generally applicable and
thus often deemed "comprehensive" in nature, they receive greater defer-
ence as legislative acts and are presumed valid.' Even after a landowner
receives a special exception that permits it to use its property for an in-
tensive land use like a concrete batching plant in a heavy industrial zone,
a city may prevent the use by amending the zoning code to prohibit the
use altogether in heavy industrial zones. The landowner has no vested
right in the continuation of any existing zoning.' Text amendments do
not address whether particular uses are appropriate on particular parcels
singled out for attention; but instead, text amendments are generally ap-
plicable determinations that certain uses are always incompatible with
the other uses in a zoning classification, or always need the oversight that
accompanies conditional use permits. Thus, they avoid the potential
problems associated with "spot zoning" and "downzoning" that result
from particularized treatment of individual parcels or small groups of
parcels.'s Local governing boards, however, must follow required proce-
dures and give affected parties proper notice and opportunity to be heard
when adopting text amendments.' In addition, changes to generally ap-
plicable zoning designations may arouse the opposition of many different
affected landowners city-wide, thus making them difficult to achieve
politically. Furthermore, a text amendment may be too blunt a tool for
excising intensive uses that are interspersed throughout low-income and
minority neighborhoods. For example, a solid waste incinerator might be
appropriate for most, perhaps even nearly all, heavy industrial zoning
designations in a city. A text amendment to make it an impermissible use
in industrial zones would not directly address the underlying environ-
mental justice problem of industrial zoning in a residential area of color.
Zoning map amendments change the zoning district designation for
a particular parcel, tract of land, or set of parcels."' Although rezoning
has been used to allow intensive uses in neighborhoods of color and low-
income communities,"2 grassroots environmental justice activists might
637. See Von Lurch, 330 A.2d at 742; Layne v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment., 460 A.2d 1088,
1089 (Pa. 1983) (deferring to zoning classifications in local zoning code unless "it is obvious that the
classification has no substantial relationship to public health, safety, morals or general welfare"
(emphasis added)).
638. Rockville Fuel & Feed Co. v. City of Gaithersburg, 291 A.2d 672,675-77 (Md. 1972).
639. See infra notes 651-63 and accompanying text.
640. Free State Recycling Sys. Corp. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 885 F. Supp. 798, 806-08
(D. Md. 1994).
641. See, e.g., Orange Lake Ass'n v. Kirkpatrick, 21 F.3d 1214, 1217 (2d Cir. 1994) (rezoning
several parcels totaling 150 acres from R-3 to R-2, thus changing density); Bartram v. Zoning
Comm'n, 68 A.2d 308, 309-10 (Conn. 1949) (rezoning single lot from residential to business);
Pierson Trapp Co. v. Peak, 340 S.W.2d 456, 457 (Ky. Ct. App. 1960) (rezoning 30-acre tract from
residential to commercial); Valley View Indus. Park v. City of Redmond, 733 P.2d 182, 186-88
(Wash. 1987) (rezoning single parcel of nearly 27 acres from light industrial to agricultural).
642. Lake Lucerne Civic Ass'n v. Dolphin Stadium Corp., 801 F. Supp. 684, 688 (S.D. Fla.
1992) (rezoning land in predominantly African American neighborhood to commercial use for a
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seek zoning map amendments to change more intensive use designations
in their neighborhoods to less intensive use designations, a technique
known as "downzoning.'" For example, a low-income minority neigh-
borhood might contain several parcels zoned for heavy industrial use in
close proximity to residences, schools, churches, health care facilities,
and the like. Residents might seek to rezone some or all of these parcels
for less intensive,-yet economically viable, commercial uses.
Even though downzoning may change the land use designations in
low-income and minority communities to reduce threats to the residents'
health, safety, quality of life, and sense of community, owners of down-
zoned parcels are likely to challenge the rezoning. A majority of courts
will deem a rezoning a legislative act and give it a presumption of valid-
ity." Thus, the landowner will have to prove that the zoning amendment
was "arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable and [has] no substantial rela-
tion to the public health, safety or general welfare.' However,
Oregon, ' Idahor and Kansas" have treated rezoning as an administra-
tive or quasi-adjudicative act, thus subject to greater judicial scrutiny. In
addition, Maryland,"' Connecticut, ' Mississippi,"' Virginia," and New
stadium and extensive commercial development); R.LS.E. Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144, 1148
(E.D. Va. 1991) (rezoning tract in predominantly African American area from agricultural to indus-
trial to allow regional landfill).
643. See e.g., McCuskey v. Canyon County, 851 P.2d 953, 955 (Idaho 1993) (downzoning
single parcel from heavy industrial to rural residential); Palermo Land Co. v. Planning Comm'n, 550
So. 2d 316, 317 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (downzoning land from heavy industrial to light industrial to
prevent expansion of solid waste landfill), overruled by Palermo Land Co. v. Planning Comm'n, 561
So. 2d 482 (La. 1990); City of Virginia Beach v. Virginia Land Inv. Ass'n, 389 S.B.2d 312, 312 (Va.
1990) (downzoning 403 acres from planned unit development to agricultural); Scabrooke Partners v.
City of Chesapeake, 393 S.E.2d 191, 192-93. (Va. 1990) (downzoning 19 acres from multi-family
residential to single-family residential); Valley View Indus. Park, 733 P.2d at 186-88 (downzoning
single parcel of nearly 27 acres from light industrial to agricultural).
644. ROHAN, supra note 506, § 39.01[2), at 39-4; see, e.g., Amel Dev. Co. v. City of Costa
Mesa, 620 P.2d 565, 567 (Cal. 1980). But see, e.g., infra notes 664-65 and accompanying text.
645. ROHAN, supra note 506, § 39.01 [21, at 39-4.
646. See, e.g., Neuberger v. City of Portland, 603 P.2d 771, 777 (Or. 1979) (rezoning by city
counsel was quasi-judicial function subject to review by court of appeals); Fasano v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 507 P.2d 23, 26-27 (Or. 1973) (rejecting the position that judicial review of a
rezoning was limited to a determination of whether it was arbitrary and capricious and futher noting
that courts should not "rigidly" view zoning decisions as legislative acts to be accorded a presump-
tion of validity).
647. See, e.g., Cooper v. Board of County Comm'rs., 614 P.2d 947, 950-51 (Idaho 1980)
(holding that the board's determination on rezoning was a quasi-judicial act).
648. See, e.g., Golden v. City of Overland Park, 584 P.2d 130, 135 (Kan. 1978) (holding that a
change of zoning which focused on a specific tract of land, rather than the entire city, was more
quasi-judicial than legislative).
649. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, § 4.05[a] (1997); see, e.g., Wakefield v. Kraft, 96 A.2d 27, 30
(Md. 1953) (building in reliance on original zoning was not sufficient to prevail on claim where a
mistake in original zoning ordinance or change in the neighborhood's character was enough to
render rezoning proper).
650. See, e.g., Kimball v. Court of Common Council, 167 A.2d 706,708 (Conn. 1961) (chang-
ing zones is improper unless new conditions or substantial changes have occurred in the area).
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Mexicoe have required that governmental bodies support rezonings with
evidence of either a substantial change in the character of the neighbor-
hood where the rezoning occurred or a mistake in the existing zoning.
The "change or mistake" rule is particularly problematic for low-income
and minority neighborhoods, as it creates strong inertia for existing zon-
ing patterns, which are inequitably distributed and often harmful to low-
income people and people of color. Environmental justice advocates who
seek land use changes are seeking to change local conditions by first
changing zoning patterns. They often will not be able to support down-
zoning with changed conditions towards less intensive uses in the area
because the area is likely to have deteriorated as a result of the existing
zoning allowing more intensive uses. Instead, they will have to argue
that the initial zoning was a mistake by showing the local land use
authority relied on invalid, or perhaps discriminatory, assumptions about
the compatibility of industrial and commercial uses with nearby residen-
tial activities.'
Even in the majority of states where rezoning is legally presumed
valid, courts as a matter of practice scrutinize downzoning carefully!' A
landowner may contend that the rezoning is impermissible spot zoning,
or more precisely spot zoning in the reverse.e" Spot zoning involves
zoning a small area of land differently than surrounding land, while spot
zoning in the reverse entails zoning a parcel more restrictively than the
surrounding parcels.a Spot zoning in the reverse, which is more relevant
to the environmental justice goal of downzoning intensive uses in mixed
use areas, is often struck down as arbitrary and capricious, an unjust dis-
crimination against the downzoned parcel while surrounding parcels are
not subjected to the same treatment.'" Environmental justice advocates
651. See, e.g., City of Biloxi v. Hilbert, 597 So. 2d 1276, 1280 (Miss. 1992) (holding that clear
and convincing evidence must be given that either a mistake in the original zoning or a substantial
change in the character of the neighborhood renders the rezoning justified).
652. See, e.g., Seabrooke Partners v. City of Chesapeake, 393 S.E.2d 191, 193 (Va. 1990)
(holding that rezoning will be sustained on the production of evidence demonstrating sufficient
change in the circumstances of a parcel's neighborhood).
653. See, e.g., Davis v. City of Albuquerque, 648 P.2d 777, 779 (N.M. 1982) (holding that
downzoning must be based on a showing of a mistake in the original zoning or change in the neigh-
borhood).
654. See Bullard, Residential Segregation, supra note 21, at 80-81; Rabin, supra note 1, at
111-12.
655. See Boyce v. Sembly, 334 A.2d 137, 142 (Md. CL Spec. App. 1975).
656. See, e.g., Grimpel Assocs. v. Cohalan, 361 N.E.2d 1022, 1024-25 (N.Y. 1977) (holding
that rezoning resulted in unconstitutional exercise of police power after considering evidence of
traffic conditions and reduction in value to determine the suitability for the uses prescribed in the
zoning ordinances).
657. See Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., "Spot Zoning"-A Spot That Could Be Removed from the
Law, 48 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONEMhP. L. 117, 117-19 (1995).
658. Id.
659. See, e.g., Viso v. State, 92 Cal. Rptr. 580, 584-85 (CL App. 1979); City of Miami v.
Schutte, 262 So. 2d 14, 17 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1972).
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must also take care to ensure that downzoning accords with, and does not
facially conflict with, the comprehensive plan.'
Furthermore, owners of downzoned property who suffer economic
loss to accommodate neighborhood residents' opposition to their uses of
their property may claim that the local land use authority unreasonably
exercised its police power and took private property without just com-
pensation. For example, a New York village rezoning of two parcels
from business to residential, resulting in at least a sixty percent loss of
value, was not only in violation of a comprehensive plan but also unjusti-
fiably discriminatory."' The court also noted that the downzoning oc-
curred in the face of a specific proposal for a bowling alley and a super-
market or discount house that received neighborhood opposition rather
than as the result of pre-proposal comprehensive planning."2 Similarly,
downzoning a parcel from commercial to residential use was unconstitu-
tional when it resulted in a 92% diminution in the parcel's value and
nearby residences could be protected from the impacts of the business
use of the land by an existing buffer area.!' However, when local resi-
dents and the land use planning authority can present sufficient evidence
that downzoning is necessary to protect local residential neighborhoods,
courts will likely uphold the downzoning.6"
People of color and poor people are in something of a Catch-22. On
one hand, zoning designations often reflect existing uses,' which in the
case of low-income and minority neighborhoods are often a set of mixed,
intrusive, intensive, and even expulsive uses. Environmental justice ad-
vocates want to change these zoning patterns. However, environmental
injustice often exists in older neighborhoods, and as Ellickson and Tar-
lock observe, "[allthough all use designations are potentially amendable,
those in established neighborhoods are the least likely to be open for
negotiation." Amendments to the zoning code and zoning map are
means of redefining acceptable land uses, at least for the future, but they
660. See supra notes 617-21 and accompanying text.
661. Udell v. Haas, 235 N.E.2d 897,905 (N.Y. 1968).
662. Id. at 903-04.
663. Grimpel Assocs. v. Cohalan, 361 N.E.2d 1022, 1024 (N.Y. 1977); see also Condor Corp.
V. City of St. Paul, 912 F.2d 215, 223 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that neighborhood opposition was not
a sufficient basis for restricting intensive uses and that the city must establish evidence of incom-
patibility of uses); D'Addario v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 593 A.2d 511, 517 (Conn. 1991)
(holding that downzoning two parcels from commercial to residential was a taking of private prop-
erty for public use without just compensation when the downzoning reduced the value of both par-
cels by about 90% each).
664. Moviematic Indus. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 349 So. 2d 667,669 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1977) (noting the validity of downzoning from heavy industrial to single-family residential to protect
ecological systems and residential, historic, and aesthetic character of neighborhoods); McGowan v.
Cohalan, 361 N.E.2d 1025,1027 (N.Y. 1977) (upholding a downzoning from industrial to residential
as necessary to create buffer between residential and industrial uses).
665. E jCKSON & TARLOCK, supra note 539, at 59.
666. Id.
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will be judged by their compatibility with surrounding uses and the char-
acter of the neighborhood,' which often reflect the very uses that grass-
roots groups are trying to change. Objectionable uses may be deemed
compatible with nearby uses that are similarly intensive. In addition,
landowners accustomed to the intensive characterization of their parcels
and the neighborhood are likely to resist change.
Low-income and minority neighborhood groups will be most suc-
cessful in achieving valid rezoning of neighboring properties from more
intensive to less intensive uses if they follow four guiding principles: (1)
seek rezoning before controversial specific land use proposals arise; (2)
carefully document the incompatibility of existing high-intensity use
designations and their impact or potential impact on the health and safety
of local residents, as well as community character, (3) seek rezoning for
all neighboring parcels with similar use designations and similar impacts
(do not leave a landowner the argument that only his or her property has
been downzoned while neighboring parcels remain zoned for more inten-
sive uses); and (4) do not downzone so greatly that the landowner suffers
a substantial diminution in the property's value (leave the owner some
economically viable use-for example, downzone from an industrial use
to a commercial use, instead of all the way to a single-family residential
use).
Perhaps the most successful strategy of all includes a comprehen-
sive set of amendments to the zoning text, the zoning map, and the com-
prehensive plan. These combined text and map amendments often create
new zoning designations and apply them to existing parcels, and they
often receive judicial approval because of their comprehensive nature."'
For example, if a group of neighborhood residents were concerned that
interspersed light industrial zoning might permit manufacturing activity
with the presence and use of toxic chemicals, the emission of noise and
dust, and the like, but did not object to warehouse uses (permitted uses in
light industrial zones), the group would have four options. First, they
could seek a zoning text amendment to delete manufacturing as a per-
mitted use in light industrial zones. This change, however, would seem to
run contrary to the definition of light industrial activity as including at
least some manufacturing and would likely develop opposition from
manufacturers in other parts of the city whose property is zoned light
industrial. Second, they could seek a zoning map amendment to down-
zone their area's light industrial property to commercial or residential.
This would prevent manufacturing in the area, but it would also ineffi-
ciently and perhaps unjustly prevent owners of the downzoned parcel
from using their land for warehouses even though the residents have no
objection to warehouses. Third, they could seek both a map and text
amendment that would downzone the land to commercial but place
667. See La Salle Nat'l Bank v. City of Chicago, 125 N.E.2d 609,613 (11. 1955).
668. See, e.g., Jafay v. Board of County Comm'rs, 848 P.2d 892,898 (Colo. 1993).
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warehouses among the permitted uses for commercial zones. However,
warehouses might not be compatible with all other commercial uses, and
residents and landowners in other parts of the city where there is com-
mercial zoning might object to warehouses in their areas. Fourth, they
could seek both a text amendment that creates a new "warehouse" zoning
designation and a map amendment that rezones the light industrial prop-
erties to warehouse uses. The creation of new districts accommodates the
particular land use compatibility needs of particular neighborhoods, such
as low-income and minority communities that historically have suffered
expulsive zoning and harmful land uses. It has the capacity to reflect
changing social norms about what uses are deemed compatible and in-
compatible with other uses. It also increases the "supply" of zoning des-
ignations, perhaps avoiding inefficient and burdensome restrictions on
land that result from attempts to avoid some uses in a particular classifi-
cation's large number of permissible uses (which accompany a small set
of use classifications). This method, however, risks proliferation of par-
ticularized use designations and piecemeal zoning. Overly specialized
zoning designations could limit both the local community and the private
landowner in options for the property's use if the conceived use is no
longer viable or desired or the property is to be sold. Nonetheless, com-
munities may need to experiment with new zoning classifications in an
attempt to achieve environmental justice.!
C. Flexible Zoning Techniques
1. Conditional Uses
Beyond traditional zoning, localities and neighborhood groups who
become involved in land use planning and regulation have a variety of
more flexible techniques available to them. Perhaps the most commonly
used mechanism is the conditional use or special exception.!" Zoning
classifications contain uses that are permitted by right (without having to
obtain any specialized permit) and uses that are completely prohibited.
However, most zoning classifications also contain uses that are permitted
in the zone only if the landowner obtains a permit and meets the stan-
dards or conditions listed in the zoning code for those uses.7' These uses
are often compatible with other uses in the zone but are not necessarily
compatible in every location or under every circumstance or without
certain limitations and conditions.' The terms "special permits," "spe-
669. "Incremental planning that adapts to change in an ad hoc manner is a fact of life." ROHAN,
supra note 506, § 32A.04[l1[b][viij, at 32A-47.
670. ELLICKSON & TARLOCK, supra note 539, at 61.
671. ROHAN, supra note 506, § 44.01[1], at 44-2.
672. Id.; see also Tullo v. Township of Millbum, 149 A.2d 620, 624-25 (NJ. Super. CL App.
Div. 1959) (holding there was sufficient evidence that the statute and ordinance had been met to
justify a special exception for the construction of an outdoor pool at private club).
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cial exceptions," and "conditional uses" are legally the same and are used
interchangeably to refer to the same device. '
Conditional uses are not a means of excluding potentially harmful
activities from areas zoned for them because the zoning code lists them
as permissible if they meet certain conditions, thus presuming general
compatibility. Instead, conditional uses are a means of imposing certain
restrictions on uses that could become nuisances or unduly burdensome
on the surrounding area if left unchecked. ' They also allow for greater
public scrutiny of some land use proposals." Residents of low-income
and minority neighborhoods cannot count on keeping out conditional
uses just because the landowner has to obtain a permit. First, to even
have a chance at preventing an unwanted conditional use, the local resi-
dents must watch vigilantly for conditional use permit applications that
affect their neighborhoods and become actively and effectively involved
in opposing the applications that would have adverse impacts on their
community.6! 6 Second, the local land use regulatory authority might grant
the permit despite neighborhood opposition. For example, the environ-
mental justice cases of East-Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Association v.
Macon Bibb Planning & Zoning Commission6" (concerning a landfill in
Macon, Georgia) and Security Environmental Systems, Inc. v. South
Coast Air Quality Management Districf' (concerning a hazardous waste
incinerator capable of burning more than 450 chemicals at a rate of two
tons per hour) involved local grants of conditional use permits. Third, a
landowner whose conditional use permit application has been denied is
likely to obtain judicial reversal if he or she can show compliance with
all the conditions in the zoning code.!"
Environmental justice groups, however, may be able to exercise
more scrutiny over industrial and commercial uses that are not likely
(politically or legally) to be prohibited altogether if the landowner is re-
quired to obtain a conditional use permit. In addition, they can seek to
influence the conditions under which a permit may be granted, so as to
reduce the negative impacts of the conditional use. Therefore, an envi-
ronmental justice strategy might involve rewriting conditional use stan-
dards to require more buffers, more limits on pollution and nuisance-like
activities, a smaller scale, and the like. Furthermore, one standard might
require denial of the permit if there is an over-concentration of similar
673. ROHAN, supra note 506, § 44.0 1 [ I ], at 44-3.
674. Id. § 44.01[4], at 44-11.
675. Id.
676. See MAXWEU. & IMMERGLUCK, supra note 510, at 13.
677. 888 F.2d 1573 (11 th Cir.), opinion amended and superseded on denial of reh'g, 896 F.2d
1264 (l th Cir. 1989).
678. 229Cal.App.3dSupp. 110(1991).
679. See, e.g., Zylka v. City of Crystal, 167 N.W.2d 45, 49 (Minn. 1969); Bankoff v. Board of
Adjustment, 875 P.2d 1138, 1142-43 (Okla. 1994).
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uses in a low-income or minority neighborhood. Finally, requiring con-
ditional use permits for new industrial or commercial activity in a low-
income or minority neighborhood that is disproportionately zoned for
these uses might be an effective way of controlling further intrusion until
comprehensive rezoning can occur."'
2. Overlay Zones and Special Districts
Overlay zones are another way of imposing additional requirements
on existing Euclidean zoning: "An outgrowth of Euclidean zoning,
overlay zones in effect circumscribe an environmental area that is al-
ready subject to Euclidean regulation, and impose additional require-
ments thereon.'" The additional requirements are laid over the existing
zoning, subjecting the land in the overlay district to the underlying tradi-
tional zoning requirements and the special requirements associated with
the overlay district. Overlay zones have been used for a wide range of
purposes, including prohibitions or limits on development where natural
conditions such as seismic hazards, hillside slopes, or flood hazards
make it unsuitable, where there are aesthetic or historic features to be
preserved, where sensitive and valuable environmental areas exist that
could be harmed by excessive development, and where certain activities
in the area, like airplane flight patterns, make constraints on other activi-
ties necessary for safety or health.'
Overlay zones could be used to impose a variety of specific re-
quirements on industrial and commercial land activities that occur in
neighborhoods or areas inhabited by low-income people and people of
color and that threaten the residents' health or the area's character and
integrity. For example, environmental justice groups could seek overlays
of "interface zones," which limit land uses and require certain mitigation
and buffer measures to create buffers where higher intensity zoning bor-
ders upon lighter intensity zoning. ' They could also seek neighborhood
conservation districts, designed to protect older neighborhoods from the
harmful or expulsive effects of mixed zoning, and then impose on all
neighborhood conservation districts certain land use limits designed to
680. The Denver Board of Adjustment reversed a grant of a conditional use permit for a solid
waste transfer facility in an industrial (1-2) zone in a low-income neighborhood of color, in part
because "[tihe area in which the station is to be located has an undue concentration of uses which
manufacture, use, or store materials which create environmental hazards." Board of Adjustment for
Zoning Appeals of the City and County of Denver, Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law, Case
No. 72-95, at 2.a.i (Sept. 19, 1995).
681. The East Austin Overlay District is an excellent example of this strategy. See Austin,
Texas Ordinance No. 970717-F (July 1, 1997); CITY OF AUSTIN, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS: EAST
AUSTIN OVERLAY DiSTRICr, supra note 591.
682. Robert J. Blackwell, Comment, Overlay Zoning, Performance Standards, and Environ-
mental Protection After Nollan, 16 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 615,616 (1989).
683. Id. at 632-34; see CALujES E AL., supra note 565, at 61-62.
684. Blackwell, supra note 682, at 619 n. 135.
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prevent those impacts.' For example, the City of Waco, Texas, enacted
an ordinance prohibiting the sale of automobiles on certain commercial
property in neighborhood conservation districts, thus protecting these
sensitive older areas from an arguably disruptive land use."' Finally, en-
vironmental justice advocates might follow the lead of residents of East
Austin and the Austin, Texas planning staff and city council in develop-
ing an overlay zone for a low-income neighborhood of color that suf-
fered a disproportionate amount of industrial and commercial uses and
zoning designations.' The East Austin overlay zone requires conditional
use permits for any new industrial or commercial activity in the district.'
The specific additional requirements imposed on the overlay zone will
vary from locality to locality, depending on the concerns identified by
local residents. The concept of the overlay zone, however, allows impo-
sition of these additional requirements only where they will help to pro-
tect and promote the health of the neighborhoods and the residents, not in
other parts of the city where overlay zones might have no or little impact
on residential areas. This narrow geographic tailoring of additional land
use regulations reinforces legal arguments that the regulations are de-
signed to protect only those neighborhoods at risk of deterioration or
environmental hazards without unnecessarily burdening land use in other
areas. It also decreases the number of landowners citywide who might be
affected and therefore might be opponents.
3. Performance Zoning
Performance zoning is a deceptively attractive option for residents
of mixed use neighborhoods wanting to protect against environmental
harms, but it contains the same limits inherent in federal and state envi-
ronmental regulations. Performance zoning does not regulate land uses,
but instead regulates the impacts of activities that occur on land.& ' A per-
formance zoning ordinance establishes certain performance standards for
possible negative impacts on neighboring property, such as dust, smoke,
noise, odor, vibration, toxic pollutants, runoff, glare, heat, and other nui-
sances (negative externalities).a ° It prohibits any land use with impacts
685. "[A) neighborhood conservation district is an overlay district 'intended to encourage the
continued vitality of older residential areas of the city, to promote the development of a variety of
new housing of contemporary standards in existing neighborhoods, and to maintain a desirable
residential environment and scale."' Bell v. City of Waco, 835 S.W.2d 211, 214 (Tex. CL App.
1992) (quoting WACO, TEX., CODE § 4.2303(a) (1987)).
686. Id. at 213.
687. See supra Part W.C.1.
688. See supra note 505; see also East Austin Due Rezoning, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN,
July 1, 1997, at AIS (discussing proposed changes to zoning policies in East Austin); Haurwitz et
al., supra note 505, at Al (describing the effects of the proposed changes to remedy the incompati-
bility of zoning and actual use of East Austin).
689. ROHAN, supra note 506, § 40.01[71, at 40-6.
690. Id.
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that exceed levels predetermined to be tolerable."' Two ways of classi-
fying performance standards exist. One is to distinguish between stan-
dards related to development density, design, and preservation of natural
resources-often associated with areas of new development-and stan-
dards related to the nuisance-like impacts of industrial activity, such as
air, water, and soil pollution; noise; vibration; and odors---often in estab-
lished industrial areas.' Another classification distinguishes between
what are known as "primitive" standards, which have only general defi-
nitions stemming from common law nuisance concepts (e.g., prohibitions
on emission of "any offensive odor, dust, noxious gas, noise, vibration,
smoke, heat or glare beyond the boundaries of the lot'") and "precision"
standards, which are developed from scientific data and reflected in
quantifiable measurements (e.g., limits on permissible decibel levels in
designated octave bands per second or designated center frequency-
cycles per second). Nevertheless, all types of performance zoning ordi-
nances supplement, as opposed to replace, traditional, use-based Euclid-
ean zoning. And courts have largely upheld the validity of performance
zoning standards both as reasonable means of protecting the public from
nuisances and as sufficiently measurable according to a "reasonable per-
son" nuisance standard.'
Performance zoning is essentially local environmental law. Except
for the performance standards that prohibit all emissions, ' the standards
permit some level of impact. The permissible level, then, is based either
on what is generally defined as "objectionable," which is vague and dif-
ficult to enforce, or on scientific calculations of risk. In either event, the
standards require legal or scientific expertise, regulatory oversight, and
control of pollution through risk assessment, rather than pollution pre-
vention-all characteristics of environmental law criticized by environ-
mental justice activists and scholars, and distrusted by low-income peo-
ple and minorities' If low-income and minority communities must en-
dure industrial and intensive commercial uses, performance standards
offer a locally available tool for prohibiting those activities from pollut-
ing and disrupting the neighborhood. Performance standards, however,
691. LANE KENDIG, PERFORMANCE ZONING (1980); ROHAN, SuPra note 506, § 40.01[l][c], at
40-6; CALLIES E AL., supra note 565, at 63; Frederick W. Acker, Note, Performance Zoning, 67
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 363,364 (1991); Blackwell, supra note 682, at 616.
692. See generally KENDIG, supra note 691 (addressing performance zoning).
693. State v. Zack, 674 P.2d 329, 331 (Ariz. 1983) (quoting city ordinance).
694. Blackwell, supra note 682, at 638-39.
695. Id. at 616, 637. But see Acker, supra note 691, at 364 (urging performance zoning as a
superior alternative to Euclidean zoning).
696. Zack, 674 P.2d at 332; Dube v. City of Chicago, 131 N.E.2d 9, 16 (i1. 1955); DeCoals,
Inc. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 284 S.E.2d 856,859 (W. Va. 1981).
697. E.g., DeCoals, 284 S.E.2d at 858 (stating that the text of the ordinance indicated that "mno
dust of any kind produced by the industrial operations shall be permitted to escape beyond the limits
of the property being used.").
698. See supra notes 111-12,119-24.
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do not address the problem of disproportionate industrial and commercial
zoning in low-income and minority neighborhoods. Nor are they as cer-
tain to keep pollution out, given slippages in enforcement and the poten-
tial for either careless or inadvertent emissions from heavy industrial
activities, as prohibitions on industrial uses in these neighborhoods are.
Thus, at best, performance standards might be a fallback negotiating po-
sition for communities that, because of private property rights, economic
and political forces, or other practical limits, cannot completely undo the
legacy of intensive zoning.
4. Buffer Zones
Buffer zones, like performance zoning, both help and hurt low-
income people and people of color. Buffer zones are use designations
that create a buffer or transition between a less intensive use, such as
single-family residential, and a nearby more intensive use, such as com-
mercial or industrial.' The buffer zone exists between the two areas to
minimize the impact of the more intensive use on the less intensive, more
sensitive use.'
The most frequent type of buffer between single-family residential
areas and industrial or commercial areas is medium- or high-density resi-
dential uses.J' In fact, in the famous case of Village of Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,' in which the Supreme
Court upheld the Village's refusal to rezone land for low-income housing
in an all-white Chicago suburb, the Village's avowed purpose for its
multi-family zoning designation was to serve as a buffer between single-
family homes and commercial activities.' Buffer zones are perhaps one
of the major reasons why low-income and minority neighborhoods have
so much industrial and commercial zoning: the multi-family housing,
where many low-income and minority people live, is purposefully placed
near the industrial and commercial uses to create a buffer that protects
high-income, white, single-family neighborhoods. Zoning practices place
large numbers of poor and minority people near intensive uses because
traditional zoning and planning theory values most the single-family
residence, instead of the integrity and quality of all residential areas.'
However, low-income and minority neighborhoods need buffers to
protect them from intensive industrial and commercial activity. Buffer
zones can also include physical screening, landscaping, significant set-
699. ROHAN, supra note 506, § 40.0 117], at 40-38.
700. Id.
701. Id.
702. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
703. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 556.
704. The practice of buffer zoning "presents the anomalous situation of putting more people
next to commercial uses rather than fewer, [but] it is consistent with traditional theory which places
the single-family use at the apex of the zoning pyramid. The courts have generally sustained the
practice." RotHAN, supra note 506, § 40.01[7), at 40-38.
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backs, open space, and even low-intensity commercial uses like offices,
shops, churches, and medical care facilities.' Environmental justice ad-
vocates can use the concept of buffer zoning but redefine it to protect
low-income and minority residences. Although neighborhood groups
might want to avoid buffering against industrial activities with open
space uses that have recreational value and could attract children and
others to play close to heavy industry, they could seek non-residential
buffer zones to separate themselves from potentially harmful or disrup-
tive uses. This would be most successful in situations in which industrial
or commercial zoning borders low-income or minority neighborhoods,
instead of being interspersed throughout them.
5. Floating Zones
Floating zones are flexible zoning techniques that require particular
scrutiny and monitoring by environmental justice groups to ensure that
low-income communities and neighborhoods of color are not assigned
harmful or burdensome floating uses. A floating zone is a land use dis-
trict created in the zoning code text but not yet designated on the zoning
map.' The zoning authority identifies a need for a particular type of use
but may not be able to identify where in the locality that use should be
placed or zoned. Rather than be limited by the rigidity of traditional
Euclidean zoning, the authority creates a district without any specific
location(s) on the map, but with a set of standards for determining ap-
propriate locations. The zone "floats" until a landowner seeks to have it
applied to his or her property via a rezoning of the property. Thus, there
is a bifurcation of the creation of the zone and the application of the zone
to any specific area. It gives the local authority flexibility in responding
to local land use needs. By and large, courts have upheld floating
zones.'
0
Floating zones pose an uncertain threat to local residents and land-
owners, who do not know whether a neighboring property will be chosen
for a floating zone use."' If it is chosen for this designation, they may
face (in some cases, literally!) an unexpected new use. Furthermore,
floating zones appear to be used most often for either industrial uses or
705. Id.
706. For discussions of floating zones and how they work, see CALLIES Eu AL., supra note 565,
at 69; WRIGtrr & GITELMAN, supra note 516, at 855; Comment, Zoning-The Floating Zone: A
Potential Instrument of Versatile Zoning, 16 CATH. U. L. REV. 85 (1966).
707. See, e.g., Lurie v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n., 278 A.2d 799, 811 (Conn. 1971);
McQuail v. Shell Oil Co., 183 A.2d 572, 580 (Del. 1962); Beall v. Montgomery County Council,
212 A.2d 751,762 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1965); Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 96 N.E.2d 731,733
(N.Y. 1951). But see Eves v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 164 A.2d 7, 12 (Pa. 1960) (invalidating use
of floating zone as antithetical to concept of zoning).
708. Herbert Goldman, Comment, Zoning Change: Flexibility vs. Stability, 26 MD. L. REv. 48,
51-52(1966).
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high-density residential uses.0  For example, in McQuail v. Shell Oil
Co.,"' New Castle County, Delaware, applied an industrial floating zone
to an undeveloped parcel previously zoned residential, so that Shell Oil
Co. could build a refinery. Residents of low-income and minority neigh-
borhoods may find that property zoned for non-intensive uses, for exam-
ple residential, may be rezoned for industrial uses through the application
of a floating zone at the request of the landowner. In fact, parcels in these
neighborhoods might be particularly attractive to industrial companies
wanting to take advantage of floating zones for their activities: the land
may be cheaper;, local residents might not have the political power, in-
formation, or resources to oppose the rezoning; there would likely be
other nearby industrial uses or industrially zoned property; and there
might be proximity to transportation facilities like railroads, interstate
freeways, waterways, and airports. In addition, the decision about
whether or not to apply a floating zone to a particular parcel or tract will
be made on the basis of criteria already established at the creation of the
use initially. Therefore, grassroots environmental groups should pay par-
ticular attention to the existence of unmapped floating zones in local
zoning codes and any possible requests to apply those zones in their
neighborhoods. They will need to be politically active in opposing any
unwanted floating zones, both in the text (the existence of the unmapped
district altogether) and on the map (the application of the zone to land in
their neighborhoods). Opposition to particular applications of floating
zones will be most successful when based on the articulated criteria, as
well as political activity.
D. Exactions
A possibly not-so-obvious tool that could be part of a land use plan-
ning model of environmental justice is the local government imposition
of exactions (i.e., conditions) on approvals of industrial and commercial
development near residential areas. Exactions require the developer to
provide the public either real property (land, facilities, or both) or mone-
tary fees as a condition for permission to use land in ways subject to
government regulation."' These dedications and fees provide the public
facilities necessitated by new development, including schools, parks,
open space, roads, sidewalks, public utilities, fire and police stations,
709. See McQuail, 183 A.2d at 574 (heavy industrial floating zone); Beall, 212 A.2d at 751
(multi-family high-rise residential floating zone); Costello v. Sieling, 161 A.2d 824 (Md. 1960)
(tourist accommodation floating zones); Huff v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 133 A.2d 83, 84-85 (Md.
1957) (restricted manufacturing floating zone); Rodgers, 96 N.E.2d at 732 (multi-family residential
floating zone); Eves, 164 A.2d at 8 (limited industrial floating zone); see also CALLIES, Er AL, supra
note 565, at 69 (using light industrial and multi-family housing uses for hypothetical about floating
zones).
710. 183 A-2d 572,574 (1962).
711. Vicki Been, "Exit" As a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitu-
tional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 478-79 (1991).
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low-income housing, mass transit, day care services, and job training
programs. 1
There are five basic types of commonly imposed exactions: (1) on-
site dedications, which consist of land and facilities within the devel-
oper's subdivision that the developer dedicates to the public; (2) off-site
dedications, which consist of land and facilities outside the subdivision,
yet dedicated by the developer, (3) fees-in-lieu-of-dedication, which are
money contributions for the public provision of facilities that the devel-
oper otherwise would be required to dedicate; (4) impact fees, which
capture from the private developer the public's costs of local capital-
infrastructure and public-services needs caused by the development's
impacts; and (5) linkages, which are facilities and/or fees provided by
central-city commercial and industrial developers for the services neces-
sitated by their specific development activities."' Cities and counties use
exactions extensively, determining the amount demanded "either ac-
cording to a nondiscretionary, predetermined schedule, or through case-
by-case negotiations."" They usually impose exactions during the subdi-
vision map approval process, because new subdivisions are significant
sources of population growth that create the demand for additional public
facilities and services.: However, other zoning approvals, such as re-
zoning or conditional use permits, may trigger the expectation of exac-
tions.
16
Exactions potentially benefit low-income and minority neighbor-
hood residents in two ways. First, if a city or county requires a developer
of a new residential subdivision to provide or pay for streets, parks,
schools, public utilities infrastructure, and the like, the costs are borne
ultimately by the residents (the new homeowner) of the subdivision, not
the general tax base. Therefore, residents of existing low-income or mi-
nority neighborhoods are not contributing taxes to infrastructure fre-
quently enjoyed by upper-income whites in new suburban subdivisions.
Furthermore, local tax revenues are not diverted from services and fa-
cilities that support inner city neighborhoods.
Second, government agencies can use exactions to mitigate the en-
vironmental impacts of new or expanding development in low-income
712. See CALuES Lr AL., supra note 565, at 182; ROHAN, supra note 506, § 9.01, at 9-4 to -5;
Been, supra note 711, at 480.
713. Been, supra note 711, at 479-81. Been also includes "set-asides or inclusionary zoning
programs"; she notes, however, that these programs are not universally regarded as exactions, but
could be considered substantive zoning requirements. Id. at 481 & n.41.
714. Id. at 481 & nn.42 & 43.
715. EuiCKSON & TARLocK, supra note 539, at 738; RoHAN, supra note 506, § 9.01, at 9-4;
cf. Been, supra note 711, at 481 ("The practice of imposing exactions is fairly widespread, although
exactions are most common in communities of growth areas.").
716. EWuCKSON & TARLoCK, supra note 539, at 738; David A. Dana, Land Use Regulation in
an Age oflHeightened Scrutiny, 75 N.C. L. ReV. 1243, 1251 (1997).
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and minority areas. Already, various federal, state, and local environ-
mental regulatory programs require developers to dedicate land or pay
fees to mitigate the environmental impacts of development in ecologi-
cally sensitive areas."' A comprehensive environmental justice land use
program, though, might include environmental impact fees and dedica-
tions for inner-city industrial and commercial development. The exac-
tions would be based on the various environmental and social impacts of
intensive uses and LULUs on the surrounding neighborhood(s), not just
the publicly funded local infrastructure, and would be earmarked for
ameliorating amenities in the affected neighborhood(s). For example, an
unsightly industrial facility might have to dedicate land for parks and
open space, or to pay fees for these features. Similarly, an operator of a
proposed waste facility might be required to contribute to a fund to be
used for monitoring pollution levels and resident health status, as well as
future cleanups of contamination related to the facility. An exactions
program would be most attractive to environmental justice advocates
when either, (1) the local residents would not oppose the proposed land
use if its adverse impacts were mitigated, or (2) complete prohibition of
the proposed land use is politically or legally infeasible. The program,
though, could apply only to new development or new activities, such as
changes in existing uses, requiring development permits. In addition, it
could not be used "to remedy existing infrastructure deficiencies, or to
provide for operation and maintenance of facilities.""'
Finally, the exactions program must be tailored to the impacts of the
proposed developments. To survive a challenge under the Takings
Clause of the U.S. Constitution,"" an exaction must bear an "essential
nexus" to the legitimate government interest that forms the basis for
regulating the development.' It must also be roughly proportional in
nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development'" This two-
part test applies to all land or facility dedication requirements and those
impact fees imposed on an individualized, or ad hoc, basis.tm Lingering
uncertainty exists over whether the Nollan "essential nexus" and Dolan
"rough proportionality" requirements apply to legislatively-adopted,
717. See COLLABORATIVE PLANNING FOR WETLANDS AND WILDLIFE: ISSUES AND EXAMPLES
(Douglas R. Porter & David A. Salvesen eds., 1995); Thomas W. Ledman, Note, Local Government
Environmental Mitigation Fees: Development Exactions, the Next Generation, 45 FLA. L. REV. 835,
836 (1993).
718. ROHAN, supra note 506, § 9.01, at 9-5.
719. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
720. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n., 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
721. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374i 391 (1994).
722. Ehrlich v. Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 438-39 (Cal. 1996). But see Sintra, Inc. v. City of
Seattle, 829 P.2d 765, 773 n.7 (Wash. 1992) (distinguishing Nollan as applicable only to physical
exactions, not fees); Frank Michelman, The Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLuM. L. REV. 1600,
1608-09 (1988) (arguing that Nollan is concerned primarily with permanent physical occupation of
land).
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formula-driven impact fees.' The Nollan and Dolan standards appear to
meet or exceed separate state constitutional tests requiring either a "rea-
sonable relationship" or "rational nexus" between the exaction and the
state interest in regulating the impacts of the development.' A few state
courts, however, require exactions to be tailored to impacts that are "spe-
cifically and uniquely attributable" to the proposed development, which
is a higher standard than those found in Nollan and Dolan.' In any
event, neighborhood groups urging local land use agencies to impose
exactions on industrial and commercial development and LULUs should
do studies on the impacts of these developments or otherwise attempt to
specify, preferably in quantitative terms, the development's direct and
indirect impacts on the neighborhood. These studies would support ar-
guments that the conditions are properly tailored to the government in-
terest in regulating adverse impacts of development. In addition, neigh-
borhood groups would need to avoid using exactions to remedy existing
or past development impacts.
E. Limits to Land Use Regulations As Environmental Justice Tools
1. Judicial Protections of Private Property Rights
The land use regulatory model of environmental justice, while
promising for many low-income communities of color, contains inherent
limits. Among these limits are legal constraints on land use regulation
that are largely designed to protect the private property rights of land-
owners. Courts, increasingly protective of private property rights and
skeptical of local political processes, have eroded the well-established
judicial presumption that zoning decisions are valid' by imposing
greater scrutiny on decisions about land use regulation tm Even if the ero-
723. Compare Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 438-39 ("A court must determine whether the factual find-
ings made by the permitting body support the condition as one that is more or less proportional, in
both nature and scope, to the public impact"), with Amoco Oil Co. v. Village of Schaumberg, 661
N.E.2d 380, 390 (111. App. Ct. 1995) (in making a legislative determination, "the city demonstrated a
rough proportionality between the requirements and objectives" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
724. See Dana, supra note 716, at 1252-53; see, e.g., Ayres v. City Council, 207 P.2d 1,8 (CaL
1949); Wald Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 338 So. 2d 863,866 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
725. See Dana, supra note 716, at 1252-53; see, e.g., Pioneer Trust & Say. Bank v. Village of
Mount Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799,802-03 1M 1961).
726. ROHAN, supra note 506, § 35.04(lXc), at 37-38 ("It is well-settled in the law that a zoning
ordinance, like other legislative acts, is entitled to a strong presumption of validity unless it is arbi-
trary or unreasonable on its face."); Daniel R. Mandelker & A. Dan Taziock, Shifting the Presump-
tion of Constitutionality in Land-Use Law, 24 URB. LAW. 1, 1-3 & n.l (1992) (showing that often
the presumption is extended to zoning bodies' administrative functions, as well as legislative func-
tions).
727. See Mandelker & Tarlock, supra note 726, at 50 (supporting the proposition that zoning
ordinances will be presumed to be constitutional); Michael Allan Wolf, Fruits of the "Impenetrable
Jungle": Navigating the Boundary Between Land-Use Planning and Environmental Law, 50 WASt.
U. J. URB. & CoNTEMP. L. 5, 6-9 (1996) (addressing the current judicial extension of the Fifth
Amendment's Takings Clause, U.S. CONST. amend V).
[Vol. 76:1
19981 ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND LAND USE REGULATION 125
sion of the presumption itself is more perceived than real, the courts are
playing a greater role in reviewing land use controls. T'
There are four primary areas of constraints relevant to achievement
of low-income and minority neighborhoods' land use goals: (1) the rea-
sonableness of the zoning decisions; (2) the impact on the property
owner's economically beneficial use of the property; (3) a developer's
expectations that zoning laws will not change once he or she has relied
on initial approvals and begun the development; and (4) rights to con-
tinue a previously permissible land use once it has been prohibited. '
First, the constitutional doctrine of substantive due process requires that
zoning bear a real and substantial relationship to the public health, safety,
morals, or welfare-the traditional police power justifications for regu-
lation.' The courts will strike down land use controls or decisions that
are arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable."' As discussed above, substan-
tive due process claims often arise in situations of downzoning; the
owner of the downzoned property will argue that the downzoning is ar-
bitrary and capricious in its application to his or her property.' The most
important factors to courts in determining the validity of downzoning are
728. Jerold S. Kayden, Judges As Planners: Limited or General Partners?, in ZONING AND THE
AMERICAN DREAM, supra note 1, at 223, 223. Nonetheless, potential land use conflicts still over-
whelmingly tend to be negotiated, rather than litigated. However, the nature, and perhaps outcomes,
of these negotiations may reflect perceptions about whether the courts will favor regulators or prop-
erty owners or interested neighbors or groups if agreement cannot be reached and the litigation
option is exercised. See, e.g., Mnookin & Komhauser, supra note 218, at 950-51.
729. See generally Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 591-92 (1962) (explaining
the Court's interpretation of "reasonableness" regarding these elements).
730. See Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 593 ("A prohibition simply upon the use of property for pur-
poses that are declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the
community, cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation of property for the
public benefit'); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (declaring that
before an ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, such provisions must be shown to be clearly
arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or
general welfare); F.H. Uelner Precision Tools & Dies, Inc. v. City of Dubuque, 190 N.W.2d 465,
469 (Iowa 197 1) ("In principle, zoning of land for the public good is a proper exercise of the police
power even though it works some onerous consequences on landowners."). Land use controls that do
not substantially advance legitimate state interests may also be regulatory takings. See Nollan v.
California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834-35 (1987) (reiterating that a restriction may consti-
tote a taking if not reasonably necessary to effectuate a substantial government purpose); Agins v.
City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (stating that "an application of a general zoning law to a
particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance state interests").
731. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395 (declaring that before an ordinance can be declared unconstitu-
tional, such provisions must be shown to be clearly arbitrary and unreasonable); Nectow v. City of
Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 187-88 (1928) (stating that the determination of public officers should not
be set aside unless the action is an arbitrary or irrational exercise of power); Marks v. City of Chesa-
peake, 883 F.2d 308, 311-12 & n.4 (4th Cir. 1989) (emphasizing that the dispositive question is
whether a local government's land use decision is arbitrary and capricious, and thus a deprivation of
property without due process); Katobimar Realty Co. v. Webster, 118 A.2d 824, 829, 831 (NJ.
1955) (deviating from the rles of the constitutional and statutory zoning process in an arbitrary
fashion is prohibited).
732. See supra notes 644-64 and accompanying text.
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the reasons for the zoning change;TM whether it appears to be designed to
stop a specific land use proposal, instead of resulting from pre-proposal
comprehensive planning;' whether surrounding parcels are treated
similarly;' 5 and the degree to which the downzoning decreases the prop-
erty's value and interferes with reasonable expectations about the use of
the property. TM
Second, the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment' limits the
government's regulation of land use. The U.S. Supreme Court has devel-
oped several different tests depending on the governmental action re-
specting private property. The Nollan "essential nexus" and Dolan
"rough proportionality" tests for the imposition of exactions are dis-
cussed above."' Physical occupation of private property would rarely be
relevant to the land use regulation model of environmental justice, and
will not be discussed here!"' However, Supreme Court jurisprudence on
regulatory takings is highly relevant. If a land use regulation denies a
property owner all of the economically viable use of his or her property,
a taking occurs and compensation is due, unless the property owner's
rights never included the right to the regulated activity, such as a public
nuisance:' If the landowner suffers a diminution in value less than one
hundred percent of the economically viable use of his or her property,
733. See Moviematic Indus. Corp. v. Board of County Comm'rs., 349 So. 2d 667, 669 (Fla.
Dist. CL App. 1977) (allowing zoning regulations that preserve ecological systems, residential or
historical character of a neighborhood, or aesthetic appeal of a community); McGowan v. Cohalan,
361 N.E.2d 1025, 1027 (N.Y. 1977) (establishing the need for an adequate separation between areas
of residential and industrial use).
734. See Nectow, 277 U.S. at 188 (recognizing that the unconstitutional zoning of the locus in
question was not indispensable to the general plan); Katobimar, 118 A.2d at 829 (insisting that all
property in like circumstances be treated alike).
735. See Viso v. California, 92 Cal. Rptr. 580,584-85 (CL App. 1979) (defining spot zoning);
Miami v. Schutte, 262 So. 2d 14,16-17 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1972) (recognizing the insensibility of
allowing spot zoning in reverse by permitting apartment houses on land surrounding a parcel but
denying apartments on that parcel).
736. See supra note 663 and accompanying text; see also Nectow, 277 U.S. at 187 (providing
an example of loss of a sales contract due to changed expectations regarding the use of the property).
737. U.S. CONST. amend. V ('IN]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation").
738. See supra notes 719-25 and accompanying text.
739. See generally Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421-23
(1982) (addressing permanent physical occupation as a per se taking); Kaiser Aetna v. United States,
444 U.S. 164, 172 (1979) (addressing governmental occupation of navigable waters in a private
marina as a physical invasion short of permanent and a taking); Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d
1364, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (stating that a permanent physical occupation of private property by the
government constitutes a taking).
740. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1004 (1992) (holding that a
regulation which denies a private property owner of all economically viable use of the property is a
per se taking unless the use was never part of the owner's rights under background principles of state
property law).
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courts will apply an ad hoc balancing test "that considers the economic
effects of the regulation and the government's purpose.''
Courts uphold zoning regulations that greatly restrict the use of pri-
vate property far more than they declare such regulations to be takings.
Many of the cases in which government agencies must compensate land-
owners involve total bans on development.:' Some takings cases, how-
ever, involve downzoning that both limits the use and diminishes the
value of the property. Where the property still has some significant value
for the rezoned use, courts will find no taking, even with a substantial
diminution in value" Where the rezoned use is deemed economically
unfeasible because the property is inappropriate for that use, though, a
taking occurs. Often, an important factor will be whether surrounding
more intensive uses, such as industrial or commercial uses or major roads
or freeways, make a less intensive zoning designation, like a single-
family residential, unreasonable, therefore rendering the property rela-
tively useless. ' Therefore, as low-income and minority neighborhood
residents seek zoning changes in their communities, they should (1)
avoid using designations for private property that completely prevent
development, such as open space designations;'" (2) seek compatible
uses for contiguous parcels so that a single piece of land does not be-
come a low-intensity island or peninsula in the midst of a sea of high-
741. Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 941 P.2d 851, 860 (Cal. 1997) (identifying
ten non-exclusive, ad hoc factors that courts have found relevant in evaluating non-categorical (i.e.,
non-Lucas) regulatory takings claims); see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438
U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (identifying three factors: (1) "The economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant"; (2) "the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations"; and (3) "the character of the governmental action').
742. See, e.g., Wolf, supra note 727, at n.366.
743. See, e.g., Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 117 S. Ct. 1659, 1665 (1997) (leaving
no productive or financially feasible use of the land constitutes a taking); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1004
(showing that a denial of all economically feasible use of the land requires compensation without the
usual inquiry as to the public interest being advanced); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28
F.3d 1171, 1180-81 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (maintaining that all economic use must be destroyed before
there is a taking).
744. See Elias v. Town of Brookhaven, 783 F. Supp. 758,761-62 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (downzon-
ing from commercial to residential); HFH Ltd. v. Superior Court, 542 P.2d 237, 242 (Cal. 1975)
(downzoning that reduced value of property by 80%); Turner v. City of Atlanta, 357 S.E.2d 802,
802-03 (Ga. 1987) (downzoning from commercial to office use, resulting in 67% reduction in prop-
erty value); Marshall v. Town of Topsfield, 433 N.E.2d 1244, 1246 (Mass. App. CL 1982) (down-
zoning from retail to residential or community facilities); Ketchel v. Bainbridge Township, 607
N.E.2d 22, 26-27 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (restricting density that reduced value of property).
745. See Canlon Oil Co. v. City of Phoenix, 593 P.2d 656, 658-59 (Ariz. 1979) (recognizing
that merely decreasing property value does not constitute a taking); Grimpel Assocs. v. Cohalan, 361
N.E.2d 1022, 1023-24 (N.Y. 1977) (holding that depriving owner of all reasonable use of the land is
necessary for a taking); Central Motors Corp. v. City of Pepper Pike, 409 N.E.2d 258, 276-77 (Ohio
CL App. 1980) (recognizing that zoning of a property for an impossible use is unconstitutional).
746. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029 (holding that the government cannot enact new legislation
that deprives an owner of all economically viable use of a property without compensation for that
property).
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intensity uses; ' (3) explicitly connect any zoning changes to traditional
state nuisance law to the extent possible;' and (4) identify economically
viable permissible uses for property subject to new zoning schemes: ' In
fact, the land use model of environmental justice envisions local com-
munities identifying productive, yet healthy, safe, and compatible uses
for land, not merely prohibiting unwanted land uses.
Third, the doctrine of vested rights and equitable estoppel may pre-
vent local governments from stopping a development proposal once the
developer obtains some approvals and relies on them in proceeding with
the project-' The issue might arise, for example, when a grassroots
group learns of a proposed chemical recycling plant in the neighborhood
and influences the city either to rezone the property in question from
light industrial use (which permits "recycling facilities") to commercial
use or to amend the zoning code text to prohibit chemical recycling
plants in light industrial districts. If the developer has already received
some city approvals (e.g., a site plan approval, a conditional use permit,
or a building permit), at what point does he or she have a vested right in
the zoning that existed at the time he or she obtained the initial approv-
als?
The area of vested rights and equitable estoppel has been termed
"hopelessly muddled."' The doctrine of vested rights, grounded in con-
stitutional protections of private property rights against government in-
terference, and the doctrine of equitable estoppel, or perhaps more pre-
cisely equitable zoning estoppel, grounded in equitable protections
against unfair exercises of government zoning power, are distinct from
each other only in theory. In practice, the concepts are treated inter-
changeably' In addition, the rles governing when a landowner has
vested rights to proceed with development (or when a government regu-
lator is estopped from preventing the development) vary considerably
from state to state in ways that defy precise categorization:" Conceptu-
ally, states can be divided into early vesting jurisdictions, which give the
developer early certainty that zoning controls will not change in the
midst of the multi-permit approval process, and late vesting jurisdictions,
which require the developer to have obtained one of the later permits
given just before the final building phase takes place, such as a building
747. See supra notes 663-64 and accompanying text.
748. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1004 (restricting use according to state's property and nuisance laws
does not require just compensation).
749. See Elias, 783 F. Supp. at 761-62 (holding that leaving a property with a viable economic
use does not constitute a taking, even when the use is different from that allowed under prior zoning).
750. Robert M. Rhodes & Cathy M. Sellers, Vested Rights: Establishing Predictability in a
Changing Regulatory System, 20 STETSON L. REV. 475,478 (1991).
751. Grayson P. Hanes & J. Randall Minchew, On Vested Rights to Land Use and Develop-
ment, 46 WASH. & LEEL. REv. 373,377,383 (1989).
752. Id. at 382-83; Rhodes & Sellers, supra note 750, at 476.
753. Hanes & Minchew, supra note 751, at 379-80.
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permit.' However, cases vary so much, not only from state to state, but
even within states, that the conceptual distinctions do not closely match
actual case outcomes in any predictable way.:-
A developer claiming vested rights or equitable zoning estoppel
must establish three elements: (1) an official government act or omission
that would suggest approval of the project; (2) good faith reliance on the
government action; and (3) substantial change in position or incurrence
of extensive obligations and expenses toward developing the property.7'
Depending on the jurisdiction and the facts of the case, some of the fol-
lowing government approvals might result in vested rights: approval of a
site plan or planned unit development (PUD) when accompanied by a
rezoning (e.g., to reflect the approved PUD use); approval of a plat or
subdivision site plan; a conditional use (or special use) permit; a prelimi-
nary permit like a rough grading, clearing, paving, foundation, or public
improvement permit; informal assurances and representations by local
government officials; and arguably, conditional zoning by which the
developer commits to certain conditions in exchange for a specific zon-
ing designation.:" If the developer, in good faith, relies on the requisite
approvals by expending substantial amounts of money or making signifi-
cant physical changes to the land, any subsequent zoning changes that
are inconsistent with the earlier approvals will be invalid.' ' Therefore,
environmental justice advocates seeking zoning changes in their neigh-
borhood might not be able to stop developments and land uses for which
the developer has already received some initial approval(s). Grassroots
groups will need to monitor closely the approvals that local officials are
considering before such approvals are made and the developer obtains
vested rights. Neighborhood groups can avoid many of the problems
with vested rights, though, by formally putting a developer on notice that
they intend to seek a zoning change or other land use controls to prevent
the development, and by giving the notice before the developer spends
substantial sums on the project post-approval.
Fourth, the doctrine of nonconforming uses prevents a local gov-
ernment, when it makes a zoning change, from demanding the immediate
discontinuance of a use that was lawful at the time of the zoning change,
unless the use is a public nuisance.' The government, however, may
754. id. at 379-80 & n.19.
755. Id. at 379-80 & n. 8.
756. Id at 388, 398, 400; Rhodes & Sellers, supra note 750, at 478.
757. See Hanes & Minchew, supra note 751, at 388-98; Rhodes & Seller, supra note 750, at
482-84.
758. Hanes & Minchew, supra note 751, at 398-400; Rhodes & Seller, supra note 750, at 478-
82, 486-89.
759. See Livingston Rock & Gravel Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 272 P.2d 4, 7 (Cal. 1954)
(approving revocation of a prior permit when the use was deemed to be detrimental to public health
and safety or a nuisance); Dugas v. Town of Conway, 480 A.2d 71, 76 (N.H. 1984) (invalidating
new zoning regulations that extinguished existing nonconforming uses as unconstitutional depriva-
ton of vested property rights); Oswalt v. County of Ramsey, 371 N.W.2d 241,246 (Minn. CL App.
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require that the nonconforming use cease after a reasonable "amortiza-
tion" period. This is designed to balance the public interest in landowner
conformance with the zoning laws against private property rights, par-
ticularly in the opportunity to obtain a reasonable return on the land-
owner's investment. However, an owner of a nonconforming use can
generally be prohibited from changing, extending, enlarging, or structur-
ally altering the use, and will lose the right to the nonconformity if he or
she abandons or discontinues the use or upon total destruction of the
structures.:' Therefore, environmental justice land use strategies might
not effectively force changes in current actual land use patterns, but in-
stead would do so over time, as nonconforming uses cease to exist or are
required to terminate at the end of an amortization period.
2. State Preemption of Local NIMBYism
Another set of legal limits to land use regulation as an environ-
mental justice tool is state preemption of local land use regulations and
decisions that attempt to keep out LULUs. These laws are a response to
the NIMBY ("Not In My Backyard") phenomenon, in which local resi-
dents mount powerful and effective campaigns to prevent the location of
LULUs near them.' Environmental justice advocates have argued that
NIMBYism by white and upper-income communities has contributed to
the siting of noxious uses in less politically and economically powerful
neighborhoods inhabited by low-income people and minorities. How-
ever, just at the time when low-income and minority communities are
trying to prevent LULUs and environmental hazards in their neighbor-
hoods, state preemption laws designed to combat NIMBYism may hurt
these environmental justice efforts.
1985) (maintaining that existing nonconforming uses must be either permitted to remain or elimi-
nated by the use of eminent domain); Bachman v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 494 A.2d 1102, 1105 (Pa.
1985) (vesting property rights in lawful nonconforming uses unless they are a nuisance, abandoned,
or extinguished by eminent domain).
760. Standard Oil Co. v. City of Tallahassee, 183 F.2d 410, 412 (5th Cir. 1950) (giving power
to a municipality to extinguish an existing use by ordinance); City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 274 P.2d
34, 44-45 (Cal. Dist. CL App. 1954) (insisting that a nonconforming use be relocated or extin-
guished within five years); Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 152 N.E.2d 42, 45 (N.Y. 1958) (requiring
the termination of nonconforming uses over a given period of time).
761. RoHAN, supra note 506, § 41.03(l), at 41-59.
762. See Michael Dear, Understanding and Overcoming the NIMBY Syndrome, 58 APA J. 288
(1992); Orlando E. Delogu, "NIMBr' Is a National Environmental Problem, 35 S.D. L REV. 198,
198 (1990); Michael B. Gerrard, The Victims of NIMBY, 21 FORDHAM URB. 14. 495, 495 (1994);
Michael Heiman, From "Not in My Backyard" to "Not in Anyone's Backyard!": Grassroots Chal-
lenge to Hazardous Waste Facility Siting, 56 APA J. 359 (1990). For a view that the NIMBY
movement represents a valuable perspective on the public interest and that LULUs have unintemal-
ized social costs, see Denis J. Brion, An Essay on LULU, NIMBY, and the Problem of Distributive
Justice, 15 B.C. ENVTn. APP. L REV. 437 (1988).
763. BuLARD, DuMPNG IN DIXmE, supra note 7, at 46, 108; Gauna, supra note 6, at 32-33.
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There are two basic types of LULUs subject to preemption in order
to overcome local opposition to their siting. The first is hazardous waste
management facilities, of which there are three approaches" One ap-
proach, "super review," occurs when the private developer of a hazard-
ous waste facility chooses a potential site and applies for a permit from a
state agency. The agency then reviews the environmental impacts and
presents all applications that meet state environmental criteria to a spe-
cial siting board that gathers public input, but is primarily designed to
neutralize public opposition and fear. A second approach is "site desig-
nation," in which the state agency-not the private developer-formu-
lates a list of possible sites that are candidates for hazardous waste facili-
ties. In addition to the "super review" or "site designation" approaches,
some states expressly prohibit localities from using land use require-
ments to burden the operation of hazardous waste facilities. This third
approach, followed only in California and Florida, is known as "local
control." Under this last approach, state law does not preempt local
regulation of hazardous waste facility siting, and localities are free to
enact strict land use regulations to keep out all hazardous waste sites.
The other type of LULU siting that is protected from local opposition by
state statutory or judicial exemption is the siting of certain residential
facilities, such as group homes for the mentally disabled '  halfway
houses," and low-income housing.' State preemption laws of both types
create some very real political and legal difficulties for grassroots envi-
ronmental justice groups.
Even though state laws might override zoning controls that prevent
hazardous waste facilities or other LULUs in low-income or minority
neighborhoods, there are several important reasons to seek these zoning
controls nonetheless. Zoning that does not permit a specified LULU
(e.g., a hazardous waste facility) suggests to state regulators that the use
764. The three major approaches are uniformly summarized in several law review articles, and
the discussion here is a synthesis of these summaries. See Hasler, supra note 257, at 456-57; Mank,
supra note 6, at 348-51; Audrey Wright, Unequal Protection Under the Environmental Laws: Re-
viewing the Evidence on Environmental Racism and the Inequities of Environmental Legislation, 39
WAYNE L. REv. 1725, 1731-35 (1993); Godsil, supra note 6, at 402-07. For an example of federal
preemption of a local attempt to ban PCB disposal in a predominantly African American area, see
Warren County v. North Carolina, 528 F. Supp. 276,289-90 (D. N.C. 1981).
765. See City of Clebume v. Clebure Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (holding the
denial of conditional use permit for mentally disabled to be a violation of Equal Protection Clause
founded on "irrational prejudice"); see, e.g., Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, CAL WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 5116 (Deering 1982) (designating a group home of six or fewer mentally disabled adults as resi-
dential use for zoning purposes).
766. E.g., Nicholson v. Connecticut Half-way House, 218 A.2d 383, 384-86 (Conn. 1966)
(finding a halfway house for prison parolees a residential use).
767. See MAss. GEN. LAwS ANN. Ch. 40B, §§ 20-23 (1973) (authorizing the state to preempt
local exclusionary zoning); see also Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount
Laurel (Mount Laurel ID, 456 A.2d 390, 410 (NJ. 1983) (holding that a county's zoning laws could
not absolutely ban mobile homes); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount
Laurel (Mount Laurel 1), 336 A.2d 713, 713 (NJ. 1975) (holding that zoning laws must allow for
low and moderate income housing).
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is incompatible with surrounding land uses--a type of presumption in
effect-whereas if the property is zoned to allow the LULU, the state
regulators are more likely to believe that it is compatible with the neigh-
boring land uses. If the local zoning allows the LULU, there may never
be close scrutiny of its siting by any level of government agency, while
an attempt by the locality to exclude it could put pressure on state regu-
lators to find reasons to deny state permits. The zoning might also dis-
courage potential developers or operators of LULUs from attempting to
site the LULUs in that area. They might perceive that the neighborhood
is politically active and opposed to such LULUs, which could lead to a
costly and time-consuming approval process. They also might want to
avoid a legal dispute to enforce the preemption.
Furthermore, the very process of developing land use plans and
regulations that reflect neighborhood goals and obtaining their enactment
by local officials will tend to promote a more politically active and aware
grassroots group. The group can mobilize more quickly and effectively
to oppose a LULU proposal, even if decided at the state level, than if the
community forms a group for the first time upon learning of the specific
proposal. In addition, there are many LULUs that local residents might
want to exclude and many beneficial land uses that they might want to
include, beyond the few land uses that are the subject of state control. In
other words, there are many LULUs that are not subject to state preemp-
tion and can be effectively precluded by local zoning. Even if a land use
plan will not effectively protect against every LULU, it should address
some of the inequities in the distribution of land use patterns, such as the
high concentration of industrial and commercial uses in many low-
income communities of color. Therefore, despite the obstacles presented
by state preemption laws, local land use regulation can be an effective
environmental justice tool.
3. Politics
The final limits to land use regulation as an environmental justice
strategy are political and economic. How successful, as a practical mat-
ter, will grassroots neighborhood groups be in changing land use patterns
in low-income communities and communities of color? There is reason
for a mix of sober realism and thoughtful optimism.
At the most practical level, residents of some, or perhaps many,
low-income and minority neighborhoods will encounter apathy, antipa-
thy, or paternalistic co-optation by local planning staff and elected offi-
cials. Local government is likely to regard changes to existing industrial
or commercial zoning as politically or fiscally inconvenient, especially
when these uses cannot be relocated to higher-income, lower-minority
areas without political conflict. Indeed, many local governments engage
in "fiscal zoning," favoring industrial and commercial uses because these
uses generate tax revenues without creating expensive demands for local
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services in the way that single-family residences do, particularly through
public school costs:" However, single-family residential neighborhoods,
particularly if occupied by upper income people, are desirable for rea-
sons other than a pure analysis of marginal costs and revenues would
indicate. But cities and counties might offset the costs of these neighbor-
hoods by reducing expenditures on older neighborhoods where industrial
and commercial uses have intruded: generally low-income and minority
neighborhoods. ' Therefore, fiscal zoning practices can have a double
negative effect on low-income communities of color:. (1) the attraction of
industrial and commercial uses to those areas, and (2) pressures on local
governments to decrease public spending on physical infrastructure,
schools, and other public services in those areas.
In addition, owners of industrially or commercially zoned property
will often oppose downzoning of those parcels, the imposition of addi-
tional controls via overlay districts or performance zoning, and demands
of exactions. These landowners are likely to have financial and political
capital to spend in seeking to defeat an environmental justice land use
plan. The local community may not be united in its goals, and disagree-
ment within the area could undermine strategies to allow only safe and
healthy land uses compatible with local residences. In other words, some
or all of a low-income minority neighborhood might embrace one or
more LULUs or other intensive land uses, and this fact may be a political
reality for opponents.' Furthermore, development of a land use regula-
tory plan for a low-income neighborhood of color is likely to involve
financial costs and volunteer effort, as well as sustained political activity
in the form of organization, publicity, education, study, lobbying, elec-
toral campaigning and voting, and perhaps even protest. Finally, the na-
ture of the land use planning and regulatory model requires continual
involvement in, and monitoring of, implementation. Developers, land-
owners, and LULU operators may seek conditional use permits, vari-
ances, and rezonings, among other changes or exceptions to whatever
regulations the local residents have helped to shape. Failure of grassroots
environmental justice groups to participate effectively in these subse-
quent government decisions could undo all that the initial land use strat-
egy had achieved.
These practical concerns raise questions about the extent to which
land use controls are inherently flawed. Some scholars imply that the
combination of zoning's exclusionary nature and society's racism leads
768. ELICKSON & TARLOCK, supra note 539, at 738-39.
769. Id. at 740.
770. See, e.g., Kevin Gover & Jana L Walker, Escaping Environmental Paternalism: One
Tribe's Approach to Developing a Commercial Waste Disposal Project in Indian Country, 63 U.
COLO. L. REV. 933, 936-42 (1992) (discussing a California Indian tribe's acceptance of the devel-
opment of a solid waste facility on their land); Jeff Kass, Homes and Shops at Odds, LA. TIMES,
Sept. 4, 1997, at B3 (noting that some residents support business development in their communities
to increase property values).
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to segregation of races, exclusion of people of color from desirable areas,
and placement of unwanted land uses in neighborhoods of color (i.e.,
expulsive zoning)."' Other scholars argue that zoning promotes balkani-
zation by socioeconomic class and geography, resulting in suburban
sprawl and protection of the economic interests of the development
community (i.e., business interests, land developers, financial institu-
tions, and the like) and/or suburban homeowners.'m Zoning can also be
seen as a tool of parochial local interests that want to keep socially nec-
essary land uses (LULUs) out of their communities, in other words, a
tool of NIMBYism--the worst of localism and pluralism, an impediment
to the larger public good.' According to some, land use controls inap-
propriately interfere with, or even supplant, the efficient workings of
private markets and privately developed norms and agreements about
land use." Others would argue that land use regulations are a means for
government capture of public benefits or power at the expense of private
property or liberty."
These critiques, in turn, raise questions about how local land use
decisions are made. In other words, will low-income and minority neigh-
borhoods have a fair and effective opportunity to influence the land use
policies that affect them? The difficulty in answering this question stems
from the lack of a single, coherent, comprehensive theory of local poli-
cymaking. 6
If land use decisions are controlled primarily by local elites, who
serve the private economic interests of either the development and busi-
ness community or upper- and middle-income homeowners in areas
zoned primarily single-family residential (i.e., suburban and suburban-
like communities)," low-income and minority people will likely remain
771. Dubin, supra note 1, at 741-44; Rabin, supra note 1, at 101.
772. MIKE DAVIS, CITY OF QUARTz: EXCAVATING THE FUTURE IN LOS ANGELES 151-219
(1992); Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I--The Structure of Local Government Law, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3-5 (1990); Jerry Frg, The Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1047,
1047-48 (1996).
773. Orlando E. Delogu, The Dilemma of Local Land Use Control: Power Without Responsi-
bility, 33 MAINE L. REV. 15, 16-20 (1981); Delogu, supra note 762, at 198.
774. Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines As
Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHL. L. REV. 681,682-87 (1973); Douglas W. Kmiec, Deregulating Land
Use: An Alternative Free Enterprise Development System, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 28, 30-31 (1981).
775. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS 263-73 (1985); ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, PLANNING FOR
SERFDOM: LEGAL ECONOMIC DISCOURSE AND DOWNTOWN DEVELOPMENT 140 (1991); BERNARD
H. SIEGAN, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM: THE CONSTITuTION, THE COURTS, AND LAND-USE
REGULATION 179-201 (1997).
776. For a discussion of three different theories of environmental policy making and their
failure to encompass an environmental justice theory of political participation in environmental
decisions, see Eileen Gauna, The Environmental Justice Misfit: Public Participation and the Para-
digm Paradox, 17 STAN. ENVrL L.J. 3 (1998) (discussing regulatory expertise, pluralism, and civic
republican models).
777. See JOE R. FEAGIN & ROBERT PARKER, BUILDING AMERICAN CITIES: THE URBAN REAL
ESTATE GAME 2 (1990); DENNIS R. JUDD, THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN CITIES: PRIVATE POWER
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"outsiders" with very little real influence over land use decisions.
These decisions will continue to protect high-income, low-minority
neighborhoods from non-residential uses, while catering to industrial
and commercial interests by placing those activities in the "subordi-
nated" low-income and minority neighborhoods. Similarly, if local land
use decisions typically reflect persistent societal racism tm minority
neighborhoods will continue to suffer a higher proportion of LULUs
and intensive zoning patterns. According to this theory, local officials
intentionally or subconsciously select these communities for greater
burdens or tolerate private and institutional forces that exacerbate ine-
qualities.
If the primary model of land use decision making is interest group
pluralismtm grassroots groups from low-income and minority commu-
nities will fare much better than if only elite interests have captured the
decision making process. Grassroots success will depend on their abil-
ity to organize, identify goals and strategies, exert pressure, persist in
participating in land use decisions, and bargain effectively with other
interest groups and government officials to obtain political benefits.
There are, however, two normative sides to interest group pluralism.
One view celebrates the diversity of interests represented in a blatantly
political process of "demanding, wrangling, and influencing," and as-
serts that the roar of many groups seeking policies which benefit their
members' interests reflects overall citizen preferences and prevents any
single group from obtaining too much power.' The other view is
aghast at the "capture" of public policy making and policy implement-
ing bodies by well-organized special interest groups." It observes the
vast differences in power and effectiveness among groups and the ten-
dency for policy outcomes that serve private interests to the detriment
of the collective good, whether that collective good is defined in terms
of equity or efficiency or both.' Although low-income and minority
neighborhood groups seeking their visions of good land use policy will
certainly add to the range of interests represented, they could find
themselves outmatched in political and economic power by well-
organized industrial and commercial interests. Furthermore, to the ex-
tent that they buy into pluralism as a dominant model, they may lose
their "moral voice": their claims that changes in zoning patterns in their
AND PUBLIC POUCY 1-9 (1984); Davis, supra note 772, at 151-219; Joe R. Feagin, Arenas of Con-
flict: Zoning and Land Use Reform in Critical Political-Economic Perspective, in ZONING AND THE
AMERICAN DREAM, supra note 1, at 73, 84.
778. Dubin, supra note 1, at 741-44; Rabin, supra note 1, at 101; see also Ford, supra note
511,at 1843.
779. See, e.g., EDMUND M. BuRKE, A PARTICIPATORY APPROACH TO URBAN PLANNING 29-
32, 41 (1979) (contending that zoning furthers a social hierarchy); Mandelker & Tarlock, supra note
726, at 36 (reconstructing the role of democratic pluralism in land use litigation).
780. BuRKE, supra note 779, at 27.
781. See Mandelker & Tarlock, supra note 726, at 36.
782. id. at 37.
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neighborhoods reflect just policy (i.e., are the "right" result), instead of
merely the preferences of yet another group.
Civic republican theory suggests that local policymaking is or
should be a deliberative public discourse about the common good and a
participatory process of developing civic virtue.' Alternatively, local
land use policies could be seen as the result of a negotiation "game,"
either between the developer and government officials, or among a
range of interested parties, including the developer, the property
owner(s) and possessor(s) (if different from the developer), neighbors
of various types, environmental groups, various government agencies
perhaps with competing or coextensive jurisdiction, and even scientific
and legal professionals.' M
One possible reason for competing theories about land use politics
and decision making is that each explains some portion of a complex and
variable reality. The process of land use regulation inevitably involves
some type(s) of negotiation. But the identity and number of participants,
their relative bargaining strength, their actual influence, whether the ne-
gotiation focuses more on positions or interests or principles, the role of
external factors, the economic efficiency of the process (transaction
costs) and outcomes (Pareto optimality), the fairness of the process (pro-
cedural justice) and outcomes (distributive justice), the impact on civic
virtue, and other factors will likely vary widely from locality to locality
and from decision to decision. Thus, it seems doubtful that the land use
regulatory process inherently or inevitably excludes low-income and
minority communities from effective participation.
Despite the critiques of land use regulation, the land use model of
environmental justice remains a useful approach to addressing envi-
ronmental injustice and the goals of low-income and minority commu-
nities. First, land use controls---even if they could be characterized as
flawed-are here to stay. Zoning and similar regulatory controls over
land use are widely used in the United States, and there is little evi-
dence that local governments pay much attention to academic criticisms
of the institution of land use regulation.' M As this article demonstrates,
however, low-income neighborhoods of color by and large do not enjoy
783. See STEPHEN L. ELKIN, CITY AND REGIME IN THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 150-51 (1987);
Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE LJ. 1493, 1503-05 (1988); Joseph P. Viterritti,
Choosing Equality: Religious Freedom and Educational Opportunity Under Constitutional Feder-
alism, 15 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 113, 124 (1996). For general discussions of civic republican the-
ory, see BRUCE A. WILLIAMS & ALBERT R. MATHENY, DEMOCRACY, DIALOGUE, AND
ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES: THE CONTESTED LANGUAGES OF SOCIAL REGULATION (1995);
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (1969).
784. See Dana, supra note 716, at 1288, 1294; Bradley C. Karkkainen, Zoning: A Reply to the
Critics, 10 J. LAND USE& ENVrL. L. 45,81 (1994).
785. Karkkainen, supra note 784, at 46; Andrew J. Cappel, Note, A Walk Along Willows: Pat-
terns of Land Use Coordination in Pre-Zoning New Haven (1870-1926), 101 YALE LJ. 617, 618
(1991).
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the same zoning protections and benefits that high-income, non-
minority neighborhoods enjoy. Unless courts correct these inequities,'
which seems highly unlikely,' the primary means of change will be
political activity in attempting to influence land use decisions and zon-
ing patterns.
Second, land use regulation serves several important functions,
including protection of neighbors against harmful or noxious activities
on nearby land; comprehensive, area-wide, coordinated planning of land
uses and development patterns; protection of private property values
from the impact of neighboring uses; prevention of development from
placing greater burdens on public funds for infrastructure and services
than the development generates in tax revenues; and protection of col-
lective rights and interests in the character of the neighborhood.7' In
addition, political pressures and the options of voice (participation) or
exit (relocating to another jurisdiction) are effective constraints on the
potential for abuse in the arena of land use regulation.' Involvement of
low-income and minority neighborhood residents in developing and
implementing land use policies enhances these various goals or values
of the land use regulatory system.
Third, if, as Luke Cole has argued, environmental justice is an issue
of power,'m the poor and people of color should seek power wherever it
is exercised, including in the land use decisions that shape both the
quality of their neighborhoods and their exposure to harmful or un-
wanted activities and pollutants. Furthermore, they can exercise power
more effectively with respect to land use decisions than with respect to
environmental permitting decisions, because land use decisions are
made at the local level to which grassroots groups have greater access"M
and are less scientifically and legally technical than environmental deci-
sions. Layperson input tends to shape local land use regulation more
than national environmental regulation.
Most importantly, not only does land use planning and regulation
theoretically embrace neighborhood-based citizen participation,m but
786. See Dubin, supra note 1, at 782-800 (urging judicial protection of zoning in minority
communities).
787. See discussion supra notes 278-338 and accompanying text (discussing civil rights re-
sponses to environmental injustice).
788. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS: A PROPERTY RIGHTS
APPROACH TO AMERICAN LAND USE CONTROLS 19 (1985); Karkkainen, supra note 784, at 47-50;
Larson, supra note 118, at 235; Cappel, supra note 785, at 618-19.
789. WILLIAM A. FIsCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS 289 (1995).
790. Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 642.
791. See Arnold, supra note 465, at 35-36; Barton IL Thompson, Jr., The Search for Regula-
tory Alternatives, 15 STAN. ENVTL. LJ. viii, at x-xi (1996) (arguing that the environmental justice
movement, like the private property rights movement, is about devolution of power from national
and state levels to local community levels).
792. See EDMUND M. BURKE, A PARTICIPATORY APPROACH TO URBAN PLANNING 13 (1979);
MICHAEL FAGENCIE, CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN PLANNING 1-13 (1977); NEIGHBORHOOD POLICY
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empirical evidence shows that citizen participation can make a differ-
ence,' including in the arena of land use regulation and environmental
justice. Early examples of environmental justice groups seeking local
land use policies suggest that low-income and minority neighborhood
residents can effectively organize, exercise power, make their voices
heard, and influence policies about zoning and land use issues that affect
them.' Despite political and legal limitations, environmental justice
groups actively seek and obtain changes to zoning laws to reflect the
goals of neighborhood residents and a more equitable distribution of
land use patterns.
VI. CONCLUSION
Low-income communities and communities of color experience not
only a higher proportion of environmental hazards and LULUs, but also
a higher proportion of zoning for intensive land uses, such as industrial
uses. With a growing grassroots environmental justice movement, these
communities-like the fictional Milagro, New Mexico--are looking for
miracles (milagros).
However, there are not easy answers or quick fixes to environ-
mental injustice. It is a complex problem with empirical, political, le-
gal, environmental, and economic dimensions. One model of environ-
mental justice features opposition to existing or proposed LULUs and
environmental hazards in low-income and minority communities.
Another model, presented in this article, calls for these communities to
become involved in land use planning and regulation. Through com-
prehensive planning, rezoning of inner-city neighborhoods, use of
flexible zoning techniques and exactions, and political involvement in
the shaping and negotiating of local land use policies, residents of low-
income neighborhoods and neighborhoods of color can proactively de-
fine their visions for healthy communities. They also can seek to prevent
would-be polluters and operators of LULUs and other intensive land
uses from selecting sites in their communities initially. In the event that
they still have to oppose siting proposals or seek changes to existing
facilities, they have a stronger case that public policy supports their po-
sition. Local residents also may choose to allow or encourage develop-
ment that meets their economic, social, and environmental goals. Land
AND PLANNING 3-5 (Phillip L. Clay & Robert M. Hollister eds., 1983); Karkkainen, supra note 784,
at 83; Mandelker & Tarlock, supra note 726, at 1.
793'. See M. MARGARET CONWAY, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED STATES 152-57
(1985); Michael Barrette, City of Anaheim: Avon-Dakota-Eton Neighborhood Association,
PLANNING, March 1994, at 16; Mary Lou Gallagher, Gila River Indian Community Public Partici-
pation Program, PLANNING, March 1993, at 12; Michelle Gregory, Champaign Neighborhood
Wellness Action Plan, PLANNING, March 1994, at 14; Scott Martelle, Don't Tread on Us: Commu-
niy Activists Show How Democracy Works Between Votes, LA. TIMES, May 25, 1997, at B 1.
794. See supra notes 137-63 and accompanying text.
795. See supra note 2.
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use planning and regulation foster choice, self-determination, and self-
definition for local neighborhoods, not paternalism that insists that there
is a single correct environmental justice goal.'
The land use planning and regulation model of environmental jus-
tice is not the miraculous cure for environmental injustice, nor is it a
replacement for the opposition model. It is an additional approach that
has faith in low-income people and people of color who want to build
healthy, safe, moral communities. It envisions that the milagros are al-
ready at work in the local neighborhoods and the people who live there.
796. Compare Metzger, supra note 148 (advocating a paternalistic approach to environmental
justice), with Gover & Walker, supra note 770 (discussing a California Indian Tribe's deliberations
about and ultimate acceptance of the development of a solid waste facility on their land).
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APPENDIX:m
Crry: ANAHEIM, CALIFORNIA; CENSUS TRACT # 219.04
Percent persons below, poverty 2.4
Median household income (1989 U.S. $) 83,296
Percent persons by race
White: non-Hispanic 77.9
Hispanic: white & other 5.0
Black (including Hispanic) 2.1
Asian & Pacific Islander (including Hispanic) 14.7
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispanic) 0.3
Other nn-Hispanic 0
Percent arca in tract by zoning designation
CL-HS, Limited Hillside Commercial 0.10
CO, Office & Professional Commercial 0.07
RM-2400, Multiple-Family Residential 0.81
RM-3000, Multiple-Family Residential 4.03
RS-500, Single-Family Residential 0.87
RS-7200, Single-Family Residential 6.15
RS-HS-l00I0, Single-Family Hillside Residential 44.94
RS-HS-22000, Single-Family Hillside Residential 5.21
RS-HS-43000, Single-Family Hillside Residential 37.81
Crry: ANAHEIM, CALIFORNIA; CENSUS TRACr# 874.02
Percent persons below poverty 20.05
Median household income (1989 U.S. $) 28,097
Percent persons by race
White: non-Hispanic 24.4
Hispanic: white & other 70.3
Black (including Hispanic) 1.6
Asian & Pacific Islander (including Hispanic) 3.2
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispanic) 0.4
Other non-Hispanic 0.1
Percent area in tract by zoning designation
CO. Office & Professional Commercial 0.89
CH, Heavy Commercial 0.11
CL, Limited Commercial 15.99
ML, Limited Industrial 23.74
RM-1200, Multiple-Family Residential 17.03
RM-2400, Multiple-Family Residential 7.87
RM-3000, Multiple-Family Residential 0.52
RS-7200, Single-Family Residential 19.99
RS-A-43000, Single-Family Residential 2.75
SP 92-2, Specific Plan-Resort 11.12
797. The information contained in this Appendix was compiled by Craig Anthony (Tony)
Arnold utilizing data from the 1990 census and zoning maps. See supra Part II.B (describing meth-
odology for the study).
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CrrY ANAHEIM, CALIFORNIA; CENSUS TRACT # 874.03
Percent persons below poverty 19.9
Median household income (1989 U.S. $) 29,010
Percent persons by race
White: non-Hispanic 30.5
Hispanic: white & other 64.7
Black (including Hispanic) 2.8
Asian & Pacific Islander (including Hispanic) 2.1
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispanic) 0
Other non-Hispanic 0
Percent area in tract by zoning designation
CO, Office & Professional Commercial 1.75
CL, Limited Commercial 20.84
ML, Limited Industrial 3.34
RM-1200, Multiple-Family Residential 12.50
RS-7200, Single-Family Residential 34.39
RS-A-43000, Single-Family Residential 23.55
SP 92-2, Specific Plan-Resort 3.63
Cr'r: COSTA MESA, CALIFORNIA; CENSUS TRACT # 638.02
Percent persons below poverty 4.3
Median household income (1989 U.S. $) 64,298
Percent persons by race
White: non-Hispanic 88.3
Hispanic: white & other 5.7
Black (including Hispanic) 0
Asian & Pacific Islander (including Hispanic) 5.8
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispanic) 0.2
Other non-Hispanic 0
Percent area in tract by zoning designation
GC, General Commercial 16.67
HDR, High Density Residential 5.05
LDR, Low Density Residential 57.82
PU, Public Use 20.46
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CrY: COSTA MESA, CALIFORNIA; CENSUS TRACT# 637
Percent persons below poverty 15.6
Median household income (1989 U.S. $) 29,422
Percent persons by race
White: non-Hispanic 54.9
Hispanic: white & other 38.6
Black (including Hispanic) 0.9
Asian & Pacific Islander (including Hispanic) 5.2
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispanic) 0.2
Other non-Hispanic 0.2
Percent area in tram by zoning designation
CC, Commercial Center 8.46
GC, General Commercial 2.32
HDR, High Density Residential 3225
LDR, Low Density Residential 15.11
LI, Limited Industry 4.79
MDR, Medium Density Residential 10.40
PU, Public Use 8.78
UCC, Urban Center Commercial 17.90
CITY: ORANGE, CALIFORNIA; CENSUS TRACT# 219.12
Percent persons below poverty 3.7
Median household income (1989 U.S. $) 89,727
Percent persons by race
White: non-Hispanic 86.0
Hispanic: white & other 6.0
Black (including Hispanic) 1.0
Asian & Pacific Islander (including Hispanic) 6.8
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispanic) 0.2
Other non-Hispanic 0
Percent area in tract by zoning designation
A-1, Agricultural 1.50
MI, tight Industrial 2.84
P-1, Public Institution 0.55
PC. Planned Community 49.83
RI-10, Single-Family Residential 0.75
RI-20, Single-Family Residential 1.57
RI-40, Single-Family Residential 11.87
RI-6 Single-Family Residential 0.53
RI-8, Single-Family Residential 11.17
RO, Recreation Open Space 11.33
SO, Sand & Gravel Extraction 8.06
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CrrY: ORANoE, CAmIFORNIA; CENSUS TRACr # 762.04
Percent persons below poverty 19.4
Median household income (1989 U.S. $) 25,313
Percent persons by race
White: non-Hispanc 23.5
Hispanic: white & other 66.7
Black (including Hispani) 2.0
Asian & Pacific Islander (including Hispanic) 6.9
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispani) 0.8
Other non-Hispanic 0.2
Percent area in tract by zoning designation
Cl. Limited Business 0.33
CZ General Business 0.21
CR, Commercial Recreation 19.89
MI, Light Industrial 3.98
M-2, Industrial Manufacturing 64.86
MH, Mobile Home Residential 2.41
OP, Office Professional 0.03
P-L Public Institution 2.45
RO, Recreation Open Space 0.16
R2-6. Duplex Residential 0.72
R-3, Multiple-Farily Residential 4.95
CITY: PITrSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA; CENSUS TRACT# 1401.98
Percent persons below poverty 7.3
Median household income (1989 U.S. $) 82.553
Percent persons by race
White: non-Hispanic 86.9
Hispanic: white & other 1.6
Black (including Hispanic) 2.8
Asian & Pacific Islander (including Hispanic) 8.7
American Indian, Eskimo, Almt (including Hispanic) 0
Other. non-Hispanic 0
Percent area in tract by zoning designation
Ri, One-Family Residential 26.39
R -A, One-Family Residence 26.18
R2, Two-Family Residence 4.59
R3, Multiple-Family Residence 1.33
RS, Multiple-Family Residence 1.10
RP, Residential Planned Unit Development 2.96
I-C, Institutional-Civic 33.68
S, Special 13.76
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CITY: PITrSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA; CENsuS TRACT # 1404
Percent persons below poverty 3.3
Median household income (1989 U.S. $) 75,269
Percent persona by race
White: non-Hispanic 95.4
Hispanic: white & other 0.7
Black (including Hispanic) 1.9
Asian & Pacific Islander (including Hispanic) 2.0
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispanic) 0
Other. non-Hispanic 0
Percent area in tract by zoning designation
C I, Neighborhood Retail 0.73
RI, One-Family Residence 30.70
R I -A, One-Family Residence 35.32
R2, Two-Family Residence 23.41
S, Special 9.84
CITY: PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA; CENSUS TRAcT# 1106
Percent persons below poverty 4.5
Median household income (1989 U.S. $) 41,439
Percent persons by race
White: non-Hispanic 86.4
Hispanic: white & other 0.7
Black (including Hispanic) 11.2
Asian & Pacific Ilander (including Hispanic) 1.5
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispanic) 0
Other. non-Hispanic 0.3
Percent area in tract by zoning designation
RI, One-Family Residence &82
R2, Two-Family Residence 15.24
R3, Multiple-Family Residence 5.03
R4, Multiple-Family Residence 2.01
S, Special 70.90
CITY: PrlTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA; CENSUS TRACT # 509
Percent persons below poverty 64.1
Median household income (1989 U.S. $) 6,039
Percent persons by race
White: non-Hispanic 2.4
Hispanic: white & other 0
Black (including Hispanic) 96.2
Asian & Pacific Islander (including Hispanic) 0
American Indian. Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispanic) 1.1
Other. non-Hispanic 0.3
Percent area in tract by zoning designation
M2, Limited Industil 1.94
R4, Multiple-Family Residence 57.74
S, Special 40.33
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CITY: PrITSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA; CENSUS TRACT# 510
Percent persons below poverty 73.2
Median household income (1989 U.S. $) 5,770
Percemt persons by race
White: non-Hispanic 0.6
Hispanic: white & other 0
Black (including Hispanic) 98.9
Asian & Pacific Islander (including Hispanic) 0.5
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispanic) 0
Other non-Hispanic 0
Percent area in tract by zoning designation
1-C, Institutional-Civic 25.35
R2, Two-Family Residence 2.02
R4, Multiple-Family Residence 1.47
RS, Multiple-Family Residence 1.14
RP, Residential Planned Unit Development 57.19
S, Special 12.84
CITY: PrFSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA; CENSUS TRACT# 1016
Percent persons below poverty 55.4
Median household income (1989 U.S. $) 7,732
Percent persons by race
White: non-Hispanic 7.6
Hispanic: white & other 0
Black (including Hispanic) 91.9
Asian & Pacific Islander (including Hispanic) 0
American Idian, Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispanic) 0.5
Other. non-Hispanic 0
Percent area in tract by zoning designation
R2, Two-Family Residence 22.61
R3, Multiple-Family Residence 9.10
RP, Residential Planned Unit Development 56.71
S, Special 11.58
CrT: PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA; CENSUS TRACT# 2609.98
Percent persons below poverty 76.4
Median household income (1989 U.S. $) 5,811
Percent persons by race
White: non-Hispanic 2.8
Hispanic: white & other 0.2
Black (including Hispanic) 96.3
Asian & Pacific Islander (including Hispanic) 0
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispanic) 0.7
Other non-Hispanic 0
Percent area in tract by zoning designation
A 1, Commercial-Residential Associated 1.35
MI, Limited Industrial 1.21
RI, One-Family Residence 50.64
R2, Two-Family Residence 1.70
S, Special 45.10
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CITY: PITr SBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA; CENSUS TRACT # 2808
Perent persons below poverty 77.0
Median household income (1989 U.S. $) 5,736
Percent persons by rae
White. non-Hispanc 10.5
ispnc white & other 0
Black (including Hispanic) 87.8
Asian & Pacific Ilander (including Hispanic) 0
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispanic) 1.7
Other non-Hispanic 0
Percent ares in tract by zoning designation_
C1, Neighbothood Retail 0.74
CP, Commercial Planned Unit Development 2.85
N3, Light Industrial 31.91
M4, Heavy Industrial 18.20
RI, One-Family Residence 5.94
R2, Two-Family Residence 0.31
R3, Multiple-Family Residence 13.57
RP, Residential Planned Unit Development 9.43
S, Special 17.05
CrTY: SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS; CENSUS TRACT# 1204
Percent persona below poverty 6.5
Median househoid incoie (1989 U.S. $) 62,705
Percent persons by race
White: on-Hpaic 90.5
Hispanic: white & other 8.2
Black (including Hispanic) 0.1
Asian & Pacific blander (including Hispanic) 0.7
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispanic) 0
Other non-xHpanic 0.5
Percent area in tact by zoning designation
Single-Family Residence 99.00
Commercial !.00
CITY: SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS; CENSUS TRACT# 1914.02
Percent persons below poverty 3.4
Median household income (1989 U.S. $) 85,099
Percent persons by race
White: non-Hispanic 83.3
Hispanic- white & other 12.4
Black (including Hispanic) 1.3
Asian & Pacific Isander (including Hispanic) 3.0
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispanic) 0
Other non-Hispanic 0
Percent area in ac by zoning designation
B-2, Business 2.14
B-3, Business 0.66
R-l, Single.Family Resilence 95.22
R-3, Multiple-Family Residence 1.98
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Crry: SAN ANMTNIO, TaXAS; CENSUS TRAcr# 1915.02
Percent persons below poverty 4.3
Median household income (1989 U.S. S) 63,657
Percent persons by race
White: non-Hispanic 79.6
Hispanic: white & other 16.9
Black (including Hispanic) 2.4
Asian & Pacific Islander (including Hispanic) 0.9
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispanic) 0.2
Other non-Hispanic 0




R-1, Single Family Residence 85.96
R-3, Multiple Family Residence 6.07
R-7, Small Lot Home 4.23
CITy: SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS; CENSUS TRACr# 1105
Percent ersons below poverty 81.8
Median household income (3989 U.S. $) 4,999
Percent persons by race
White: non-Hispanic 1.8
Hispanic: white & other 96.6
Black (including Hispanic) 0.3
Asian & Pacific Islander (including Hispanic) 0
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispanic) 0.3
Other am-Hispanic 1.1




I-1, Light Industry 14.40
K, Commercial 1.98
L, Firt Manufacturing 30.16
M, Second Manufacturing 3.74
R-3, Multiple Family Residence 34.92
R-7, Small Lot Home 9.79
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CITY: SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS; CENSUS TRACT# 1305
Percent persons below poverty 52.0
Median household income (1989 U.S. $) 9,731
Percent persona by race
White:. non-Hispanic 6.4
Hispanic: white & other 23.6
Black (including Hispanic) 69.6
Asian & Pacific Ilander (including Hispanic) 0
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispanic) 0.4
Other non-Hispanic 0




B-2 NA, Non-Alcohol Sales 1.35
B-3, Business 0.12
B-3 R, Restrictive Business 1.81
C, Apartment 2.16
F, Local Retail 2.68
HISTORIC 0.04
1-t, Ught Industry 1.64
J, Commercial 2.62
Ai, Commercial 0.66
R-2, Two Family Residence 28.68
R-3, Multiple Family Residence 13.17
R-3 CC, Multiple Family Ridence 4.21
CITY: SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS; CENSUS TRACT# 1307.85
Percent persona below poverty 64.3
Median household income (1989 U.S. $) 9,169
Percent persons by race
White: non-Hispanic 8.0
Hispanic: white & other 70.4
Black (including Hispanic) 20.0
Asian & Pacific Islander (including Hispanic) 0
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispanic) 1.6
Other: non-Hispanic 0





F, Local Retail 0.44
G, Local Retail 0.62
J, Commercial 30.65
JJ, Commercial 0.50
L Frst Manufacturing 36.59
0-1, Office 0.46
R-1, Single Family Residence 13.48
R-2, Two Family Residence 0.06
R-2A, Three & Four Family Residence 0.30
R-5, Single Family Residence 0.88
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Cr-y: SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS; CENsus TRACT# 1702
Percent persons below poverty 54.4
Median household income (1989 U.S. $) 8,999
Percent persons by race
White non-Hispanic 2.6
Hispanic: white & other 96.8
Black (including Hispanic) 0.2
Asian & Pacif Isander (including Hispanic) 0.2
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispanic) 0.1
Other non-Hispanic 0




B-2 NA, Non-Alcohol Sals 0.04
B-3, Business 2.40
B-3 NA, Non-Alcohol Sales 1.75
B-3 R, Restrictive Business 1.05
F, Local Retail 7.22
G, Local Retail 1.56




R-1, Single Family Residence 0.35
R-3, Multiple Family Residence 5.67
R-5, Single Family Residence 9.80
R-7, Small Lot Home 38.05
CrrY: SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA; CENSUS TIRACr # 753.03
Percent persons below poverty 7.7
Median household income (1989 U.S. $) 54,346
Percent persons by race
White. non-Hispanic 73.3
Hispanic: white & other 20.6
Black (including Hispanic) 1.6
Asian & Pacific Ilander (including Hispanic) 3.1
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispanic) 0.8
Other non-Hispanic 0.7
Percent area in tract by zoning designation
Cl, Community Commercial 4.90
CS, Arterial Commercial 2.78
0, Open Space Land 0.69
P, Professional 8.99
RI, Sigle-Family Residence 81.05
R3, Multiple-Family Residence 1.59
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CrrY: SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA; CENSUS TRACT# 744.03
Percent persons below poverty 28.1
Median household income (1989 U.S. $) 24,408
Percent persons by race
White: non-Hispanic 13.6
Hispanic:. white & other 74.9
Black (including Hispanic) 3.9
Asian & Pacific Islander (including Hispanic) 7.6
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispanic) 0
Other non-Hispanic 0
Percent area in tract by zoning designation
C2, Generl Commercial 0.20
C4, Planned Shopping Center 0.45
MI, Ught Industrial 88.28
M2, Heavy Industrial 2.26
RI, Single-Family Residence 3.43
R3, Mukiple-Family Residence 2.07
R4, Suburban Aparment 0.75
SD-16, Specific Development 1.54
SD-56, Specific Development 1.02
CmTY: SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA; CENSUS TRACT# 749.01
Percent persons below poverty 27.5
Median household income (1989 U.S. $) 24,931
Percent persons by race
White: non-Hispanic 4.0
Hispanic: white & other 91.6
Black (including Hispanic) 0.7
Asian & Pacific Islander (including Hispanic) 2.0
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispanic) 0.9
Other non-Hispanic 0.7
Percent area in amt by zoning designation
Cl, Community Commercial 4.83
C2, General Commercial 1.72
0, Open Space Land 13.43
P, Professional 10.22
RI, Single-Family Residence 17.88
R2, Two-Family Residence 25.99
R3, Multiple-Family Residence 7.47
SD-18, Specific Development 0.77
SD-40, Specific Development 13.09
SD-55, Specific Development 1.60
SP-l, Specific Plan 2.99
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CrrY: SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA; CENSUS TAcr# 750.02
Percent persons below poverty 33.6
Median household income (1989US$) 15,508
Percent persons by race
White: non-Hispanic 12.4
Hispanic: white & other 80.4
Black (including Hispanic) 3.4
Asian & Pacific blander (including Hispanic) 3.2
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispanic) 0.3
Other non-Hispanic 0.2
Percnt area in tra by zoning designation
C2, General Commercial 13.36
C3, Central Business 15.92
C5, Arterial Commercial 3.19
GC, Government Center 16.96
0, Open Space Land 9.11
P, Professional 15.83
R2, Two-Family Residence 6.22
R3, Multiple-Family Residence 6.21
SD, Specific Development 8.78
SD-40, Specific Development 4.42
CITY: WICHITA, KANSAS; CENSUS TRACT# 73.01
Percent persons below poverty 2.6
Medin household income (1989 U.S. $) 64,495
Percent persons by race
White: non-Hispanic 95.0
Hispanic: white & other 0.3
Black (including Hispanic) 0.7
Asian & Pacific Islander (including Hispanic) 3.1
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispanic) 0.9
Other: non-Hispanic 0
Percent area in tract by zoning designation
A or TF-3, Two-Family Residential 3.05
AA or SF-6, Single-Family Residential 67.95
B, Multi-Family Residential 2.48
BB or GO, General Office 3.03
Country Club 16.68
LC, Limited Commercial 6.74
MF-29, Multi-Family Residential 0.06
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CITY: WClHrrA (EASTBOROUGH), KANSAS; CENSUS TRACT # 74
Percent persons below poverty 2.8
Median household income (1989 U.S. $) 76,305
Percent persons by race
White: non-Hispanic 97.1
Hispanic, white & other 0.2
Black (including Hispanic) 2.1
Asian & Pacific Islander (including Hispanic) 0.6
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispanic) 0
Other: non-Hispanic 0
Percent mae in tract by zoning designation
Single-Family Residential 100.00
CITY: WICHITA, KANSAS; CENSUS TRACT # 8
Percent persons below poverty 47.5
Median household income (1989 U.S. $) 9,673
Parent persons by race
White: non-Hispanic 3.0
Hispanic: white & other 0
Black (including Hispanic) 95.7
Asian & Pacific Islander (including Hispanic) 0
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispanic) 1.3
Other. non-Hispanic 0
Percent area in tract by zoning designation
B, Multi-Family Residential 15.60
GC, General Commercial 0.88
GO, General Office 0.66
LC, Limited Commercial 4.11
TF-3, Two-Family Residential 78.76
CITY: WICHITA, KANSAS; CENSUS TRACT# 41
Percent persons below poverty 66.6
Median household income (1989 U.S. $) 6,248
Percent persons by race
White: non-Hispank 40.9
Hispanic: white & other 9.7
Black (including Hispanic) 45.9
Asian & Pacific Islander (including Hispanic) 3.5
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispanic) 0
Other. non-Hispanic 0
Percent area in tract by zoning designation
B, Multi-Family Residential 6.77
CBD, Central Business District 48.93
GC, General Commercial 18.18
GO, General Office 1.05
LC. Limited Commercial 2.52
U, Limited Industrial 22.55
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CITY: WICHITA, KANSAS; CENSUS TRACT# 78
Percent persons below poverty 41.4
Median household income (1989 U.S. $) 15,065
Percent persons by race
White: non-Hispanic 14.1
Hispanic: white & other 3.2
Black (including Hispanic) 77.1
Asian & Pacific blander (including Hispanic) 4.8
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut (including Hispanic) 0.7
Other:. non-Hispanic 0.1
Percent area in tract by zoning designation
B, Multi-Family Residential 2.52
GI. General Industrial 0.94
GO, General Office 0.78
C or GC, General Commercial 5.07
LI, Limited Industrial 5.58
MF-29, Multi-Family Residential 037
MH, Manufactured Housing 12.87
SF-6, Single-Family Residential 68.03
TF-3, Two-Family Residential 3.83
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I. INTRODUCTION
Tax law is an important regulatory means for implementing our no-
tion of the just society.' Do we value individual enterprise or preserving a
* Assistant Professor of Law, Co-Director Law & Business Program, American University,
Washington College of Law; B.A. Columbia University, 1988; M.A., The University of Virginia,
1993; J.D., The University of Virginia School of Law, 1993. I would like to thank Anne Alstott,
Joseph Bankman, James Boyle, Daniel Farber, Barbara Fried, lrum Hasan-Khan, Michael Living-
ston, Andy Pike, Janet Spragens, David Weisbach, Joan Williams, and Larry Zelenack for their
comments at various stages of this project's development. Any errors are my own.
1. The current political landscape makes clear the relevance of tax to the "big issues." Most
of the recent debates on social policy, from family values to corporate welfare, focus on the tax
system as both the cause of social decay and injustice, and a major hope for radical reform. See, e.g.,
CONTRACT WITH AMERICA: THE BOLD PLAN BY REP. NEWr GINGRICH, REP. DICK ARMEY, AND
THE HOUSE REPUBUCANS TO CHANGE THE NATION 85-90 (Ed Gillespie & Bob Scbellhas eds.,
1994) (discussing tax reform as the chief mechanism to; implement new values); CHISTIAN
COATIXON, CONTRACT wITH THE AMERICAN FAMILY: A BOLD PLAN BY THE CHRISTIAN
COALMON TO STRENGTHEN THE FAMILY AND REsTORE COMMON-SENSE VALUES (1995); Eric
Black, Perot Stands Out on Taxes, Plan to Cut Deficit; But Positions on Other Major Issues Lack a
Main Component: How Would He Do It?, STAR TRIB., Oct. 18, 1992, at 16A, Perot's Economic Pill
Might Not Be All That Bitter, BUS. WK., Oct. 12, 1992, at 30; Robert B. Reich, How to Avoid These
Layoffs?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1996, at A21 (encouraging a tax-based carrot and stick approach to
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decent life for all individuals? Are we social democrats or libertarians?
The structure of our tax system reflects our answers to these basic philo-
sophical questions. At its best, normative tax policy challenges these
answers, by exploring their implications and contrasting them with other
possible visions of the good life.
Despite its central role in connecting these most fundamental philo-
sophical issues to actual legal structures, tax law has traditionally not
attracted anywhere near the level of interdisciplinary attention enjoyed
by other areas of the law.2 It could even be said that tax law scholarship
has developed as a theoretical Galapagos Islands, largely insulated by
interdisciplinary movements affecting other areas of the law, though that
has begun to change in recent years! This does not mean that the pre-
vailing methods are necessarily primitive. On the contrary, isolation can
yield significant innovation. Tax scholars were engaged in economic
analysis, for instance, long before economic analysis became so widely
used in all other areas of legal scholarship.! No amount of sophisticated
economic analysis, however, can help shed light on the kind of funda-
promote greater "corporate responsibility"). Historically. of course, taxation was often the flash
point for political and social change. See Edward J. McCaffery, Tax's Empire, 85 GEO. LJ. 71, 73-
74, 121-28 (1996) (discussing the role of taxes in the American Revolution and the importance of
tax issues to the authors of the Federalist Papers). Furthermore, the public's intense interest in tax
policy can literally make or break a political candidate, as Steve Forbes's flat tax campaign attests.
See Carl Rowan, IfForbes Becomes President, God Help Us, Ctt. SuN-ThMuS, Feb. 7, 1996, at 43
(noting Forbes's status as "the New Republican phenomenon" and criticizing him for emphasizing
the flat tax plank of his political platform). Finally, congressional hearings on IRS abuses gamered
national attention. See Andrew Sullivan, The Tax That Could Revive Conservatism, SUNDAY TfMES
(London), Oct. 5, 1997, at 6.
2. Indeed, under some accounts of the hierarchy of disciplines within the legal academy, tax
law ranks close to the bottom. See Deborah Jones Merritt & Barbara F. Reskin, Sex, Race, and
Credentials: The Truth About Affirmative Action in Law Faculty Hiring, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 199,
266 (1997) (describing tax as a less prestigious area of scholarship).
3. Increasingly, the field is becoming much more interdisciplinary, with tax scholars bringing
perspectives as diverse as libertarianism and feminism to reexamine traditional problems. See gener-
ally, BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALs'FOTT, TIM STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY (forthcoming 1999); Anne
L. Alstott, Tax Policy and Feminism: Competing Goals and Institutional Choices, 96 COLUM. L.
REV. 2001 (1996) (considering feminist goals in tax policy); Dorothy A. Brown, Race, Class, and
Gender Essentialism in Tax Literature: The Joint Return, 54 WAsH. & LEE L. REV. 1469 (1997)
(describing the bias in the federal tax laws based on race, class, and gender); Marjorie E. Komhau-
ser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax Movement: A Typical Male Reaction, 86
MICH. L. REV. 465 (1987) (arguing for progressive taxation based on feminist views of humanity);
Edward J. McCaffery, The UCLA Tax Policy Conference: Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L.
REV. 1861, 1861 (1994) (noting that cognitive theory "has much to offer the study of taxation");
Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Tax Fairness or Unfairness? A Consideration of the Philosophical Bases for
Unequal Taxation of Individuals, 12 AM. J. TAx POL'Y 221 (1995) (challenging the idea that fair-
ness requires some taxpayers to bear more of the burden than others).
4. As demonstrated infra, Part 11, tax scholarship's isolation from self-consciously interdisci-
plinary movements such as law and economics may have helped it avoid some of the problems
associated with the broader claims of the law and economics movement. See generalty RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE at xiv (1990) (acknowledging the Chicago School's
"thin and unsatisfying epistemology").
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mental philosophical issues that shape tax law at its most basic level. For
these more philosophical questions, other strategies are required.
One possible strategy, of course, is to assume that such questions
are basically unanswerable, that issues of fairness, justice and the good
life are matters of the heart, not of the head, settled by emotions and not
scholarly analysis! Under this strategy, leaving questions of fairness
unanalyzed is a perfectly legitimate way of conducting tax policy schol-
arship, even if tax law is the area of law where these questions need an-
swering most. Employing this strategy in tax and other areas of the law
may seem perfectly natural, reflecting as it does a view of the status of
fairness claims quite deeply embedded in the intellectual culture at large."
As this article demonstrates, however, such a strategy is anything but
natural, as it relies on a philosophical view of the status of fairness
claims Once this particular philosophical view is abandoned, the avail-
ability of alternative philosophical approaches to fairness becomes clear.
5. This article uses the term "fairness" to encompass all issues of equity and distributive
justice in tax policy.
6. In discussing broader methodological issues in tax law, this article tries to explain the
persistence of formalism in the discourse that has been identified by others. See, e.g., Thomas D.
Griffith, Theories of Personal Deductions in the Income Tax, 40 HASTINGS LJ. 343, 343-45 (1989)
(noting the lack of normative principles in the tax theories of several scholars); Louis Kaplow,
Human Capital Under an Ideal Income Tax, 80 VA. L. REV. 1477, 1513 (1994) (explaining that tax
design should not be formalistic but based on "fundamental moral principles or views of distributive
justice"); Louis Kaplow, A Fundamental Objection to Tax Equity Norms: A Call for Utilitarianism,
48 NAT'L TAX J. 497 (1995) (recommending a utilitarian approach to tax policy); McCaffery, supra
note I (identifying formalism in the discourse); Michael A. Livingston, Reinventing Tax Scholar-
ship: Lawyers, Economists, and the Role of the Legal Academy, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 365, 386, 390
(1998) (identifying deficiencies in the current discourse and suggesting alternatives).
7. The philosophical view referred to here is "emotivism," which (as a corollary to "logical
positivism") views ethical statements as cognitively meaningless. For a partisan account of the rise
of logical positivism and emotivism, see HANS REICHENBACH, THE RISE OF SCtENTIFIC PHILOSOPHY
at vii, 276-302 (1951). This view is so much a part of our intellectual culture that subsequent ethical
views (like the pragmatism endorsed in this article) often define themselves by reference to it. See
Russell B. Goodman, Introduction to PRAGMATISM: A CONTEMPORARY READER 1, 8 (Russell B.
Goodman ed., 1995).
8. The downside of tax scholarship's isolation from the interdisciplinary debates in the legal
academy lies here, in its treatment of fairness issues. It may be that, to change the traditional way of
analyzing fairness issues in tax scholarship, the tax policy discourse must engage in the types of
reflections on methodology that proliferate in jurisprudential scholarship. See, e.g., Robert Justin
Lipkin, Beyond Skepticism, Foundationalism and the New Fuzziness: The Role of Wide Reflective
Equilibrium in Legal Theory, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 811, 874-76 (1990) (explaining the persistence
of skepticism in legal reasoning); Pierre Schlag, Law and Phrenology, 110 HARv. L REV. 877
(1997) (comparing the discipline of law to phrenology, and questioning its legitimacy as a discipline
of knowledge). Indeed, these types of reflections are occurring more and more in the tax policy
discourse. See, e.g., Livingston, supra note 6; McCaffery, supra note 1; see also Thomas D. Griffith,
Should "Tax Norms" Be Abandoned? Rethinking Tax Policy Analysis and the Taxation of Personal
Injury Recoveries, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 11 15 (recommending a normative approach to tax policy).
This article also speculates on method. In doing so, it raises further issues (such as whether there is a
pragmatic "method" which can avoid philosophical theory, taken up briefly in Part IV) that have also
been addressed in the jurisprudential work. See, e.g., Richard Rorty, Pragmatism and Law: A Re-
sponse to David Luban, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 75 (1996) (questioning the relevance of pragmatist
theory to law).
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One obvious candidate is philosophical pragmatism, which has been so
influential in legal scholarship as well as the general culture. This article
explains how a pragmatic method of evaluating tax policy questions
might operate to improve analysis of fairness issues in the tax discourse.9
Under a pragmatic analysis, for instance, fairness principles are not dis-
missed as "merely political," "fuzzy" or "cognitively meaningless." On
the contrary, pragmatism shows that fairness principles can be just as
"valid" as the result of scientific investigations, including quasi-scientific
investigations such as utilitarian or econometric modeling. Pragmatism,
in short, "denies absolute truth in order to make room ... for humanized
morality."
0
This article takes a pragmatic approach in that it shows the useful-
ness of denying absolute truth in discussions of fairness in tax law. At a
broader level, it also shows the usefulness of dropping philosophical
concerns over the truth status of fairness claims altogether. In this way it
echoes the pragmatist call to pay less attention to "the problems of phi-
losophers" and more attention to "the problems of men."" In place of an
absolutist or foundationalist view of truth, pragmatism takes a more ho-
listic approach, evaluating a principle of fairness by reflecting on its co-
herence with our other principles and practical goals. Thus, pragmatism
takes a big tent approach, bringing all considerations into play, including
distributive justice as well as efficiency considerations. This big tent
approach is clearly an established tradition in tax policy scholarship.
Nevertheless, its free-floating, foundationless character may make some
scholars feel that it is mushy, fuzzy or somehow nonrigorous. They may
feel more comfortable with a more formalistic form of analysis, with just
assuming a stock principle of fairness and plugging it into a neat analyti-
cal model. Under this formalist approach, principles of fairness or dis-
tributive justice operate in the same way that empirical facts or data op-
erate in the natural sciences.'" This article argues that applying the prag-
9. There are (to say the least) significant variations within the pragmatist tradition. Conten-
porary pragmatists Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam, for instance, have very different views of truth
and rationality. Compare HILARY PUTNAM, REAUSM WITH A HuMAN FACE 19-26 (James Conant
ed., 1990) (describing how Rorty's position differs from his), with Richard Rorty, Putnam and the
Relativist Menace, 90 J. PHIL 443, 458 (1993) (asserting that he and Putnam are in the "same line of
business"). In addition, pragmatists have different attitudes regarding the scientific method. See KAI
NIELSEN, NATURAuSM WITHOUT FOUNDATIONS 32 (1996) ('l[f we get more precise [about the
pragmatist scientific method] we discover that there is no such a thing as the scientific method but a
cluster of different methods developed by various scientific disciplines for their various purposes
and answering to their often quite different interests."); 5 CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, COUCTED
PAPERS 50-72 (Charles Hartshome & Paul Weiss eds., 1960) (aligning pragmatism with the scien-
tific method). See generally ARTHUR 0. LOVEJOY, THE THIRTEEN PRAGMATISMS AND oTHER
ESSAYS 1-29 (1963) (analyzing pragmatism as a loose collection of conflicting philosophies).
10. Goodman, supra note 7, at 8.
II. JOHN DEWEY, The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy, in 10 JOHN DEWEY: THE MIDDLE
WORKS, 1899-1924 at 3, 46 (Jo Anne Boydston ed., 1980).
12. For a (much, much) more detailed account of the relationship between scientific ap-
proaches and social policy questions, see THOMAS A. MCCARTHY, THE CRITICAL THEORY OF
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matist approach is not only philosophically defensible but in many cases
more useful than formalist models in analyzing core tax policy issues.
Accordingly, this article compares formalism to pragmatism in two areas
of tax policy debate: the progressivity debate and the consumption tax
debate. In addition, this article compares the pragmatist approach to
some relatively recent attempts to take fairness issues seriously by ap-
plying explicit theories of justice developed by philosophers such as John
Rawls or Ronald Dworkin. In both cases, this article shows that the
pragmatic tradition is superior to both formalism and explicitly philo-
sophical theories of justice in that it: (1) avoids analytical errors inherent
in stuffing fairness analysis into a formalist paradigm and (2) provides a
philosophical justification for tax scholars to examine fairness issues by
their own lights without a Ph.D. in philosophy.
This article proceeds in the following manner. Part H describes the
methodological strategy of the tax policy discourse at its most general
level, identifying economic analysis as the master trope and examining
how its rigid dichotomy between efficiency and fairness issues might
discourage rigorous discussion of fairness issues." Part II rejects the
view, associated with critical legal scholarship, that economic analysis is,
as a theoretical or ideological matter, inherently dismissive of fairness
concerns or automatically supportive of the status quo. Part II acknowl-
edges, however, that the sociological phenomenon of tax scholars in law
schools "playing economists" may result in permanent deferral of fair-
ness concerns even where, as in law schools, addressing such concerns
would seem to be particularly appropriate. Part III describes in greater
detail the formalist strategy for addressing fairness questions in the con-
temporary tax policy discourse, focusing on actual articulations in the
two most important historical debates in tax policy: the consumption tax
debate and the progressivity debate. As Part I shows, the formalist
strategy is based on a foundationalist view of knowledge, the idea that
the only legitimate knowledge is knowledge that is objectively grounded
in something outside our historically and culturally contingent traditions
and beliefs. The foundationalist orientation sees a formalist plugging in
of stock fairness principles into models as the best we can possibly hope
to do if we want to examine fairness claims. As Part II demonstrates,
some tax scholarship even resists analysis of fairness principles alto-
gether as a result of foundationalist preoccupations, marginalizing fair-
ness principles on the philosophical level as unscientific, "'cognitively
meaningless' 'pseudostatements"' about which real knowledge is impos-
sible." Part III rejects this foundationalism as philosophically problem-
JURGEN HABERMAS 137-149 (1978) (summarizing Habermas's critique of attempts to use natural
science methods in the social sciences).
13. As explained below, the methodology of economic analysis is defined as the application of
the equity/efficiency dichotomy, which separates economic efficiency issues into separate baskets.
14. Goodman, supra note 7, at 8. The most this treatment of fairness claims can do is ask how
the tax system stacks up against a posited (but not independently evaluated) fairness principle as in
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atic and therefore regards the resulting formalism as unnecessary. Part II
offers a nonfoundationalist, pragmatic approach that questions the need
for objectivity in the first place by showing how we can analyze fairness
issues by our best lights, seeing how we get on without any foundational
guides or grand theories to point us in the "right" direction. Thus, Part III
also distinguishes the pragmatic approach from the approaches of recent
tax scholarship that use comprehensive philosophical doctrine to provide
an overarching theory to adjudicate fairness and distributive justice
claims. Specifically, Parts III and IV raise the question of whether such
master theories relying on "reasonableness" (Rawls)" or "integrity"
(Dworkin)" are necessary or even useful for serious examination of fair-
ness in tax policy. To defend the pragmatic tradition in tax policy, Part
IV questions the usefulness of recent attempts to rationalize tax policy
analysis along the lines suggested by Dworkin and Rawls, by contrasting
them with the nonfoundationalist/pragmatic approach that eschews over-
arching theory for a more ad hoc, provisional, and local form of analysis.
II. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
More than any other identifiable method, economic analysis frames
tax policy analysis at every level. Even in an introductory tax law course,
some understanding of, for instance, deferral and deadweight loss' is
important for understanding doctrine and policy. In more specialized
forums, economic analysis often predominates;" every issue is broken
down into two discrete and presumably manageable tasks, answering
the formulation, "Given (fairness) principle X, our tax system is (or is not) desirable." In viewing
this formalism as derivative of an underlying foundationalism, the diagnosis (and remedy) of this
article is different than other recent accounts of formalism in tax policy analysis. Cf., e.g., McCaf-
fery, supra note i, at 75-76 (taking a "political-interpretive" approach to tax analysis).
15. See William D. Andrews, Fairness and the Choice Between a Consunption-Type and an
Accretion-Type Personal Income Tax: A Reply to Professor Warren, 88 HARV. L. REV 947, 950 &
n.10 (1975) (using Rawls); McCaffery, supra note 1, at 83, 88-89 (using Rawls).
16. See McCaffery, supra note 1, at 82-83 (using Dworkin).
17. See, e.g., WILLiAM A. KLEIN & JOSEPH BANKMAN, FEDERAL INCOME TAxATION 112-15
(11 th ed. 1997) (discussing deferral); HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 328-33 (4th ed. 1995)
(describing deadweight loss).
18. As previously noted, the tax policy discourse assimilated economic analysis well before
the law and economics movement made economic concepts so familiar in other areas of the law. See
supra note 4 and accompanying text. Indeed, it is fair to say that economic analysis is so much a part
of the traditional approaches to tax policy that it hardly even represents an interdisciplinary approach
at all, as it might when it occurs in torts, property, criminal law, contracts, or constitutional law. Cf.,
e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View ofthe Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (property); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E.
Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE LJ. 1261 (1980)
(contracts); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J.
LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989) (copyright); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory ofthe Criminal Law,
85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193 (1985) (criminal law); Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis
of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377 (1994) (torts).
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questions of efficiency and questions of fairness.'9 Use of the eq-
uity/efficiency dichotomy raises two issues affecting the treatment of
fairness in the tax policy discourse. First, it raises the specter of "law and
economics," the use of which in other areas of the law has been sharply
criticized as an ideology which distorts analysis of fairness. Second, it
raises the practical question of whether tax scholars in the legal academy
can safely adopt economic analysis without being redundant or deriva-
tive given the work of their colleagues in the economics departments.
This Part argues that if there is a problem with using economic analysis
in tax policy it is a practical rather than an ideological one.
It is worth considering therefore, even at a general level, a basic cri-
tique of law and economics as ideology to distinguish it from the practi-
cal critique favored in this Part. The point of this exercise is to distin-
guish the pragmatic orientation from ideology critique or critical legal
theory in general. While pragmatism and critical legal theory share a
skepticism about objective truth and ultimate foundations, the type of
pragmatism offered sees little use in the term "ideology" and is much
more accommodating in using all available modes of analysis-including
economic analysis-if it gets us an acceptable answer. To distinguish
pragmatism from critical theory, then, it is useful to examine critical the-
ory's criticism of economic analysis more closely.
Consider, for instance, the claim that economic analysis is a conser-
vative ideology." Under this critique, economic analysis asserts highly
dubious (usually conservative) normative claims while seeming to en-
gage in objective, scientific reasoning.2 An analysis supporting such a
conclusion might take the following line. Economic analysis purports to
tell us what legal rule is desirable by determining whether it maximizes
aggregate utility. The tool of measurement it uses is the utilitarian cal-
culus, where each person's utility is measured to determine maximum
aggregate utility." One problem for normative economic analysis, how-
ever, is that measuring an individual's subjective utility is a nearly im-
19. Thus, to evaluate comprehensively the policy effects of a tax rule, tax scholars generally
take the off-the-shelf methodology of public finance economics, separating and balancing efficiency
and equity effects. Cf., e.g., RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE 13, 95-96 (4th ed. 1984); PAuL SAMUEISON, MACROECONOMICS 23 (15th
ed. 1997); Nohel B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, The Case for a Capital Gains Preference,
48 TAx L REV. 319,366-67 & n.207 (1993).
20. For examples of critiques of law and economics in the legal literature, see C. Edwin Baker,
The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law, 5 PHIL. & PuB. AW. 3 (1975); Morton J. Horwitz,
Law and Economics: Science or Politics?, 8 HoFSTRA L. REv. 905 (1980); Mark Kelman, Con-
sumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL L. REV. 669
(1979); Arthur Allen Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L.
REV. 451 (1974). For the leading examination of ideology critique and critical theory in philosophy
(in English), see RAYMOND GEuss, THE IDEA OF A CRITICAL THEORY 4-26 (1981) (examining the
claims of the Frankfurt School's critical theory).
21. See Leff, supranote 20, at 451-82.
22. See ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 571-73 (3d ed.
1995).
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possible task. Thus, economic analysis often takes a shortcut, relying on
objective manifestations of individual preference, such as monetary
wealth. Ideology critique can focus on this compromise, characterizing it
as a distortion that excludes nomnonetary expressions of value. Under
this critique, using price as the measure of efficiency excludes, for in-
stance, the value that poor people would place on commodities if they
had the means (i.e., the money) to express such value, as well as any
subjective utility we might get from realizing our egalitarian impulses.
An ideology critique could claim that excluding powerless voices or
nonmonetized values from the analysis makes an implicit value judgment
that these voices and values are not worth counting." Accordingly, under
this critique, when economic analysis measures the desirability of a legal
rule using a utilitarian calculus with a monetized domain set, it not only
gets it wrong, but gets it wrong in a politically incorrect manner.
The problem with ideology critique is that it impugns economic
analysis per se, throwing the baby out with the bathwater. If one recog-
nizes the limitations of economic analysis, it can be used quite success-
fully. Tweak economic analysis a bit, for instance, and the philosophical
problems lessen. This is, in fact, what tax scholars implicitly do already.
Economic analysis in tax law either explicitly modifies the utilitarian
model to account for these problems or recognizes its limitations by the
constant disclaimer that fairness considerations might change the results.
For instance, while economic analysis in tax law does use price as a
measure of utility, it generally does so by taking into account the differ-
ent value of dollars to taxpayers of differing wealth by assuming a de-
clining marginal utility of income.' Far from supporting conservative
political programs, economic analyses with declining marginal utility
assumptions have historically been used to justify a progressive income
tax structure.' Furthermore, even assuming that measuring preferences
only in dollars (even with declining marginal utility assumptions) ex-
cludes important values, economic analysis has an out. By its own terms,
23. For example, the claim is that if a poor person has only one dollar to spend on bread, it is
misleading to say that when the poor person offers one dollar, that poor person values the bread less
than the rich person who offers (and can pay) two. Thus, under this critique, economic analysis errs
when it asserts that forcing the baker to sell the bread to the poor person for one dollar is inefficient
in any meaningful sense of decreasing aggregate utility. See Leff, supra note 20, at 478-79 & n.77.
24. See, e.g., HAROLD M. GROVES, TAX PHLXSOPHERS 29-30, 61-62 (Donald J. Curran ed.,
1974).
25. See, e.g., Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation,
19 U. CMt. L. REV. 417,456-58 (1952), reprinted in WALTER J. BLUM & HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE
UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION 40-42 (Phoenix Books 1963) (1953) (noting the im-
portance of the concept of marginal utility in justifying progressivity); Joseph Bankman & Thomas
Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L
REV. 1905, 1947 (1987) (assuming a reasonable degree of declining marginal utility in applying an
optimal taxation model to support moderate progressivity).
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economic analysis requires a further inquiry after the determination of
the economic efficiency effects; one must ask, "But is it fair?' "s
The point of this brief excursion into economic analysis is to distin-
guish critical theory from pragmatic theory, two approaches which often
share a nonfoundationalist orientation. From a pragmatic perspective,
economic analysis, like any other analytical tool, is quite useful as long
as we remain aware of its limitations. Thus, pragmatic analysis, consis-
tent with the big tent metaphor and in contrast to ideology critique, wel-
comes economic analysis as one tool among many. The tool has its de-
fects as well as its strengths. One defect is that economic analysis, while
it does not foreclose rich analysis of fairness issues, does not exactly
encourage it either. The prevalence of economic analysis might cause the
tax scholar to feel comfortable sticking to efficiency considerations and
deferring discussion of fairness issues altogether through a formalist
mode of analysis where principles of fairness are stuck in as going as-
sumptions. The question then arises, "Who will pick up the slack?" 7
Adoption of a purely economic mode of analysis also threatens to
make tax scholarship redundant and derivative.' It places the tax scholar
in direct competition with economists. This is not a level playing field.
Economists safely use economic analysis to exploit the benefits of spe-
26. See, e.g., PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 22, at 570-73 (describing equity/efficiency
effects); AMARTYA K. SEN, CODLLECTVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 22 (1970) (noting that it is
efficient, but not fair, to let Nero fiddle while Rome bums). The fact that the tax discourse imported
economic analysis directly from public finance economics, and not from proponents within the law
and economics movement per se, may help account for why tax policy analysis can resist critiques of
economic analysis. Tax scholars (like public finance economists) do not typically make overarching
reductive claims that, for example, tax law is only about maximizing a narrow category of efficiency
or that maximizing wealth is the only criterion to evaluate a tax rule. Cf., e.g., Richard A. Posner,
Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 179, 185 (1987) ("'The common law seeks to promote efficiency in the sense of
wealth maximization .... "); Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, I J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 33
(1972) (asserting that "profit-maximizing" is the engine of innovation in the common law). To the
extent tax policy analysis avoids such ambitious uses of economic analysis, it may avoid the criti-
cisms of economic analysis generally. See, e.g., Cento G. Veljanovski, Wealth Maximization, Law
and Ethics--On the Limits of Economic Efficiency, I INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 5, 22-23 (1981) (stat-
ing that Pomer's wealth maximization principle does not acceptably address ethics or rights).
27. As stated by Posner
Economics does not answer the question whether the existing distribution of income and
wealth is good or bad, just or unjust .... Nor can the economist tell us whether... con-
sumer satisfaction should be the dominant value of society. Thus, the economist's com-
petence in a discussion of the legal system is limited. He can predict the effect of legal
rules on value and efficiency, in their strict technical senses, and on the existing distribu-
tion of income and wealth, but he cannot issue mandatory prescriptions for social change.
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 15 (5th ed. 1998). Economists regularly defer
on fairness issues by either using simplifying assumptions, such as equal distribution, or by a self-
imposed division of labor, characterizing fairness concerns as the domain of philosophers and politi-
cians but not economists. See generally DEIRDRE N. MCCLosKEY, THE VICES OF ECONOMISTS: THE
VIRTUES OF THE BOURGEOISIE (1996) (describing formalism in economics and criticizing neoclassi-
cal economics for abandoning its ethical roots).
28. See Livingston, supra note 6, at 374 ("If tax policy is economic in nature.... why do we
need any lawyers?').
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cialization. They provide economic models for examining the economic
efficiency effects of a tax rule, but leave others to grapple with equity
determinations. It might be suggested that examination of such issues
should be left to the political process, that tax scholars have no business
imposing their own views into the analysis. But this separation of the
"political" from the "scholarly" is just what this article questions. There
is no reason to think that any analysis is apolitical or objective. Accord-
ingly, it is a mistake to strive for neutrality on such issues. On the con-
tary, there are good reasons for encouraging tax scholars to enter the
political debates. First, it might improve the level of analyses in circula-
tion, thus improving the broader public policy discourse. Second, think-
ing about politics might encourage tax scholars to examine the political
process. Similarly, a pragmatic approach encourages a broad range of
topics and approaches in tax scholarship.
ImI. EQuITY ANALYSIS
This Part critically examines the way in which the tax policy dis-
course traditionally treats fairness claims. As shown below, the dominant
strain in the discourse is to analyze tax equity by listing core, stock prin-
ciples of fairness and determining whether the tax proposal in question
supports or undermines the chosen principle. In this strain, fairness prin-
ciples are asserted rather than independently examined, used as the foun-
dational starting point of inquiry rather than conclusions of reasoned
analysis. This point has been made elsewhere.' This article, however,
moves beyond identifying formalism to explaining and remedying it. To
these ends, this Part connects formalist analysis of fairness in tax policy
to the foundationalist tradition in philosophical ethics." In this tradition,
29. See Barbara H. Fried, Fairness and the Consumption Tax, 44 STAN. L. REV. 961,964-65,
1015 (1992) (analyzing fairness principles that am presumed without analysis in the literature);
McCaffery, supra note 1, at 86.
30. In this tradition, the great hope of ethical philosophy is to explain how ethical claims can
be "objective" in the sense "of a kind consistent with a respectable resolution of a range of is-
sues--epistemological, metaphysical, semanti--that in philosophical common sense are character-
istically bundled together in the idea of objectivity." Stephen Darwall et al., Toward Fin de siecle
Ethics: Some Trends, in MORAL DISCOURSE AND PRACTICE: SOME PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACHES 3,
37 n.29 (Stephen Darwall et al. eds., 1997) [hereinafter MORAL DISCOURSE]. This article views this
tradition as foundationalist and encourages the tax policy discourse to abandon the goal of "respect-
able resolutions" to the problem of objectivity and instead focus on more provisional, ad hoc, and
contingent resolutions to issues of fairness.
A note on terminology is appropriate here since "foundationalism" is used in the philosophi-
cal discourse in different ways. Similar to the definition used in this article, the foundationalist
approach has been described as an attempt "to ground inquiry and communication in something
more firm and stable than mere belief or unexamined practice. The foundationalist strategy is first to
identify that ground and then so to order our activities that they become anchored to it and are
thereby rendered objective and principled." STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY:
CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 342 (1989).
"Foundationalism" has also been used to denote a form of empiricism, asserting that all knowledge
is derived fron certain basic sensory givens whose truth is immediately evident and indubitable. See
NIELSEN, supra note 9, at 29. The foundationalist tradition in philosophy has been contrasted to
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fairness claims must be grounded in objective reality, or something like
it, to merit assent." This Part identifies these foundationalist strains in the
formalist tradition in tax policy, connecting formalist treatments with the
foundationalist view that fairness claims are mere expressions of per-
sonal preference not subject to rational analysis (because they lack ob-
jective grounding).!' This Part makes clear that other nonfoundationalist
philosophical views are not only possible but might be better at giving
rigorous analysis of fairness claims a respectable philosophical pedigree.
Accordingly, this Part offers nonfoundationalist pragmatism as an alter-
native approach not only to the dominant foundationalist strategy of re-
jecting fairness principles as meaningless but also to the constructivist
strategy (much more prevalent in the more recent interdisciplinary lit-
"naturalism," which describes knowledge as arising from reliable processes (causes) rather than
being derived from basic premises. As one commentator puts it
Modem epistemology has been largely dominated by positions which can be character-
ized as "foundationalist": all knowledge is seen as ultimately grounded in certain founda-
tional beliefs which have an epistemically privileged position-4hey are a priori or self-
warranting, incorrigible, or something of the sorL.... Recent work in "naturalistic epis-
temology" ... suggests that there are no beliefs which are epistemically privileged in the
way foundationalism seems to require.
Richard Boyd, How to Be a Moral Realist, in MORAL DISCOURSE, supra, at 105, 112-113. The
approach suggested in this article is closer to naturalistic than foundationalist epistemology, though
it seeks to avoid discussions of epistemology altogether. This, in turn, pushes this article's approach
closer to "natural language philosophy" which has its own critics. See id. at 116 (describing "philis-
tine antiscientism often associated with 'ordinary language' philosophy"). The foundationalism in
the tax policy discourse identified in this article includes the empiricistlemotivist form that views
fairness claims as cognitively empty because they lack empirical foundation. See ALFRED JULES
AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LOGIC 111 (1952). It also includes attempts to ground moral knowl-
edge in universal reason. See, e.g., Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, in MORAL
DISCOURSE, supra, at 389, 393, 399 (discussing Kant's grounding of the moral law in human auton-
omy and deriving a universal obligation to others from this fact).
31. See Darwall et al., supra note 30, at 7. It is of course well beyond the scope of this article
to catalogue the tremendous variety of sub-schools within philosophical ethics. See generally Peter
Railton, Moral Realism, in MORAL DISCOURSE, supra note 30, at 137-38 (listing 13 different forms
of moral realism alone). The point is simply to identify the quest for foundations in much philo-
sophical theory.
32. This article views such formalist treatments as one response to the foundationalist prob-
lematic: since fairness claims are not verifiable by facts in the world, they are utterly lacking in any
cognitive content and are meaningless. A nonfoundationalist account of fairness claims would rec-
ognize that fairness principles are not verified by facts in the world but, and here is the difference, it
would not deem fairness evaluations as lower on the totem pole of knowledge. Nonfoundationalism,
in other words, rejects the fact/value distinction in ethics:
To frame a theory of knowledge which makes it necessary to deny the validity of moral
ideas, or else to refer them to some other and separate kind of universe from that of
common sense and science, is both provincial and arbitray. The pragmatist has at least
tried to face, and not to dodge, the question of how it is that moral and scientific "knowl-
edge" can both hold of one and the same world. And whatever the difficulties in his prof-
fered solution, the conception that scientific judgments are to be assimilated to moral is
closer to common sense than is the theory that validity is to be denied of moral judgments
because they do not square with the preconceived theory of the nature of the world to
which scientific judgments must refer.
John Dewey, Does Reality Possess Practical Character?, in PRAGMATISM: A CONTEMPORARY
READER, supra note 7, at 79, 83. For a more detailed critique of foundationalism in philosophy, see
KAI NIELSEN, ON TRANSFORMING PHLOSOPttY: A METAPHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY (1995).
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erature relying on Rawls and Dworkin) of establishing a solid basis for
fairness claims by grounding them in idealized notions of reasonableness
or integrity.
The remainder of this Part contrasts the use of the foundational-
ist/formalist strategy with the use of the nonfoundationalist pragmatic
strategy in the two areas of tax policy where questions of fairness are
paramount: the consumption tax and progressivity debates. It shows how
the analysis of principles in these areas under the nonfoundationalist
pragmatic approach, free from a concern over objective foundations, can
legitimate rigorous discussion of fairness claims.
A. The Consumption Tax Debate
The consumption tax debate concerns whether it is desirable from
an efficiency and fairness standpoint to change the tax base from an in-
come tax base to a consumption tax base. Generally speaking, an income
tax taxes aggregate increases in wealth regardless of whether such wealth
is consumed or merely accumulated.33. A consumption tax, by contrast, is
generally thought to tax only wealth that is consumed for personal pur-
poses and to exempt savings.' A pure consumption tax has traditionally
been understood as the equivalent of a tax on wages alone, leaving the
income from savings and investment collected tax free.3 Put in these
terms, it is not surprising that fairness questions have historically been
paramount in the consumption tax debate.
The obvious pragmatic approach to the consumption tax debate is to
make as clear as possible the distributive and productivity effects of
switching to a consumption tax, line them up with our varied, sometimes
competing notions of the good, and balance the information to reach
some reasonable agreement or equilibrium. Indeed, the tax policy dis-
course has a rich pragmatic tradition in the debate. The purpose of this
section is to provide a solid philosophical basis for that tradition and to
33. Our current system of income tax is, of course, a hybrid system because it defers taxation
on a substantial amount of annual wealth accumulation. See Henry J. Aaron et al., Introduction to
UNEASY COMPROMISE: PROBLEMS OF A HYBRID INCOME-CONSUMPrION TAx 1, 3 (Henry J. Aaron
et al. eds., 1988) (discussing the United States' hybrid system); David F. Levy, Towards Equal Tax
Treatment of Economically Equivalent Financial Instruments: Proposals for Taxing Prepaid For-
ward Contracts, Equity Swaps, and Certain Contingent Debt Instruments, 3 FLA. TAX REV. 471,
474-75 (1997) (discussing the use of derivatives to postpone recognition); Edward J. McCaffery,
Tax Policy Under a Hybrid Income-Consumption Tax, 70 TEx. L. REV. 1145, 1152-55 (1992)
(examining the United States' hybrid system).
34. This understanding, however, must be qualified because a consumption tax does tax ele-
ments of saving in the same way as an income tax. See Joseph Bankman & Barbara H. Fried, Win-
ners and Losers in the Shift to a Consumption Tax, 86 GEO. LJ. 539, 541-42 (1998).
35. See William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87
HARv. L. REv. 1113, 1126 (1974); Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Fairness and a Consumption-Type or Cash
Flow Personal Income Tax, 88 HARV. L. REV. 931, 938 (1975). 'bis equivalence does not hold,
however, since a consumption tax does tax elements of savings. See Bankman & Fried, supra note
34, at 541-42.
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raise the philosophical problems with the alternative, formalist tradition
in the discourse. Under the formalist tradition, the consumption tax is
tested to see if it reflects a given foundational principle. This section
examines the use of four such principles to highlight the problems of
formalist analysis. These principles are: (1) the endowments tax princi-
ple, (2) the Hobbesian benefits principle, (3) the perfected income tax
principle, and (4) the nondiscrimination principle. Historically, these
principles often operated in the tax policy debate as grounding principles.
Under the formalist use of these principles, the consumption tax is le-
gitimate if it accurately reflects the chosen foundational principle. This
mode of analysis is limited in that it fails to recognize that there is no one
norm that legitimates our tax system but rather a multitude of competing
and conflicting norms that tax policy must grapple with. Furthermore,
mere matching of tax system to stock principle may hamper evaluation
of the system by creating a false sense of analytical progress on fairness
issues when in fact it is just recycling stock principles. The persistence of
the formalist tradition can best be explained by the resilience of the
foundationalist view that without objective grounding, knowledge is im-
possible; that without grounding principles, analysis is merely fuzzy
contextualism. The point of this article is to delete the word "merely" in
front of "fuzzy contextualism." This section argues that abandoning this
formalist heritage for the more pragmatic orientation is both philosophi-
cally defensible and quite useful for making explicit the connection be-
tween tax policy and the good life.
1. The Endowments Tax Principle
One foundational principle used to evaluate the fairness of the con-
sumption tax regime is the endowments tax principle. Under the endow-
ments tax principle, tax burdens should be proportional with initial en-
dowments (in terms of initial financial and human capital). ' Under this
notion of fairness, two taxpayers with the same potential income stream
should be taxed equally regardless of what they choose to do with their
endowments." Thus, two taxpayers with equal ex ante earning power and
financial capital should, under this principle, face the same tax burden
regardless of whether they save their earnings and capital or spend it on
consumption. Such taxpayers should face the same tax burden even if
one taxpayer in fact earns more than the other taxpayer. An income tax
violates the endowments principle because it taxes people differently
according to what they actually do with their endowments. Specifically,
assuming people maximize their endowments, an income tax discrimi-
36. See DAVID F. BRADFORD & U.S. TREASURY TAX PoucY STAFF, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC
TAX REFORM 36-38 (2d ed. rev. 1984); DON FU.ERTON & DIANE LIM ROGERS, WHO BEARS THE
LIFETIME TAX BURDEN? 22-23 (1993).
37. DAVID F. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX 315 (1986), discussed in Fried,
supra note 29, at 997-98 & nn.99-102.
38. See Fried, supra note 29, at 997-98.
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nates against ex post savers, even when these individuals have the same
ex ante endowments as their spender counterparts. A consumption tax,
by removing this disparity between those who choose to spend and those
who choose to save, is thus a more equitable tax under the endowments
tax argument because it eliminates this ex post discrimination."
Analyses under the endowments principle generally do not focus on
why taxing people on their ex ante endowments should be considered
fair in the first place. In this regard, the analyses are highly formalistic,
assuming the appropriateness of the endowments principle and then de-
ciphering which tax system best reflects that principle. The problem with
this approach, however, is that it begs the question of whether the en-
dowments principle is legitimate. What is required for answering, or
even just posing correctly, the fairness question is an alternative analysis
that does more than merely plug in a principle as a core assumption, an
analysis that actually examines whether this assumption is justified. Even
asking this question, however, requires that one abandon the foundation-
alist view that fairness principles cannot be true or false, correct or incor-
rect in any meaningful sense. Put another way, it is only if one assumes
that one principle of fairness is just as good as another that plugging in
stock notions of fairness is satisfactory. The formalist use of the endow-
39. A simple example demonstrates how an income tax, which taxes earnings as well as the
accrual on saved earnings, is said to increase the effective tax rate on those who save versus those
who immediately consume, given certain assumptions. See id. at 963-64. But see Bankman & Fried,
supra note 34. Two taxpayers, Profligate and Thrifty, each earn $100 in wage income. Profligate
spends the $100 in the year earned, while Thrifty saves the $100 for 14 years. In a no-tax world, in
14 years, with a 5% compounded interest rate, Thrifty will have $200 saved. Thus, in a no-tax world,
Thrifty will have twice as much to spend as Profligate. With an income tax of 40%, however, Thrifty
must pay tax on the initial $100 in the year earned, as well as paying tax on the interest as it accrues
in the following years. The result is that Thrifty will only have $91 for consumption, instead of $200
for consumption at the end of the 14th year. Profligate, under a 40% income tax will have $60 to
spend as he pleases in the year earned. The net result of the income tax is that Thrifty has only about
50% more than Profligate as opposed to twice as much in a no-tax world. Put another way, savers
pay a greater present value tax than equivalently situated spenders.
Under a consumption tax, by contrast, Thrifty is placed in an equal after-tax position relative
to Profligate. Under a 40% consumption tax, Profligate will still have $60 to spend as he pleases in
the year earned. Thrifty, however, pays no initial tax on the $100 earned and saved, and will pay a
tax of $80 on the $200 she withdraws in year 14. Thus, Thrifty will have $120 in year 14 under a
consumption tax, rather than the $91 she would enjoy under an income tax. Comparing Thrifty's and
Profligate's relative positions under a consumption tax and a no-tax world, they are in identical
relative positions since Thrifty will still enjoy twice as much income as Profligate under a consump-
tion tax regime. See id. at 963-64. For similar examples, see Andrews, supra note 35, at 1121;
IRVING FISHER, THE NATURE OF CAPITAL AND INCOME 249-53 (1906); Warren, supra note 35, at
934-36. In this way, the consumption tax is said to preserve the relative benefits of saving in a no-
tax world and to leave taxpayers indifferent (from a tax perspective) between saving and spending
once a consumption tax is imposed. Another way to view the endowments principle as supporting a
consumption tax is to view the consumption tax "as the closest practical approach to the [endow-
ments principle] ideal" since a cash-flow consumption tax is traditionally understood the functional
equivalent of a tax on wages as earned. Lawrence Zelenak, The Reification of Metaphor: Income
Taxes, Consumption Taxes and Human Capital, 51 TAX L. REV. 1, 3 n.17 (1995). But see Bankman
& Fried, supra note 34.
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ments principle in the tax policy discourse gets its legitimacy from this
background foundationalism. A nonfoundationalist, pragmatic strategy
that views principles of fairness as being as susceptible to truth determi-
nations as statements in the harder sciences would never have plugged an
unexamined endowments principle in a formalist model. Instead, it
would have first evaluated the endowments principle to see if it made
sense.
Indeed, even a preliminary analysis under a nonfoundationalist
strategy indicates significant problems with the endowments principle.
For instance, the endowments principle seems to advocate a lottery
method of taxation. To make this clearer, consider a group of 1000 tax-
payers. A computer randomly assigns to each person a number from one
to 1000. These numbers represent endowments, with 1000 representing
the greatest endowment and one representing the lowest. The endow-
ments principle requires taxing this group of 1000 in proportion to their
randomly assigned endowments. At a 30% rate, the person who drew
1000 would have a tax burden of 1000 x 30% or 300. The person who
drew 10, however, would have a tax burden of only 3.
The interesting question that formalist uses of the endowments prin-
ciple misses, and that can only be raised and not fully argued here, is
whether such a lottery system of taxation makes any sense. Put another
way: Why should the person who draws 1000 face a heavier tax burden
merely because the computer assigned her this number? The endow-
ments principle fails to explain why the tax burden should be heavier on
those who, by luck of the genetic draw for instance, have the mere ca-
pacity to earn Michael Jordan salaries. As a principle of justice, this ar-
bitrariness casts doubt on the endowments tax principle as a grounding
norm for a fair tax system.' On the contrary, implementation of a system
based only on the endowments principle would seem to violate fairness
in many cases. This is because it would impose unduly harsh tax burdens
on those who choose not to maximize the value of their endowments in
the market. Accordingly, the endowments principle acts as a moral im-
perative that people should be forced to maximize the market value of
their talents. This would be at least a controversial moral position. It
would punish those who chose, for instance, to donate their labor to pub-
lic service rather than sell it to the NBA. Libertarians would object that
people should be free to undervalue their potential according to their own
personal preferences without regulatory penalty.! In addition, the en-
40. See Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not to Bury It, 93 YALE U. 259, 276
(1983) (describing the arbitrariness of the benefits of birth and genetics).
41. It may be possible to implement an endowment tax in a manner that would mitigate this
and other problems. See Alan Gunn, The Case for an Income Tax, 46 U. COi. L. REV. 370, 381-82,
399-400 (1979) (raising libertarian concerns); Kaplow, supra note 6, at 1507-12 (acknowledging
libertarian objections to ex ante taxation of endowments and developing a proxy system which
would tax actual earnings while still approximating the endowment ideal); Alvin Warren, Would a
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dowments tax principle conflicts with the notion that the tax burden
should bear some relation to whether one deserves her actual income.
Under an endowments tax, persons who realize wealth in excess of their
ex ante endowments, through windfall gains for instance, would be re-
warded through an exemption for such windfall gains!' Furthermore, the
endowments principle entirely ignores end-state concerns about the tax
system's effect on overall social welfare, thus possibly conflicting with
utilitarian views of the good. The point here is not to refute the endow-
ments principle but to show what the formalist/foundationalist approach
misses and perhaps obscures and what a nonfoundationalist pragmatic
analysis opens up.
2. The Hobbesian Benefits Principle
Another fairness principle that has been used in the consumption tax
debates in a formalist manner is the Hobbesian benefits principle. Under
this principle, one should be taxed only to the extent one removes re-
sources from the common social pool. ' The Hobbesian benefits principle
is said to justify a consumption tax because a consumption tax taxes in
proportion to what an individual takes out of the common pool." An in-
come tax is unfair under the Hobbesian benefits principle because it
taxes savers more than identically situated spenders, thereby penalizing
those who contribute to the common pool. Thus, a consumption tax
which taxes savers and spenders equally is said to be more equitable un-
der the Hobbesian benefits principle.
The use of the Hobbesian benefits principle in the tax policy dis-
course is of particular interest because it represents the second species of
foundationalism criticized in this article. This second species brings
master theories of distributive justice to solve fairness problems. Since
the pragmatic approach advocated in this article rejects both formalism
and the use of full-fledged theories of justice as foundations for fairness
principles, it is useful to examine an example of the latter in William D.
Andrews's 1974 article, A Consumption-Type Or Cash Flow Personal
Income Tax.'5 The article's call for a consumption tax* on fairness
grounds sparked a debate more than twenty years ago that still preoccu-
Consumption Tax Be Fairer Than an Income Tax?, 89 YALE L.. 1081, 1114 (1980) (voicing con-
cern about the effect an earning capacity tax would have on individual liberty).
42. SeeFried, supranote 29, at 1011-12.
43. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN: PARTS I AND 11 at 271 (Liberal Arts Press 1958) (1651).
44. Id. ("For what reason is there that he which labors much and, sparing the fruits of his
labor, consumes little should be more charged than he that, living idly, gets little and spends all he
gets, seeing the one has no more protection from the commonwealth than the other?"). For modem
treatments of this view, see CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 147-50 (1978); NICHOLAS
KALDOR, AN EXPENDIURE TAX 53 (4th impression 1965).
45. Andrews, supra note 35.
46. Seeid.at1122.
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pies the discourse.' Andrews makes two clusters of arguments for a con-
sumption tax. In the first cluster are administrability, simplicity, distribu-
tive, and perfected income tax arguments. 4 In the second cluster is an
argument for fairness based on the Hobbesian benefits principle.'
Andrews discusses the first cluster through a straightforward analy-
sis much like the one advocated in this article. For instance, the distribu-
tive effects of a flat consumption tax are considered undesirable by An-
drews, and thus, he adds progressivity and a strengthened estate and gift
tax element to ensure distributive equity." Andrews also questions how
well the actual income tax lives up to its own ideal of taxing annual in-
creases in -wealth and suggests that the current system is too broken to
fix, and that switching to a consumption tax might be better than tinker-
ing with the broken system." Still within the first cluster, Andrews
evaluates the effect of a consumption tax on simplicity and administra-
bility, describing in detail the complexities of current law in contrast to
the relative simplicity of the cash-flow model of consumption taxation he
supports.'
It is within the second cluster of arguments, explicitly addressing
the fairness issues, that Andrews' methodological commitments become
clearer. Andrews repeatedly endorses the consumption tax as more fair
than an income/accretion tax. 3 Surprisingly, Andrews offers little to jus-
tify this central fairness claim. Andrews does cite the Hobbesian princi-
ple as an appealing intuition, quoting Hobbes for the principle that accu-
mulation, the excess of what has been contributed to public production,
should not be taxed.' What is interesting is Andrews' discussion (really,
off-the-cuff ruminations) about the status of the fairness claim and
47. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 35, at 931 (examining whether, as Andrews contends, a
consumption tax is fairer than an accretion-type tax). But see William D. Andrews, Fairness and the
Personal Income Tax: A Reply to Professor Warren, 88 HARv. L. REV. 947 (1975) (arguing that a
consumption tax is fairer than an accretion-type tax).
48. Andrews, supra note 35, at 1150-65.
49. Id. at 1164-67.
50. See id. at 1172. Andrews also argues that the present income tax has done little to redress
actual distributive discrepancies as an empirical matter, and notes that a progressive consumption
tax, supplemented with strengthened estate and gift taxes is the equivalent of a progressive income
tax so supplemented since, in both cases, both accretion and accumulation are taxed. id. Andrews
prefers a consumption tax so modified, however, because it is less complex to administer than a
supplemented income tax. Id. at 1116-18.
51. For instance, Andrews points out how far our system is from a tre income tax since it
defers tax on pension savings and unrecognized capital appreciation. Id. at 1116-19. The modifica-
tions required to eliminate these and other discrepancies (through a market-to-market system for
instance) would create undue complexity and serious administrative problems according to Andrews.
Id.
52. See id. at 1148-65. Accordingly, he welcomes the fact that a cash-flow consumption tax
would render the complex reorganization provisions of the Internal Revenue Code obsolete. See id.
at 1152.
53. Andrews often adds persuasive force to his fairness assertion by claiming efficiency gains
in the same sentence. See id. at 1115, 1169.
54. Seeid.at 1121, 1165-67,1172.
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method. When Andrews first mentions the Hobbesian benefits principle,
he characterizes it as a "point of view." In his second mention he writes,
"[tio the extent accumulation exceeds deferred consumption it is indeed
consumption foregone, and the Hobbesian view ... is of considerable
validity in suggesting that accumulation should be exempted, at least
during the lifetime of the accumulator." 6 Thus, Andrews can be read as
thinking that the Hobbesian benefits principle is both a point of view and
capable of validity determinations. Accordingly, Andrews's strategy is
not merely the formalist/foundationalist strategy of viewing fairness
principles as personal preferences incapable of validity determinations.
Instead, he seems at least to allow for the possibility of a provisional type
of truth determination advocated by the nonfoundationalist pragmatic
account in this article.
Examining in greater detail Andrews' methodological approach,
however, reveals a distinction between his approach and the pragmatic
approach suggested in this article. Andrews is not a formalist, but he is
not a nonfoundationalist pragmatist either. He is somewhere in-between,
reaching out to explicit theories of justice as a foundation for fairness
claims. Andrews is something of a Rawlsian, which, from the perspec-
tive of this article, can be distinguished from nonfoundationalist pragma-
tism. As Andrews writes:
Matters of fairness are not generally subject to logical demonstration
from independent premises. All that reason can do is elaborate the
implications of plausible hypotheses in order to facilitate an informed
choice among them. What we need to do, therefore, is to examine the
matter from both equal-earner and equal-consumer perspectives, rec-
ognizing that each incorporates a certain assumption about how taxes
are to be distributed, and to reserve final judgment and choice be-
tween these assumptions until after the implications of both have
been explored."
While it is easy to see the similarities between this view and the
pragmatism advocated in this article, it is more interesting to emphasize
the differences in order to distinguish the ad hoc, judge-by-our-own-
lights approach of this article from the self-consciously theoretical ap-,
proach that is gaining currency in the discourse. One aspect of this char-
acterization of the Rawlsian strategy is particularly worth examining-
that it makes a distinction between the foundations of scientific
discourses (which operate from "independent premises") and the
foundations of ethical discourses. By placing fairness judgments in
relation to scientific judgments, this strategy problematizes the fairness
55. See id. at 1166.
56. Id. at 172.
57. See Andrews, supra note 47, at 950 (citing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusTiCE 48-50
(1971)).
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discourse. It creates the need to provide the same foundation for ethical
claims as exists in the hard sciences. The task is to find a system of con-
firmation that will give fairness claims some objectivity. Andrews looks
to Rawls for such a system. It is therefore worth examining the possible
distinctions between Rawls's system and nonfoundationalist pragmatism.
The main difference between the pragmatic approach advocated in
this article and the Rawlsian project is that while pragmatism is moti-
vated by a desire to get the job done, the Rawlsian constructivist project
(at least one version thereof) has the goal of establishing "moral objec-
tivity" through obtaining "a suitably constructed social point of view that
all can accept." Thus, explicitly bringing Rawls into the analysis
through interdisciplinary work, using Rawls's system to evaluate fairness
claims, inevitably brings the purely philosophical problems of objectivity
and truth back into the tax policy discourse. The pragmatic approach, by
contrast, gives up on such problems altogether and urges policy analysts
to "just do it"" without worrying too much about the problems of phi-
losophy.
The point is that we may not need philosophical theory to solve
these problems and may even be better off steering clear of it. Neverthe-
less, there are strong similarities between, for instance, Rawls's depiction
of ethical deliberation and the one in this article. Indeed, stripped of the
foundationalist concerns, Rawls could be reinterpreted as a pragmatist.
The similarity hinges (in part) on the account of "reflective equilibrium,"
where one balances all available principles and effects to reach an end
state of knowledge. ' The difference between Rawlsian reflective equilib-
rium and the ad hoc, provisional balancing of competing principles of the
pragmatic approach may just be one of degree. For instance, the prag-
58. See John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, in MORAL DISCOURSE, supra
note 30, at 247, 248. Obviously, this aspiration for universal acceptance is mor ambitious than the
provisional approach advocated in this article that views it as inevitable that some reasonable objec-
tions will apply to any particular fairness regime. The pragmatic approach rejects constructivist
requirements of "reasonableness" or universalizability as a priori constraints on acceptable justifica-
tion. Such constraints can always be questioned as first principles by asking, for instance, Why
should I accept your definition of reasonableness?, and, Isn't defining reasonableness a priori (as,
for instance, requiring equal respect to one's interlocutors) just another way of defining what is fair?
59. See, e.g., Lynn Baker, "Just Do It": Pragmatism and Progressive Social Change, 78 VA.
L. REV. 697 (1992). The "just do it" phrase captures the low-brow temperament of the pragmatist
approach. As William James wrote:
This pragmatist talk about truths in the plural, about their utility and satisfactoriness,
about the success with which they "work," etc., suggests to the typical intellectualist
mind a sort of coarse lame second-rate makeshift article of truth. Such truths are not real
truth. Such tests are merely subjective. As against this, objective truth must be something
non-utilitarian, haughty, refined, remote, august, exalted. It must be an absolute cone-
spondence of our thoughts with an equally absolute reality. It must be what we ought to
think unconditionally. The conditioned ways in which we do think are so much irrelevance
and matter for psychology. Down with psychology, up with logic, in all this question!
William James, Pragmatism, in PRAGMATISM: A CONThMPORARY READER, supra note 7, at 53,60-61.
60. For a more detailed account of reflective equilibrium, see NORMAN DANIELS, JUSTICE
AND JUSTIFICATON: REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 2 (1996).
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matic approach accepts fairness judgments as true or false at any point
along the continuum before maximum coherence is attained. By contrast,
achieving wide reflective equilibrium seems to require suspending judg-
ment until end-state equilibrium is reached.6' For tax policy analysts,
requiring this type of analysis as a necessary precondition to commitment
to principles places moral knowledge too far out of reach.! Instead of
worrying about maximal coherence as a foundation for objectivity, the
pragmatic approach urges tax scholars to just get on as best they can.
Applying this provisional pragmatic approach to the Hobbesian
benefits principle then, one would ask some basic questions. First, even
assuming the Hobbesian benefits principle as the ground norm, using it
to justify exempting savings from taxation discounts the power and per-
sonal gain inherent with wealth accumulation,' even if the accumulation
also benefits the common pool.' After all, the owners of capital retain
property rights to such capital and can withdraw it at any time.r Second,
the Hobbesian benefits principle is only one principle among many.
Egalitarian tendencies, for instance, might require taxation of savings as
a means of increasing benefits to the poor. Thus while Andrews is right
that the Hobbesian principle is of considerable validity, it is best viewed
as one principle among many others in the mix, rather than a ground
norm. Furthermore, in embracing Rawls, tax scholars should read out
any implication that what we are really after is an end state of perfect
wide reflective equilibrium. The point here is not to settle the issue but
rather to highlight the difference between foundationalist and pragmatic
approaches.
61. For instance, under a "wide reflective equilibrium" analysis one must maximize coherence
not just among ethical precepts but also among all other principles in play in all areas of inquiry. See
id.
62. From a practical (pragmatic) perspective, requiring tax scholars to learn the ins and outs of
Rawls's work is likely to backfire. The fact that ethical philosophy can often be unwieldly has dis-
couraged scholars in other areas. See, e.g., Philip M. Nichols, Trade Without Values, 90 Nw. U. L.
REv. 658, 669-70 (996) (bemoaning and avoiding the "maelstrom" of ethical theory). Instead of
requiring tax scholars to learn all of Rawls's work, for instance, the approach advocated in this
article sets the bar significantly lower, requiring only everyday language and analytical skills to
address fairness issues. In advocating ordinary language and moving away from philosophical/
theoretical language, the pragmatic approach generates some criticisms. See, e.g., Boyd, supra note
30. The emphasis on language would draw at least implicit support from others, however. For exam-
ple, Rorty writes:
To say that the world is out there... is to say.. that most things in space and time are
the effects of causes which do not include human states. To say that truth is not out there
is simply to say that where there are no sentences them is no truth, that sentences are
elements of human languages, and that human languages are human creations.
Richard Rorty, The Contingency of Language, in PRAGMATISM: A CONTEMPORARY READER, supra
note 7, at 107, 109.
63. See Jeff Strnad, Periodicity and Accretion Taxation: Norms and Implementation, 99 YALE
LJ. 1817, 1833-46 (1990) (discussing the tangible and intangible benefits derived from the accu-
mulation of wealth).
64. See Groves, supra note 24, at 109;, Warren, supra note 41, at 1094-95.
65. See Warren, supra note 35, at 1094.
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3. The Perfected Income Tax Principle
Examining the use of the perfected income tax principle in the con-
sumption tax debate is a useful way to identify another manifestation of
formalism in the tax policy discourse: the tendency to evaluate tax policy
by matching tax system to normative base. The perfected income tax
arguments have this formalist/matching quality. The matching of base to
system may contribute less than we think to the resolution of fairness
questions. The perfected income tax principle seeks a fair measure of
aggregate wealth. It considers the income tax a poor measure of aggre-
gate wealth, and thus endorses a consumption tax as a surrogate meas-
ure--a "perfected income tax." Under one form of the perfected income
tax principle, the current income tax is viewed as unfair because it over-
taxes savers by taxing the interest payments they receive on noncon-
sumed funds. The argument is that, when measured in terms of subjec-
tive utility, this interest does not represent a real accretion to wealth be-
cause it is merely compensation for the pain and suffering of deferred
consumption.' Accordingly, it is said to be unfair to tax the saver be-
cause she has already suffered from her deferral of consumption and the
interest from deferral is therefore not really income in an appropriately
cognizable sense."" A consumption tax, by contrast, which exempts such
interest payments from taxation, is said to be a better measure of aggre-
gate wealth, a perfected income tax which fully accounts for the subjec-
tive utility measure of income.
The first thing to note about the perfected income tax argument for
the fairness of the consumption tax is its formalist, conditional quality. It
posits the income/accretion base as an ideal and argues that a consump-
tion tax better approximates this ideal. It remains facially noncommittal
66. The point is best illustrated by a simple example. Spender, who earns $100 and immedi-
ately spends it, has enjoyed the full present value of the $100. Thus, a tax on the $100 accurately
captures his wealth, taking into account the full utility that Spender has received from the $100.
Saver, by contrast, who saves the $100 and collects $10 of interest, does not really gain in wealth by
$10, under this theory, because the $10 is merely payment for the disutility of deferring consump-
tion. Thus, both Saver and Spender actually receive the same aggregate wealth increase from the
$100, whether they save it or spend it. Fried, supra note 29, at 967-68. For purposes of the current
discussion, the distinction between riskless return and return from risk is not examined. The general
difficulty in measuring subjective utility applies to both returns, even assuming that the risk compo-
nent can be reasonably construed as compensation for the "discomfort" of bearing uncertainty. Il at
990-94; see Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Is the Debate Between an Income Tax and a
Consumption Tax a Debate About Risk? Does it Matter?, 47 TAx L. REV. 377, 397 (1992) (arguing
that taxpayers can avoid the discriminatory impact of an income tax on the risk component of inter-
est); see also Bankman & Fried, supra note 34.
67. See Fried, supra note 29, at 968.
68. As is well known, this base is referred to as the Haig-Simons tax base. Under the Haig-
Simons base the income tax system should tax aggregate annual increases in personal income. "Per-
sonal income may be defined as the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in
consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store of property rights between te beginning
and end of the period in question." HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938).
The formalist use of the Haig-Simons base is discussed in Livingston, supra note 6. at 375-80,
McCaffery, supra note I, at 75, 77.
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on which tax base is better. Accordingly, it is not really a fairness argu-
ment at all, but rather a more formal exercise, taken up after such basic
decisions have been made. This process is much like the process econo-
mists use for evaluating systems against normative bases. For an explicit
argument about fairness in the tax policy discourse, however, this agnos-
ticism is rather unsatisfactory.
The interesting question for purposes of this article is what accounts
for the prevalence of this formalist/matching mode of analysis?' One
distinct possibility is that a bad foundationalist metaphor is to blame.
Under this metaphor, rational inquiry proceeds by building on independ-
ent premises. Thus, it might seem natural to proceed by stating an ideal
base and measuring the system to see if the system follows from, or
matches, the base. The problem is that analysis does not always, if ever,
proceed in this way.' Rather than matching, the metaphor of balancing is
better at making clear that the premises of analysis are themselves at
issue. Under the influence of the matching metaphor, by contrast, there is
a risk of thinking that demonstrating a mismatch between system (our
income tax) and base (the stated ideal) is saying more than it is about the
desirability of the tax system.' A pragmatic balancing approach to fair-
ness issues would better focus.
4. The Nondiscrimination Principle
The last foundational principle addressed here is the most patently
metaphysical. The nondiscrimination principle explicitly uses a no-tax
world as the foundation by which to evaluate our actual tax system
through the principle's parity of treatment between "similarly situated"
taxpayers in a no-tax and tax-filled world:' Thus, the nondiscrimination
principle supports a consumption tax as fairer because a consumption tax
preserves the relative benefits of saving in a no-tax world and leaves
69. For an acknowledgment of the puzzling fact that perfected income tax arguments have
been accepted for so long, see Fried, supra note 29, at 996. As noted above, this article views for-
malism as a symptom of foundationalism, rather than the problem itself.
70. This account of analysis is not even universally accepted in the traditional philosophy of
science. See Boyd, supra note 30, at 113.
71. Thus concluding that our tax system does not match an assumed base says nothing in itself
about the desirability of our system. Policy debates which focus on matching alone nn the risk of
becoming semantic. See, e.g., Jeff Stmad, Taxation of Income from Capital: A Theoretical Reap-
pralsal, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1023 (1985) (using finance economics to show that a cash flow tax, rather
than an income tax is a better match to the Haig-Simons base); Louis Kaplow & Alvin C. Warren,
Jr., An Income Tax by Any Other Name-A Reply to Professor Strnad, 38 STAN. L REv. 399 (1986)
(arguing that Stmad simply changed the definition of the income tax base); Jeff Stmad, The Bank-
ruptcy of Conventional Tax Timing Wisdom Is Deeper Than Semantics: A Rejoinder to Professors
Kaplow and Warren, 39 STAN,. L. ReV. 389 (1987) (countering the semantics charge); Louis Kaplow
& Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Professor Strnad's Rejoinder: Simply Semantics, 39 STAN. L. REv. 419
(1987).
72. See Fried, supra note 29, at 963-66, 1010.
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taxpayers indifferent (from a tax perspective) between saving and
spending once a consumption tax is imposed."
As is recognized, the problem with the nondiscrimination principle
as a mantra in tax law is that it skips over why tax law should or should
not discriminate in any particular case.' Andrews, for instance, invokes
notions of horizontal equity in his support of a consumption tax, without
defining equality in any great depth." What is missing from the formalis-
tic uses of the nondiscrimination principle is an explanation of why the
no tax world is the appropriate base:'
The analysis in this article suggests that an underlying foundation-
alism accounts for the prevalence of formalistic uses of the nondiscrimi-
nation principle. After all, foundationalism is just the grounding of prin-
ciples of justice in a world outside of our current circumstances, inter-
ests, and customs. Like the original position, the no-tax world functions
as a foundational source of correctness in tax law." The nonfoundation-
alist, pragmatic approach, by contrast, views other-world groundings
with some skepticism. Indeed, from a pragmatic perspective, the no-tax
world seems particularly odd as a ground norm. This is because (for one
thing) changing the tax system to the ideal in mid-stream, after social life
and other aspects of regulation have built up around the "wrong" system,
may be more unfair than implementing no change at all. Most impor-
tantly, it is because pragmatism views gestures to ahistorical sources of
authority as presumptively metaphysical. Rather than taking the no-tax
world as the normative foundation for fairness, a pragmatic approach
would identify savers and spenders in the real world and ask whether
they should be treated equally by the tax system. Putting the question this
way highlights the fairness issue that, perhaps more than any other fair-
ness concern, stands in the way of wide spread acceptance of the con-
sumption tax: savers are richer than spenders and switching to a con-
sumption tax seems at first blush to disproportionately benefit the already
rich.
78
73. See id. at 961-66. There are, of course, efficiency arguments based on the no-tax world
hypothetical. See, e.g., KLEIN & BANKMAN, supra note 17, at 23.
74. See Louis Kaplow, Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of a Principle, 42 NAT'L TAX
J. 139, 140 (1989) (noting the "failure to identify the normative justification for [then] current uses
of [horizontal equity]" and identifying those bases).
75. See Andrews, supra note 35, at 1165-67 (discussing the likelihood that a consumption-
type tax will treat taxpayers fairly by imposing similar burdens).
76. See Fried, supra note 29, at 1006 (noting the failure of consumption tax advocates to
explain and support the theory that both "savers and nonsavers have an entitlement to the relative
levels of well-being they would have enjoyed in a no-tax world').
77. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JuSTICE 136-37 (1971) (describing the use of the
"original position" as a ground for justice).
78. Cf. Banknum & Fried, supra note 34 (showing how the effects of switching to a consump-
tion tax may be overstated).
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B. The Progressivity Debate
The tax policy debate on progressivity focuses on the fairness of
wealth redistribution through a progressive tax. One system of progres-
sivity involves increasing the percentage of tax paid to the government in
proportion to increases in income.7' Progressivity is achieved in our cur-
rent system of taxation through graduated marginal rates.!* Increasing
marginal rates is not the only way to achieve progressivity. A propor-
tionate, or a flat tax, where each dollar is taxed at the same rate, can be
progressive if it is combined with an exemption, or with demogrants to
lower-income taxpayers." Similarly, even a pure consumption or sales
tax can be progressive if combined with exemptions for consumption for
essentials of certain basic needs, or with rebates or credits.'
The desirability of progressivity from an equity perspective has
been the subject of discussion within the legal literature on tax policy for
more than 40 years. The starting point in this debate is Walter J. Blum
and Harry Kalven, Jr.'s, The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation,'
published in 1953. In this work, Blum and Kalven place the burden of
persuasion on the proponents of progressivity," and after examining the
various arguments for progressivity, conclude that the burden has not
been met.' Given that the case for progressivity was so "uneasy," Blum
and Kalven's argument supported a flat or proportionate tax system."
The most significant rebuttal to Blum and Kalven's view came in 1987,
when Joseph Bankman and Thomas Griffith applied optimal taxation
theory to demonstrate that the case for progressivity was less uneasy than
previously asserted.Y
79. See Bankman & Griffith, supra note 25, at 1907.
80. Thus, the federal income tax rate for singles increases from 15% for income below
$22,101 to 39.6% for income above $250,000. L.R.C. § I (West Supp. 1998).
81. Under Representative Anney's flat tax proposal, for instance, which provides for standard
deductions for married, joint filers and an additional standard deduction for each dependent, a family
of four earning $50,000 would pay about 6% in taxes while a family earning $200,000 would pay
about 14% in taxes. See Freedom and Fairness Restoration Act of 1995, H.R. 2060, 104th Cong. §
101; see also Jacki Calmes, Flat-Tax Plan Is Revised by Rep. Armey to Reduce Projected Loss of
Revenue, WALLST. J., July 20, 1995, at B12.
82. Senator Lugar's plan is an example of such a progressive consumption/sales tax system.
See Robert S. Stein, National Issue: Is a Major Tax Overhaul Ahead? Presidential Race May Focus
on Tax Reform Issue, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Apr. 13, 1995, at Al (addressing Senator Lugar's
plan).
83. BLUM & KALVEN, supra note 25.
84. Id. at 28-29.
85. Id. at 56; see also Walter J. Blum, Revisiting the Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation,
60 TAXES 16, 21 (1982) (concluding that recent changes in society have not facilitated the imple-
mentation of a progressive tax system).
86. See BLUM & KALVEN, supra note 25, at xxii. However, Blum and Kalven endorse a flat
tax with an exemption, thereby including some progressivity in their proposal. See id.
87. See Bankman & Griffith, supra note 25, at 1906 (applying "recent developments in eco-
nomics and moral theory" to the progressivity debate).
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For the purposes of this article, what is important about the histori-
cal debate on progressivity is its treatment of redistributive principles' A
closer reading of Blum and Kalven's work shows some implicit
metaethical commitments in their overall strategy. Specifically, it shows
an underlying foundationalism in their work which colors their conclu-
sions.
Blum and Kalven explicitly contrast value judgments with scientific
ones." When evaluating the concept of decreasing marginal utility of
income or "sacrifice theory," which can justify progressivity on the
grounds that the rich gain less utility from dollars over a certain level of
income, for instance, Blum and Kalven remark that "[tihe ostensibly
scientific form of sacrifice theory, which purports to deal with the way
people actually react to money, frequently conceals a normative judg-
ment either about the way that people ought to value money or about the
social value of typical expenditures at different levels of income." Blum
and Kalven seem to think that the abandonment of scientific analysis for
normative analysis itself undermines the argument for declining marginal
utility of income. Rather than explicitly considering the legitimacy of
these underlying normative judgments, Blum and Kalven associate such
judgments with the purely political (specifically, "the socialist litera-
ture")," and ultimately reject "the very idea of a 'moral scheme of con-
sumption."' What Blum and Kalven fail to recognize is that all tax sys-
tems, progressive or flat, overtly redistributive or not, are moral schemes
of consumption. It is a mistake to think that not taxing the rich at higher
rates (and thus more) is somehow value-free or value-neutral. It appears
that Blum and Kalven make this mistake because they are foundational-
ists. They believe that there is an objective (a default) distribution of tax
burdens that redistributive rationales are challenging. By locating the
arguments for progressivity closer to the political than to the scientific,
Blum and Kalven set up a foundationalist dichotomy which caricatures
redistributive rationales as groundless, political, even unsettling." The
88. As with the literature on fairness in the consumption tax, discussions of distributive justice
rationales for progressivity have become increasingly diverse and not always susceptible to the
description as foundationalist. See, e.g., Marjorie E. Komhauser, Equality, Liberty, and a Fair In-
come Tax, 23 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 607, 607-14 (1996) (applying different principles of distributive
justice).
89. See BLUM & KALVEN, supra note 25, at 68-69.
90. See id. at 69.
91. See id. at 72-73.
92. Id. at 69; see also SIMONS, supra note 25, at 4-5 (rejecting declining marginal utility of
income justifications for progressivity because of its normative character); id. at 18-19 (viewing
progressive taxation as being based merely on "the ethical or aesthetic judgment that the prevailing
distribution of wealth and income reveals a degree (and/or kind) of inequality which is distinctly evil
or unlovely").
93. As Blum and Kalven wrote:
The lingering fear must always have been that any case for progression on [redistributive]
grounds proves too much. It has been seen that it is quite difficult to sponsor progression
on the basis of economic equality without calling into question either the meaningfulness
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pragmatic, nonfoundationalist approach rejects this dichotomy alto-
gether, asking not whether the case for progressivity is strong enough to
overcome the presumption in favor of a flat rate, but rather how the case
for more redistribution compares with the case for less redistribution.
Thus, the pragmatic questions are things like: Do we want to live in a
society where a tiny percentage of the population owns the vast majority
of the wealth and a large percentage of the population lives hand to
mouth? If not, is redistribution through the tax system the best way to get
us what we want?" While these questions may be politically charged,
they are not "merely" political. All policy judgments are political in this
sense. The trick is finding a reasonable compromise between competing
norms. The pragmatic approach, unlike the foundationalist approach,
provides a philosophical justification for this type of analysis. To further
examine the difference between the pragmatic approach and the formal-
ist/foundationalist approach in the progressivity debates, it is useful to
examine two basic principles which play an important role in the debate.
Accordingly, the remainder of this section briefly examines the
Nozickian justice in transfer principle and the Rawlsian maximin princi-
ple from a pragmatic, nonfoundationalist perspective.
1. The Nozickian Justice in Transfer Principle
By setting up a dichotomy between redistributive taxation and taxa-
tion that respects to a greater extent the market allocation of income,
Blum and Kalven implicitly endorse market distributions as presump-
tively just or natural. A pragmatic, nonfoundationalist approach views
such moves with suspicion. This suspicion, it turns out, is justified. Spe-
cifically, the main problem with using the market as a foundation is that
markets, even efficient ones, are not necessarily fair. By assuming mar-
kets as a baseline for fairness, foundationalist approaches snuff out
analysis before it starts. A nonfoundationalist, pragmatic approach views
market allocations just as man-made as post-market redistributions. They
are fair or unfair according to our norms and traditions. Under a prag-
matic form of analysis, the question is whether in a particular case a
market allocation is fair. It is important to emphasize that pragmatic
analysis does not provide an overarching theory of fairness or justice that
is applied to particular facts. Instead, pragmatic analysis takes smaller
steps, identifying problems as they come up and proposing solutions
after gathering as much information as possible. Thus, rather than pro-
of personal responsibility or the fairness with which the market distributes rewards. Pro-
gression, when offered on these grounds, is an unsettling idea.
BLUM & KALVEN, supra note 25, at 85; see also LIONEL ROBBINS, AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE AND
SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE 132 (1932) (describing ethical determinations as amounting to
claims about "thy blood or mine").
94. For an analysis supporting the argument that tax law may be a desirable means to address
distributive norms, see Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient
Than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994).
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viding a defense, or critique of the fairness of market allocations in gen-
eral, pragmatic analysis reminds us that "it depends." This distinction
between pragmatic, ad hoc, provisional analysis and broader theory
building is important to emphasize. This distinguishes the pragmatic
form of analysis advocated in this article from interdisciplinary work that
applies all encompassing theories of justice (A la Rawls and Nozick) to
tax policy problems. The pragmatic approach rests on the claim that such
theories are not necessary for settling practical policy issues. Take for
example, Nozick's theory of "justice in transfer,"'' that one is entitled as
a matter of right to the value received in market trades (under certain
conditions). Does this theory help in determining when redistribution is
justified? The pragmatic approach asks us to entertain the notion that the
answer is "No," that there is nothing about the theory per se that offers
insight. Rather, the value of reading and applying Nozick lies in bringing
more perspectives and information we have not anticipated into the data
set so we can make a more informed decision. Thus, a pragmatic ap-
proach would not be interested in, for instance, poking holes in Nozick's
theory. Rather, a pragmatic approach would use Nozick's work as a
source of counterexample and competing perspective?'
We simply do not need to comprehensively examine the justice in
transfer principle, or any other theory of justice in order to get on with
policy analysis.'7 Pragmatic analysis suggests that no theory or founda-
tional principle is necessary for resolving practical policy issues. It pro-
vides a philosophical basis for grappling with these problems anyway.
The questions it asks are quite basic: Is the wealth distribution that exists
one that we can live with? Are there other possibilities that would reduce
suffering and make our society more just?" Our answers to these ques-
95. ROBERT NozicK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 152(1974).
96. 'The pragmatic approach, in other words, would probably discourage taking a "Nozickian"
approach to a particular problem. Addressing the problem in theoretical language invites theoretical
questions about, for instance, the coherence of Nozick's system and moves away from the practical
question of how to solve the particular problem. One such theoretical question is whether under
justice in transfer one deserves a market price that is high not because of the skill of the owner, but
merely because of the scarcity of the resoures owned. In this case, it is not clear that one deserves
the full reward and that taxing and redistributing would be unfair. John Locke, for instance, can be
read as denying that one is entitled to the value of property in exchange to the degree such value is
derived from the scarcity of the property exchanged. See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF
GOVERNMENT 16-30 (Thomas P. Peardon ed., 1952). This point is discussed in Barbara Fried, Wilt
Chamberlain Revisited: Nozick's "Justice in Transfer" and the Problem of Market-Based Distribu-
tion, 24 PHIL & PUB. AsP. 226 (1995).
97. Thus, the pragmatic, nonfoundationalist approach looks to the practical use value of the
theory and tries, as much as possible, to analyze its "value for concrete life." See James, supra note
59, at 62.
98. Indeed, if there were a foundationalist principle in nonfoundationalist pragmatism it is that
relieving suffering is a baseline norm. See RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY AND
SOLIDARITY 141 (1989). In justifying such baseline norms, however, nonfoundationalist pragmatism
would avoid deep justifications and instead offers the reassurance that:
We should just thank our lucky stars that there am quite a lot of people nowadays who
are pretty consistently appalled by human beings suffering unnecessarily. With
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
tions are no less legitimate because they lack ultimate foundations or
correspond to a general theory of justice.
2. The Rawlsian Maximin Principle
The Rawlsian maximin principle has been extremely important in
justifying progressivity on fairness grounds." As used in the tax policy
debates, the maximin principle states that the utility of the least well-off
is weighted more heavily in a utilitarian calculus to determine the opti-
mal tax rate."° Examining approaches to scrutinizing this principle is
ueful for distinguishing the pragmatic approach. The first thing to note
is that arguments for redistribution to the least well-off as a good thing to
do are different in kind than arguments for redistribution because it is
correct under Rawls's theory. The latter approach lends the weight of
Rawls's theory to support a liberal principle of redistribution. The former
does not have this type of pedigree. It is useful to ask whether the weight
of Rawls's theory really adds anything to the persuasiveness of the call
for taking care of the least well-off. Indeed, the pragmatic approach as-
serts what Rawls's approach seems to deny: that the maximin principle is
just one among many principles that gets its force from our tradition of
equality, compassion, or liberalism. On the contrary, the point of backing
up redistribution with Rawls's theory is to give it some sense of objec-
tivity. After all, the maximin principle is "true" under Rawls's system
not merely because it comports with our modem liberal notions," but
because it is derived from an original position in which parties would
agree to the principle in a hypothetical contract behind the veil of igno-
rance before they know their station in society.
The pragmatic approach views such attempts at objective grounding
as not worth the trouble. Indeed, if you press the foundationalist claim a
bit, it seems quite unstable. Is the maximin really what we would agree
to behind the veil of ignorance? Doesn't requiring the voting parties in
the original position to accept, for instance, the equal worth and dignity
luck--and especially affluence and security---there will be more and mom such people.
Some of them will be liberal ironists like Nabokov, Bloom and Derrida himself....
Some of them will be unimaginative, literal-minded, unromantic, decent dullards. We can
use as many of both kinds of people as we can get.
Richard Rorty, Response to Simon Critchley, in DECoNSTRUCrIoN AND PRAGMATISM 41, 42
(Chantal Mouffe ed., 1996).
99. See Bankman & Griffith, supra note 25, at 1916.
100. See id.
101. Rawls's use of the original position to justify the institutions of classical liberalism has
been criticized as "rationalization of the political status quo." RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGTrS
SERIOUSLY 182 (1977) (noting this criticism). The pragmatic approach suggested in this article takes
seriously the interpretation of Rawls's theory as largely an expost justification for our liberal heritage.
102. This type of foundationalism is the flip side of the foundationalism (like that of Blum and
Kalven) which treats fairness principles as empty of meaning and not susceptible to truth determina-
tions. Rather than dismissing fairness questions as meaningless, constructivism establishes alterna-
tive grounds (such as the veil of ignorance) for fairness principles.
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of each individual make the original position a fixed game where the
"right" results are preordained? These are questions that are quite re-
moved from the question of whether and to what degree redistribution is
appropriate. Rather than construct a system of justice around basic prin-
ciples, the pragmatic approach enters the process in mid-stream evaluat-
ing each principle or suggestion from a more practical perspective."
For example, the pragmatic approach would ask whether the
maximin principle is a good idea by noting, for instance, that it seems
rather extreme since it would lead to "perfect equalization, that is, 100-
percent taxation above a certain level, with corresponding subsidies be-
low it."'" This raises serious incentive and efficiency problems which
would sensibly prevent it from being carried out within the tax system."
Furthermore, taken to its extreme, it would seem to require questionable
social policies such as keeping people in vegetative states alive even at
the expense of reducing the rest of society to poverty." Of course, one
may be able to read Rawls in a way that accounts for these objections.'"
To even raise these questions supports the pragmatist point: whether a
given proposal fits into Rawls's theory is not always relevant to whether
the proposal is justified. Theory fit is a different question thanS whether
the principle is one we should embrace. The pragmatic approach is inter-
ested primarily in the latter question. Detached from its theoretical base,
putting the poor first seems to make sense. It is a dysfunctional society
that has a significant portion of the population eating out of garbage cans
or sleeping on the street."U Fortunately, such a claim resonates in our
103. As one philosopher has described the theoretical antifoundationalist approach,
[]it attempts to begin from within a particular ethical perspective, working outward to ex-
plore common ground with other perspectives, requiring neither the antecedent identifi-
cation of a privileged class or statements that issue from an objective point of view nor
conclusive positions on canonical problems in philosophy. Despite the absence of a
genuinely independent perspective, the theorist can still seek to codify the moral per-
spective of the particular agents in question. For example, in thinking about euthanasia,
we might begin with the conviction that it is a matter of individual choice and that there-
fore the decision should be left to the patient. Upon further reflection on the effects of
euthanasia, and our convictions that we owe things to loved ones, we might reject a rule
that leaves the decision in the hands of the patient alone.
NtHasEN, supra note 9, at 58. While this approach is similar to Rawls's conception of equilibrium, it
does not assume or require any theoretical process of construction from behind a veil of ignorance.
104. See KENNETH J. ARRow, Some Ordinalist-Utilitarian Notes on Rawls's Theory of Justice,
in CoLLECmD PAPERS OF KENNE J. ARRow: SOCIAL CHOICE AND JUSTICE 96, 110 (1983).
105. See id.
106. See id. at 102-03.
107. Instead of defining the least well-off in such specific terms, for instance, Rawls seems to
choose a more general approach, defining the least well-off as something like the average wealth and
income of members of a particular social position while eschewing any more precise philosophical
definitions of this category. The more malleable definition might avoid the reductio ad absurdum
argument against Rawls.
108. Beyond reducing human suffering, redistribution might also create greater participation
and cohesion in our social, political, and cultural life. For an argument that redistribution increases
political participation and social commitment and is thus desirable, see ACKERMAN & ALSTorr,
supra note 3. For a nonfoundationalist pragmatist, an appropriate response to someone who rejects
redistribution in the face of abject poverty is not to offer them a theory but to tell them a story or
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culture. The important activity for tax policy analysts is to attend to this
culture by adding to its narrative, not matching principle to theory.
IV. THE PRAGMATIC "METHOD"
The philosophical tradition of American pragmatism informs the
nonfoundationalist approach advocated in this article. The pragmatism
urged here tries to change the language of fairness from formalism and
philosophical theory to the more contextualized and practical. It gives
policy analysts a reason to drop the question, "What is the appropriate
ground for our ethical beliefs?" and replace it with, "What should we do
in this particular case?" The main reason for dropping the former is its
failure to help solve the problem at hand and its potential to distract ef-
forts at resolution of the problem.' Obviously, there is more than a little
irony in using nonfoundationalist pragmatism (a philosophical theory) to
justify walking away from philosophical theory."° Thus, the question
arises whether philosophical pragmatism is useful at all. Indeed, the bulk
of this article has addressed purely methodological issues on a fairly high
level of abstraction. Accordingly, the article arguably engages in the
same type of philosophical theorizing that it claims to avoid.
Obviously, this article claims the answer is "yes," or at least to a de-
gree. Reviewing the pragmatic method and comparing it to foundation-
alism and the use of theories of justice shows tax scholars that they can
take fairness seriously without bringing in Rawls or Dworkin. Put an-
other way, the nonfoundationalist pragmatic project operates on two lev-
els. On one level it counters explicit philosophical doctrines on the status
of ethical claims. The strategy is a patently philosophical enterprise, con-
ducted at a high level of abstraction in discussions of methodology. On
the other level, the nonfoundationalist method consists not of talking
about method or philosophy, but in redescribing the world in ways that
help us see the parameters of the fairness issues at stake and what the
world might look like upon their resolution. On this practical level, non-
foundationalism, as a philosophical doctrine debunking objective truth,
drops away and we are left with our other ways of speaking (literary,
descriptive, evangelical, romantic) to guide us through the problems we
drive them around some really bad parts of town. If the person remains unconvinced, nonfounda-
tionalist pragmatism offers nothing more except to ask: What happened to you anyway?
109. Putting these practical questions in theoretical/philosophical language might therefore
encourage "moral holidays," See James, supra note 59, at 64 ("1 have enough trouble in life already
without adding the trouble of carrying (metaphysical conundums].").
110. Indeed, pragmatism's nonfoundationalist claims has generated a great deal of theoretical
debate. See, e.g., SUSAN HAACK, EVIDENCE AND INQUIRY: TOWARDS RECONSTRUCTION IN
EPISTEMOLOGY 182-202 (1993) (criticizing Rorty's epistemological claims).
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face. On this practical level, nonfoundationalist pragmatism is best de-
scribed as a temperament rather than a philosophical method."
The pragmatic approach's emphasis on temperament rather than
theory becomes clear when one compares it to the strategy suggested
recently by Professor McCaffery, who has recently examined the domi-
nant strategies in the tax policy discourse. Like the analysis in this arti-
cle, McCaffery identifies formalism as the dominant methodology of the
tax policy discourse. In contrast to this article's approach, however,
McCaffery advocates an "interpretive-political approach" based on John
Rawls's theory of justice or Ronald Dworkin's concept of integrity.
' 2
The interpretive-political approach of Rawls and Dworkin is based on the
belief that "[wlords alone cannot answer [the difficult policy issues in tax
law]; we need principles.""' By contrast, the approach in this article de-
emphasizes foundational principles and argues that words alone are all
we have and all we need. From a pragmatic perspective, the interpretive-
political approach gestures at something beyond the natural language of
fairness, like integrity or reason."4 While the interpretive-political ap-
proach purports to abandon a certain variant on foundationalism (for-
malism), the pragmatic approach views the interpretive-political ap-
proach as a species of foundationalism. The pragmatic approach moves
away from using philosophical theories of justice as grounds for our fair-
11l. William James describes pragmatism by comparing the pragmatist, a "happy-go-lucky
anarehistic sort of creature" with the "doctrinaire and authoritative complexion" of the rational mind
(the foundationalist James was attacking). James, supra note 59, at 71. Translated into the context of
the tax policy discourse, the difference in temperament is between the formalist modeler and the
storyteller.
The two levels of nonfoundationalist pragmatism can be viewed as two separate "language
games," each appropriate for certain purposes and certain contexts. This article does not move away
from foundationalism so much because of its philosophical error, but because another vocabulary at
this point might enrich the tax policy discourse on fairness. It is a claim about relative usefulness,
not about relative accuracy or correctness, to urge that we "in fact say little about these [philosophi-
cal] topics, and see how we get on." See Rorty, supra note 8, at 111. Thus, the difference between
the suggested nonfoundationalist pragmatic "method" and the traditional foundationalist method
might just be the difference between "an entrenched vocabulary which has become a nuisance and a
half-formed new vocabulary which vaguely promises great things." Id. at 1 2
112. See McCaffery, supra note 1, at 82-84.
113. Id.at84.
114. By contrast, the approach in this article adopts the view that "there is nothing beyond
vocabularies." STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TExT IN This CLASS? 354-55 (1980). This is more useful
than the view that there is something beyond language which can help us decide which proposition,
description, or imperative is better than the next. Positing something beyond words merely raises a
host of philosophical questions that are not useful for solving the fairness problems at hand. To
quote Richard Rorty on a similar point:
[l1f we stick to the picture of language as a medium, something standing between the self
and the nonhuman reality with which the self seeks to be in touch, we have made no pro-
gress .... mhe seesaw battles between romanticism and moralism, and between idealism
and realism, will continue as long as one thinks there is a hope of making sense of the
question of whether a given language is "adequate to a task"-either the task of properly
expressing the nature of the human species, or the task of properly representing the
structure of nonhuman reality.
Rorty, supra note 8, at 113-14.
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ness evaluations. The approach advocated in this article abandons any
"attempt to see the patterns of justification within normal discourse as
more than just such patterns... [as well as any] attempt to see them as
hooked on to something which demands moral commitment-Reality,
Truth, Objectivity, Reason.""5
McCaffery uses both Rawls and Dworkin in his theory. The foun-
dationalist appeal of Rawls was examined above. It is beyond the scope
of this article to analyze Dworkin's theory in great detail. However, it
can be said that the pragmatic approach embraces the type of checker-
board approach Dworkin's theory of integrity seeks to overcome.""
Dworkin's theory explicitly rejects a checkerboard pattern of decision
making, thus rejecting the provisional, ad hoc style of analysis advocated
in this article. Instead Dworkin's theory places integrity as the master
principle. For example, in order for our hybrid consumption/income tax
system to be justified under Dworkin's theory, it would have to conform
to the principle of integrity. By contrast, the pragmatic approach would
accept the hybrid income/consumption tax system if the system was jus-
tified by reasons which have nothing to do with integrity, but with the
more practical concerns of administrability, fairness and economic effi-
ciency. This is not to say that consistency would not be desirable. It is
just to say that it would not be the guiding principle of tax policy. Under
a pragmatic approach, furthermore, full integrity may simply be too
much to ask.""
V. CONCLUSION
This article criticizes how a tradition of formalism in the tax policy
discourse affects discussions of fairness, arguing that it is rooted in foun-
dationalism. It advocates a pragmatic nonfoundationalist strategy which
lends philosophical credibility to dropping the need for objectivity alto-
gether. Tax scholars should discuss fairness in the same language they
discuss the fairness of a tip, or any other day-to-day interaction. This
115. RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 385 (1980). Unlike the
interpretive-political approach, which has "one foot in our actual, contingent, historically situated
community and context, and another foot in political, social, and moral theory," the nonfoundation-
alist approach tries to step out of philosophical theory altogether. McCaffery, supra note 1, at 87.
116. See James D. A. Boyle, Legal Fiction, 38 HASTINGS LJ. 1013, 1020-22 (1987); see also
Allan C. Hutchinson, The Three 'Rs': ReadinglRortylRadically, 103 HARV. L. REV. 555, 579 (1989)
(reviewing RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY AND SOLIDARITY (1989), and comparing
Dwodin's foundationalism to Rorty's method of checkerboard conventions and anecdots); Richard
Rorty, Postimodernist Bourgeois Liberalism, in HERMENEUrICS AND PRAXIS 214, 215 (R. Hollinger
ed., 1985) (criticizing Dworkin's theory as foundationalist). Thew has been a serious, often heated
debate between Dworkin and Rorty concerning the derivation and status of the integrity principle.
See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Pragmatism, Right Answers, and True Banality, in PRAGMATISM IN LAW
AND SoCIETY 359, 359 (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991) (explaining his belief that
Rorty's "new" pragmatism does not contribute to legal theory).
117. See DWORKIN, supra note 101, at 105 (positing a lawyer of superhuman skill as a model of
principled adjudication).
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language is all we have and all we need to adjudicate fairness claims.
Obviously, the more perspectives and information the better and this is
the role interdisciplinary work might play. Incorporating all encompass-
ing theories of justice to give foundation to our principles, however, may
not be the most constructive strategy as a practical matter or the most
defensible philosophically. Far better that tax policy discourse echo the
natural, not specialized, language of fairness.





Arthur Miller took on no formal role in the Hart-Devlin debate,' nor
does one find even in passing any mention of The Crucible' in the volu-
minous commentaries the debate has spawned. Yet The Crucible was as
much a product of, and statement about, the popular controversy on law
and morals that commenced in the 1950s as was the work first of Patrick
Devlin, and then, H.L.A. Hart. Written six years before the debate's
commencement, Miller's play reveals an astonishing grasp of what
would become Devlin's and Hart's positions on the legal enforcement of
morality. Further, as a statement on the issue, The Crucible resonates as
powerfully today as it did when first produced some six years before the
exchanges between the two jurisprudents began. Therefore, as we mark
the fortieth anniversary of the Hart-Devlin debate, this article proposes to
add to the debate the long ignored voice of Arthur Miller as one deserv-
ing our attention.
I will argue that The Crucible supplies a prescient airing of the gen-
eral arguments advanced by Devlin and Hart. Miller crafts a world of
past and present, grounded firmly on assumptions Devlin would later set
forth in his Enforcement of Morals.3 Miller then demonstrates how such
assumptions fail under the weight of historical and psychological argu-
ments that Hart, in philosophical form, would develop later in response
to Devlin, first in Immorality and Treason, then in Law, Liberty and
Morality. In so doing, Miller advances principles identical to ones Hart
would come to embrace. First, Miller argues that any theory that assumes
the legal enforcement of popular morality is essential to securing a soci-
ety's existence cannot withstand the test of objective reality. Second, he
warns, therefore, that legal coercion and legal punishment are not mor-
ally justifiable means for preserving morality. Finally, he persuades the
audience to accept the view that a society's morality is best secured
through the application of universal norms and virtues that attend to the
* Associate professor of legal writing, Southwestern University School of Law.
I. For a description of the Hart-Devlin debate, see infra Part L
2. ARTHUR MILLER, THE CRUCIBLE (1953).
3. PATRICK DEVUJN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965).
4. H.L.A. Hart, Immorality and Treason, in MORALITY AND THE LAW 49 (Richari A.
Wasserstrom ed., 1971), reprinting H.L.A. Hart, Immorality and Treason, LISTENER, July 30, 1959,
at 162.
5. H.L.A. HART, LAw, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY (1963).
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interests of social order and vitality by attending equally to the interests
of individual liberty.
I express these principles as Hart might, not Miller. The Crucible
propels one far beyond Hart's descriptions and explanations which are
hobbled, along with Devlin's, by the boundaries of ordinary discourse.
Miller, by contrast, illustrates and animates these principles through set-
ting, plot, character, dialogue, feeling, and color, thereby giving them
human texture. By these means, the play becomes a fascinating vehicle
for anyone interested in revisiting the debate afresh.
This article comprises two parts. Part I summarizes the main threads
of the Hart-Devlin controversy in order to supply a framework for un-
earthing thematic correspondences as they appear in the play. My interest
in this play is how it addresses the broad issue of whether the law is mor-
ally permitted to enforce morality. Hence, the summary pays scant atten-
tion to the debate's subject matter in favor of elucidating those principles
all three writers found most germane to the inquiry. Part II focuses on the
play and on unearthing connections between the play and the Hart-
Devlin discourse. Readers in this context will note that the connections
appear everywhere--in Act One (An Overture), in each of the play's
three remaining acts, and in Echos Down the Corridor, the play's epi-
logue. Since The Crucible appeared before the onset of the debate, read-
ers might marvel, as I have, over the degree to which Miller anticipates
the terms of the arguments. In any event, inasmuch as the arguments
issue from different quarters, one cannot ignore their wide reaching cur-
rency or their relevance to contemporary application. I offer observations
on these matters in this article's conclusion.
I. THE HART-DEVLIN DEBATE REVISITED
In 1957, the Wolfenden Committee adopted and applied a broad
principle to conclude that in England private acts of homosexuality ought
to be decriminalized and that prostitution, albeit in restricted form, ought
to remain legal." The Committee stated, "there must remain a realm of
private morality and immorality which is, in brief and crude terms, not
the law's business."' Patrick Devlin then issued a speech attacking both
the principle and its application, commencing the debate that in part
bears his name But as Hart suggested in his response to Devlin, and as
6. See DEVLN, supra note 3, at 2-3. The Wolfenden Committee was also known as the
Committee on Homosexual Offenses and Prostitution, which was established on 24 August 1954 to
review the law as it related to prostitution, homosexual crimes, and immoral solicitation in Britain.
See Larry Cata Backer, Tweaking Facts, Speaking Judgment: Judicial Transmogrification of Case
Narrative As Jurisprudence in the United States and Britain, 6 S. CAL. INrERDISC. L. 611, 619
n.26 (1998).
7. DEVLJN, supra note 3, at 3.
8. See Wasserstrom, Introduction to MORALITY AND THE LAW, supra note 4, at 4-5. As
Wasserstrom explains, the debate was characterized by a series of exchanges between the two
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Devlin later acknowledged, the principle under attack was largely de-
rived from the teachings of John Stuart Mill.9 Hence, one must look to
those teachings to appreciate the debate's proper beginnings.
Mill insisted in On Liberty" that "the sole end for which mankind
are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty
of action of any of their number, is self-protection."" He added, "the only
purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of
a civili[z]ed community... is to prevent harm to others."'2 Mill's interest
in restricting the reach of criminal law flowed from an acute under-
standing that legal enforcement involves the imposition of grave harm
upon individuals. As Hart would come to explain, this harm looms ap-
parent when one considers the coercive and punitive faces of legal en-
forcement." Legal coercion compels obedience to the law by threatening
punishment for disobedience." As a threat, legal coercion necessarily
delimits personal liberty, and in so doing, inflicts suffering on those
whose desires are frustrated by fear of punishment." Legal punishment
inflicts the palpable harm one customarily associates with such penalties
as fmes, imprisonment, and death.6 Mill's harm principle, therefore,
permits the application of legal coercion and legal punishment only in
those instances where such application promotes the good that accompa-
nies preventing persons from harming others.7 It would not permit such
adversaries. See id. at 4. Imnorality and Treason, Hart's first response to Devlin's argument was
initially delivered as a talk over the B.B.C. in 1959. See id. It was then later presented in printed
form in Hart's Law, Liberty, and Morality, which appeared in 1963 and offered an expanded
response. See id. Devlin, as Wasserstrom says, "had the last word" with Hart when, in 1965, he
included the speech under the new title Morals and the Criminal Law in the book known now as The
Enforcement of Morals. Id. at 5. In footnotes to the printed speech, he amply responded to Hart's
remarks. See DEVUN, supra note 3, at 13. The debate raged in the 1960s, Hart and Devlin passing
the baton to their followers. In the !980s and 1990s the debate has sparked less interest in legal
philosophical circles, although writers continue to regard it as the principal reference point for the
modem inquiry into the legal enforcement of morality. Cf., e.g., Jeffrie G. Murphy, Legal Moralism
and Liberalism, 37 ARIz. L. REV. 73,75 (1995).
9. See HART, supra note 5, at 15-16; see also DEVuN, supra note 3, at vi. Devlin also
acknowledges the correspondence, noted by Hart, between his thinking and that of J.F. Stephen,
Mill's nineteenth-century opponenL Id. at vii. Stephen's thesis that the law is permitted to enforce
morality for morality's sake receives almost as much attention in Hart's essay as does Devlin's, and
equal disapproval. See HART, supra note 5, at 27-28; see also Richard A. Posner, Foreword to
JAMEs FrIT.JAMEs STEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUAUTY, FRATERNITY 10 (1991) (discussing how Hart and
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. oppose Stephen's and Devlin's views on the legitimate use of law to
enforce morality).
10. JOHN STUART Miu, ON LIBERTY (Stefan Collini ed., 1993).
I1. Id. at 13.
12. Id.
13. See HART, supra note 5, at 21-22.
14. See id. at 22.
15. See id. at 21-22.
16. See id. at 21.
17. See id. at 2D.
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application, and the Wolfenden Committee agreed, where a person's acts
cause others no harm."
Devlin's objections to the Wolfenden Committee's findings, and
therefore to Mill's teachings, rested on his single assumption that a soci-
ety is kept together by the bonds of a common morality.'9 On the basis of
this assumption, Devlin thought it reasonable to conclude first, that a
society has a right to pass judgment on all matters of morality, and sec-
ond, that it has the right to use the law to enforce those judgments.' He
relied on history and on political analogies when tendering these obser-
vations:
[A]n established morality is as necessary as good government to the
welfare of society. Societies disintegrate from within more frequently
than they are broken up by external pressures. There is disintegration
when no common morality is observed and history shows that the
loosening of moral bonds is often the first stage of disintegration .... 21
For these reasons, Devlin maintained that "society is justified in
taking the same steps to preserve its moral code as it does to preserve its
government and other essential institutions." Equating "vice" with sedi-
tion, he considered it wrong to think that the law should not be concerned
with private morality, or acts of immorality.' Devlin then moved to a
statement of principle, which, if one concedes the value of his assump-
tions and observations, emanates as a natural and necessary conclusion:
"There are no theoretical limits to the power of the State to legislate
against treason and sedition, and'likewise I think there can be no theo-
retical limits to legislation against immorality." He left the task of as-
certaining the moral judgments of society to "the reasonable man," "the
man in the Clapham omnibus," or "the man in the jury box." Such indi-
viduals could be counted upon to embrace moral principles that "every
right-minded person would accept as valid."= Further, according to Dev-
lin, moral alignments among right-minded persons may be permissibly
based on shared "feelings" concerning right and wrong.' When these
feelings gather in the form of intolerance, indignation, and disgust, then
the act that arouses them becomes properly suitable for moral and legal
proscription.'
I8. See DEVLIN, supra note 3, at 1I.
19. Seeid.at 10.
20. See id. at 13.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See id. at 13-14.
24. Id. at 14.
25. Id. at 15.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See id. at 17.
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It would be no exaggeration to suggest that similar feelings, at least
in part, prompted Hart to launch his first attack upon Devlin's "legal
moralism." In Imnorality and Treason, Hart asserted that it was at best
a crude and uncritical expedient on Devlin's part to turn, in Hart's words,
"popular morality into criminal law." At worst Hart perceived grave
danger in Devlin's thesis, for, if left uncriticized, it would appear to ac-
commodate a popular morality based on ignorance, superstition, and
misunderstanding!' This finding caused Hart to *exclaim at the essay's
conclusion: "Morality, what crimes may be committed in thy name!"'
Hart renewed his warning in Law, Liberty, and Morality by empha-
sizing throughout that essay that Devlin's thesis, so at odds with Mill's
liberty principle, was little more than untested utilitarianism. "[I]t is
Utilitarianism without benefit of facts,"3 Hart observed, causing him to
inquire early on in the essay whether any good may attach to preserving
a society whose morality is based on retrograde principles--racial and
religious hatreds, for example. ' He suggested that such a society's dis-
integration would be preferable to its continued existence."
Hart's central objection to Devlin's thesis, as untested utilitarianism,
rested on Devlin's a priori assumption that a universally shared morality
was requisite to a society's existence, and that legal enforcement may be
used as an essential instrument that works to the good, so to speak, of
keeping that morality shared.'. Such an assumption, according to Hart,
would warrant the extravagant claim that all of a society's morality
"forms a single seamless web, so that those who deviate from any part
are likely or perhaps bound to deviate from the whole." Any deviation,
of course, would have to be perceived as a threat to the society's exis-
tence. ' In addition, argued Hart, once this assumption is in place one
must squarely concede that at any given moment a society is identical to
its morality?' As a consequence of this concession one could easily
maintain, as Devlin appeared to against all plausibility, that a change in a
society's morality is tantamount to that society's destruction.'
29. HART, supra note 5, at 6.
30. Hart, supra note 4, at 51; see Ronald Dworkin, Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of
Morals, in MORAiUrY AND THE LAW, supra note 3, at 69. Dworkin, agreeing with Hart, remarks:
"What is shocking and wrong is not [Devlin's] idea that the community's morality counts, but his
idea of what counts as the community's morality." id.
31. See Hart, supra note 4, at 54.
32. Id.
33. HART, supra note 5, at 55.
34. See id. at 19.
35. See id.
36. See DEVLN, supra note 3, at 9.
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Most detrimentally, thought Hart, following a seamless web theory
to the conclusion that at any given time a society is identical to its mo-
rality prompts the additional conclusion that legal enforcement be a re-
quirement for moral preservation." Hart maintained that in order to sup-
port this view one would have to argue, unconvincingly, that the best
teacher of morality is legal coercion, the fear of punishment.' Secondly,
one would have to contend that legal punishment itself has value on re-
tributive grounds only, and that such value is perceptible in those inevi-
table instances wherein one is punished for acts causing no harm to oth-
ers.' Hart considered such a perception unlikely, since it would rest on
the implausible claim that two moral wrongs-the wrongful act and the
suffering wrought by punishment--taken together produce one moral
good.' Hart insisted, rather, that the only plausible justification for using
punishment to enforce morality rests not in any interest in preserving
society or a useful morality but in maintaining moral conformity.' This is
the morality of brute dogma and form which seeks merely to preserve
itself from change.' In view of the toll that legal punishment exacts in
terms of human suffering, Hart considered its employment for the ad-
vancement of conformity worthless:
The use of legal punishment to freeze into immobility the morality
dominant at a particular time in a society's existence may possibly
succeed, but even where it does it contributes nothing to the survival
of the animating spirit and formal values of social morality and may
do much to harm them.07
Hart's interest in securing social morality was every bit as pro-
nounced as Devlin's. He stated that "some shared morality is essential to
the existence of any society."' To explain the substance and practice of
the moral vision he had in mind, Hart returned to Mill and to a much
different set of assumptions than Devlin's on what constituted social
morality.4 Devlin expressed no more concern over the principles that
informed a society's morality at a particular time other than that they be
"derived from the sense of right and wrong which resides in the commu-
nity as a whole." ° Hart maintained to the contrary that all societies of
practical value for human beings must make room for universal values,
such as individual freedom, safety of life, and protection from intention-
41. See id. at 72.
42. See id. at 58.
43. See id. at 60.
44. See d.
45. See id. at 69.
46. See id.
47. Id. at 72.
48. Id. at 51.
49. Id. at 70-71.
50. See DEVLJN, supra note 3, at 22.
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ally inflicted harm." Hart explained that these values spring not from the
feelings of the man in the jury box, although such a person may certainly
cherish them, but rather from the most elemental truths of the human
condition." Devlin would say that such values, where they are in place,
ought to be preserved because their preservation, in turn, might help se-
cure a society's existence.' Hart would counter that the preservation of
society is worthwhile only to the extent that society secures these values
for its constituents.' Once this argument is accepted, Hart implied, then
one immediately recognizes the error in Devlin's assumption that a soci-
ety's morality is a seamless web of shared beliefs.' For when the values
of liberty, safety, and protection are once secured, these values not only
permit a society to accommodate individual divergences from a domi-
nant morality, but also enable it to profit from such divergences by
making suitable adjustments for change."
Hart observed further that from these universal values issued the
content of social morality, or a society's moral code. ' This code is prac-
ticed according to universal formal virtues whose operation Hart de-
scribed:
In moral relationships with others the individual sees questions of
conduct from an impersonal point of view and applies general rules
impartially to himself and to others; he is made aware of and takes
account of the wants, expectations, and reactions of others; he expects
self-discipline and control in adapting his conduct to a system of re-
ciprocal claims. These are universal virtues and indeed constitute the
specifically moral attitude to conduct."
Hart emphasized that these formal virtues obviously deserve preser-
vation as much as the universal values they advance," but such preserva-
tion is not to be equated to that contemplated by the identification of a
society with its moral code.' Most importantly, legal enforcement is not
at all required for the preservation of universal values and virtues." Other
methods of preservation--advice, argument, and example-are prefer-
able and more than equal to the task.' With these and other like methods
51. See HART, supra note 5, at 70.
52. See id. at 71-72.
53. See DEvLUN, supra note 3, at 10.
54. See HART, supra note 5, at 70.
55. See id.
56. See id. at 70-71.
57. See id. at 71.
58. Id.
59. See id. at 72.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id. at 75.
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in place, the individual, in Mill's words, properly becomes the "final
judge" in adopting a moral course of action.u
II. THE CRUCIBLE
To introduce The Crucible within the context of the Hart-Devlin de-
bate, one need only to observe" that Miller would not have written his
play had not twenty persons been executed in the witch hunt that envel-
oped Salem in 1692.0 In focusing on this occurrence, Miller invites his
audience to consider these facts: the executions were legally sanctioned;
they were greeted with strict moral approval by most, if only for a time;
and they were occasioned by findings that the accused committed
"crimes" that could have involved at worst the infliction of imaginary
harm upon others.
With these facts established, Miller causes the matter of particular-
ized justification to emerge. But he does so, as later would Hart and
Devlin in the particular context of prostitution and private acts of homo-
sexuality, by raising the broader issue: Is a society permitted to take any
legal measures it finds necessary to secure its popular morality on a the-
ory that such measures are required for social preservation? Miller poses
the question in all earnestness and urgency, having taken measures to
demonstrate that his Salem, like its historical counterpart, is best under-
stood as a community struggling for moral and social survival." It is a
place, in other words, especially ripe for asking such a question. So, too,
are a number of other places and contexts, Miller might argue, if only in
the perceptions of those persons feeling entangled in the struggle. Hence,
the question acquires trans-historical importance for Miller and his audi-
ence, just as it would for Hart and Devlin and for those of their followers
who have taken up the cudgels on both sides of the debate.
Miller sides, as I have indicated, with Hart by embracing identical
philosophical principles.' Miller demonstrates forcefully that Devlin's
essential assumptions are illusory, even delusionary. According to
Miller, social preservation does not depend upon legally securing a soci-
ety's seamless web of moral bonds because the seamless web, where one
believes it to exist, exists merely as artifice, and always at odds with hu-
mankind's instinct for individual freedom." Rents will occur, and the
63. MILL, supra note 11, at 77; see Hart, supra note 5, at 77.
64. Readers unfamiliar with The Crucible may benefit from the prdcis provided in the
appendix to this article. See app. ifra p. 213.
65. According to a New York Toies article, the Penguin edition of the play sells 180,000
copies annually. See Sarah Lyall, Quiet Heroes: Books Not on the Best Seller Lists, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 1, 1994, at Al. Additionally, the play has undergone scores of theatrical productions, two
television productions, and two movie treatments, the most recent in 1996. See, e.g., THE CRUCIBLE
(Twentieth Century Fox 1996).
66. See MILLER, supra note 2, at 5-6.
67. See HART, supra note 5, at 1-4.
68. See MIUlER, supra note 2, at 7.
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assumption that such rents portend social collapse can only lead first to
concealment and then to self-fulfilling prophesy.' Legal coercion and
legal punishment when used in service of the seamless web, therefore,
possess no value as moral instruments.' Instead, they must be perceived
merely as moral negatives. Finally, Miller agrees with Hart and Mill that
humankind's moral instinct is as entrenched as the liberty instinct, and
that the cultivation of individual morality and its sharing are essential to
social existence.' Morality's cultivation and sharing, moreover, can be
achieved in a manner consonant with the cultivation of individual liberty.
By properly securing the latter, the law need have no business with the
former.7
A. The Seamless Web: "[T]he people of Salem developed a theocracy""
"That were pretense, sir," says Mary Warren to Judge Danforth in
Act Three, referring to the girls' frenzied courtroom displays of demonic
possession. Such displays have already led to accusations of witchcraft
against Rebecca Nurse, Martha Corey, Elizabeth Proctor, and others."
Mary, if her courage holds, would expose the fraud, but she retracts her
statement moments after making it to rejoin ranks with the pretenders.6
Mary's reversal issues from her disposition to place her community's
survival secondary to her own." By now the audience has seen enough of
this disposition in others to recognize that it is emblematic of Salem's
reversal. We are resigned to the expectation that other examples will
follow Mary's.
That the Devil could have found any foothold in the Massachusetts
Colony was a thought unspeakable to the Colony's founders." Miller
tells us in the play's Overture that the colonists originally grouped for
good, even "high" purposes--to shine "the candle that would light the
world."" Their theocracy, or as Miller calls it, "an autocracy by
consent," succeeded early on in this purpose by requiring that individual
self-interest subordinate itself to the Puritans' larger concerns of moral
and social preservation. They cultivated these concerns by requiring from
all within their camp a rigorous observance of the unique stamp they
placed on the Bible's various prescriptions and proscriptions." In their
69. See id.
70. See id. at 7-8.
71. See id. at 8.
72. See id. at 7-8.
73. Id. at 7.
74. Id. at 106.
75. See id. at 56.
76. Seeid.at 118.
77. Seeid.at 118-19.
78. See id. at 5.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 6.
81. See id. at 7.
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interpretation of the Bible, one could find the seamless web of beliefs or
the core of moral bonds whose function it was to keep the community
together. 8
The society that Miller sketches, in a word, was Devlinesque. No
Puritan of serious mind would doubt that social survival was inexorably
dependent upon the preservation of God's law, nor would one deny the
law its prerogative to administer "hard handed justice" in the interests of
such preservation.' It is thus clear from Miller's description of the early
colony that it was not a place where one could somehow separate the
society from its morality." But Miller leads us to believe that the Puri-
tans' early success depended less upon these assumptions themselves
than upon their willingness to validate them through the application of
well entrenched and beneficent traits that guided them in their daily lives.
"Probably more than the creed," he says, "hard work kept the morals of
the place from spoiling." Hard work, coupled with "their self-denial,
their purposefulness, their suspicion of all vain pursuits," also rewarded
the Puritans with physical survival in the early years." These traits sup-
plied them the means for withstanding frequent attacks by natives, bouts
of disease, and harsh winters." In a couple of generations the Puritans
had taken root and prospered." It had come time for them to feel the nas-
cent stirring of personal freedom."
Miller observes that panic sprang from such stirring and that the
witch hunts in turn sprang from this panic.? This assessment is difficult
for modem audiences to understand unless we perceive, as would Hart,
that freedom is inimical to the seamless web. A society cannot have both;
rather, it must honestly accommodate the former and abrogate the latter.
82. See MARION L. STARKEY, THE DEVIL IN MASSACHUSETTS: A MODERN INQUIRY INTO THE
SALEM WrrcH TRIALS 51-52 (Doubleday 1969) (1949). Starkey remarks:
This chosen people, this community which submitted itself to the direct nule of God,
looked less to England for its precepts than to God's ancient and holy word. So far as was
practicable the Puritans were living by a legal system that antedated Magna Carta by at
least two millennia, the Decalogue and the tribal laws codifed in the Pentateuch.
Id.; see Edmund S. Morgan, Arthur Miller's The Crucible and the Salem Witch Trials: An
Historian's Perspective, in THE GOLDEN AND THE BRAZEN WORLD: PAPERS IN LITERATURE AND
HISTORY, 1650-1800, at 183 (John M. Wallace, ed., 1985); see also David R. Samuelson, "I Quit
This Court.": Is Justice Denied in Arthur Miller's The Crucible? 2 U. CH. L ScH. ROUNDTABLE
619, 634 (1995) (describing the law in historical Salem as "rough hewn and hard-handed" and at
best, primitive). In commenting on Miller's treatment of history in the play, Morgan observes:
"Puritans believed that the state existed to enforce the will of God among men." Morgan, supra, at
183.
83. MILLER, supra note 2, at 6.
84. See id. at 6-7.
85. Id. at 4.
86. See id. at 6.
87. See id. at 5-7.
88. See id. at 5-6.
89. See id. at 7.
90. See id.
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This the Puritans could not do, nor did they know how. Instead, they
outwardly clung to the web while flirting with individual liberty!' Con-
sternation and then panic erupted because the people were at a loss to
interpret the displays of liberty they began to see all about them. A soci-
ety that had so long and so closely identified itself with its shared moral-
ity, the Puritans now had to face an immense problem in the realization
that some individuals were, on their own, setting the margins separating
freedom's blessings from its curses. Their shift toward personal freedom
thus signified a shift toward subjective morality,' which in most in-
stances meant a morality of convenience. They turned to the web for
meaning and redress, failing to understand that all that remained of it was
artifice and repression. They also failed to understand that the answer
and remedy the web would supply-namely witchcraft and the necessary
persecution of witches-would push them from mere moral subjectivity
to moral inversion. The Father of Lies, once identified as the cause of
their problem, would make witches out of innocents and saints out of
villains. The seamless web of public morality would unravel and turn
inside out and become a tangle of pretense, false accusation, and false
denial.
The question the play might pose to Devlin, accordingly, is this:
Can a society secure itself by securing a popular morality that in no re-
spect should account as such? Miller develops a negative answer to this
question by taking pains throughout the play to illustrate the question's
premise. Most of the major characters, sooner or later, reveal themselves
as moral pretenders. Act One, for example, develops around various
contests of transparent moral one-upmanship. Parris is the first to per-
ceive a serious rent in Salem's moral fabric, having witnessed the girls'
dancing and conjuring." His moral reflex is to conceal, but he sees some
wisdom in Thomas Putnam's advice to be the first to charge witchcraft
rather than wait for an enemy to lay the charge at his own door. Putnam
obviously shares our understanding of Parris as a man to whom expedi-
ent moral accusations might come easily. We just earlier saw Parnis
charge his niece Abigail with "abominations" over the conjuring." The
charge emanated not at all from any concern for Abigail's soul, but from
a concern for his reputation. A similar concern will soon spur him to
accuse Proctor of Quakerism, a grave accusation since the Puritans re-
garded all sects but their own as abominations." Putnam's advice is also
91. See id. at 7.
92. See ARTHUR MIL ER, ARTHUR MILLER'S COLLECTED PLAYS 39 (1957).
93. See MILLER, supra note 2, at 10.
94. Id. at 11.
95. See THOMAS JEFFERSON WERTENBAKER, THE PURITAN OUGARCHY 208, 211 (1947).
Miller no doubt wants us to appreciate the keen dislike that would accompany such a charge.
Wertenbaker explains that the Puritans could not countenance other sects and persecuted them at
every turn. See id. at 209-10. The penalty for Quakerism was banishment
But when the heretic refused to accept banishment ... the ministers and magistrates
showed him no mely. "If any Quaker or Quakers shall presume, after they have once
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in keeping with his own character, for when Proctor dares question Put-
nam's and Parris's authority in the community, Putnam is quick to point
out Proctor's many absences from Sabbath services.' Upon answering
this charge, Proctor discloses no less an interest in taking the moral high
ground: Parris's preaching, in his opinion, is not sufficiently elevating to
warrant the five mile trek to the village. ' Interestingly, this exchange
comes straight on the heels of Proctor's private encounter with Abigail,
whom Proctor had seduced." In that scene he dismisses her entreaties to
renew the affair as he would a child's, and he calls her such.9 They
should both, he suggests, opt for pretense:
Proctor: We never touched, Abby.
Abigail: Aye, but we did.
Proctor-. Aye, but we did not"'0
All of this moral posturing is an apt prelude to Act One's finale.
Abigail, having long understood Salem's pretense, and having just been
stung by Proctor's callous reminder of it, finds it only natural, when
pushed, to seek the artificial high ground. Reverend Hale comes on the
scene, ignorant as yet of the web's inversion. Having just uncovered
witchcraft, Hale offers Abigail and her mates the choice of which moral
role to play.' They could play the witch or the victim-saint-judge who
would ferret out Salem's witches. Abigail the conjurer would prefer to
wear a saint's mantle.
The pattern thus cast, morality for show becomes a dominant motif
in the play." We revisit Proctor in Act Two and observe him initially
occupy the role of aggrieved penitent and moral judge. Proctor's adultery
has caused his wife, Elizabeth, to nurse some hurt, resentment, and sus-
picion. Proctor asks her to find some goodness in him, but she declines to
be his judge." She will remain steadfast in her resentment and suspicion
as long as her husband's behavior earns them. Proctor, then, would be his
wife's judge. He confessed his sin to Elizabeth like a good Christian and
suffered what the law requireth, to come into this jurisdiction," stated the Massachusetts
law of 1656, "every such male Quaker shall for the first offence have one of his ears cut
off... and for the second offence... his other ear cut off... and every woman Quaker
shall be severely whipt ... and for every Quaker, he or she, that shall a third time herein
again offend, they shall have their tongues bored through with a hot iron." At last, if all
other measures failed ... they were to be put to death.
Id. at 213 (quoting STATE OF MASSACHUSErTS, RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF THE
MASSACHUSETTS BAY 308 (AMS Press 1968) (1853)).
96. See MILLER, supra note 2, at 28.
97. See id. at 28-29.
98. See id. at 21-24.
99. See id. at 23.
100. Id.
101. See id. at 44-46.
102. See id. at 7.
103. See id. at 55.
[Vol. 76:1
HART, DEVLIN & ARTHUR MILLER
perceives something un-Christian in his wife's continued aloofness." He
seems content in this role until Mary Warren, the house servant, alerts
him to the raw consequences. She too has become the moral judge, hav-
ing been appointed an officer of the court. By Elizabeth's account, Mary
Warren left the Proctors' house earlier "like the daughter of a prince" to
attend the witchcraft proceedings."' She returns sickened, worried over
those who have been accused.'" From this point onward moral inversion
in the play becomes an essential element of individual survival. As we
see in Act Three, Mary's distaste for pretense cannot overcome her re-
luctance to lose her own skin. Therefore, she calls out Proctor, again as
victim-saint-judge, instead of maintaining the truth.'' By this time as
well, the truth of Proctor's adultery has lost its self-serving value for
Elizabeth. Just before Mary's recanting, she issues the false denial that
damns him." In Act Four Hale completes the circle. He entreats Eliza-
beth to ask her husband to confess to witchcraft, knowing it to be a lie, so
that Proctor may save his life." Hale shares our understanding that the
lie is all that is left of Salem's seamless web.
B. The Matter of Legal Enforcement: "[CJonfess ... or hang!"-
"Hang them high!"""0
As noted earlier, Devlin's premise that a society's existence de-
pended upon securing its universally shared morality permitted him to
conclude that society thus was warranted in adopting theoretically limit-
less legal measures to accomplish such an end."' Hart rejected the prem-
ise and decried the consequences of acting upon a false conclusion."2 The
best one could hope from applying the moral negatives of coercion and
punishment to secure a society's morality, Hart maintained, are the
negatives themselves, that is, fear and suffering."' Miller adopts a similar
position in The Crucible. We have observed that morality in Salem had
disintegrated into a practice of form motivated largely by self-serving
values. It is not surprising, then, to find such values informing most of
the play's scenes involving coercion and punishment, or that the effect of
legal enforcement, as depicted, is merely fear, futility, and suffering.
Legal coercion and punishment, thereby, become fitting instruments of
Salem's collapse.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 52.
106. See d. at 55.
107. See id. at 118.
108. See id. at 119.
109. See id. at 132.
110. ld. at 117, 144.
111. See supra text accompanying note 24.
112. See HART, supra note 5, at 57-60.
113. See id. at 59-60.
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Antecedent to the punishment that awaits Salem's accused is a coer-
cive option best summed up in the phrase "confess or hang." The option
is implicated in every act."' At the end of Act One, following Tituba's
example, the girls confess to trafficking with the Devil in order to escape
hanging."' We learn in Act Two that others have confessed to the crime
to avoid the same fate."6 Confess or hang becomes Proctor's option at
Act Three's conclusion and throughout Act Four."7
Thus, Miller would have us test Devlin's thesis concerning the use
of legal extremes to preserve a society's morality by inviting us to pass
judgment first on the worth of forced confessions. The test would appear
to be an easy one were it not for Miller's insistence here and there to
offer concessions to the option's plausibility. While he does not argue his
story's historicity, he would have us observe, accurately enough, that the
witch hunts arose in Salem from a genuine perception of dire
emergency."" Anyone interested in pursuing the matter could find ample
historical occurrences buttressing Miller's finding, that to the people of
Salem, the times must have been out of joint."9 Further, he cautions the
audience that the cosmology of the day required a belief in witches. In-
deed, to deny their existence was to deny Satan's, which was tantamount
to denying God's.'2 Killing the witch-one exposed acceptably enough
through "spectral evidence""2-flowed necessarily from the biblical in-
junction, "Thou shalt not suffer a witch to live. ' Moreover, the play is
replete with authentic practitioners and participants in the black arts.l"
114. MILisR, supra note 2, at 47,56, 119, 137.
115. See id. at 48.
116. See id. at 56.
117. See, e.g., id. at 119, 137.
118. See id. at 6-7.
119. See WERTENBAKER, slpra note 95, at 326-38. Special consternation greeted the 1684
revocation of the 1630 charter that granted the people virtual autonomy from England. See id. at 328.
Massachusetts would now be a crown colony. See id at 329. A fatal blow came from the subsequent
issuance of a new charter permitting, among other things, religious freedom. See id. at 338. Other
problems haunted the Bay Colony and caused people to fear for the worst
One calamity after another had been heaped on the Bay Colony---small pox, Indian raids
.. and the growing certainty that New England had lost for ever the near-independence
it had enjoyed under the charter. God had manifestly turned His countenance from a
people unworthy to be chosen as He had once chosen them. The devout were searching
their hearts-and the conduct of their neighbours-for cause of this withdrawal. There
were many who seriously believed that Doomsday was imminent ... Repent, they cried,
for the Kingdom of God is at hand.
STARKEY, supra note 82, at 32-33.
120. See Arthur Miller, Why I Wrote The Crucible, THE NEw YORKER, Oct. 21 & 28,1996. at
162; see also STARKEY, supra note 82, at 53.
121. Samuelson, supra note 82, at 637. "Spectral evidence" includes any evidence--marks on
the body, hallucinations, the vexing of neighbors, etc.-indicating that the accused is in league with
the devil. See STARKEY, supra note 82, at 53-54.
122. Exodus 22:18.
123. See MtLER, supra note 2, at 20,42-48.
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All of this tempts the impression that the options available to Sa-
lem's authorities were plausibly as limited as the ones they offered their
accused. Plausibility emerges as well from Miller's early characterization
of Hale and Danforth as individuals entertaining principled belief in the
moral efficacy of baring one's soul. Hale, for example, in Act One per-
ceives in Tituba's confession a "wish to come to Heaven's side."'" He
gratefully announces that the community will bless her for it.'" And Dan-
forth, it should be recalled, is so moved by Proctor's confession of adul-
tery in Act Three that he would permit Elizabeth's corroboration of it to
direct the future course of the proceedings.'
It becomes obvious, however, that by lending some measure of
plausibility to the "confess or hang" option, Miller is but offering a re-
minder, as a warning, concerning the use of legal coercive tactics in
modern prosecutorial arenas. Here, I am not only referring to the flagrant
abuses one associates with the Stalin era or with McCarthyism; I am re-
ferring, as does Miller, to commonplace legally sanctioned and socially
accepted tactics such as the plea bargain, grants of immunity, and the
like. For surely it is not difficult to see glimpses in the girls of our every-
day modern accused turned state's witness. And surely Mary Warren's
remark to Proctor--I'll not hang with you!"'--resonates with an un-
derstanding shared with the audience that the state eagerly accommo-
dates those whose tales it wants to hear. Such tactics, just as those on
display in The Crucible, relegate the truth secondary to governmental
and personal expediency. Further, cloaked as these tactics are in per-
ceived necessity and good motive, they too look to plausibility to acquire
moral acceptance.
For Miller, the option, while conceivably plausible, can never gather
moral acceptance. He advances this thesis in nearly all the scenes alluded
to and in his parting characterization of Hale and Danforth." Notwith-
standing Hale's good purpose, the audience knows fully that the confes-
sions he elicits from Tituba's and the girls' fear are dishonest and so-
cially disunifying. If Hale would want to learn the identity of the oppres-
sors, as his coaxing and suggestions imply, then Tituba and the girls will
gladly furnish any number of likely names from around the community.
It is simply easier to confess and name others than it is to hang for the
truth. Of course, Proctor gets it right when he learns from Hale in Act
Two that several others have also succumbed to the option:
Hale: Mister, I have myself examined ... others that have confessed
to dealing with the Devil. They have confessed it.
124. Id. at 46.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 113-14.
127. Id. at 118.
128. See id. at 141-44.
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Proctor: And why not, if they must hang for denyin' it? There are
them that will swear to anything before they'll hang; have you never
thought of that?'2
Ironically, after Danforth points the option in Proctor's direction
towards the end of Act Three, it is Hale in Act Four who would have
Proctor lie to save his life." Hale thus comes to personify that capacity
in all of us to pave a road to Hell with good intentions. He realizes that
the option speaks to sheer legal expediency, yet his knowledge of the
moral trickery involved does not discourage him from urging its use
upon Proctor. Hale's mission has ceased to be soul-saving. Neither
Proctor's nor the community's nor his own moral life has any meaning.
The same can be said of Danforth toward the play's end. He retains full
allegiance in the option, not for any potential it might have for producing
a moral or social good, but for its capacity to shore up his own "moral"
authority. For him the option cannot accommodate an evident lie, for it
would then necessarily speak to some lie about that authority. However,
as Danforth indicates in his last exchange with Proctor, he will readily
accept a lie if the lie can be mistaken for the truth.-" The coercive option
rings morally hollow in Salem.
As a consequence, legal punishment in The Crucible becomes little
more than an expression of futility. Miller establishes the point in a series
of brief scenes in Act Four. The jail sequence involving Tituba and Sarah
Good offers droll mockery of Salem justice. Witches both, they deserve
some punishment, but awash in Herrick's cider and comic hopes of Sa-
tanic rescue they seem oblivious to imprisonment's sting." The audience
perceives them throughout the scene as marginally harmless creatures
whose presence in jail accentuates the absence of Salem's genuine mis-
creants. Later in the Act, Miller focuses on the consequences of impris-
oning Salem's innocents. Here, punishment's futility is evoked through
references to vagrant cattle, wandering children, rotting crops, and ru-
mors of rebellion. Salem is on the verge of social suicide.
We then learn of Giles Corey's demise as told by Elizabeth.'" The
futility of killing Giles is apparent on two fronts. Giles is pressed to death
for his refusal to enter a plea, but by refusing to plea Giles legally pre-
vents the theocracy from confiscating his lands and possessions.'" Nor
129. Id. at68-69.
130. See id. at 141.
131. See id. at 134-44.
132. See id. at 122.
133: See id. at 130.
134. See id. at 135.
135. See Samuelson, supra note 82, at 642 n.42. If a person refused to answer a charge, then the
matter could not proceed to trial. See id. The state could resort to peine forte et dure to induce a plea,
as it did in Giles's case. See id. However, as Elizabeth tells Proctor, if the person still refused to
answer, as did Giles, then the state could not seize that person's property. See MILJER, supra note 2,
at 135; see also CHADWICK HANSEN, WrTHcRAFT AT SALEM 153 (1969).
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can the theocracy derive the slightest, even pretended, moral satisfaction
from executing Giles, since his refusal to deny the charge of witchcraft
erases the usual proof of the charge's legitimacy. Lastly, futility emerges
as an indelible fixture of Proctor's imprisonment and execution. Al-
though imprisonment succeeds in transforming Proctor into "another
man" physically, it has not broken his resolve." He goes to his death at
the end as defiant as Giles, causing Danforth's parting words, "Hang
them high,"" to sound out in abject frustration.
We thus see in Miller's thematic treatment of legal punishment a
thorough repudiation of Devlin's thesis. Legal punishment cannot pre-
serve Salem's society or morality any more than legal coercion can. Ac-
cordingly, because it is lacking in moral instrumental value, punishment
ultimately emerges in the play as the mere brute expression of human
suffering and sacrifice--a thing of evil. Furthermore, since Miller selects
for our attention the deaths of virtuous persons at play's end, we must
conclude that it is an evil that temporarily triumphs. Miller thereby gives
shape to what would become Hart's direst warning: "Morality, what
crimes may be committed in thy name!"'
C. The Final Judge: "There be no higher judge under Heaven than
Proctor is!"
39
Miller notes with approval in the play's epilogue, Echoes Down the
Corridor, that twenty years after the last hanging the theocracy no longer
controlled Massachusetts.'" This observation recalls another of Hart's:
There are some societies whose disintegration is morally better than their
continued existence. Miller's comment also points out in concluding
fashion the supreme folly of assuming, as did Devlin, that social and
moral existence depend upon the legal enforcement of morality. This
assumption, as we have seen, may produce an unwelcome opposite ef-
fect.
But outweighing such reflections on social collapse is Miller's re-
minder in the epilogue that moral conditions seemed to have improved
with the theocracy's disappearance.'' In 1712, the government offered
compensation to surviving victims and ordered the congregation to re-
scind excommunications."' In addition, and far more importantly, several
church members on their own issued a statement urging forgiveness from
all who suffered during the witch hunt.'4 This last fact, a testament to the
136. MILLER, supra note 2, at 133.
137. Id. at 144.
138. Hat, supra note 4, at 54.
139. MIUER, supra note 2, at 137.





DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
worth of voluntary morality, encourages an examination of how else-
where in the play worthy individual morality is depicted as a thing to be
achieved and sustained.
In this context we return to Proctor and to the development in his
character of a moral vision that permits him at the play's conclusion to
lay a claim to a "shred of goodness."'" In presenting this vision, Miller
once again reveals an unmistakable kinship to Hart and John Stuart Mill.
All three would agree that a good life is premised upon a social alle-
giance to individual liberty bounded by universal virtues of moral con-
duct. To reiterate Hart's articulation of them, these virtues comprise a
willingness to apply general social rules impartially to oneself and others
in moral relationships; a recognition in one's conduct of the wants, ex-
pectations, and reactions of others; and, a regard for self-discipline and
control as adaptive requirements for participating in a system of recipro-
cal claims. Miller not only displays a similar appreciation for such vir-
tues, he posits them as essential criteria for charting Proctor's moral edu-
cation. Further, he insists, quite in keeping with Hart and Mill's senti-
ments, that one regard these virtues as qualities to be learned and culti-
vated voluntarily by means of advice, example, and argument. In so do-
ing, he ultimately gathers attention to the central informing principle of
this play and the work of both Hart and Mill: morality, once secured vol-
untarily by means of such virtues, will ensure that evil's triumphs re-
main, at worst, momentary.
According to Hart's three principles, Proctor must be counted a
moral failure throughout most of the play. First, he exhibits no feel for
the impartial application of social rules. Rather, always preferring to play
according to his own rules, he is arrogant and socially disconnected. For
example, he will not attend church services regularly and refuses to have
his third son baptized, both on account of his hatred of Parris." Moreo-
ver, he says he would join a faction, if he could find one, in order to op-
pose Parris, Putnam, and anyone, we may suppose, whose "authority"
offends his sense of "smell."" Proctor, of course, favors his own author-
ity, and he does not hesitate to impose it on others when, in his opinion,
the occasion so warrants. In this regard, we see Proctor violating the sec-
ond of Hart's principles. For Proctor would much rather control others
than fashion his own conduct according to what others need and expect
from him. We again note his curt dismissal of Abigail in Act One, and
further, how he answers her criticisms of Elizabeth with threats of whip-
ping.'" He uses the same threat against Mary Warren in Act Two when
he scolds her for leaving the Proctor house against his orders.'" At the
144. ld. at 144.
145. Seeid. at28-29.
146. See id. at 31.
147. See id. at 24.
148. See id. at 55.
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act's end he orders Mary to accompany him to court.'" When she resists
the command, he uses force to bend her will.'" We recall the earlier
scene in Act Two when, alone with Elizabeth, he orders that she desist in
doubting him.' | He regrets his prior demonstrations of meekness: "I
should have roared you down."" But we know, along with Proctor, that
for all of his attempts to control others, he has failed miserably in con-
trolling himself. Evidence of this violation of Hart's third principle ap-
pears throughout the play's first three acts. Speaking against him in this
respect is his adulterous conduct with Abigail preceding the action, and
indications offered by his own admission in Act One and by Elizabeth's
suspicions in Act Two that he has had difficulty in ridding Abigail from
his thoughts.'" In Act Two we also become aware that Proctor's undisci-
plined self has tragically prevented him from calling out Abigail sooner
than he does.'
Proctor thereby has permitted his conduct, by turns reckless and un-
responsive, to be a source of his own and of others' undoing. Signifi-
candy, at the end of Act Three, events cause him to blaspheme and to
denounce both himself and Danforth.'" At this point Proctor has come to
understand the fruits of his hypocrisy and so has the audience. We are
tempted to recall his admonition to Elizabeth in Act Two to see some
good in him, and to wonder in retrospect what goodness ought to have
attached to this man who always insisted upon playing according to his
own rules and who, oblivious of the consequences, would control others
without giving a thought to controlling himself,"
Yet, if Proctor exaggerated his goodness in the earlier interlude with
his wife, he surely exaggerates his wickedness by condemning himself at
the conclusion of the trial scene. His attempt to save Elizabeth and his
friends, his public confession of adultery, as well as his guilt all belie
genuine evil in his make up.'-' Nor would either Hart or Mill perceive
evil in Proctor. Mill's thinking on this topic is especially apposite. Mill
would regard Proctor merely as someone who has reaped the woes of
self-regarding faults. Proctor's "rashness, obstinacy, self-conceit,"'" his
pursuit of "animal pleasures at the expense of those of feeling and intel-
lect"'" are traits rightfully likely to arouse social reproval, and they right-
fully deserve correction through "self-development."'' However, they do
149. See id. at 80.
150. See id. at 80-81.
151. See id. at 54-55.
152. Id. at 55.
153. See id. at 54.
154. See id. at 77.
155. See id. at 119-20.
156. See id. at 55.
157. See id. at It3-14, 141-43.
158. Miu, supra note 1l, at78.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 79.
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not make Proctor evil. According to Mill, genuine evil resides in cruelty,
envy, covetousness, and total preoccupation with self above others."'
These traits constitute what Mill terms "an odious moral character,"' 2
and with these traits in mind, Mill would join the audience in identifying
Abigail, Parris, Putnam, and possibly Danforth as figuring among the
play's evil characters, not Proctor.'
Proctor, then, is very much in need of moral self-development. He
achieves this goal throughout Act Four. Miller invites us to view Proc-
tor's moral education, and hence everyone's, as an achievement that nec-
essarily must issue from the exercise of free will."' It is up to the individ-
ual to chart a moral course and to the individual to assess the efficacy of
such a course. The play furnishes ample proof that the law, although it
certainly may channel conduct through fear, has properly nothing to do
with shaping one's moral development. Nor is it the responsibility of
those possessing true moral authority to direct or judge the moral course
of another. However, others may assist through advice, example, and
argument. The point echoes directly from Mill, finding appropriate re-
statement in Hart. Mill says this:
Considerations to aid [the individual's] judgment, exhortations to
strengthen his will, may be offered to him, even obtruded on him, by
others; but he himself is the final judge. All errors which he is likely
to commit against advice or warning, are far outweighed by the evil
of allowing others to constrain him to what they deem his good.'
0
Proctor learns through Elizabeth's advice that he must become his own
judge." Through the moral influence of Elizabeth and others, he also
learns that his proper moral course is to die rather than sacrifice his own
and his fellows' good name. As her husband's principal moral advisor,
Elizabeth strikes one as a proper student of Mill. She will advise Proctor,
but she will not offer him her moral judgments on specific conduct. We
see her exhibit this attitude from first to last. In Act Two she reminds
Proctor of her advice to go to Salem to put an end to the fraud.' Proctor
has declined to heed her, yet she will not judge his tarrying. Neither will
161. Seeid.at78.
162. Id. at 79.
163. In his Introduction to the Collected Plays, Miller expresses disappointment that he did not
render Danforth more obviously a man of evil, referring specifically to Danforth's willingness to
allow Elizabeth's testimony to decide his course of action. See MILLER, supra note 92, at 43.
However, Danforth at the end is unwilling to hear further arguments concerning the accused's guilt,
lest postponement speak of "fiounderimg" on his part. MILLER, supra note 2, at 129. His resistance to
postponement, given its consequences, might fit within Mill's definition of cruelty enough to
warrant regarding Danforth as an evil person. But see Samuelson, supra note 82, at 640-41
(providing possible justifications for Danforth's actions).
164. See MILLER, supra note 2, at 135-36.
165. Miu, supra note I1, at 77.
166. See MILLER, supra note 2, at 137.
167. See id. at 53.
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she judge his conduct favorably, despite his entreaties to see some good
in him. "I cannot judge you,"'" she says. Instead, she tells Proctor to look
to the magistrate who sits in his heart for proper judgment.'" She reveals
having acted upon her own advice when, in Act Four, she admits to
Proctor that a reading of her own heart has revealed serious imperfec-
tions." Therefore, insisting that one follow one's own conscience, she
refuses to judge his early decision to confess for living's sake."' She re-
fuses even though she told Hale just beforehand that opting for this
choice would amount to accepting "the Devil's argument.""
Both Elizabeth and Proctor realize that goodness, horribly, lies in
opting for death, but she would not make that choice for him either.
Rather, she acknowledges a wonderful goodness she has at last discov-
ered in him and his own capacity to make this decision for himself. She
tells him: "There be no higher judge under Heaven than Proctor is! ... I
never knew such goodness in the world!"'" Proctor at first does not un-
derstand her, his self-loathing having permitted him at this point only the
personal judgment that he is "no good man," and not one to be confused
with the saints who go to their rest." As "no good man" he would have
his life.
Elizabeth's advice and counseling thus prove insufficient in them-
selves to position her husband to consider the choice that would allow
him to claim some goodness. But her advice is only a beginning. Moreo-
ver, other means exist to assist Proctor in completing his moral educa-
tion, namely, example and argument. Elizabeth's example of judging
herself but not others has had a serious impact on Proctor. "I speak my
own sins. I cannot judge another," he tells Danforth when questioned
about Rebecca Nurse." He cannot bring himself to blacken a worthy
person's name. In his refusal to call out Rebecca, one readily perceives
the influence of Proctor's friend, Giles Corey. Corey's demise initially
staggers Proctor. He is "numbed"" when Elizabeth informs him of the
pressing. He can merely repeat Giles's last words." When Elizabeth la-
bels Giles a "fearsome man,""' Proctor is silent. He would rather broach
the topic of his own survival than contemplate Giles's character. Giles
cannot be too far from his thoughts, however, because he quickly in-
quires about Giles's wife, Martha."' Then, to rationalize a decision to
168. ld. at 135.
169. See id. at 55.
170. See id. at 136-37.
171. See id. at 135.
172. Id. at 132.
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174. Id. at 136.
175. Id. at 141.
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keep his life, Proctor interjects a premise he knows to be a straw man: "I
cannot mount the gibbet like a saint," he protests, "I am not that man,'"
meaning Giles.
Clearly, Giles never had any claim to sainthood. Only too often has
he revealed himself as fractious, meddlesome, hard-headed, irascible,
and loose-mouthed."' Giles's loose mouth, in fact, is partially account-
able for his wife's imprisonment." His faults notwithstanding, Giles is
brave and knows right from wrong. Further, the audience understands
that he shares these qualities with Proctor--that he and Giles, in certain
respects, are the same man. Giles goes to court to save his wife and oth-
ers. Proctor does the same. Giles calls out Thomas Putnam.13 Proctor
follows suit by calling out Abigail.'" Giles would rather die than call out
his friends and betray his own name. Proctor knows that the proper
course is to follow Giles's good example.
Still Proctor wavers, preferring "the Devil's argument."83 Against
this argument is pitted another, one voiced simply and resolutely by Re-
becca Nurse who is shocked and saddened to discover Proctor's buck-
ling.'" "[l]t is a lie, it is a lie," she answers Danforth when asked to con-
fess."' "[H]ow may I damn myself? I cannot, I cannot."'" Having heard
Rebecca's declaration, Proctor must choose. On the one side is the argu-
ment of expediency, one with whose terms and consequences Proctor has
long been familiar. On the other side is the argument of plain truth, one
he has long sought to ignore. He opts for the truth upon discovering that
to do otherwise requires the sacrifice of his name.'" His good name, he
learns, one he can pass on to his family and to the community, is worth
the price of this life.
Proctor can now, in a manner that would fully meet with Hart's and
Mill's approval, reap the benefits of his moral development. As his own
judge, he can forgive his prior social aloofness, his disregard for others,
and his immoderation. He can claim a shred of goodness by heeding Re-
becca's argument and following Giles's example. "He have his goodness
now,""0 observes Elizabeth, as Proctor goes to the scaffold. According to
Miller, it was a goodness that was to survive in Salem.
180. Id.
181. See id. at 40-41.
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CONCLUSION
Readers attracted to The Crucible and to the work of Devlin and
Hart may find it serendipitous that Miller's thinking on law and morals
was so intimately connected to that of the these legal writers that he was
able to simulate thei" argument in dramatic form six years before its en-
try into philosophical circles. Of course, by coincidence strong political
crosscurrents were blowing on both sides of the Atlantic at the time,
prompting strong responses. Miller, by his acknowledgment, had the
proceedings of Senator McCarthy's House on Unamerican Activities
Commission (H.U.A.C.) in mind when he wrote the play,"' just as Devlin
was spurred to write by the recommendations of the Wolfenden Com-
mittee. But coincidence would not explain Miller's reaction to events in
America any more than it could explain Devlin's reaction to similar
events taking place in Great Britain, nor Hart's reaction to Devlin's. To
explain these, one would have to look to the tension that since Mill's day
has accompanied conservative and classical liberal efforts to define the
contours of liberty, morality, and social order, and to the circumstances
that encouraged these writers, by different means, to take one side or the
other.
On the business of taking sides, I think it would miss the mark to
conclude that Lord Devlin would have sided either with the McCarthy-
ites or the likes of Deputy Governor Danforth. Neither Hart nor Miller
would readily have it so. Rather, they might argue that Devlin's assump-
tions, if pressed to their theoretical limits, could have found favor for the
best of motives in very unpleasant quarters. But it should not be forgot-
ten, as one commentator has recently observed, that Mill's own thinking
on freedom can be viewed largely as based on hunches concerning its
long-range benefits." Miller is wedded to these hunches inasmuch as
they found validation in society's repudiation of the Salem witch trials,
the H.U.A.C. proceedings, Stalinism, Maoism, and other obvious tyran-
nies. Whether the play, Hart's, or Mill's work speaks persuasively to
issues of penumbral harm might be another matter. Is the law really over-
reaching, for example, where it sees fit to regulate the use of tobacco
products or alcohol, or where it proscribes gambling, euthanasia, dueling,
begging, and the like?' 3 The debate seems far from over.
My final thoughts concern the consequences that have attended the
different means by which these writers have presented their arguments.
Formally, Miller's world of discourse exists far apart from Devlin's and
Hart's, this difference apparently having prevented any consideration of
how their works may speak to one another. As I indicated at the outset of
this article, one will not find any reference to The Crucible in the debate
commentaries. I will add here that no reference to my knowledge exists
191. See ILLER, supra note 92, at 41.
192. See Murphy, supra note 8, at 77.
193. See Wasserstrom, supra note 8, at 7.
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of the Hart-Devlin debate in the canon that has developed around the
play. These facts should come as a surprise on the basis of the works'
contemporaneous writing, their enduring influence, and their uncanny
similarity in thought. I have joined them here momentarily, therefore, to
build a much needed bridge. To those among my audience possessing
interests in legal philosophy, I reiterate my belief that Miller's unique
voice should be added to the debate. Any among them having occasion
to teach courses in Jurisprudence or Law and Literature will find The
Crucible a worthy course addition. To readers who enjoy teaching The
Crucible, I recommend the Hart-Devlin debate as an instructive com-
panion piece.
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APPENDIX
Act One (An Overture): Spring, 1692-The house of the Rev. Samuel
Parris, a minion among Salem's theocracy.
The act begins with Paris having discovered his house-slave
Tituba, his daughter Betty, his niece Abigail, and other girls participating
in nighttime dancing and perhaps conjuring. The discovery prompts
Betty to collapse into a trance, leaving Parris to worry over the possibil-
ity of witchcraft. Abigail denies any Devil trafficking. The act ends with
the house-slave, niece, and daughter hysterically denouncing several
townspeople of low repute as witches.
Miller introduces all but two of the play's memorable characters in
the beginning act. After the four just mentioned, we encounter by turns
Thomas Putnam, a prosperous landowner, Ann Putnam, Thomas's wife;
John Proctor, a local farmer, Giles Corey, another farmer and Proctor's
aged friend; Mary Warren, Proctor's servant; and Rebecca Nurse, a pious
and saintly woman of the community. Directly or indirectly, the cause of
these characters' arrival on the scene is Betty's unusual behavior, news
of it, and associated rumors of witchcraft by now running through the
town. Putnam sees in it the work of the Devil. Parris, new to Salem and
generally disliked by his congregation, initially recoils at the suggestion,
fearing added damage to his reputation. Nevertheless, he has called upon
the Rev. John Hale from a nearby village to investigate, Hale being an
expert in such matters. Proctor, a practical man, is skeptical, as is Re-
becca, who senses Betty's confusion and fear. Hale arrives. He learns
that Tituba conducted an authentic conjuring on the night of the dancing.
His resolute, leading, and threatening questioning of Abigail and Tituba
causes these two to begin the accusations of others. These others, it
seems, have sent out their spirits to afflict Tituba and the girls. This turn
of events frees Betty from her trance so that she may add her voice to the
denunciations.
One cannot appreciate the remainder of the story without attending
to some additional information supplied in Act One. From external
quarters, the colony was experiencing vexing political change, some
among the theocracy seeing ample evidence of the Devil's stamp in the
current political condition. And, of course, wherever Lucifer lurked,
churchmen and government leaders alike required that he must be rooted
out. Internally, Salem's politics had deteriorated into a factionalism that
pitted the camp of Thomas Putnam, a thoroughly disagreeable soul,
against that of Francis Nurse, Rebecca's husband. Putnam, with Parris
squarely behind him, will eventually win out as a ringleader in the
witchhunt purge. Act One gives us a taste of things to come in a couple
of scenes. In the first, Putnam squabbles with Proctor over Nurse's right
to sell Proctor the land from which Proctor gathers wood, Putnam
claiming the land as his own. This follows an earlier heated exchange
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wherein Proctor challenged and ridiculed Putnam's authority. Giles
Corey sides with Nurse and Proctor in this matter of the wood, thereby
incurring Putnam's threat of a writ. Later, Giles will accuse Putnam of
denouncing others in order to grab up their land, this charge ultimately
leading to Giles's demise. In the other, and more startling scene, Ann
Putnam reveals to the group that she sent her daughter to the conjuring to
find the cause of her seven still-borns. She refuses to countenance the
rebuke that immediately issues from Rebecca. Later, Rebecca will be
charged with the supernatural murders of Ann's babies.
For dramatic purposes, the most important relationship unearthed in
Act One is that between Proctor and Abigail. Seven months before the
events of Act One take place, Proctor's wife, Elizabeth, dismissed Abi-
gail from her household employ upon learning that Abigail and Proctor
had committed adultery with one another. Abigail despises Elizabeth,
and, during the conjuring, drank a potion to bring about Elizabeth's
death. She would have Proctor for her own. She attempts to rekindle the
flame when the two of them are alone together early in the act, but
Proctor will have none of it. Interestingly, she tells him that the dancing,
being mere silliness, had nothing to do with witchcraft and that Betty's
condition was brought on simply by her father's discovery of events. In
Act Two, her charges of witchcraft against Elizabeth will result in Eliza-
beth's arrest.
Act Two: Eight days later--Proctor's home.
Elizabeth Proctor makes her first appearance. Outside, the air is
heated by witchcraft proceedings underway in the village. Abigail, as-
sisted by other girls, including Mary Warren, is calling out names of
witches at court. Several persons have been arrested. Inside, Proctor's
home is chilled by Elizabeth's lingering disappointment over her hus-
band's infidelity, and lately over her husband's reluctance to report to the
authorities Abigail's prior minimization of the dancing and Betty's con-
dition. Mary Warren enters, interrupting an argument between the Proc-
tors. She brings sad tidings: the number of those arrested has increased
substantially, and one is condemned to hang. She tells the Proctors that
Elizabeth's name is "somewhat mentioned" in court. Enter now Hale,
repeating much of Mary's news, and adding that Rebecca Nurse's name
is mentioned along with Elizabeth's. Incredulous, Proctor tells Hale
about Abigail's denial of any witchcraft. This news only partially regis-
ters with Hale, for now enter Giles and Francis Nurse with word that
their wives have been arrested. Giles regrets earlier having told the
authorities that his wife, Martha, had lately taken up reading books at
night. The act ends with Elizabeth herself being carted off to jail. Proctor
forces Mary Warren to admit the fraud. They are both poised now to
expose it in court.
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Act Three: A few days later-The court of Judge Danforth, the Deputy
Governor.
Miller describes Judge Danforth, the chief jurist in the proceedings,
as a grave but not humorless man. By now his court has arrested hun-
dreds of individuals, sentencing seventy-two to hang, including Rebecca
Nurse. Danforth greets Mary's words with high skepticism when Mary
finally gathers the courage to tell the court that there never were any af-
flicting spirits-it was all pretence. Proctor also charges the girls with
fraud, echoing charges brought earlier by Giles and Francis Nurse. Giles,
irascible and pugnacious, will find himself jailed at the act's end for
contempt of court. He declares that Thomas Putnam is fabricating accu-
sations of witchcraft against local farmers in order to buy up their land.
In addition, he threatens Putnam's life. Later, he will be charged with
witchcraft, and, refusing to plead, will be pressed to death. Focusing now
on Mary, we witness a gradual waning of courage once Abigail and the
other girls make an appearance--pretending that Mary's spirit afflicts
them. Attention shifts to Proctor, who desperately pulls Abigail to her
feet and calls her out as a whore. He then publicly owns up to his lechery
with her. Danforth declares that Abigail will pay dearly if Elizabeth can
corroborate the charge. Elizabeth cannot do this, preferring instead to
save Proctor's name. Proctor tries then to stiffen Mary Warren's resolve,
but Mary buckles after the girls once again turn on her, this time howling
their pretended afflictions. She rejoins the girls and accuses Proctor of
witchcraft. Wholesale pandemonium results. Proctor damns himself and
Danforth, and is hauled away. Hale quits the court, convinced finally of
the fraud.
Act Four: The autumn of 1692-A cell in the Salem jail.
Proctor awaits his execution. So many people are jailed now that
wandering orphans and untended cattle are common features in Salem's
gloomy landscape. Word of rebellion emerges. The action moves quickly
from a comic jailhouse interlude involving Tituba, fellow witch, Sarah
Good, and the drunken Gaoler, Herrick, to a touching scene in which
Proctor, in Elizabeth's and Danforth's presence, considers arguments for
saving his life. All he need do is confess to witchcraft. Moments before,
the transformed Hale entreated Elizabeth to urge Proctor to confess for
life's sake. She refuses. Danforth would like a confession for purposes of
vindicating the court. Elizabeth informs Proctor of Giles's death, leaving
him awed over the man's courage. He tells Elizabeth that his own weak-
ness renders him a creature apart, that he doesn't belong in this company
of saints. He asks his wife for guidance, but Elizabeth, who would
clearly have Proctor live, insists that he decide on his own. He tells her
within the hearing of Rebecca, who is ashamed for him, that he would
speak the lie to have his life. He then quickly signs the confession, but
just as quickly tears it up. Danforth insists that the confession be publicly
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INTRODUCTON
Federal judges survive as the only romantic figures in the three
branches of government. Executive officials appear entangled in admin-
istrative bureaucracies and rarely emerge other than as functionaries.
Service in Congress seems less a personal enterprise as the cost of elec-
tions, the structure of committees, the demands of constituents, the eso-
teric rules, and the proliferation of staff turn the legislator into a manager
and a fundraiser. Judges, however, control their courtrooms and person-
ally resolve issues of national importance. They stand against popular
prejudice, redress wrongs, and thunder against mendacity and greed.
Even the criticism of judges condemns their idiosyncrasies and their
ability to implement personal visions of the law.
Given this perception, the links between courts and bureaucracy
may seem strange, even jarring. Yet, in this article, I assert that the dis-
cussion of the future of the federal courts requires an examination of
theories about executive bureaucracies. The romantic vision of federal
judges captures one, but increasingly not the most, salient aspect of the
federal judiciary. The recent literature regarding the judiciary chronicles
the decline of this romantic perception and reflects unease, if not con-
cern, about the future. Indeed, the fear of bureaucratic justice lies beneath
much of the debate about civil justice reform. For example, participants
in the debate about civil justice reform have repeatedly written about
bureaucracy in examining the federal courts and their future.' Com-
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1. Discussions of bureaucracy have occupied a significant amount of the literature addressing
civil justice reform and the future of the federal courts. Several books and articles use conceptions of
bureaucracy as a central point of discussion. See DAVID NACHMIAS & DAVID H. ROSENBLWOM,
BUREAUCRATIC GOVERNMENT USA 141, 141 (1980) (asserting that "while the judicial system has
always been bureaucratic in terms of structure, it is now operating in an increasingly bureaucratic
fashion as well"); David S. Clark, Adjudication to Administration: A Statistical Analysis of Federal
District Courts in the Twentieth Century, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 65, 66-67 (1981) (illustrating the
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transformation of judges into administrators and rejecting the current judicial reform movement's
emphasis on bureaucratic efficiency); Harry T. Edwards, The Rising Work Load and Perceived
"Bureaucracy" of the Federal Courts: A Causation-Based Approach to the Search for Appropriate
Remedies, 68 IOWA L. REV. 871, 878-90, 927-28 (1983) (discussing and rejecting the theory of
bureacratization of the federal court system but offering alternative dispute resolution (ADR) as a
remedy to the growth in judges' case-loads); Owen I. Fiss, The Bureaucratization of the Judiciary,
92 YALE L.J. 1442, 1442-43, 1462 (1983) [hereinafter Fiss, Bureaucratization] (delineating, through
analysis of particular scholarship, the bureaucratization of the judiciary as an inevitable process for
which potential problems can be minimized); Wolf V. Heydebrand, The Context of Public Bureauc-
racies: An Organizational Analysis of Federal District Courts, I 1 L. & Soc'y REv. 759, 759-60
(1977) (detailing the growing bureaucratization of courts and in turn rejecting that bureaucratization
as a strategy for dealing with court growth); Patrick E. Higginbotham, Bureaucracy-The Carci-
noma ofthe Federal Judiciary, 31 ALA. L. REV. 261,264-65 (1980) (warning that the growth in the
use of magistrates and administrative law judges is infecting the federal judiciary with a "carcino-
gen" bureaucracy); Wade H. McCree, Jr., Bureaucratic Justice: An Early Warning, 129 U. PA. L.
REV. 777, 777-81 (1981) (warning that the increase in the number of federal judges, law clerks, and
staff attorneys, as well as the decrease in full court opinions may transform federal courts into bu-
reaucracies); Gilbert S. Merritt, Owen Fiss on Paradise Lost: The Judicial Bureaucracy in the Ad-
ministrative State, 92 YALE LJ. 1469 (1983) (recognizing federal judges as administrators); Bernard
S. Meyer, Justice, Bureaucracy, Structure, and Simplification, 42 MD. L. REv. 659, 667 (1983)
(arguing that inter- and intra-goverumental relations are fostering bureaucracy in the judiciary and
offering solutions including the restructuring of the functioning of legislative bodies and the courts,
and simplifying court procedures); William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Appellate Justice
Bureaucracy and Scholarship, 21 U. MicH. J.L REFORM 623, 624-25, 646 (1988) (discussing
scholarly criticism alleging bureaucratization of the United States Courts of Appeals and why such
criticism has resulted in little change in judicial behavior); Alvin B. Rubin, Bureaucratization of the
Federal Courts: The Tension Between Justice and Efficiency, 55 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 648, 654
(1980) (detailing the increased workload of the federal courts and suggesting management tech-
niques and methods to "halt the dilution of judicial responsibility"); Joseph Vining, Justice, Bu-
reaucracy, and Legal Method, 80 MIcH. L. REV. 248, 251 (1981) (arguing that "[bureaucratiztion
is reflected in the elaboration of the Court's institutional organization, particularly its hierarchical
aspect"); Patricia M. Wald, Bureaucracy and the Courts, 92 YALE LJ. 1478, 1478-79, 1485 (1983)
[hereinafter Wald, Bureaucracy & Courts) (agreeing with Owen Fiss's general approach, but parting
with Fiss on a specific solution); Patricia M. Wald, The Problem with the Courts: Black-Robed
Bureaucracy, or Collegiality Under Challenge?, 42 MD. L. REv. 766, 766-69 (1983) [hereinafter
Wald, Black-Robed Bureaucracy] (refuting the idea that federal appeals courts are becoming a
bureaucracy but recognizing that some institutional limitations need to be implemented in order to
retain judges' abilities for personalized decision making).
Other articles use conceptions of bureaucracy as criteria for the examination of specific
aspects of the federal courts. See Thomas E. Baker, Intramural Reforms: How the U.S. Courts of
Appeals Have Helped Themselves, 22 FLA. ST. U. L REv. 913, 943-51 (1995) [hereinafter Baker,
Intramural Reforms] (describing the expansion in the number of federal judicial support personnel
and relating the concern that dependence on appellate staff has bureaucratized the judicial process);
Thomas E. Baker, Proposed Intramural Reforms: What the U.S. Courts of Appeals Might Do to Help
Themselves, 25 ST. MARY'S LJ. 1321, 1357-58 (1994) [hereinafter Baker, Proposed Reforms]
(comparing the present bureaucracy of appellate judging with the role of an appellate judge 20 years
ago); Philip B. Kurland & Dennis J. Hutchinson, The Business of the Supreme Court, O.T. 1982, 50
U. Ctl. L. REv. 628, 636-37 (1983) (commenting on the bureaucracy of the Supreme Court); John
H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. Cit. L. REV. 823, 823 (1985) (ar-
guing that "Continental civil procedure," such as is found in Germany, "avoids the most troublesome
aspects" of U.S. civil procedure by taking the judicial process out of partisan hands, and "assigning
judges rather than lawyers to investigate the facts"); Otto R. Skopil, Jr., Long Range Planning in the
Federal Judiciary: Some Observations on a Work in Progress, 14 MISS. C. L REV. 199, 204-05
(1994) (emphasizing that the federal courts, in a structural administrative governance sense, am not a
hierarchical bureaucracy and as such "centralized plan formulation and implementation" in a corpo-
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monly, a particular aspect of the proposals regarding trial or appellate
practice is identified and then characterized as either engendering or re-
ducing bureaucracy in the courts. In this exercise, the courts may be com-
pared to the public bureaucracies of executive administrative agencies.!
This approach risks using language about bureaucracy as a rhetori-
cal device expressing approval or disapproval of the practice at issue.
Analysis turns on definition. The selection and application of the defini-
tion usually controls the result. Therefore, commentators can see the
same practice as a confirmation of bureaucracy as well as its rejection.!
rate manner is difficult); Robert S. Thompson, Legitimate and Illegitimate Decisional Inconsistency:
A Comment on Brilmayer's Wobble, or the Death of Error, 59 S. CAL L. REV. 423, 440-41 (1986)
(noting how hierarchical control in the name of efficiency sometimes results in information not
being "processed" by the "checks of adversarial process"); J. Harvie Wilkinson 11l, The Drawbacks
of Growth in the Federal Judiciary, 43 EMORY LJ. 1147, 1147 (1994) (arguing that "growth [in
caseload] is compromising the effectiveness of the federal function").
2. See, e.g., NACHMIAS & ROSENBLOOM, supra note I, at 170-71 (asserting that judges are
increasingly functioning as public bureaucrats by taking on administrative roles when their orders
involve reforms to public institutions); Clark, supra note 1, at 68-89 (noting that the administrative
trend in the judiciary may make it more closely resemble the executive branch of government);
Kurland & Hutchinson, supra note 1, at 636-37 (discussing the likelihood that, as with Cabinet
officers in the executive branch, judicial opinions are written by judicial staff rather than by judges
alone); Vining, supra note i, at 252-55 (arguing that if judicial opinions were to become the product
of clerks, rather than judges, such opinions would be treated with the same disregard lawyers have
for administrative opinions). But see, e.g., RICHARD J. RICHARDSON & KENNETH N. VINES, THE
POLITICs OF FEDERAL COURTS 167-69 (1970) (finding that federal courts are not bureaucratic; they
are instead political); Edwards, supra note 1, at 882-85 (distinguishing the judiciary from public
service bureaucracies and noting that though judges may delegate responsibilities, few are likely to
delegate decision making to their staffs).
3. The inconsistency of analysis arising from varying definitions of bureaucracy exists in
much of the literature addressing the growing bureaucratization of the federal judiciary in specific
contexts such as judicial clerks, compare Rubin, supra note 1, at 652 (arguing that the expanded
duties of law clerks creates a risk of institutional judging), with Edwards, supra note 1, at 885-89
(asserting that growth of judicial support staffs will not lead to judges delegating decision-making
authority to those staffs); central appellate staff, compare Richman & Reynolds, supra note 1, at
627-29, 636-38 (noting that over-reliance on staff attorneys endangers the judicial function), with
Wald, Black-Robed Bureaucracy, supra note 1, at 778-80, and Wald, Bureaucracy & Courts, supra
note 1, at 1485 (noting the benefits to a judge of having a central appellate staff); the number of
judges, compare Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 1164, 1172 (asserting that an increase in the number of
judges leads to more bureaucracy, thus arguing for limits on the expansion of the federal judiciary),
with Richman & Reynolds, supra note 1, at 625 (describing literature viewing the increase in judges
as an alternative to more administrative and bureaucratic approaches to justice); magistrate judges,
compare Higginbotham, supra note 1, at 266-67 (condemning the growth in the number of magis-
trate judges and other judicial officers as establishing a bureaucracy not subject to the protections
given to Article I judges), with Todd D. Peterson, Restoring Structural Checks on Judicial Power
in the Era of Managerial Judging, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 41, 92-105 (1995) (proposing greater use
of magistrate judges in pretrial to return accountability to the trial process); the institutions of judi-
cial administration (including the Judicial Conference, the Federal Judicial Center, and the Adminis-
trative Office of the United States), compare Clark, supra note i, at 76-77 (stating that judicial
institutions, such as the Judicial Conference of the United States and the Federal Judicial Center,
further the process of "[bJureaucratic coordination" in the operation of the federal courts), with
RICHARDSON & VINES, supra note 2, at 167-69 (arguing that the Judicial Conference and similar
institutions do not stifle judicial autonomy); and curtailing oral argument, compare McCree, supra
note 1, at 790-91 (emphasizing the risk of curtailing oral argument to the personalized judicial role),
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Indeed, activities of the court viewed as worthy of protection from bu-
reaucracy may be seen by others as the court's incorporation into the
bureaucracy. Of course, the choice of a definition can offer powerful
insights that help to frame the discussion. For example, Owen Fiss's pro-
posal that bureaucracy poses the danger of a lack of accountability and
responsibility identifies a central fear of bureaucracy at odds with the
perception of the judge as a personal decision maker.' The articulation of
that fear has influenced subsequent discussion: Even the most thorough
definitions, rigorously applied, however, can fail to clarify the discus-
sion. For example, David Nachmias's and David Rosenbloom's applica-
tion of Max Weber's definition of bureaucracy permits as much dispute
as it resolves.!
Commentators recognize that the discussion of procedural and
structural reforms implicates political and ideological considerations.
These considerations are perhaps easier to perceive on issues such as the
scope of federal jurisdiction" but they have been identified regarding
with Robert J. Martineau, The Value of Appellate Oral Argument: A Challenge to the Conventional
Wisdom, 72 IowA L. REv. 1, 28-29 (1986) (asserting that the court must employ oral argument
much less than it does now and that its construction must change if it is to be a useful tool at all).
4. Fiss, Bureaucratization, supra note 1, at 1443. Fiss expresses doubts about Max Weber's
definition of bureaucracy, which emphasizes rules governing conduct, and prefers the approach of
Hannah Arendt, which focuses on the impact on moral character of those within a bureaucracy
through the fragmentation of human experience and the loss of a sense of individual responsibility.
See id. at 1450-56.
5. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 1, at 880 Cagree(ing] with Fiss that bureaucracy in the
sense of 'Rule by Rules' is unlikely to overtake the federal judiciary"); Merritt, supra note 1, at
1469-72 & n.5 (reiterating Fiss's views but countering some of them, arguing that "Ithe advent of
the staff attorney, the summary affirmance, and oral dispositions from the bench seem justified, if
used within reasonable limits"); Wald, Bureaucracy & Courts, supra note 1 at 1479-83 (concurring
with Fiss that organizational reform of the judiciary is needed but rejecting his remedies as "too
much toward the quaintly anachronistic notion that judicial responsibility requires freeing judges
from worrying about how others act so that they can worry about doing everything themselves').
6. These authors base their analysis on Weber's description of bureaucracy and apply this
definition to the federal courts. NACHMAS & ROSENBLOOM, supra note 1, at 148-62. Their book is
notable for the rigor with which they apply Weber's definition and the range of aspects of the judici-
ary considered in this application. As noted above, different results might be reached by authors who
choose other definitions of bureaucracy. See supra note 3 (noting different definitions of bureauc-
racy in judicial institutions). In addition, different results could follow the application of Weber's
definition depending upon the aspects of the definition emphasized and the description of the cir-
cumstances to which it is applied.
7. Politics can be conceived, for example, both in terms of general values in conflict within
the political system and in terms of the advantages and disadvantages that jurisdictional rules impose
on different groups. As such, court commentators themselves conceive of politics in a number of
ways. See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, THE FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL ORDER: JUDICIAL
JURISDICTION AND AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORY 4-6, 17-19 (1991) (exploring how representa-
tional and counter-majoritarian principles have influenced federal jurisdiction); RUSSELL R.
WHEELER & CYNTHIA HARRISON, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., CREATING THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM
22 (1989) (noting that in creating the federal court system, questions surrounding the organization
and structure of federal courts were not mere technical questions, but at a deeper level passionate
political conflicts); Albert W. Alschuler, Mediation with a Mugger: The Shortage of Adjudicative
Services and the Need for a Two-Tier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1808, 1817-18
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practice and procedure as well.! At heart, the discussion consists more of
values than of techniques. Therefore, this portion of the literature rejects
an approach to the debate that sees it as deciding how the federal courts
can be more efficient-an approach that identifies reform as a technical
matter divorced from normative considerations. This portion of the lit-
erature recognizes the normative content of reform proposals but often
seeks to connect such content with specific values, such as judicial inde-
pendence or individual rights.9 These values are classically associated
with images of the federal courts.' However, these proposals fail to
identify a broader range of competing values.
Unfortunately, definitions of bureaucracy have also failed system-
atically to identify these normative considerations or to provide the basis
for organizing and analyzing the welter of proposals and accompanying
arguments. I believe, however, that the way one talks about bureaucracy
can contribute significantly to the discussion regarding the future of the
federal courts by identifying suppressed normative considerations, by
explaining inconsistencies in argumentation as clashes between compet-
ing visions of judicial legitimacy, and by demonstrating that civil justice
reform touches the deepest value conflicts in modem American public
law.
(1986) (emphasizing that rising caseloads reflect a growth in the availability of redress under law,
not an explosion of litigation); Arthur D. Hellman, Courting Disaster, 39 STAN. L. REv. 297, 311
(reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM (1985), and noting
the ideological foundations of judicial reform proposals); Mark Thshnet, General Principles of the
Revision of Federal Jurisdiction: A PoliticalAnalysis, 22 CONN. L. REV. 621,637-40 (1990) (high-
lighting that the branches of government are affected by different interest groups and that conflicts
about jurisdiction represent views on the character of the courts and the role of government, ex-
plaining why these differences prevent a consensus regarding the scope of federal jurisdiction in the
political branches or in the courts, and noting that changes in federal jurisdiction are sometimes
motivated not by caseloads but by a desire to change the way in which cases are decided); Wald,
Black-Robed Bureaucracy, supra note 1, at 771 (noting that the influx of cases "reflects more legal
protections, benefits, and access for those groups that previously only encountered the law as a
weapon aimed against them").
8. See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, Taking Aim at the American Legal System: The Council on
Competitiveness's Agenda for Legal Reform, 75 JUDICATURE 244, 250 (1992) (arguing that the
procedural court reforms proposed by the Council on Competitiveness implement a blatantly politi-
cal agenda); Matthew R. Kipp & Paul B. Lewis, Legislatively Directed Judicial Activism: Some
Reflections on the Meaning of the Civil Justice Reform Act, 28 U. MICH. J.L REFORM 305, 311-16
(1995) (noting Lockean views underlying traditional federal procedure); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr.,
American Law Institute Study on Paths to a "Better Way:" Litigation, Alternatives, and Accommo-
dation, 1989 DUKE LJ. 824, 847-50 (discussing the various values and perspectives at issue in
procedural reform); Tushnet, supra note 7, at 628, 630 (indicating how "the perceived need to do
something about the outcomes of the cases the courts are handling" is a reflection of "the politics of
jurisdictional revision").
9. See, e.g., discussion and sources cited supra note 7 (noting the different influences and
implications of procedural and structural reform on the federal court jurisdiction).
10. See, e.g., THE DECLARATtON OF INDEPENDENCE pant. 11 (U.S. 1776) ("He has made
Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of
their salaries.'); THE FEDERAtIsT No. 78, at 527 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)
(discussing life tenure of federal judges as a means of ensuring judicial independence to "guard the
[C]onstitution and the rights of individuals").
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I propose to demonstrate that an examination of a way in which le-
gal scholars have analyzed the structure of arguments about bureaucratic
practices in executive administration can advance the debate about the
future of the federal courts. To be successful in this regard, a language
about bureaucracy" must permit an observer to identify the underlying
values contained in the discussion, to place disparate practices and pro-
posals within that framework, and to recognize how arguments support-
ing a particular proposition may be inconsistent with one another, as well
as to predict the relationships between proposals and the values they
support. To do this, I use the work of two administrative law scholars,
Thomas Sargentich and Gerald Frug. Despite important differences be-
tween them, two of their articles provide comprehensive views of bu-
reaucracy that go beyond argument over definition. Because of this
comprehensiveness, they offer a more descriptive and analytical lan-
guage that I believe illuminates the discussion about the future of the
federal courts.
Thomas Sargentich's article, The Reform of the American Adminis-
trative Process: The Contemporary Debate,2 focuses on broad theories
about the "legitimacy and character of administrative decision making."'3
In so structuring the debate, Sargentich organizes proposals for reform of
the administrative process in an informative and analytically powerful
way. He identifies three ideals of the administrative process: the "Rule of
Law Ideal," the "Public Purposes Ideal," and the "Democratic Process
Ideal."" These ideals contain a core embodiment of how the administra-
tive process should operate." Because these ideals are not fully imple-
mented in the reality of administrative practice, each contains an altema-
tive expression reflecting the limitations that reality places on imple-
mentation of the corresponding core embodiment."' Each alternative ex-
pression also reflects the theoretical weaknesses of its respective core
embodiment.' The core embodiment of the Rule of Law Ideal is formal-
ism and its alternative expression is proceduralism. The core embodi-
ment of the Public Purposes Ideal is instrumentalism and its alternative
expression is the market. The core embodiment of the Democratic Proc-
11. To avoid repetition of and grammatical difficulties with the phrase, "a way of talking
about bureaucracy," I occasionally use the phrase, "a language about bureaucracy," as an alternative.
In doing so I do not contend that the articles that I will examine create a "language," nor do I use the
term in a figurative sense that they create something analogous to a language.
12. Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Reform of the American Administrative Process: The Contem-
porary Debate, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 385 [hereinafter Sargentich, American Administrative Process].
13. Id. at 394.
14. Id. at 392-93. Sargentich discusses the methodology of decision making in each of these
ideals in Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Future of Administrative Law, 104 HARV. L. REV. 769, 771
(1991) [hereinafter Sargentich, Future of Administrative Law] (reviewing CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY,
JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY (1990)).
15. See Sargentich, American Administrative Process, supra note 12, at 393.
16. See id. at 393-94.
17. See id. at 394-95.
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ess Ideal is participation and its alternative expression is oversight."
These ideals reflect general philosophical and ideological positions re-
garding the role of government and administration.
Gerald Frug's article, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American
Law," presents four stories or models that "justify bureaucracy."" These
stories seek to reassure us that bureaucracies, with their potential for
domination, are under control. Regardless, Frug argues that each is inca-
pable of providing a basis for the control of bureaucracy!' His discussion
unabashedly opposes bureaucratic organization, viewing it as inconsis-
tent with democratic life.' These stories he calls the "Formalist Model,"
the "Expertise Model," the "Judicial Review Model," and the "Mar-
ket/Pluralist Model.""' Although considerable correlation exists between
Sargentich's ideals and these models, there are important differences
between Sargentich and Frug?' For example, unlike Sargentich's reliance
on classical political theory, Frug relies on critical legal studies. He as-
serts that each model is doomed to failure because each relies on the im-
possible task of separating subjectivity and objectivity, the communal
and the shared, from the personal and the unique?5
In Part I, I use the analytical structures of these two articles to or-
ganize the arguments and proposals regarding civil justice reform and to
examine and critique their normative foundations. In so doing, I do not
rigidly follow either article, although the format of the presentation relies
on Sargentich's ideals. I do not contend that this undertaking incorpo-
rates the subtlety and nuance of either work, but I do believe that it cap-
tures the broad structures of analysis upon which I rely. With each of
these articles, I draw analogies between the corresponding comprehen-
sive formulations of a language about bureaucracy and the literature of
judicial reform. These comprehensive formulations provide a systematic
way of thinking and talking and they influence perspective and percep-
tion. I contend that Part I shows that this way of talking about bureauc-
racy helps to identify the values underlying the discussion regarding civil
justice reform and permits organization of civil justice reform arguments
and proposals around those values.
18. See id. at 395.
19. Gerald E. Frog, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276
(1984) [hereinafter Frog, Ideology of Bureaucracy].
20. id. at 1279; see id. at 1277-86 (using the areas of corporate and administrative law to
conduct his analysis).
21. See id. at 1277-78 (asserting that the stories are based on a single story which serves as a
"mechanism of deception").
22. See id. 1377-88 (using experiences in the Federal Circuit to examine arguments about
specialized courts and arguing that in the quest for freedom it is necessary to undermine the status
quo faith in bureaucratic organization as a protector of freedom).
23. Id. at 1282-84 (identifying the source and development of each story).
24. See infra notes 317-20 and accompanying text.
25. See Frog, Ideology of Bureaucracy, supra note 19, at 1286-88.
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In Part II, I explore some of the implications of the application of
these discourses about bureaucracy to the evaluation of civil justice re-
form. I do this first by making some more specific observations about the
analytical approaches employed in the two articles. This exploration also
uses specific examples to indicate how this conception of bureaucracy
empowers a new assessment of arguments in the literature of civil justice
reform. For example, I show how the cluster of arguments supporting
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) contains arguments incompatible
with one another because they arise from differing visions of the judici-
ary. In this context, I also develop Sargentich's conclusion that some
arguments relating the alternative expression of one ideal with the core
embodiment of another can seem consistent until analyzed in light of the
underlying visions of each ideal. 6
I also describe how the application of a language about bureaucracy
can enrich concepts important to the discussion of judicial reform. For
example, I address judicial independence and individual rights, two such
concepts that often appear in discussions of the future of the federal
courts. The language of bureaucracy discloses the varied and conflicting
meanings of these deceptively inclusive terms. Because the meanings of
these terms are altered with each normative vision of the judiciary, they
can neither organize nor illuminate the tensions between these visions
that underlie specific proposals.
The way in which Sargentich and Frug each talk about bureaucracy
also suggests an analytical methodology. For example, their discussions
render less useful dichotomous categories that encourage the balancing
of values. Because the debate regarding civil justice reform rests on con-
flicting visions of the judiciary, balancing cannot accommodate these
incommensurable normative positions. Sargentich and Frug approach
their tasks from different intellectual perspectives. These differences
emphasize the similarity of many of their insights and they offer some
clues to fruitful ways of evaluating issues of civil justice reform.
Despite the widespread use of language about bureaucracy in the
literature of judicial reform, it may still seem odd to rely on views of
executive administration in examining the future of the federal courts.
After all, unlike administrative agencies, courts form a separate and in-
dependent branch of government, and an extensive body of constitutional
law and practice defines judicial power. Unlike administrative agencies,
courts are reactive. They generally lack substantive rulemaking power
and act only through adjudication. The setting and tenor of judicial and
administrative adjudication differ considerably. The constitutional status
of judges, the formality of the trial, the norms and traditions of trial, and
appellate practice distinguish judicial from administrative adjudication.
26. See Sargentich, American Administrative Process, supra note 12, at 439-40.
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Like agencies, however, the courts are lawmaking institutions that
must deal with burgeoning caseloads as they decide issues of national
significance. Courts face the challenges confronting executive adminis-
trative agencies: addressing increasing workloads, and issues of compe-
tence, rewards, and accountability. Perhaps most importantly, like ad-
ministrative officials, federal judges and judicial officers are not elected.
Like administrative officials, these judges and judicial officers wield the
power and authority of government. With executive bureaucracies, each
of Sargentich's ideals of administrative law answers the central question,
"On what general normative principles may the use of often substantial
public power by unelected agency officials in our political system be
justified and, at least for the system as a whole, legitimated?"' Accord-
ing to Frug, the purpose of the stories of control is intended to ally our
fear of this same bureaucratic power.m ' In her rereading of the traditional
story of the development of the federal courts in light of new versions of
the story, Judith Resnik states a like theme: "The terrorizing fear of too
much power."' The ways in which Sargentich and Frug talk about bu-
reaucracy address this dilemma central to both administrative agencies
and to the courts."' Debates about the legitimacy of unelected administra-
tive officials are relevant, with proper modifications, to the courts which
share this fundamental dilemma. Finally, to be useful, not every premise
of these conceptions of executive administration need apply to the courts.
However, the major aspects of them do illuminate normative conflicts
underlying debates about civil justice reform.
I. A WAY OF TALKING ABOUT BUREAUCRACY
In this Part, I demonstrate how comprehensive examination of ex-
ecutive administration structures the discussion of the future of the fed-
eral courts. First, I set out in the most general way the types of criticisms
and reforms that populate this discussion. The presentation is general and
cursory because the character of the issues raised is explored in detail
27. Id. at 393.
28. See Frug, Ideology of Bureaucracy, supra note 19, at 1284-85 (discussing the assurances
that the models seek to provide in order to counter perennial concerns that bureaucratic organizations
can dominate those outside of the organization and destroy the freedom of self-expression of those
within the organization).
29. Judith Resnik, Rereading "The Federal Courts:" Revising the Domain of Federal Courts
Jurisprudence at the End ofthe Twentieth Century, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1021, 1035 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter Resnik, Rereading the Federal Courts] (discussing the traditional story of the federal courts and
its limited ability to completely address the question of too much power in any one of the three
branches); see WHEEmE & HARRISON, supra note 7, at 2-4 (describing the historical concern that
courts can be tyrannical and noting that several provisions concerning judicial procedure were in-
cluded in the Bill of Rights to address the problem).
30. Like the heads of administrative agencies and departments, federal trial and appellate
judges are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. See U.S. CONsr. art. II, § 2, cl.
2. Unlike these administrative heads, judges enjoy tenure for life. See id. art. I, § 1. Although the
staffs are smaller in size, like administrative heads, judges supervise and rely on the efforts of a
number of personnel who are not subject to confirmation. See Baker, Intramural Reforms, supra
note 1, at 943-51.
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later in this Part. My intention is to give the reader some general back-
ground before beginning a more detailed examination. Next, using Sar-
gentich's ideals of administrative law as the format, I examine Sargen-
tich's and Frug's discussions of bureaucracy. Their views create a way of
talking about bureaucracy that I apply to civil justice reform, both to
organize the debate and to examine and critique its normative founda-
tions. This application is aided by the large body of literature addressing
civil justice reform and its corresponding implications for the future of
the federal courts.
A. The Federal Courts in Transition
The character and number of issues regarding federal procedure and
the federal courts show that we are in the midst of a comprehensive reex-
amination of the role and legitimacy of the federal courts. Nearly every
major aspect of the judicial process and procedure is now a topic for dis-
cussion. For purposes of presentation rather than analysis, I introduce
these issues as ones related to the growing caseload of the federal courts,
to the appellate courts, to the pretrial process, to access to the courts, to
jury reform, to alternative dispute resolution, to judicial selection and
discipline, and to the relationships between the President, Congress, and
judiciary. Some sense of the scope of the discussion about the future of
the federal courts provides a basis for applying language about bureauc-
racy.
The growing caseloads of trial and appellate courts have in turn
generated a number of proposals, each of which raises a variety of issues
regarding the practicality and wisdom of the specific proposals!' These
proposals also involve a discussion of the future of the federal judiciary.
In a series of articles, Thomas Baker describes and evaluates proposals
that respond to this caseload in the appellate courts." He divides the re-
31. See Baker, Intramural Reforms, supra note 1, at 940; see also supra note I and accompa-
nying teXt.
32. See Thomas E. Baker, An Assessment of Past Extramural Reforms of the U.S. Courts of
Appeals, 28 GA. L REV. 863, 863-65 (1994) [hereinafter Baker, Past Extramural Refirms] (dis-
cussing the historical methods Congress has used to assist the federal courts faced with increasing
caseloads); Thomas E. Baker, Imagining the Alternative Futures of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 28
GA. L REV. 913, 913-14 (1994) [hereinafter Baker, Imagining Futures] (discussing the structual
proposals to reform the intermediate appellate courts); Baker, Intramural Reforms, supra note 1, at
913-14 (examining the various "procedural shortcuts" historically employed by the United States
Courts of Appeals); Thomas E. Baker, On Redrawing Circuit Boundaries--Why the Proposal to
Divide the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Is Not Such a Good Idea, 22 ARIZ.
ST. LJ. 917, 919 (1990) (discussing the then pending, but not adopted, proposal to divide the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit into two circuits); Baker, Proposed Reforms, supra
note 1, at 1321-32 (examining proposed "procedural shortcuts" currently in limited use in the United
States Courts of Appeals); Thomas E. Baker, A View to the Future of Judicial Federalism: "Neither
Out Far Nor In Deep," 45 CAsE W. RES. L REv. 705, 707-15 (1995) [hereinafter Baker, Future of
Judicial Federalism] (discussing the possible future of state and federal courts and the future oppor-
tunities for cooperation and judicial federalism).
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sponses into the intramural, steps that courts can take to more efficiently
dispose of cases,3 and the extramural, steps that require changes from
outside the judiciary.' Included in the intramural are case management
and case tracking,"" increased use of settlement and other alternative
techniques of case resolution, ' more efficient use of support personnel,"
limitations on oral argument and on briefs, ' different procedures for dif-
ferent types of appeals, and resolution of appeals without a published
opinion.' Extramural responses include increases in the number of fed-
eral judges and other judicial personnel,' reducing or altering federal
33. See Baker, Intramural Reforms, supra note 1, at 913; Baker, Proposed Reforms, supra
note 1, at 1321-22.
34. See Baker, Past Extramural Reforms, supra note 32, at 864 (noting the requirement of
congressional action for this type of refor).
35. See Baker, Intramural Reforms, supra note 1, at 940-43 (discussing the variety of man-
agement plans which include tracking and monitoring of cases); see also Baker, Proposed Reforms,
supra note 1, at 1330-31 (identifying the "hallmark" of case management to be the monitoring of
appeals through each stage and the increased importance of the screening process). These plans and
proposals have elicited comment. See, e.g., Hon. Stephen Breyer, The Donahue Lecture Series:
"Administering Justice in the First Circuit," 24 SUnFOLK U. L. REV. 29, 42-44 (1990) (discussing
the current system of tracking appeals in the First Circuit and the limited possibilities for increased
efficiency within such a system).
36. See Baker, Intramural Reforms, supra note 1, at 941-42 (discussing the primary goal of
some case management plans to be settlement and the difficulties in measuring the effectiveness of
such programs).
37. Cf. id. at 943-51 (discussing the increased importance of both administrative and deci-
sional personnel in response to an oppressive caseload).
38. See id. at 915-25 (discussing the reduced availability of oral argument and the increased
importance of written briefs); Baker, Proposed Reorms, supra note 1, at 1337 (discussing the "re-
evaluation of the deemphasis of oral argument"). Other comments on the subject have been made.
See, e.g., McCree, supra note 1, at 790 (questioning the value of the efficiency gained by reducing
the number of appeals decided without oral argument); see also Martineau, supra note 3, at 33
(reviewing the history and various positions with regard to oral argument and concluding that unless
changes are made to the current oral argument process it "will continue to be little more than a waste
of time").
39. See Baker, Intramural Reforms, supra note 1, at 940-43 (discussing experimentation in
response to increasing caseloads); cf. Baker, Proposed Reforms, supra note 1, at 1330 (noting that
"differentiated case management has been the most common response" to the growth of appellate
dockets). The case management reforms have also been addressed by others. See, e.g., Breyer, supra
note 35, at 47 (discussing the identification of related cases for assignment and increasing settlement
and screening techniques); John B. Oaldey, The Screening of Appeals: The Ninth Circuit's Experi-
ence in the Eighties and Innovations for the Nineties, 1991 BYU L. REv. 859,859-62 (discussing in
great detail the adoption and continued use of appeal "screening" to manage workload).
40. See Baker, Intramural Reforms, supra note 1, at 930-39 (discussing issues of quality and
efficiency that are involved in deciding whether a decision should be published); Baker, Proposed
Reforms, supra note 1, at 1329-30 (discussing the possibilities of using a preliminary opinion, sub-
joct to review by the parties before a final opinion is published, as more efficient than the current
practice). These reforms have been discussed in detail by other authors. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
The Obligation to Reason Why, 37 FLA. L. REv. 205, 218-23 (1985) (discussing the use of abbrevi-
ated unpublished decisions, advocating an' explanation of every decision made by a court of appeals
and favoring citation to unpublished decisions where appropriate); cf William L. Reynolds & Wil-
liam M. Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publication in the United States Courts ofAppeals: The
Price of Reform, 48 U. Cmii. L. REV. 573, 573-74 (1981) (evaluating the publication plans of the
then I I courts of appeals and proposing a model publication plan).
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jurisdiction, ' limiting appeals,' and restructuring the trial and appellate
courts." This listing only suggests the variety of responses under these
general rubrics and the complexity of the arguments that can be mar-
shaled for and against them.
Connected to, but also separate from, the issues raised by these re-
sponses are issues related to reduced access to the courts. These areas are
related because several proposals for reducing the caseload burdens on
the courts would limit access to the courts; however, proposals in this
area reflect a different agenda.45 For example, these suggestions include
the imposition of user fees; ' settlement rules that would shift costs if
parties refusing settlement offers did not receive more favorable results
at trial; fee shifting provisions, such as variations of the English, loser
pays rules;' and penalties for frivolous litigation and appeals. '
Proposals from a variety of perspectives address the pretrial process.
Prominent among these are reform of the discovery process, use of alter-
native dispute resolution, and increased judicial involvement in encour-
aging settlement. ' Discussion of the pretrial process includes broader
issues, such as the implications of managerial judging' and alterations of
the adversary process.
41. See Baker, Past Rxtramural Reforms, supra note 32, at 877-88 (arguing that caseload
demands should be addressed by increasing the number of appellate judges only as a "last resort").
42. See id. at 865-71.
43. See Baker, Imagining Futures, supra note 32, at 919-23.
44. See id. at 924-69 (discussing restructuring of courts through redrawing circuit boundaries,
establishing additional tiers of appellate courts, creating specialized national subject matter courts,
creating a centrally organized court of appeals, and drawing jumbo circuits); Baker, Past Extramural
Reforms, supra note 32, at 870-911 (discussing methods of court restructuring including increasing
the use of ADR, dividing courts of appeals, establishing specialized courts of appeals, and improving
the quality of federal legislation); see also J. Joseph F. Weis, Jr., Disconnecting the Overloaded
Circuits-A Plug for a Unified Court ofippeals, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L. REv. 455, 457 (1995).
45. See, e.g., Hensler, supra note 8, at 245 (discussing the Council on Competitiveness's
proposal to limit access to federal trial courts); cf. Baker, Imagining Futures, supra note 32, at 919
(creating discretionary appellate jurisdiction); Breyer, supra note 35, at 34-37 (discussing the 1990
Federal Courts Study Committee report that suggested limiting the right to appeal).
46. See Alschuler, supra note 7, at 1812 n.l I (discussing user fees as a method to manage the
caseload); c. Rowe, supra note 8, at 896-98 (discussing a more limited use of user fees).
47. Breyer, supra note 35, at 45-47 (arguing that strong smaller claims would benefit from
loser pay rules and discussing the advantages of tailoring fee shifting provisions).
48. Cf. Hensler, supra note 8, at 247-48 (discussing incentives for encouraging meritorious
litigation); Rowe, supra note 8, at 871 (discussing the incentives to reduce litigation, particularly
regarding costs and attorney fees).
49. See John Maull, ADR in the Federal Courts: Would Uniformity Be Better?, 34 DUQ. L.
REV. 245, 247-52 (1996) (discussing experimentation with ADR by local district courts); Rowe,
supra note 8, at 898-902 (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of alternative dispute resolu-
tion). See generally Hensler, supra note 8 (canvassing proposals regarding discovery abuse, case
management, and ADR).
50. See infra notes 166-70 and accompanying text.
51. See infra notes 252-74 and accompanying texL
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Reform of the civil jury also appears in a variety of contexts. Some
proposals seek to improve the decision-making ability of the jury;" other
proposals seek to alter the role of the jury by greater use of court ap-
pointed experts, expert panels, and expert courts." Attention has also
focused on the use of peremptory challenges in the selection of juries. '
Finally, relationships between the judiciary and other branches of
government appear in the literature.' Most of the discussion has ad-
dressed the role of Congress in procedural rulemaking and the implica-
tions of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990.' Also of interest have been
52. See, e.g., Douglas G. Smith, The Historical and Constitutional Contexts of Jury Reform,
25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 377, 474-92 (1996) (arguing that simplifying jury instructions, increasing
judge-jury interactions, allowing judicial summary of and commentary on the evidence, eliminating
many complex evidentiary rules, and reducing the role of the directed verdict and of the judgment
not withstanding the verdict would be constitutional and consistent with historical practices in the
United States and in England; and returning the jury to a more activist role); Development in the
Law-The Civil Jury, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1408, 1411-21, 1459, 1503-13 (1997) [hereinafter The
Civil Jury] (presenting and commenting on various proposals for strengthening the jury system).
53. See Smith, supra note 52, at 458-70 (asserting that juries could be selected based on level
of education and previous trial experience and that specialized or expert juries could be used); The
Civil Jury, supra note 52, at 1459, 1491-92 (noting proposals for specialized juries and summarizing
criticisms of the jury system in complex cases). But see, e.g., Hellman, supra note 7, at 308-10
(discussing Posner's arguments against specialized courts). See generally Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss,
The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1-5 (1989) (using
experiences in the Federal Circuit to examine arguments about specialized courts); A. Leo Levin &
Michael E. Kunz, Thinking About Judgeships, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1627 (1995) (discussing the use of
expert surrogates for Article I judges).
54. See Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should Be Abolished: A Trial Judge's
Perspective, 64 U. CHL L. REV. 809, 809-12 (1997) (arguing that the peremptory challenge is
"meaningless" and "undemocratic" and thus is inconsistent with the current representational finc-
tions of the jury); The Civil Jury, supra note 52, at 1460-63 (summarizing the debate about the
peremptory challenge); cf. Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth Amendment
As a Prohibition Against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76 CORNELL L. REV. i, 2-9
(1990) (discussing the inherent unconstitutionality of an all-white jury in race-sensitive cases).
55. See, e.g., RUSSELL R. WHEELER & GORDON BERMANT, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., FEDERAL
COURT GOVERNANCE: WHY CONGRESS SHOULD-AND WHY CONGRESS SHOULD N0T--CREATE A
FULL-TIME EXECuTiVE JUDGE, ABOLISH THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, AND REMOVE CIRCUIT
JUDGES FROM DISTRICT COURT GOVERNANCE (1994) (discussing the current governance structures
and procedures of the federal courts and outlining proposed reforms and arguments favoring the
reforms that Congress may choose to adopt); Baker, Future of Judicial Federalism, supra note 32, at
807 (discussing the relationship of the judiciary and the other branches, noting specifically with
respect to judicial and congressional relations that, "I must confess that I am not hopeful [for im-
proved relations]'); Deanell Reece Tacha, Judges and Legislators: Enhancing the Relationship, 44
AM. U. L. REV. 1537, 1541-42, 1550-53 (1995) (discussing examples of positive, contributory
exchanges between the judiciary and Congress from the mid-1980s to mid-1990s); see also Louis
Fisher, Judicial Independence and the Line-Item Veto, JUDGES' J., Winter 1997, at 19, 53 (arguing
that the line-item veto may be constitutionally infirm because of its threat to judicial independence).
56. 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1994); see, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in
Procedural Justice, 77 MINN. L REV. 375, 382 (1992) (hereinafter Mullenix, Counter-Reformation]
(discussing the many ways in which the Act infringes on judicial rulemaking, in fact producing an
environment which "authorizes unconstitutional mlemaking'); Linda S. Mullenix, Unconstitutional
Rulemaking: The Civil Justice Reform Act and Separation of Powers, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1283, 1283-
88 (1993) [hereinafter Mullenix, Separation of Powers] (arguing that the Act violates the separation
of powers doctrine); Philip M. Pro & Thomas C. Hnatowski, Measured Progress: The Evolution and
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changes in impeachment procedures" and the implications of the line-
item veto."
The literature suggests a lack of consensus regarding fundamental
issues of both procedure and structure." The literature evidences a fed-
eral judiciary in transition, a judiciary whose future may differ signifi-
candy from its past. Conceptions of bureaucracy provide one way of
organizing and critiquing the issues entailed in this discussion of the fed-
eral courts.
B. The Rule of Law Ideal
According to Sargentich, the Rule of Law Ideal rests on state con-
tract theories that require the consent of the governed.' This vision seeks
to ensure that individuals are permitted to make their own choices free
from the interference of the state.' Public law divides the realm of gov-
ernment from that of private action.' Because of reliance on this distinc-
Administration of the Federal Magistrate Judges System, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1503, 1520-23 (1995)
(suggesting how the Act has led to greater use of magistrates); see, e.g., Maull, supra note 49, at
245-47 (discussing the variations of alternative dispute resolution programs spawned by the Civil
Justice Reform Act's call for implementation of ADR in general).
57. See John P. Sah, Secret Discipline in the Federal Courts--Democratic Values and Judici-
ary Integrity at Stake, 70 NOTRE DAME L REV. 193, 221-50 (1994) (discussing weaknesses in
statutory disciplinary procedures); Lynn A. Baker, Note, Unnecessary and Improper: The Judicial
Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 94 YALE LJ. 1117, 1125-33
(1985) (discussing the relationship between the Act and the impeachment power); Herman Schwartz,
The War Against Judicial Independence, LA. TIMES, May 11, 1997, at M2 (noting threats of im-
peachment against federal judges for the content of their opinions). See generally RUSSELL R.
WHEELER & A. LEO LEVIN, FED. JUDICIAL CTM., JUDICIAL DISCPluNE AND REMOVAL IN THE
UNITED STATES (1979) (describing methods of judicial discipline and removal); Victor Williams,
Third Branch Independence and Integrity Threatened by Political Branch Irresponsibility: Review-
ing the Report of the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal, 5 SETON HALL
CONST. LJ. 851,870 (1995) (expressing concern about Senate impeachment procedures).
58. See generally Robert C. Byrd, The Control of the Purse and the Line-Item Veto Act, 35
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 297, 331-32 (1998) (calling on the judiciary to strike down the Line-Item Veto
Act). This article does not specifically address the implications of the recent Supreme Court decision
which struck down the line-item veto as a violation of the presentment Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, §
7, cl. 2; see Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S. C. 2091, 2095 (1998). Some of the concerns ex-
pressed by Senator Byrd and other opponents of the line-item veto have been alleviated by the
Court's decision in Clinton. However, as the Court struck down only the specific method utilized in
the implementation of the line-item veto before them, the critique is still relevant to future construc-
tions of the line-item veto that will undoubtedly be deployed. See Clinton, 118 S. CL at 2108.
59. See Charles W. Nihan, A Study in Contrasts: The Ability of the Federal Judiciary to
Change Its Adjudicative and Adtninistrative Structures, 44 AM. U. L REV. 1693, 1695 (1995) (con-
cluding that the "judiciary is unlikely to reach a consensus on either judgeship limitations or juris-
dictional changes, which many believe are necessary to cope with the judicial workload projected for
the next twenty-five years"); Tushnet, supra note 7, at 628-30 (suggesting that the different interest
groups affecting Congress and the courts ar likely to make consensus difficult both within and
among the branches).
60. See supra notes 31-59 and accompanying text.
61. See Sargentich, American Administrative Process, supra note 12, at 397-98.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 398.
[Vol. 76:1
A WAY OF TALKING ABOUT BUREAUCRACY
tion between public and private spheres, the core embodiment of the
Rule of Law Ideal is formalism-the idea that all exercises of public
power must be guided by legal rules." Although the conception of these
legal rules may vary, formalism rests its faith on these rules to separate
legal from political decision making."
Frug likewise describes the formalist model of bureaucratic control
as attempting to place all judgments regarding values, ends, and desires
outside of the bureaucracy.' The bureaucracy then objectively carries out
the subjective choices made by others." The bureaucracy applies rules
derived from outside itself, and these rules are such that their application
mechanically determines the outcome in specific instances." To Frug,
this line between the objective and subjective cannot be drawn.' His cri-
tique of the nondelegation doctrine leads him to conclude that no princi-
pled way exists to determine how much discretion regarding subjective
choices may be given by the legislature to administrative agencies.
For Sargentich, discretion exercised by administrative agencies also
limits formalism.7! ' Like Frug, he believes that the nondelegation doctrine
seems unlikely to restrict this discretion in any important way.' Sargen-
tich articulates a number of reasons for the existence of such discretion
including the "indeterminate and sweeping... scope"' of much legisla-
tion. Many practical and political considerations act to assure this inde-
terminacy.' Of particular interest is his conclusion that "statutory norms
designed to criticize existing institutions-for instance, antidiscrimina-
64. See id. at 398-99. The concept of legal norms can "include principles in Ronald
Dworkin's sense or rules in H.LA. Hart's sense." Id. at 398. The crucial element is that they are
"relatively autonomous from the sphere of frankly political decisions." Id. at 398-99.
65. See id. at 399.
66. See Frug, Ideology of Bureawracy, supra note 19, at 1298-99.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. Cf. id. at 1300-03. Under this framework, some subjectivity must be introduced into the
bureaucracy because administrative agencies have always exercised at least some discretion. See id.
at 1301. In fact, such discretion "has always seemed indispensable." Id. The task of deciding what
discretion is permissible requires the separation of the objective and the subjective. See id. at 1301-03.
70. See id. at 1300-05. The nondelegation doctrine is the attempt "to distinguish the kind of
discretion agencies can exercise from the kind that must be exercised only by the legislature." id. at
1301. The failure of the doctrine to do so in any meaningful way illustrates the melding of the sub-
jective and the objective. See id. at 1304-05.
71. See Sargentich, American Administrative Process, supra note 12, at 402-03 (discussing
formalist limitations on the Rule of Law Ideal).
72. See id. at 400-02.
73. Id. at 402.
74. See id. at 403. These considerations include: lack of time, staff, and resources to develop
more precise agency limitations; the independent value of agency discretion through "expefimenta-
tion, flexibility and change without recourse to statutory amendment"; and the political expediency
of general language permitting compromise and focusing controversy on the administrative agency
rather than Congress. Id. Sargentich puts it frankly when he notes that by scripting vague and inde-
terminate legislation, Congress creates the framework in which the focus of controversy shines on
the administrative agency rather than on Congress. See id at 403-04.
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tion norms... -may require.. general and open-ended principles."75
This observation is of particular interest because a substantial number of
federal statutes applied by the courts are of this character!'
Because of the limitations on formalism, the Rule of Law Ideal
turns to proceduralism. ' Proceduralism protects the individual from
abuse of governmental power by requiring that government officials
follow certain procedures before acting.' Proceduralism, however, does
not ultimately restrict substantive discretion because it permits officials
to act on the basis of vague, unarticulated powers that permit a number of
substantive choices." The principal methodology of the Rule of Law
Ideal is legal reasoning-a methodology that manifests the importance of
restrictions on the exercise of power by the application of legal rules. 0
Likewise, Frug notes that some commentators argue that courts could
validly avoid the difficulties of substantive review by turning to proce-
dure."' In his discussion of a judicial review model, Frug argues that at-
tention to bureaucratic procedure, rather than substantive decisions, fails
to escape the contradictions that plague substantive review.'
1. Formalism
The applicability of this vision of the administrative process to
courts is suggested by Sargentich. According to him, the line between
legal reasoning and political judgment seems easier to draw with the
courts than with administrative agencies."2 He recognizes, however, that
in administrative law, the Rule of Law Ideal requires that courts review-
ing administrative agencies follow the dictates of the legislature.'" The
inconsistency in the delegation doctrine is that courts are to be "restricted
decisionmakers"' applying the norms set out in the legislation; yet the
nondelegation doctrine may well require them to strike down the legisla-
75. Id. at 404. Statutes that seek to change existing institutions and practices require broad
principles because, "[ilf the critical norms were highly specific and thus strictly confined in their
reference or implications, their force as catalysts of social change inevitably would be blunted." Id.
76. See infra notes 99-100 and accompanying text. Sargentich recognizes that formalism can
deal with a few open-ended norms but not a statutory scheme where the majority of norms are of this
character. See Sargentich, American Administrative Process, supra note 12, at 402-04. Clearly, the
administrative process contains many of these open-ended norms. Arguably, the tasks of the federal
courts now require them to confront a substantial number of similarly open-ended norms.
77. See Sargentich, American Administrative Process, supra note 12, at 404-05.
78. See id. at 405.
79. See id. at 406-07.
80. See Sargentich, Future of Administrative Law, supra note 14, at 773-74.
81. See Frug, Ideology of Bureaucracy, supra note 19, at 1343-44.
82. See id. at 1344. "This retreat to procedure ... adopts the same mixed formalist-expertise
structure that rendered substantive judicial rview incoherent." Id.
83. See Sargentich, American Administrative Process, supra note 12, at 399.
84. See id. at 400-01.
85. Id. at 401.
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tion that contains the norms they are to apply." As Sargentich notes, this
"constitutionally-based nullification of legislative enactments in the ad-
ministrative context presents the same conundra for courts that are raised
so often in discussions of judicial review."'
In his discussion of the judicial review model, Frug recognizes the
application of his analysis to the courts.U In conducting judicial review,
the courts can adopt either a formalist or expertise model of its role, em-
phasizing either the breadth of or the limits on judicial discretion.' The
courts can also combine the two models.' Skillfully used, this mixing of
models in defining the judicial role permits the courts to choose views of
its role that either doubly restrain or doubly authorize judicial interven-
tion.9' Likewise, the courts can use formalist or expertise models of the
bureaucracy, emphasizing bureaucratic discretion or the limits placed
upon it.' The combination of these perceptions of the role of the courts
and of the bureaucracy generates sets of inconsistent arguments coun-
seling for and against judicial intervention." Frug's description of the
formalist and expertise models of the role of the courts in control of bu-
reaucracy fits nicely with the literature of civil justice reform discussed
in this Part of the article.
Some judicial systems still rely upon the language of formalism to
define and to defend the judicial role.' Civil law systems, particularly in
Latin America, reflect the dominance of the civil coder Law consists of
a set of norms that can be mechanically applied; this mechanical appli-
cation supporting a perception of a limited role for the judge?' This lan-
guage of formalism remains attractive because the notions of democratic
legitimacy upon which the Rule of Law Ideal rests makes the decisions
of unelected judges vulnerable.
86. See id. at 401-02.
87. Id. at 401 (footnote omitted).
88. See Frug, Ideology of Bureaucracy, supra note 19, at 1334-38.
89. See id. at 1337-38.
90. Cf. id. at 1340 (noting that "Justice Frankfurter... defined and circumscribed the court's
role by understanding it in joint formalist-expertise terms. He envisioned the courts as organizations
that could successfully combine the features of apparently antithetical model [sic] of bureaucratic
legitimacy").
91. See id.
92. See id. at 1340-42.
93. See id. at 1342-43.
94. See, e.g., Robert G. Vaughn, Proposals for Judicial Reform in Chile, 16 FORDHAM IN'L
LJ. 577, 579-90 (19921993) [hereinafter Vaughn, Judicial Reform) (describing the Chilean judici-
ary's history of emphasizing formal norms and its mechanical application).
95. See, e.g., id. at 581. See generally Tom Farer, Consolidating Democracy in Latin America:
Law, Legal Institutions and Constitutional Structure, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1295, 1310-23
(1995) (discussing the difference in conception of judicial function prevailing in common law coun-
tries as opposed to civil law countries).
96. See Farer, supra note 96, at 1312-13 (discussing the creation of bureaucratic career pat-
terns that make judges less likely to strike down government action than those judges who do not see
themselves as bureaucrats).
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The legal realists in the United States critiqued formalism as a de-
fense of the exercise of public power by unelected officials." To the re-
alists, legal norms established in precedent, in legislation, or in the Con-
stitution were less important in determining outcomes than an examina-
tion of the behavior of the judges themselves." The norms limiting courts
were interpreted and applied by the courts, who had rather broad discre-
tion to establish the content and application of these legal norms.
Constitutional interpretation repeatedly demonstrates that the courts
enjoy relatively broad policy-making powers. Although this power can
be justified on several grounds related to the character of judicial power,
the separation of powers, and the protection of individual rights, these
justifications less easily apply .to common law decisions or to statutes-
the interpretation of which now forms the bulk of activity of the federal
courts." After the realists, precedent seems a malleable concept that im-
poses limits only on the margins. As do administrative agencies, courts
confront statutes of "indeterminate and sweeping ... scope.""'
®
In these circumstances the options for reformers are few. One could
attempt to redefine judicial power around more formal limits, an option
embraced by many conservatives. Attacks on the antimajoritarian char-
acter of the courts have been combined with attempts to restrict constitu-
tional interpretation by relying upon "original intent,"' to develop rules
of statutory construction that deny judges the use of legislative history,
thereby forcing courts to apply only the words of the statute" and to ad-
97. The formalist perspective may more properly capture the popular view of the courts. For
example, even that astute observer and prolific author, Isaac Asimov, saw a future where decisions
would be made by computers analyzing precedent, a development that he believed would guarantee
fair results and eliminate the advantages conferred on litigants with greater resources. Isaac Asimov,
The Next 70 Years for Law and Lawyers, 71 A.B.A. J. 56, 58 (1985).
98. Cf. G. EDWARD WHIrrE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES OF LEADING
AMERICAN JUDGES 251-91 (expanded ed. 1988) (discussing the impact of legal realism and process
jurisprudence on the judicial role). But cf. Ruth Gavison, The Implications of Jurisprudential Theo-
ries for Judicial Election, Selection, and Accountability, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1617, 1632-33 (1988)
(stating the critique forwarded by legal realists, yet recognizing a broad mix of determinacy and
indeterminacy in adjudication, and as such, recognizing that at some level not all judicial decisions
are controlled by norms).
99. See Jorge L. Carro & Andrew R. Brann, Use of Legislative Histories by the United States
Supreme Cowl: A Statistical Analysis, 9 J. LEGIS. 282, 285-290 (1982) (discussing the dominance
of statutory interpretation in cases before the Supreme Court).
100. Sargentich, American Administrative Process, supra note 12, at 402; see supra notes 7 1-
76 and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMiTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
LAW 143-60 (1990) (arguing that original understanding is the only method of constitutional inter-
pretation that upholds the American ideal); Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent and
Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823, 829 (1986) (proposing a vision of original intent that
judges should employ "that focuses on each specific provision of the Constitution rather then upon
values stated at a high level of abstraction" when engaging in constitutional interpretation).
102. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987
DUKE LJ. 371, 373-74 (discussing different schools of thought regarding the use of legislative
history). Some Supreme Court Justices advocate abandoning the use of legislative history or dra-
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vocate judicially created standards that are clear and easily applied. The
success of this enterprise seems considerably in doubt. Ironically, these
attempts to restrict judicial discretion appear rather to increase it. For
example, "original intent" is as indeterminate as the techniques it re-
places."' The rejection of legislative history, at least as to social legisla-
tion, increases, rather than limits, judicial discretion and enfeebles the
legislature."
Two important civil procedure decisions reflect this attempt to reas-
sert formal limits on the courts. Justice Scalia used Burnham v. Superior
Court' to articulate a standard of due process that, at least regarding
long standing procedures of current applicability, limits the substantive
discretion of judges.'0 ' Scalia's desire to restrict the subjective assess-
ments of individual judges regarding what is fair and just drives his
analysis.' Likewise, he emphasizes the antimajoritarian character of the
courts as well as the need for certainty of standards' In Finley v. United
matically reducing its relevance through the application of interpretative techniques that rely on the
language of statutory provisions. See, e.g., Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440,
470 (1989) (Kennedy J., concurring) ("Where the language of a statute is clear in its application, the
normal rule is that we ar bound by it."); United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 373 (1989) (Scalia J.,
concurring) ('We conduct[] no separate inquiry into the intent or expectations of the signatories (of a
particular treaty) beyond those expressed in the text .... 1).
103. See, e.g., John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 160-64 (1989) (Scalia J.,
dissenting) (arguing that "'a practical approach' to [the interpretation of] FOIA consists of following
the clear provisions of its text, and adhering to the rules we have enunciated regarding interpretation
of the unclear ones"). See generally Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law As a Law of Rules, 56 U. Cm.
L. RE V. 1175 (1989) (exploring the dichotomy between the general rule of law and personal discre-
tion in creation of law by the courts).
104. See James Boyle, A Process of Denial: Bork and Post-Modem Conservatism, 3 YALE J.L.
& HUMAN. 263, 283-90 (1991). Boyle lists six arguments against original intent, noting that it is (I)
"simply false as both a practical and philosophical matter" that the intention of the original author
must control the subsequent meaning of the text; (2) the Framers had a view of interpretation that
rejects original intent as the appropriate method of interpretation; (3) records show that the intentions
of the Framers "are often contradictory, indeterminate, or both"; (4) in those areas where their intent
is clear, such as support of slavery or belief in the inferiority of women, that intent is "morally outra-
genus"; (5) "the theory of original intent is inconsistent with most of the Supreme Court's jurispru-
dence, with the vast majority of scholarly writing, with the opinions of most constitutional histori-
ans, and probably with the views of most Americans"; and (6) adoption of original intent would
involve "an impossible transition" from current interpretative practices and standards. Id. at 283-84.
Boyle notes that Bork, in The Tempting of America, "shift[s] his ground somewhat," moving to the
concept of original understanding which is the "understanding of the Constitution's contemporary
audience, rather than the intent of its original authors," id.; see id. at 284-90 (discussing the concept
and problems of original understanding). Boyle finds original understanding to be subject to the
same defects as original intent. See id. at 287-90.
105. Cf. Robert G. Vaughn, A Comparative Analysis of the Influence of Legislative History on
Judicial Decision-Making and Legislation, 7 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 1-6 (1996) (examining
the impact of plain meaning interpretation on the application of the British race and sex discrimina-
tion statutes and the resulting increase in judicial discretion).
106. 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
107. See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 622-23.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 625-27.
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States," he emphasized that most federal court jurisdiction must be con-
fened by Congress and that courts may not independently expand that
jurisdiction.'" Again, this effort regarding the power of the court over its
jurisdiction fits with the enterprise of restricting judicial discretion.
2. Proceduralism
Sargentich's analysis would predict, in an administrative context,
that the theoretical and practical limitations on formalism would lead to
proceduralism. In this view, procedure protects the individual against the
application of the power of the state."2 Indeed, the courts rely on proce-
dure to ensure fairness to a greater extent than the administrative process.
In fact, articulation of uniform procedure seems to have been the tradi-
tional response to the challenges of legal realism to formalism. Judith
Resnik suggests that the drafting of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
was partly a response to the influence of the legal realists."' The certainty
of substantive norms, then lost, was replaced with the uniformity and
predictability of procedural rules. Of course, she is right to emphasize the
variety of influences on the rules and the fictional nature of any intent of
the advisory committee,"" but her recognition of uniform procedure as a
reaction to legal realism seems consistent with G. Edward White's de-
scription of consensus thought, which he dates somewhat later.' 5 Con-
sensus thought also responded to the realists. Part of the response was an
emphasis on legal process and the importance of reasoned decision
making rather than fiat."' This emphasis on process and on reasoned de-
cision making highlighted the importance of the rationale for judicial
opinions. In this sense, an obligation to expose a judge's reasoning, in-
cluding the policy choices contributing to it, to rational analysis, changed
precedent from a substantive to a procedural protection. Consensus
thought, however, undermined its own agenda. Its emphasis on a rational
solution that all educated persons would arrive at so ignored conflicting
perspectives and irrational behavior that it cast doubt on the conception
of rationality supporting consensus thought. The substantive agenda of
consensus thought contained a central paradox that undermined it--the
110. 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
11l. See Finley, 490 U.S. at 547-48.
112. See Sargentich, American Adninistrative Process, supra note 12, at 405.
113. See Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CH. L REV.
494,502-03 (1986) [hereinafter Resnik, Failing Faith].
114. Id. (noting the impact of progressives and New Dealers, and the self interest of attorney-
members who had cases in federal courts in more than one state). A sense of the intellectual climate
in which the rules were developed can be gleaned from a retrospective evaluation of them. See
generally Symposium, The 50th Anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1938-1988,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 1873 (1989) (assessing the debate concerning local, state, and federal rules of
procedure).
115. See generally G. EDWARD WHTE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTEL.CFAL HISTORY
(1985) (dating consensus thought from 1945 through 1970).
116. Seeid.atl4l.
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assumption that every problem has a consensual rational solution that
educated persons will arrive at, ignoring conflicting perspectives and
irrational behavior, ironically casting in doubt the possibility of consen-
sus thought. The procedural responses to the limitations of formalism
remain, and concern about their viability forms an important part of the
discussion regarding civil justice reform.
Among the reforms undertaken by appellate courts, the most con-
troversial ones reduce or eliminate oral argument and limit the publica-
tion of opinions."" Other appellate court practices include differential
tracking of appeals, the increasing use of court staff to process and
evaluate opinions, and practices where panels of judges review proposed
opinions individually without a formal conference regarding them.""
Many of the criticisms of these practices have repeated the theme that
they reduce the procedures restraining judges and thereby jeopardize the
fair and adequate consideration of individual claims."9 For example, if
unpublished opinions are not precedent and the process leading to such
opinions differs significantly from traditional appellate procedures, crit-
ics fear that judges will be encouraged to rely on the advice of others, to
give the decisions inadequate consideration, and to indulge biases which
would otherwise be constrained by the need to live with the precedent
created.'" These practices have generated considerable academic criti-
cism, generally without effect.'2' The acceptance of these practices shows
that the pressures on the courts have led to changes that call into doubt
many traditional procedural justice values of civil adjudication.
Perhaps of greater significance to proceduralism as a restraint has
been the loss of uniformity in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Commentators identify as causes of this loss expansive interpretations of
Rule 83,'" which permits local rules not inconsistent with the general
rules of civil procedure;"n the 1992 amendments to the federal discovery
117. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 40, at 205-06 (discussing the obligations of appellate
judges); Martineau, supra note 3, at 1-5 (discussing the reform measures that appellate courts have
recently taken); Oakley, supra note 39, at 859-62 (discussing the measures used by the Ninth Circuit
for handling the increased case load); Richman & Reynolds, supra note 1, at 623-25 (discussing the
validity of arguments that consider the streamlined process that is being used by the circuit courts as
a threat to the efficacy of the legal process). Federal appellate courts began by denying oral argu-
ment in a small percentage of cases that presented no real issue for decision. Today, the majority of
federal appellate cases are decided without oral argument. See Martineau, supra note 3, at 20.
118. See Hellman, supra note 7, at 299-300; Reynolds & Richman, supra note 1, at 623-24.
119. See, e.g., Reynolds & Richman, supra note 1, at 634 (discussing some of these critiques).
120. See id. at 633. They also note that these practices will fail to provide public accountability
for trial court errors. See id. at 635.
121. See id. One alternative to an unpublished opinion is a summary per curiam. However, an
unpublished opinion articulating the grounds for the decision might be more helpful than a summary
per curium opinion.
122. FED. R. Ctv. P. 83.
123. See Carl Tobias, More Modern Civil Process, 56 U. PT. L. REV. 801, 807-08 (1995)
(discussing Rule 83); cf. Peter G. McCabe, Renewal of the Rulemaking Process, 44 AM. U. L. REV.
1655, 1687-91 (1995) (discussing local rules).
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rules that allow individual districts to opt out of portions of the amend-
ments;' and the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990,'" which creates rule
committees on the district level and encourages experimentation and the
development of rules related to local conditions.'" Because of the im-
portance of uniformity in procedure as a response to the weaknesses of
formalism, the demise of uniformity portends the courts' greater vulner-
ability to criticisms based on the Rule of Law Ideal. Certainly, fair pro-
cedures need not be rigidly uniform, but the lack of commitment to the
ideal of uniformity highlights the discretion of specific courts and sug-
gests indeterminacy of procedural as well as substantive standards.
The changes in appellate procedure arguably exacerbate the effects
of the loss of uniformity in procedure. To the extent that appellate proce-
dures reduce significant review of lower courts' application of a variety
of procedures, the variation appears more likely to reduce the potential
protection of procedure in individual cases. Stephen Yeazell identifies a
larger effect of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure--the transfer of
power from appellate to trial courts."2 In his view, this transfer of power
is the unintended result of the creation of extensive pretrial procedures.'"'
The final judgment rule insulates most of these pretrial procedures from
appellate scrutiny, thereby reducing the control of appellate courts.'"
Against this background, trial court experimentation becomes more
problematic because most of that experimentation occurs at the pretrial
level and is unlikely to be subject to significant appellate review.
124. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (amended Dec. 1, 1992); see McCabe, supra note 123, at 1689-90
(discussing the 1992 amendments to Rule 26); Tobias, supra note 123, at 812 (discussing amend-
ments to Rule 26).
125. 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1994).
126. See Baker, Future of Judicial Federalism, supra note 32, at 779-81 (discussing implica-
tions of decentralized rulemaking and congressional activity in rlemaking spawned by the Civil
Justice Reform Act); Maull, supra note 49, at 245-47 (demonstrating, through an analysis of the
diversity of ADR procedures and their contribution to forum shopping, the negative impact of the
Civil Justice Reform Act on uniformity); McCabe, supra note 123, at 1689-91 (discussing the Civil
Justice Reform Act as a threat to uniformity); Mullenix, Separation of Powers, supra note 56, at
1287 ("More significantly, the [Civil Justice Reform Act] will contribute to the increased balkaniza-
tion of federal civil procedure and transform the reigning procedural aesthetic of simplicity and
uniformity into one of increasing complexity and variation."); Carl Tobias, Improving the 1988 and
1989 Judicial Improvements Acts, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1589, 1619-27 (1994) (discussing the causes of
lack of uniformity); Cheryl L. Haas, Note, Judicial Rulemaking: Criticisms and Cures for a System
in Crisis, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 135, 151-55 (1995) (noting conflict between local rules and federal
rules and discussing dangers of decentralization of rulemaking following congressional involve-
ment); cf. Lauren Robel, Fractured Procedure: The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 46 STAN. L
REV. 1447, 1473-83 (1994) (asserting that the Act does not compel nor authorize adoption of local
deviations inconsistent with the federal rules and does not violate the separation of powers).
127. See Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994
WIS. L. REV. 631, 631 (discussing the consequences of "redesigning the process of litigation").
128. See id. at 631-40,648.
129. See id. at 646-47.
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Although the Rule of Law Ideal is central to a defense of judicial
and administrative discretion, the federal courts cannot rely on its core
embodiment in the theory of legal formalism. Modem reforms also
threaten to undermine reliance on the alternative expression of proce-
dural regularity and fairness. The assumptions regarding the value of
procedure underlying criticisms of modifications in trial and appellate
practices mirror those supporting proceduralism in the administrative
process-that procedures guarantee fair results by encouraging thorough
and thoughtful consideration of substantive decisions. The responses to
these criticisms also reflect those given to attempts to formalize more of
administrative procedure-that the burdens imposed are not worth the
price of the additional procedure. Given recent developments, the viabil-
ity of proceduralism itself in the federal courts is now in question.
C. The Public Purposes Ideal
According to Sargentich, the Public Purposes Ideal stresses the role
of administrative agencies in accomplishing important public goals."
The ideal draws on the importance attached to the affirmative tasks of
government in policy making under governing statutes. Therefore, the
core embodiment is instrumentalism, "by which is meant the familiar
notion that the significant worth of a policy inheres in its success as an
instrument of the public good." 3' Instrumentalism focuses on carrying
out the public purposes of an agency's enabling legislation, or choosing
between alternatives based on agency judgments regarding the public
good-as in cost-benefit analysis. '" The Public Purposes Ideal relies
upon official expertise as its principal methodology.3 This methodology
manifests the ideal's reliance on technical and rational judgments to
achieve the public good.
By focusing on rational analysis, instrumentalism leads to ever-
expanding analytical schemes that inescapably tend to become vague and
devoid of substantive content.'" Indeed, such an approach can eventually
become the guise for political manipulation. 5 Sargentich expresses sev-
eral doubts about the efficacy of cost-benefit analysis as a basis for ad-
ministrative policy making. A principal normative objection is that utili-
tarian ethics tend to discount the power of "plural conceptions of values
[as] having distinct and independent claims of moral force."'" The
130. See Sargentich, American Administrative Process, supra note 12, at 410.
131. Id. at 411.
132. See id. at 411-12. Reliance on the enacting legislation of an agency and cost-benefit
analysis constitute the two principal instrumentalist approaches. See id.
133. See Sargentich, Future of Administraive Law, supra note 14, at 774.
134. See Sargentich, American Administrative Process, supra note 12, at 415-16.
135. Seeid. at416.
136. Id. at 418. In addition, cost-benefit analysis assumes a limited set of preconceived aims
that cannot be derived by cost-benefit analysis. The difficulty of establishing a common denominator
for costs and benefits and the difficulty of quantifying benefits also render determinations resting on
cost-benefit analysis suspect.
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weaknesses of instrumentalism and the limitations placed upon it by the
reality of the administrative process lead to an alternative expression of
the vision of the Public Purposes Ideal; namely, protecting the market.'"
The reliance on the market accepts private decision making as the princi-
pal determinant of the public good. Subjective preferences in the market
decide the public values to be pursued.'" This alternative expression
forecloses a significant role for the administrative process except to the
extent that the agencies intervene in response to imperfections in the
market. Issues of administrative choice become matters of economic
rationality, foreclosing other normative viewpoints.!" A variety of ration-
ales for administrative intervention, however, suggest that such interven-
tion may be the usual rather than the exceptional event.'"
Frug describes the expertise model as celebrating the discretion of
those within the bureaucracy.' The bureaucracy becomes a social system
in which leadership is crucial. The bureaucracy works for the public to
achieve common goals. Its internal structure must remain flexible and
responsive."2 Constituents of a bureaucracy no longer set the policies of
the organization, but become consumers of those policies." Under the
expertise model, the bureaucracy enjoys immense discretion and there-
fore immense power.
The immense power of the bureaucracy under the expertise model is
circumscribed by its expertise and professionalism and by the require-
ment of impersonal judgment.'" The model, however, is unable to draw
the line between arbitrary and proper discretion. It is unable to draw the
line between the necessary subjectivity of the members of the bureauc-
racy and the objective constraints upon it." Nor is the model able to
draw the same line between expertise and bias." Subjective and objec-
tive elements are so related that it is not possible to separate them. Frug
137. Seeid.at419-25.
138. See id. at 419-20.
139. C.f id. at 420 (discussing how the market imperfections allow for "room for intervention
by the administrative process").
140. See id. at 423. According to Sargentich, these include: monopoly power that forecloses
competition, natural monopolies involving economies of scale, inadequate consumer information.
externalities, unfair windfall profits, and "the perceived need to eliminate 'excessive' competition or
to moderate distributional inequities that may result.from a sudden or severe scarcity of a valued
good." Id.
141. See Fmg, Ideology of Bureaucracy, supra note 19, at 1318.
142. See id. at 1318-19.
143. Seeid.at 1320.
144. See id. at 1321-22 (arguing that these objective restraints must somehow be separated
from the subjective characteristics of bureaucratic decision making).
145. See id. at 1324-26 (explaining that it is not possible to decide which discretion is neces-
sary and which is arbitrary, just as it is not possible to decide which restraints are excessive and
which are proper).
146. See id. at 1326-27 (explaining that expertise can be another way of describing bias-a
viewpoint or perspective based on background and experience).
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sees the call for super-experts as a response to the impossibility of the
separation-an attempt which, due to its very nature, is also doomed."
Given the contradictions inherent in the expertise model, defenders
of bureaucracy rely upon a third model, the market/pluralist model. Be-
cause the discussion here is structured around Sargentich's ideals of ad-
ministrative law, this summary focuses on the market aspects of the mar-
ket/pluralist model--a model which Frug applies principally to private,
not public, bureaucracies."' Still, his discussion relates the market model
to the formalist one--some "predetermined, formally realizable constitu-
ent goal,""' such as the desire to maximize stock value, is assumed, and
the corporation objectively acts to fulfill this goal."'°
1. Instrumentalism
Perceptions that the federal courts play an important, affirmative
role in American society reflect the Public Purposes Ideal. Owen Fiss's
passionate defense of the courts' responsibility to articulate and to im-
plement constitutional values illustrates such an affirmative role."' The
separation of powers and the nature of judicial power require action for
the public good."n The role of the courts in our government uniquely
obligates them to protect the individual against the institutions of
power-both public and private." This obligation extends beyond inter-
pretation of the Constitution to the construction and application of stat-
utes as well.
Conservative and liberal ideologies can support a substantial af-
firmative role for the courts. For example, important strains of public
choice literature assert that the courts must be active in limiting the self-
interest of other branches of government, for self-interest distorts public
147. See id. at 1327-31 (explaining that the super-expert fails to resolve the conflict because of
the simultaneous need for the expert to be independent and to acquire information and expertise
about the bureaucracy).
148. See id. at 1355-62.
149. Id. at 1360.
150. See id.
151. See Fiss, Bureaucratization, supra note 1, at 1461 (describing adjudication as a constant
exercise of collective power to assure that social life conforms to public values); Owen M. Fiss, The
Supreme Court 1978, Term-Forword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARM. L. REV. 1, 11-18 (1979)
[hereinafter Fiss, Forms of Justice] (noting that courts implement public values not contained in
specific prohibitions--for example, equal protection); cf. WHIrrE, supra note 98, at 252 (describing
how appellate judicial expertise has been defined in different ways during this century-4he appel-
late judge has variously been described as an "oracle, social engineer, hunch player," or a "craftsman
in... 'reasoned elaboration,"-and how each of these views has been used at some time or another
to justify the exercise of judicial power).
152. See Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 151, at 5-9 (explaining that under modem concep-
tions, courts act in response to legislative failure).
153. See, e.g., id. at 5 ("Structural reform is ... distinguished by the effort to give meaning to
constitutional values in the operation of large-scale organizations."); id. at 8 (responding to the
special incentives causing bureaucracies to insulate themselves from public scrutiny); id. at 42-43
(rejecting an individualism that leaves the individual at the mercy of large concentrations of power).
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policy." The courts should require other branches to follow institutional
rules designed to control self-interest, such as the rules addressing the
internal operation of the legislature."s Some commentators argue that the
courts should actively ensure that legislative action satisfies the public
interest." Not surprisingly, adherents to the Rule of Law Ideal are un-
likely to accept such a broad formulation of the judicial role.
The increasing obligation of the courts to hear "public law" litiga-
tion encourages a conception of the judicial role consistent with the Pub-
lic Purposes Ideal. Abram Chayes early recognized the implications to
the federal courts of laws requiring them to articulate as well as to vindi-
cate a variety of public policies." Other commentators have likewise
perceived the relationship between public law litigation and bureaucratic
pressures on the federal courts."
As it does in its application to the administrative process, the Public
Purposes Ideal celebrates the discretion and policy-making role of the
courts. The selection of the right people to become federal judges and the
creation of a flexible setting in which they may function is important.
Indeed, many objections to proposals to increase the number of federal
judges or to restructure the appellate courts express concerns with a re-
sulting decline in the prestige of the federal bench and the quality of per-
sons who will serve as judges." Unlike the Rule of Law Ideal, the Public
154. See Richard A. Epstein, The Independence of Judges: The Uses and Limitation of Public
Choice Theory, 1990 BYU L. REV. 827, 843-53 (discussing the ways in which courts fit and do not
fit the model as agents of interest groups); William C. Mitchell & Randy T. Simmons, Public Choice
and the Judiciary: Introductory Notes, 1990 BYU L. REv. 729, 737-38 (pointing out that courts,
much like bureaucracies are not elected); Linda A. Schwartzstein, Bureaucracy Unbounded: The
Lack of Effective Constraints in the Judicial Process, 35 ST. LOUIS U. LJ. 597, 597-98 (1991)
(criticizing courts for removing democratic restraints for overseeing public bureaucracies).
155. See Michael E. DeBow & Dwight R. Lee, Understanding (and Misunderstanding) Public
Choice: A Response to Farber and Frickey, 66 TEX. L REv. 993, 1006-11 (1988) (discussing Far-
ber and Frickey's proposal for judicial enforcement of legislative rules).
156. See, e.g., id. at 1007 (addressing proposal for substantive judicial review of economic
legislation).
157. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv.
1281,1316 (1976).
158. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 1, at 66 (asserting that the rise of public law litigation is one of
the forces turning federal judges into administrators); Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 151, at 1 -
14 (examining the role judicial independence must play in the judicial function); Heydebrand, supra
note 1, at 773 (noting that an important element in understanding the courts is the increasing role of
the federal government in the economy); Kipp & Lewis, supra note 8, at 323-24 (discussing the role
of public law disputes in transforming courts to an activist model); Rowe, supra note 8, at 833 (ar-
guing that to some degree theincrease in litigation is due to the expanded reach of substantive law).
159. See, e.g., Baker, Past Extramural Reforms supra note 32, at 884 (discussing Judge Kauf-
man's view that the quality of judges may be adversely affected by an increase in the number of
judges); Edwards, supra note 1, at 918-19 (expressing concern that an increase in the number of
judges will lower the prestige of the judiciary); McCree, supra note I, at 782-84 (expressing con-
cern that an increase in the number of federal judges not only lowers the status of the position, but
also creates administrative problems); Hon. Jon 0. Newman, Determining the Size of the Federal
Judiciary Requires More Than a Mission Statement, 27 CONN. L. REV. 865, 868 (1995) (expressing
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Purposes Ideal perceives the antimajoritarian character of the federal
courts not as a vulnerability, but as a significant advantage. The insula-
tion of judges from interest group politics ensures that they can rationally
pursue sound public policy. These positions reflect the importance of
expertise and professionalism emphasized in the Public Purposes Ideal.
They also reflect its emphasis on reasoned decision making.
Instrumentalism, the core embodiment of the Public Purposes Ideal,
requires an official to ascertain the public good in order to pursue it in-
strumentally." Because the courts cannot look to a single statutory
scheme commissioning them, they can rely even less than administrative
agencies on enabling legislation to define the public good to be pursued
through their expertise. The Constitution as an enabling document is
simultaneously terse and broad, and could support a variety of concep-
tions of the public good to be pursued by the courts. Public law legisla-
tion provides somewhat more, but usually incomplete, guidance as to the
public good to be pursued by the courts in litigation invoking such legis-
lation. The legitimacy of courts, like agencies, in applying public law
statutes rests on the success in realizing the purposes of the law. Unlike
agencies, courts make these decisions episodically not with one, but
rather with numerous similarly broad statutory mandates. As with agen-
cies, the most likely substitute for such statements is some variant of
cost-benefit analysis.
In this context, cost-benefit analysis, as an application of instru-
mentalism, is closely tied to the development of the managerial role of
federal judges, particularly federal trial judges. A brief examination of
that role provides the necessary predicate to an examination of the role of
cost-benefit analysis. As illustrated below, this focus on managerial ex-
pertise shifts the view of judicial expertise from being a means to the end
of realizing the public good to being an end in itself. Managerial judging
can undermine the ideal of public purposes that justifies the courts as
instrumentalist decision makers.
Many commentators see the growing caseload as the problem con-
fronting the federal courts. "' The Long Range Plan for the Federal
concern over the possibility that an increase in the number of judges will lead to an increase in
bureaucracy and a reduction in the quality of the judiciary). An increase in the number of judges is
likely to increase the cost and decrease the availability of benefits, such as sabbaticals, that have
been seen as important to the professional development of federal judges. Cf. IRA P. ROBBINS, FED.
JUDICIAL CTR., JUDICIAL SABBATICALS 21-57 (1987) (discussing the benefits of judicial sabbaticals
to judges and the federal courts).
160. See Sargentich, American Administrative Process, supra note 12, at 411.
161. See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 35, at 37 (discussing the effects of the increased caseload on a
judge's available time); Clark, supra note 1, at 149-50 (examining how the growth in caseload is
one factor which has driven bureaucratization); id. at 73 (stating that "in large measure the history of
judicial administration is the story of a fight against delay"); Edwards, supra note i, at 896 (asserting
that a rising workload creates a risk of quality in courts of appeals); Samuel R. Gross & Kent D.
Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1, 3
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Courts" paints a bleak picture regarding the future growth of that
caseload and its impact on the functioning of the federal courts." From
this perspective, managerial judging is principally, if not exclusively, a
response to a burgeoning caseload. The relationship between the mana-
gerial role of federal judges and increasing caseloads, however, appears
more complex-with each driving and reinforcing the other. The com-
plexity of this relationship becomes important because so many reform
proposals, particularly ones regarding the scope of federal jurisdiction,
seem driven only by the desire to reduce caseloads-an approach to fed-
eral jurisdiction that Martin Redish refers to as the astrological sign ap-
proach
1'6
Many commentators recognize that public law litigation has not
only increased caseloads but also expanded the role of the federal
courts." Many proposals to limit federal jurisdiction, although not justi-
fied on policy grounds, presume a role for the federal courts different
from that contained in the Public Purposes Ideal. These proposals sup-
port limitations on federal jurisdiction or the restriction of public law
litigation primarily as a way of reducing caseloads. Likewise, the focus
on management finds justification in the Public Purposes Ideal. Moreo-
ver, more efficient management allows the courts, like an overburdened
agency, to direct resources to those activities in which the greatest public
good can be obtained.
In her prescient work regarding managerial judging, Judith Resnik
recognizes the relationship between that approach and an expanded af-
firmative role for the courts.' She also predicts, however, how that ap-
proach could actually limit the judicial role.' 7 Managerial judging, al-
though initially connected to policy goals of the courts, hais developed a
focus on efficiency that has disconnected it, and the cost-benefit analysis
it employs, from the values that justify broad judicial discretion. This
development is predicted by Sargentich's analysis.'"
(1996) (implying that too few judges and too large a caseload has created a system geared toward
settlement).
162. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS
(1995) [hereinafter JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, LONG RANGE PLAN).
163. Id. at 9-16.
164. See Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business Between State and
Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and "The Martian Chronicles," 78 VA. L. REv. 1769. 1787
(1992) (stating that an equally rational result to altering jurisdiction to achieve docket reduction
"would have been achieved by elimination of all cases brought by those born under the signs of
Pisces, Leo, and Virgo"); id. at 1831 (stating that the common problem of current jurisdictional
structure is that limitations have "no rationale other than the simple fact that they limit docket size'.
165. See sources cited supra note 158.
166. See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARv. L. REv. 374,377-80 (1982) [hereinafter
Resnik, Managerial Judges].
167. See id.
168. See Sargentich, American Administrative Process, supra note 12, at 417 (examining how
the cost-benefit analysis easily becomes separated from any normative moorings as it seeks to en-
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This disconnection follows a subtle but important shift in the con-
ception of judicial expertise contained within managerial judging. Under
instrumentalism, expertise relates to determinations of the public good.
In this context, cost-benefit analysis would be used to decide substantive
policies or standards for the public good. At an operational level, cost-
benefit analysis would be used to help set the priorities of the courts.
There is much to suggest that managerial judging now fails to relate to
instrumentalism in these ways. Judicial discretion now relates to an ex-
pertise in management, and as such, a matter of bureaucratic, not profes-
sional, expertise. This change in the concept of expertise risks converting
managerial judging into an end itself. Sargentich describes this same risk
in administration: cost-benefit analysis becomes a tool, rather than a rule
of decision."
Managerial judging relates to the Public Purposes Ideal in the sense
that it grants trial judges immense discretion combined with a belief in
managerial expertise. Discussions of the future of the federal courts now
incorporate the image of the judge as a manager of litigation.'"0 It is not
uncommon for federal judges to recommend the most extensive use of the
case management powers now incorporated into the federal rules.' This
view of active management combined with a recognition of inherent pow-
ers in procedural matters portends an expansion of managerial judging.
Linda Mullenix argues that the Civil Justice Reform Act strengthens
these portents by resting procedure on judicial expertise with its distinc-
compass more and more factors). This separation permits cost-benefit analysis to be pursued for its
own ends. Moreover, because cost-benefit analysis presumes a limited range of preconceived ends
not generated by the analysis, it can be pursued as an end in itself against these preconceptions.
169. See id. at 418-19. Because the preconceived ends of the courts contained in both formal-
ism and instrumentalism can be pursued through cost-benefit analysis, it is not surprising that appli-
cation of managerial expertise in the service of efficiency becomes self-directed. Dispute resolution,
according to established rules as well as the broader ends of instrumentalism, can be accomplished
more efficiently by a judiciary composed of capable managers.
170. See, e.g., Edith Fl. Jones, Back to the Future for Federal Appeals Courts: Rationing Fed-
eral Justice by Recovering Limited Jurisdiction, 73 TEx. L. REV. 1485, 1492 (1995) (reviewing
THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S. COURTS OF
APPEALS (1994), and stating that "case management has become integral to the operation of the
appellate courts"); Kipp & Lewis, supra note 8, at 307 (stating that the Civil Justice Reform Act
"represented a formal recognition that the more traditional, passive role of the judge-a role that was
a primary value in the Anglo-American system of justice--was no longer viable under present-day
conditions"); Rogelio A. Lasso, Gladiators Be Gone: The New Disclosure Rules Compel a Reexami-
nation of the Adversary Process, 36 B.C. L. REv. 479, 513 (1995) (arguing that automatic disclosure
rules and new discovery rules require managerial judges because judges must necessarily be in-
volved in the process); CJ. William H. Rehnquist, Seen in a Glass Darkly: The Future of the Fed-
eral Courts, 1993 Wts. L. REv. 1, 8 (stating that district judges must now see their roles as managers
and "experience some of the strong hand of management themselves. The future may require even
more dramatic changes.').
171. Cf. Charles R. Richey, Rule 16 Revised, and Related Rules: Analysis of Recent Develop-
ments for the Benefit of Bench and Bar, 157 F.R.D. 69, 75-85 (1994) [hereinafter Richey, Rule 16
Revised]; id. at 84-85 (citing examples of judicial use of case management); Charles R. Richey, Rule
16 Revisited: Reflections for the Benefit and Bar, 139 F.R.D. 525, 527 (1992) [hereinafter Richey,
Rule 16 Revisited) (discussing various case management techniques).
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tive counter-majoritarian approbation."' The decentralization of rule-
making power will only exacerbate the willingness of judges to define
procedure in terms of docket control." Decentralization delegates rule-
making power to the level most concerned with docket reduction; decen-
tralized procedure may reflect the values of docket control rather than
other values now contained in more centralized rules. Managerial judg-
ing will overshadow other perspectives and cost-benefit analysis can
overwhelm other values including less easily quantitative concepts of
justice. The application of cost-benefit analysis to access to the courts
favors the commodification of justice, subsuming other values in this
analysis.'" Ironically, in this way managerial judging can undermine the
vision of the judiciary supported by the Public Purposes Ideal, again, a
development predicted by Sargentich's analysis.
Although many commentators express reservations about manage-
rial judging, John Langbein strongly argues for the aggressive case man-
agement contained within the inquisitorial model of German civil proce-
dure.'" Langbein's article exemplifies the efficiency arguments that can
be marshaled for managerial judging.' More importantly, it demon-
strates how managerial judging can lead to significant alterations in the
character of the courts. He notes that the discretion inherent in the Ger-
man inquisitorial system, like most European civil law systems, requires
a variety of protections including merit selection, a separate professional
cadre of judicial officials, close supervision of new judges by other
judges in a judicial hierarchy, and improved systems for the discipline of
judges.'" This aspect of his article makes the close connection between
172. See Mullenix, Counter-Reformation, supra note 56, at 439 ("Federal procedural rulemak-
ing has for the past 50 years been counter-majoritarian and predicated on a model of expertise.");
Mullenix, Separation of Powers, supra note 56, at 1336 (discussing Judge Weinstein's policy argu-
ments on procedural rulemaking); see also Kipp & Lewis, supra note 8, at 307 (noting that the Civil
Justice Reform Act adopts Judge Learned Hand's view that judges are active case managers); Carl
Tobias, More Modern Civil Process, 56 U. Prrr. L. REV. 801,803 (1995) (emphasizing the "positive
value," as "sanctified" by the Civil Justice Reform Act, of greater rulemaking authority by local
federal courts).
173. See, e.g., Mullenix, Counter-Reformation, supra note 56, at 392 (explaining that a key
congressional policy decision behind the Civil Justice Reform Act was to "promulgate a national,
statutory policy in support of judicial case management more extensive than what the current federal
rules require").
174. See Clark, supra note 1, at 77 ("The promotion of efficiency in the judiciary cannot be
accomplished without cost and sacrifice of other important values.").
175. See Langbein, supra note 1, at 824-25.
176. See id. at 826-41 (exemplifying, in part, by contrasting the American approach to the
German approach). Joseph Weis argues that civil law systems may require more judges because ot
the more extensive involvement of judges in cases. Joseph F. Weis, Jr., Are Courts Obsolete?, 67
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1385, 1389 (1992). A substitute for an increase in the number of judges is an
increase in the number of subordinate judicial officials.
177. See Langbein, supra note 1, at 848-51. However, the possibility of interest group influ-
ence exists in a civil law system. See, e.g., Carlo Guamieri, Justice and Politics: The Italian Case in
a Comparative Perspective, 4 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 241,252 (1994) (noting the proliferation
of connections between the larger political environment and the Italian judiciary); id. at 251-53
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management responsibilities and the treatment of judges as civil
servants,'' a treatment common in civil law countries. "  The reality of
increased discretion drives the project seeking greater accountability and
control. His proposals, like the expertise model in general, would lodge
this control in objective professional standards.
Todd Peterson's evaluation of how managerial judging has altered
many of the traditional checks on the judiciary also recognizes the im-
portance of accountability and control.'" Likewise, it ties that control to
the development of bureaucratic structures. Peterson argues that manage-
rial judging reduces or eliminates such traditional checks on trial judges
as precedent, appellate review, and juries."' He proposes using magistrate
judges to control the pretrial process, thereby substituting review by fed-
eral trial judges for the more traditional checks imposed on trial judges."
The limitations imposed on these magistrate judges would be profes-
sional in character." Peterson's suggestions as well as Langbein's rec-
ommendation for civil service accountability both accept the need for
impersonal judgment and seek to reduce the scope within which personal
bias can operate."
Given the concerns about the control of discretion and the elimina-
tion of bias, the renewed interest in judicial discipline'" comes as little
(describing the impact of organized factions within the Italian judiciary); Vaughn, Judicial Reform,
supra note 94, at 582-88 (describing how bureaucratic organization and personnel practices created
a conservative state bureaucracy ill-equipped to respond to violations of human rights).
178. See Langbein, supra note 1, at 826-41.
179. See, e.g., Ruggero J. Aldisert, Rambling Through Continental Legal Systems, 43 U. PrTT.
L. REV. 935, 991-93 (1982) (suggesting that training within a bureaucracy affects outlook and limits
contact with real life); David S. Clark, The Selection and Accountability of Judges in West Germany:
Implementation of a Rechtsstaat, 61 S. CAL L. REv. 1795, 1846 (1988) (noting that sociological
research over the last 40 years shows West German judges to be conservative and authoritarian);
Heydebrand, supra note 1, at 763 (commenting that such structures risk turning courts into another
arm of the state and in civil law countries "judges tend to be bureaucratically oriented and have a
comparatively low-paid civil service status").
180. See Peterson, supra note 3, at 45-46, 91-92.
181. Id. at 45; see also RiCHARDSON & VINES, supra note 2, at 172 (stating that the potential
for extensive pretrial more clearly makes the individual judge the decision maker); Harlon Leigh
Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95 YALE LJ. 62,92 (1985) (discussing
reasons "to question the intuitively appealing notion that the threat of reversal induces trial judges to
self-correct).
182. See Peterson, supra note 3, at 95. See generally R. Lawrence Dessem, The Role of the
Federal Magistrate Judge in Civil Justice Reform, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 799 (1993) (asserting that
because magistrate judges are directly accountable to trial judges in ways that trial judges are not
accountable to appellate courts, magistrate judges may be encouraged to eliminate cases at the pre-
trial stage as part of a team effort to reduce congestion).
183. Cf. Peterson, supra note 3, at 95-100. Peterson's discussion shows that the restraints
would be professional in character because they rest on review of the magistrate judge's decisions
using the criteria applicable to well conceived and presented decisions of a professional. See id.
184. See Langbein, supra note I, at 850-55; Peterson, supra note 3, at 95.
185. See WHEE u & LEVIN, supra note 57, at v (noting "sustained interest in new forms of
judicial discipline and removal has existed in the United States for the last two decades"); see also
JAMES R. BROWNING Fl" AL., FED. JUDICIAL CR., ILLusmATIVE RULES GOVERNING COMPLAINTS
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surprise. The literature contains a variety of proposals for improving the
discipline of judges, including federal judges."6 The coincidence of the
growth in managerial judging and the renewed interest in judicial disci-
pline hints at an important connection. This coincidence reflects a rela-
tionship between the vision of the judiciary contained in the Public Pur-
poses Ideal and the need to limit and control the discretion validated by
that vision.
The instrumentalist vision of agency behavior justifies considerable
secrecy. Secrecy protects the expertise and discretion of members of the
bureaucracy. In part, it insulates rational decision making based on that
expertise from political pressures and from the "irrationality" of custom
and existing social conventions." In this way, instrumentalism exalts
efficiency above the competing interests of openness. The Rule of Law
Ideal and the Democratic Process Ideal place much greater value on
openness. Publicity provides a method of insuring that decisions fall
within the boundaries created by legal standards, and openness is impor-
tant both to public participation and to political oversight.
In theory, much of the judicial process is open. Traditional views
regarding the importance of public trials and the increasing use of cam-
eras in courtrooms permit, if not encourage, public examination of the
judicial process." Opinions, briefs, and a variety of discovery documents
are part of a public record." Although the deliberative process, particularly
for appellate courts, remains closed as do the deliberations of juries (book
contracts aside), the judicial process has traditionally been more open than
OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT AND DISABILITY at vii-ix (1986) (describing the citizen complaint
mechanism and the goal of reasonable response to citizens who invoke it); Sahl, supra note 57, at
194-95 (suggesting courts increasingly have been subjected to public scrutiny); Williams, supra
note 57, at 906-07 (noting recent charges of "bad behavior" made against members of the federal
judiciary).
186. See, e.g., WHEELER & LEVIN, supra note 57, at 4-6 (discussing disciplinary proposals and
tracing historically the development of mechanisms for discipline); Sahl, supra note 57, at 199-200
(stressing need for more openness and public scrutiny of disciplinary procedures); Williams, supra
note 57, at 899-903 (discussing the need to deal effectively with race and gender bias complaints
and the need for procedures with respect to Supreme Court Justices).
187. See Sargentich, American Administrative Process, supra note 12, at 415.
188. See generally Elizabeth M. Hodgkins, Throwing Open a Window on the Nation's Courts
by Lifting the Ban on Federal Courtroom Television, 4 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 89 (1995) (discuss-
ing the progression of television in courtroom from its historical beginnings to the present); Angeli-
quo M. Paul, Turning the Camera on Court TV: Does Televising Trials Teach Us Anything About the
Real Law?, 58 OHIO ST. LJ. 655 (1997) (discussing whether Court TV is educating the public).
189. For example, the discovery rules assume that discovery information will be public absent
direction to the contrary. However, the common law and constitutional rights to discovery material
are limited. See, e.g., Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 10-14 (1st Cir. 1986) (concluding that
First Amendment and common law rights of public access to judicial proceedings "do[] not extend
to documents submitted to a court in connection with discovery proceedings").
[Vol. 76:1
A WAY OF TALKING ABOUT BUREAUCRACY
many executive bureaucracies, where legislation and litigation have been
required in order to obtain access to meetings and to documents.'"
The impact of managerial judging on openness illustrates the rela-
tionship between in'ttrumentalism and secrecy. Managerial judging re-
moves the activity of judges from public view. Commentators emphasize
that managerial judging operates in the pretrial process, a process closed
to the public and in which little, if any, record is kept.' The replacement
of a public trial process with a closed pretrial one reduces not only the
opportunity for public view, but also the rationale for openness as well. If
some of the benefits of managerial judging rely on the involvement of
the judge in ways that influence the parties in the course of the litigation,
those benefits might be lost if the judge were limited by the restrictions
that openness might place on that role. The literature contains proposals
for greater openness in the pretrial process, in the selection process, and
in the disciplining of judges."9
The recent controversy regarding secrecy in litigation also seems
tied to the Public Purposes Ideal and stresses that the pretrial process is
generally closed to public scrutiny. The advocates of Sunshine in Litiga-
tion provisions" argue that protective orders, sealing of records, and
confidential settlements prevent the public and regulatory agencies from
receiving important, perhaps life-saving, health and safety information.'
They propose provisions that restrict the ability of judges to issue such
orders but grant judges the power to review confidentiality provisions in
settlements."" Arthur Miller's resistance to the application of such pro-
posals in the federal courts rests heavily upon a defense of the discretion
190. The history of the federal Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994), is instruc-
tive. See generally American Bar Association's Symposium on the 25th Anniversary of the Freedom
of Information Act, 9 GOV'T INFO. Q. 223 (1992) (providing a discussion of the history and the
operation of the FOIA).
191. See, e.g., Kipp & Lewis, supra note 8, at 331-32 (noting literature discussing how Rule 16
takes case management out of public view with no obligation for reasoned written opinions and how
this secrecy is accompanied by the lack of procedural safeguards); Resnik, Managerial Judges,
supra note 166, at 425-26 (remarking on one judge's case management decisions as "off the record
and beyond the reach of appellate review').
192. Cf. Resnik, Failing Faith, supra note 113, at 494-98 (outlining tasks and choices that must
be undertaken to improve the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra
note 166, at 380 (noting that managerial judging may be redefining what is fair and rational adjudi-
cation); Sahi, supra note 57, at 199 (arguing that more open process would better serve judiciary's
reputation).
193. See, e.g., S. 374, 104th Cong. (1995) (unenacted federal Sunshine in Litigation bill).
194. See generally SOC'Y OF PROF'L JOURNALISTS, Ass'N OF TRIAL LAwYERS OF AM.,
KEEPING SECRETS: JUSTICE ON TRIAL (1990) (arguing that policy interests, for the most part, should
take precedence over privacy rights).
195. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081 (West Supp. 1999) (stating that no court may enter an
order which would conceal a public hazard or which would result in public hazard); TEX. R. OF CIv.
P. 76(a) (stating that court records may not be sealed if sealing will have an adverse effect upon
general public health unless clearly outweighed by substantial specific interest).
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of trial judges." This defense repeats the themes of the Public Purposes
Ideal including professional restraints, the expertise of judges, and the
efficiency of the trial process.
Proposals requiring that trial judges review confidentiality provi-
sions demand separate examination. These proposals involve the court in
private settlements in order to vindicate the public interest-powers that
fit nicely within the view of the courts under the Public Purposes Ideal.
Because managerial judging may often intimately involve courts in the
settlement process leading to such agreements, these proposals can be
viewed as limitations on judicial power as well as its expansion. In light
of the discussion above, however, both conceptions seem linked to the
role of the courts contained in the Public Purposes Ideal.
Managerial judging invokes many of the fears of abuse suggested
by the Public Purposes Ideal. The failure of cost-benefit analysis to es-
tablish the public good to be implemented by the courts leads to tech-
niques of bureaucracy to control the exercise of judicial discretion. Sar-
gentich would predict that the limitations of instrumentalism would lead
to the alternative expression of the Public Purposes Ideal--the market.'"
Before examining how proposals for reform incorporate this alternative
expression, I turn briefly to Frug's description of responses of the exper-
tise model to the failure to draw the line between appropriate and inap-
propriate discretion and between expertise and bias.
Frug states that the inability to draw lines between subjectivity and
objectivity would lead to attempts to recreate some type of objective
limits.'" In fact, one of his examples, the creation of "Super-Experts,""
finds several analogies in the proposals for reform of the federal courts,
including the use of court appointed experts, the creation of panels of
experts to examine scientific and technical claims, and the establishment
of courts with specialized expertise." Frug argues that this attempt to
rely on super-experts will likewise fail because it again requires the
drawing of lines between functions that contain both the objective and
the subjective.?'
196. See Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders and Public Access to the Courts,
105 HARV. L. REV. 427, 428-32 (1991).
197. See Sargentich, American Administrative Process, supra note 12, at 419-20.
198. See Frug, Ideology of Bureaucracy, supra note 19, at 1318-34 (discussing various real-
world ramifications of the expertise model).
199. Id. at 1327-31.
200. See generally Dreyfuss, supra note 53 (discussing issues with specialized courts); Smith,
supra note 52, at 458-70 (discussing selection of juries based on education and experience); The
Civil Jury, supra note 52, at 1459 (discussing use of specialized panels); infra notes 249-51,278-82
and accompanying texL
201. Frug, Ideology of Bureaucracy, supra note 19, at 1330-31. The conflict between the
requirements of an independent and informed super-expert "merely reproduces the discussion of the
expertise/bias distinction." Id. at 1330.
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More basically, Frug's examination of the judicial review model as
a control of bureaucracy casts doubt on the efficacy of judicial restraints
on public and private bureaucracies. The imposition of such restraints
forms an important component for the affmnative role of the federal
courts.' The judicial review model must draw a line between the role of
the court and the role of the bureaucracy. In so doing the court can rely
on formalist and expertise views of the court, each of which can be inter-
preted to either expand or contract the scope of judicial review. The court
can also draw on formalist and expertise models of the bureaucracy, each
of which can again be interpreted to expand or contract the scope of bu-
reaucratic action.' The combination of these possibilities explains ex-
* isting doctrines of judicial review and demonstrates why the judicial re-
view model cannot effectively control bureaucracies. '
2. The Market
Traditionally, settlement could be seen as reliance on private deci-
sion making in which the parties independently examine the alternatives
available and choose those alternatives that best fulfill their subjective
values.' Conceived in this way, settlement seems analogous to market-
grounded decision making; that is, courts provide a framework of rules
that support this private decision making and ensure adequate informa-
tion for the determination of rational choice.' Even provisions for some
public expenditure for these alternatives do not alter their basic private
character. This conception of settlement and the role of the courts in it
can be seen to be inconsistent with the vision of the role the courts con-
tained in the Public Purposes Ideal. Owen Fiss's critique of settlement '
demonstrates how advocates of the Public Purposes Ideal can perceive
settlement as potentially undermining the involvement of the courts in
addressing public values and public rights.
Managerial judging alters the character of settlement; because the
judge "encourages" settlement, settlement becomes court-directed. In-
deed, managerial judges may move beyond facilitating settlements to
influencing the content of settlements.' Many settlements may include
202. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
203. See Frug, Ideology of Bureaucracy, supra note 19, at 1334-43.
204. See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
205. Cf. Gross & Syvemd, supra note 161, at 3-4 (noting that party control inherent in the
American legal system engenders settlement).
206. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 607-15 (Aspen Law & Bus. 5th
ed. 1998) (1974) (noting the importance of litigation in setting roles for settlement even if most cases
are settled).
207. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE LJ. 1073 (1984).
208. Cf. Alschuler, supra note 7, at 1821-22 (listing judicial pressure to settle cases among the
reasons why "the defects of America's adjudicative system have distorted the settlement process");
Marc Galanter, A Settlement Judge Not a Trial Judge: Judicial Mediation in the United States, 12
J.L. & Soc'y I (1985) (discussing the powerful influence of judges in directing parties toward
settlement); Gross & Syverud, supra note 161, at 2-4 (describing incentives for judicial encourage-
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provisions reflecting not just the subjective values of the parties but the
perspectives and experience of the judge. Conceived in this way, settle-
ment seems less analogous to the market and more reflective of judicial
instrumentalism.
In a similar way, perceptions of alternative dispute resolution oscil-
late between instrumentalism and market analogies. ADR can be seen as
privatization of the judicial mechanism. The parties choose, based on
their values and interests,' from a variety of techniques of dispute reso-
lution. ADR not only rests this choice with the parties, but also provides
methods of resolution that give the parties more control over the process
of resolution. For example, even with arbitration, one of the more formal
options provided by alternative dispute resolution, the parties can choose
the decision maker, can influence, if not control, the standards to be ap-
plied, and can tailor process and procedure to their individual needs. 1"
Under traditional rules, courts may only intervene in circumstances that
suggest the equivalent of market failure-where the arbitration is funda-
mentally unfair or deviates from the agreement of the parties."' As with
market analogies of settlements, advocates of the Public Purposes Ideal
can perceive ADR as a threat to the public responsibilities of the courts,
responsibilities that go beyond the resolution of an individual case to
implementation of judicial conceptions of the public good. Suggestions
that arbitration should not be permitted in certain types of public law
litigation, such as employment discrimination,2 ' rest not only upon a
belief that the agreements to arbitrate may be an abuse of the superior
bargaining power of employers, but also upon a conviction that such
litigation should involve public judgments made through public officials,
particularly judges." The suggestion that public law standards bind arbi-
ment of settlements); Richey, Rule 16 Revised, supra note 171, at 71 (advocating greater judicial
involvement in pretrial). But cf. Dessem, supra note 182, at 819 ("Since most judges do not discuss
settlement with counsel in cases over which they may preside at trial, a judge other than the trial
judge is needed to preside over judicially-hosted settlement conferences.").
209. See, e.g., Maria Dakolias, A Strategy for Judicial Reform: The Experience in Latin Amer-
ica, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 167,200 (1995) (noting use of alternative dispute resolution in Latin America
as a response to "delays and corruption that characterize the formal judicial system"); Resnik, Fail-
ing Faith, supra note 113, at 537 (showing that managerial judging and alternative dispute resolution
share the view that disposition by the parties' consent is preferable to adjudication); Weis, supra
note 176, at 1387 (discussing innovative procedures available in alternative dispute resolution).
210. Cf. Dakolias, supra note 209, at 200-01 (asserting that the flexibility and party-based
control that ADR offers has led to the willingness of Latin American parties to choose this method
as opposed to traditional judicial procedures); Weis, supra note 176, at 1387 (proposing that party
agreement allows experimentation).
211. Cf. Martin H. Malin, Arbitrating Statutory Employment Claims in the Aftermath of Gilmer,
40 ST. Louis U. LJ. 77, 95-99 (1996) (noting limited procedural safeguards for arbitration under
the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (1994)).
212. See generally id. at 77-78 (discussing controversy, in the wake of Gilmer v. Inter-
state/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991), surrounding mandatory arbitration of employment
claims).
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trators in employment discrimination cases relies on similar instrumen-
talist perspectives. 1"
Mandatory alternative dispute resolution prior to proceeding in the
courts is not a market alternative but rather the application of instrumen-
talist principles. Indeed, the view that such mandatory provisions are
really consumer driven echoes instrumentalist descriptions of bureau-
cratic activity. 1" It assumes that consumers of dispute resolution services
want the most efficient service and that the courts using their experience
and expertise determine what services best serve which groups of con-
sumers."' Although the mandatory ADR provisions under the Civil Jus-
tice Reform Act, which rest the requirement on the amount in contro-
versy,7 belie any careful consideration of consumer interests, they still
reflect judicial judgments about the appropriateness of different forms of
dispute resolution.
213. See, e.g., David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee
and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 36-39
(focusing on superior bargaining power of employers, particularly in the context of pre-dispute
agreements, noting such agreements are a form of corporate "self-deregulation," and emphasizing
that these clauses remove important public rights from the courts); cf. Edwards, supra note 1, at 928
(arguing that significant public rights should not be limited "by those whom the law seeks to regu-
late").
214. Cf. Baker, Past Extramural Reforms, supra note 32, at 872-73 (expressing concern about
the effect of arbitration on underlying legal norms); Breyer, supra note 35, at 44 (emphasizing the
importance of just settlement in disputes potentially leading to litigation, and the fact that there is
uncertainty whether ADR leads to such just settlement); Judge G. Thomas Eisele, Differing Vi-
sions-Differing Values: A Comment on Judge Parker's Reformation Model for Federal District
Courts, 46 SMU L. REv. 1935, 1940-41 (1993) (criticizing judges' ability to require alternative
dispute resolution as opposed to a traditional trial); Malin, supra note 211, at 100-02 (emphasizing
the role of courts and the important public function of judges, noting that arbitrators are outside the
public justice system, and arguing that private arbitral interpretation of Title VII can undermine
uniform federal labor standards).
215. See, e.g., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MANUAL FOR Lr'IGATION MANAGEMENT AND COST AND
DELAY REDUCTION 2 ("Case management must be directed at tailoring dispute resolution procedures
and techniques to the available resources and needs of the case."); Alschuler, supra note 7, at 1840
(arguing that mandatory arbitration reduces backlogs and users of arbitration have high levels of
satisfaction); Breyer, supra note 35, at 44-45 (discussing the possible unfairness of mandatory,
alternative dispute resolution); Judge R. Allan Edgar, A Judge's View-ADR and the Federal
Courts-The Eastern District of Tennessee, 26 U. MEM. L. REv. 995, 995-97 (1996) (suggesting
that a benefit of using alternative dispute resolution is quality, as well as efficiency); Justice Penny J.
White, Yesterday's Vision, Tomorrow's Challenge: Case Management and Alternative Dispute
Resolution in Tennessee, 26 U. MEM. L. REv. 957, 961 (1996) (discussing the Tennessee courts'
ability to provide appropriate dispute resolution and public perception that ADR is less expensive,
more efficient, and more satisfactory than litigation).
216. See generally Rowe, supra note 8, at 828 (discussing whether litigation or ADR is the
most efficient way to handle disputes).
217. See, e.g., E.D. PA. Civ. R. 8 (mandating mediation for cases involving disputes of less
than $100,000). See generally Maull, supra note 49, at 246-52 (describing alternative dispute reso-
lution processes adopted under the Civil Justice Reform Act, including the Pennsylvania provision
cited above); id. at 253 CEach of the principal ADR processes is mandatory in at least one dis-
tricr.'). The courts' attraction to alternative dispute resolution may rest on ADR's ability to remove
cases from the courts and to reduce dockets, for many cases that are sent to alternative dispute reso-
lution do not return to the courts.
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To the extent that alternative dispute resolution can be described as
a market alternative, it remains vulnerable to criticism from advocates of
instrumentalism. To the extent that ADR seems to be the application of
instrumentalism relying on the discretion and expertise of judges, it is
vulnerable to critics of state intervention and the advocates of market-
based alternatives. In either instance, the Public Purposes Ideal and this
way of talking about bureaucracy collectively illuminate the values at
issue.
The Public Purposes Ideal conceives a radically different role for
the courts than the Rule of Law Ideal."" The Public Purposes Ideal cele-
brates discretion, while the Rule of Law Ideal shuns it.219 For this reason,
the Public Purposes Ideal places the discussion regarding managerial
judging within a normative framework that contrasts sharply with that
encountered in the Rule of Law Ideal---a normative framework that
generates different arguments and different concerns. The Rule of Law
Ideal opposes the broad judicial decision making inherent in the Public
Purposes Ideal. It opposes judicial policy making rather than judicial
application of existing standards." On the other hand, the Public Pur-
poses Ideal opposes the narrow and constricted view of the judicial role
advocated by the Rule of Law Ideal.' Both the Rule of Law and the
Public Purposes Ideal, however, perceive the judicial role for good or ill
as countermajoritarian.' In this regard, they both conflict with the
Democratic Process Ideal.'m
D. The Democratic Process Ideal
According to Sargentich, the Democratic Process Ideal rests on a
participatory and representative decision-making process in which
agency officials consider the views of those affected by administrative
decisions.' This ideal sees the administrative process primarily as a plu-
ralist political process because its core embodiment relies on public par-
ticipation in that process.' Public participation conflicts with the bu-
reaucratic structure of administrative decisions, and challenges the prin-
ciple that public employees are politically neutral actors. A number of
practical and policy considerations also limit the possibility of wide pub-
218. See Sargentich, American Administrative Process, supra note 12, at 411.
219. See id.
220. Cf. id. (discussing the nature of the Public Purposes Ideal).
221. See id. at 397.
222. See id. at 411.
223. See id.
224. See id. at 425.
225. Seeid.
226. See id. at 426-27.
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lic participation. For example, the limited resources of many interest
groups will prevent them from meaningfully participating in the admin-
istrative process.' Indeed, the need for administrative discretion in de-
ciding which groups to permit to participate, and which, if any, groups to
subsidize, involves nondemocratic decisions by agency officials.'
Given the restraints on the core embodiment of participation, the
Democratic Process Ideal offers an alternative expression of oversight by
politically responsible officials.'m This alternative expression, of course,
abandons direct public participation central to the ideal. It also rests on
doubtful assumptions about the responsiveness of the President and Con-
gress "to a full range of public interests." " The methodology of this
ideal is politics: the process of balancing and compromising affected
interests."2 This methodology manifests the judgment that the adminis-
trative process is a political one.
As part of the market/pluralist model, Frug critiques the view that
"demands of the political process can (or do) protect the constituents of
the bureaucracy from domination by bureaucratic officials."' He notes,
as does Sargentich, that participation in bureaucratic decision making
requires an identification of the relevant interests, a description of the
nature of their participation, and rules to resolve conflicts between the
various interests. ' Each of these issues, he believes, creates a subjec-
tive/objective combination that potentially undermines the model. ' For
example, because every interest group cannot participate, the choice of
the relevant groups requires an objectification by the bureaucracy of the
subjective desires of the people.m The character of interest group partici-
pation combines the insight that interest groups represent narrow subjec-
tive interests while together they represent the objective constituency of
the agency."' The rules of interest group conflict cannot be objective, but
must chose between views of formal equality of groups or real equal-
ity---considering financial resources, organization, and other social
capital-a choice that will lead to radically different outcomes.' Rather
227. See id. at 428-29. Sargentich notes that "despite the continuing power of the democratic
process ideal, the gap between its core embodiment and the existing process is so profound that the
core, if fully realized, would radically transform rather than merely reform it."Id. at 429.
228. See id. at 430.
229. See id. at 43 1.
230. See id. at 431-38.
231. Id. at 436.
232. See Sargentich, Future of Administrative Law, supra note 14, at 774-75.
233. Frog, Ideology of Bureaucracy, supra note 19, at 1356 (internal quotation marks omitted).
234. See id. at 1368-69.
235. See id. at 1369.
236. See id.
237. See id. at 1371 (asserting the theory that interest groups are therefore alternatively de-
scribed "as representatives of subjective desire and representatives of objective neutrality").
238. Cf. id. at 1372 (discussing how, within the pluralist mechanism, specified.rules must be
implemented). As Frug notes:
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than participation within the bureaucracy, Frug advocates participatory
decision making that would serve to undermine rather than the support
the legitimacy of bureaucracies.'s
1. Participation
The Democratic Process Ideal seems particularly ill-suited to a dis-
cussion of the future of the federal courts. The Constitution gives federal
judges tenure on good behavior for life and limits the ability of Congress
to reduce the salaries of judges.' These provisions implement an attempt
to insulate judges from much of interest group politics. Although some
states provide for the popular election of judges," and many others re-
quire judges to stand against their record for re-election,' the role of
judges contained in the Rule of Law Ideal and the Public Purposes Ideal
so dominates our perceptions of federal judges that these other methods
of judicial selection and accountability appear notable principally as ex-
amples of the risks of corruption and politicization of judges posed by
the application of electoral practices to the courts.' Direct interest group
participation seems anathema to a perception of the judge, either as a
neutral arbitrator applying formal standards to individual cases, or as a
disinterested expert policymaker or judicial manager.
Simply sketching these three solutions to the problem of class differences-disregarding
them, financing the poor, reorganizing the economic structure-should demonstrate the
range of possible rules for interest group conflict. ... These rules create not a neutral ar-
biter but a battleground for determining the kinds of messages that will influence the bu-
reaucratic process.
Id. at 1373.
239. See Id. at 1370.
240. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § I (Compensation Clause) ("The Judges, both of the supreme
and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, re-
ceive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in
Office."). On three particular occasions, federal judges have challenged actions that they argued
reduced their salaries, including failure of Congress to increase salaries with the rate of inflation. See
United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200,218 (1980); Hatter v. United States, 953 F.2d 626,629-30 (Fed.
Cir. 1992); Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028, 1045, 1048 (Ct. Cl. 1977), overruled by Ameri-
can Fed'n of Gov't Employees, AFL-CIO, 806 F.2d 1034, 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1986). See generally THE
FEDERAUST No. 79 (Alexander Hamilton) (asserting that judges are entitled to fair compensation
that should not be lowered).
241. See Schwartz, supra note 57, at M2 (noting that 21 states popularly elect judges).
242. See id. (noting that 38 states require judges to run against their records); see a/ro
WHEELER & LEVIN, supra note 57, at 8 (stating that most states have such a provision at least in
some courts and that seven states have popular recall provisions for judges).
243. See, e.g., WHEELER & HARRISON, supra note 7, at 6 (noting that at the time of the Consti-
tution, state legislatures appointed judges in most states and approximately half had the power of
removal); Epstein, supra note 154, at 840-41 (suggesting how appointment rather than election of
judges limits application of some aspects of public choice); Langbein, supra note 1, at 853-54 (ex-
pressing hesitation in having elected Illinois state court judges exercise powers through German-type
civil procedure, as a large number of Chicago judges ar indicted for corruption, yet noting that
"[riemodeling of civil procedure is intimately connected to improvement in the selection of judges");
Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 1156-57 (implying concern about an elected judiciary adjudicating civil
rights and liberties). But see, e.g., Guamieri, supra note 177, at 251-54 (describing how factions and
interest group politics have arisen in the appointed Italian judiciary).
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The federal courts, however, contain two institutions, both ancient
in origin, that rely on public participation in the judicial process. Until
recently, these two institutions-the lay jury in civil actions and the ad-
versary system-have seemed inextricably linked to American concep-
tions of civil litigation. The Seventh Amendment protects the role of the
lay jury'" and centuries of tradition and the assumptions of civil proce-
dure buttress the adversary role.
The civil jury involves members of the public-usually persons
without legal training or experience in the judicial process. Ideally, juries
are representative of the community at large, and the authority of their
judgment lies in good part on their representative character.' A substan-
tial body of law and practice seeks to insure that representative
character 4' and the current controversy about the status of the peremptory
challenge can be viewed as illustrative of the importance placed on the
jury as a surrogate for the community.' In addition, because juries are
not part of any judicial bureaucracy, they serve as community observers
whose presence alone helps to validate the judicial process.' Even in
civil litigation they can perform as dispensers of justice by avoiding the
harshness of established rules.
Indeed, juries embody participatory decision making; they are im-
portant decision makers, not simply advisers to others. In this sense, ju-
ries offer an example of public participation unlike any in administrative
agencies. The decision-making powers of juries have engendered a
framework of trial and appellate procedures designed to limit and control
that power.' Much of civil procedure chronicles the attempts by the ju-
diciary to constrain popular decision making that often lies at the heart of
civil trials. At different stages in American history, public responses to
244. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("In Suits at common law ... the right of trial by jury shall
be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United
Sates, than according to the rules of the common law.").
245. Cf. RICHARDSON & VINES, supra note 2, at 174 (insinuating that although the federal
courts represent the very embodiment of legal order, they also represent institutions intrinsically
linked to popular democracy); Eisele, supra note 214, at 1977 (discussing the jury as a political
institution crucial to a heterogeneous, democratic community committed to protecting the interests
of "outs"). Akhil Reed Amar and Alan Hirsch contend that the Constitution originally conceived the
jury as an institution of self-government that would check the power of judges. See AKHIL REED
AMAR & ALAN HIRSCH, FOR THE PEOPLE: WHAT THE CONSTITUTION REALLY SAYS ABOUT YOUR
RIGHTS 52-53 (1998).
246. See, e.g., Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1871 (1994) (estab-
lishing guidelines for the selections of grand and petit juries in federal courts).
247. See supra note 54.
248. See, e.g., Weis, supra note 176, at 1390-91 (suggesting that litigants may more readily
accept the judgment of juries because of anonymity, lack of continuity, and the fact that jurors "are
perceived as having no interest in the outcome of the case').
249. This framework consists of the Rules of Evidence, presumptions, elements of claim,
instructions, Rule 49, directed verdict, judgment as a matter of law, and renewed motion for judg-
ment as a matter of law.
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these attempts' have generated political controversy and significant le-
gal responses."l
Likewise, the adversary process can be justified as an institution of
public participation in the judicial process. Commentators have expressly
linked this process to the protection of individual rights and the further-
ance of individual autonomy.' The individual, through her representa-
tive, plays an important role in the determination of her claim. The ad-
versary process, like any scheme of participation, addresses basic issues
regarding which persons or interests will have an opportunity to present
views to an official decision maker, what will be the character of the
participation, and what will be the rules of conflict between representa-
tives of different groups. Because federal courts act only upon cases or
controversies brought before them, the participation of others is neces-
sary to invoke judicial power. The courts are reactive and lack the proac-
tive powers of most administrative agencies.
In courts, the rules of participation are quite democratic. Any person
who has a claim within the competence of the court may bring that
claim. "3 The parties decide what interests to represent and the parties
initiate the process. Individuals can bring claims that affect large seg-
ments of the public, and these actions are clearly representative in their
character. For example, the civil rights litigation leading to Brown v.
Board of Education' used individual plaintiffs in cases where the inter-
ests of millions were asserted.' Class litigation more explicitly accepts
this representative role, and the adequacy of representation is not only a
250. See, e.g., AMuz. CONST. art. XVIII, § 5 (containing populist provisions that prohibit judges
from directing verdicts on the issue of contributory negligence); OKLA. CONST. art. XXI, § 6
(stating that the defense of contributory negligence shall be a question of fact left to the jury).
251. See, e.g., Noel Fidel, Preeminently a Political Institution: The Right of Arizona Juries to
Nullify the Law of Contributory Negligence, 23 ARIZ. ST. U. 1, 1 (1991) (discussing the power of
juries to reach verdicts that may be "inconsistent with the traditional application of facts to the law").
252. See, e.g., Kipp & Lewis, supra note 8, at 308 (arguing that individual autonomy is vindi-
cated in individuals invoking the judicial process and in individuals retaining control over all rele-
vant aspects of the process); id. at 347-48 (criticizing the Civil Justice Reform Act on the ground
that the Act "represents a clear diminution in the absolute autonomy of individuals who invoke the
civil justice system," but implying that the Act could increase substantive liberty, "namely access to
a more meaningful federal civil adjudicative process").
253. For general comments dealing with court openness, accessibility, and accountability, see
Martineau, supra note 3, at 11-13 (stressing that oral argument is needed for institutional purposes
of openness and accountability); id. at 19-20 (analyzing participation as a value supporting oral
argument in light of the need of courts to deal with sharply increased appellate caseload); Meyer,
supra note 1, at 662 (commenting favorably on the greater accessibility of the courts compared with
legislatures); Redish, supra note 164, at 1776-77 (addressing arguments that advocate a role for
consumer choice in shaping jurisdiction); Resnik, Failing Faith, supra note 113, at 504-05 (de-
scribing central consideration of the adversary process in the drafting of the federal roles).
254. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
255. See generally RIcHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCAION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1976) (addressing, among other
things, the fact that Brown was a consolidated opinion).
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constitutional touchstone but also a*preeminent requirement of federal
procedure.' Clearly, some persons seek to represent only themselves,
while many cases are driven by interest group considerations rather than
the desires of the individual party. Within this range, however, represen-
tation of others seems more common and less the exception. Although
professional representation is not a prerequisite to such participation, as a
practical matter, professional representation is usually a necessity. Not
surprisingly, litigation in the United States becomes an important form of
interest group activity. Many factors influence this use of litigation but
the ease of participation is particularly important.
Participation by litigants representing different groups also serves to
educate judges about the interests and problems of broad segments of the
public. The breadth of this education can create a democratic bias in
judges who see the claims of all groups and social classes. For example,
one long-standing critique of the Chilean judiciary was its separation
from the concerns and interests of the vast majority of Chileans.' Many
believed that this insulation from the polity of the state contributed to the
inability of the judiciary to respond to the human rights abuses of the
military regime.' Proposals for reform in Chile seek to increase public
participation in the courts as a way of inculcating democratic values in
judges.'
Attempts to limit access to the courts can appear undemocratic, and
therefore provoke especially strong reactions. These attempts can take
the form of reducing the ability of individuals to raise the interests of
others. Both the controversy and confusion of the Supreme Court's
standing decisions demonstrate the difficulties when the court seeks to
articulate standards for participation.' These attempts can also seek to
discourage the use of the courts by certain groups or interests. A strong
undercurrent of the discussion of civil justice reform proposals, particu-
larly those proposals affecting access to the courts, articulates the suspi-
256. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23. Of course, class actions can prevent or limit the participation by
members of the class in independent litigation. The limitation on participation is especially true for
those class actions seen as mandatory and in which the members of the class are not given an op-
portunity to opt out. See id.
257. See Vaughn, Judicial Reform, supra note 94, at 587-88.
258. See id. at 588 (noting the commonly held view of the Chilean Judiciary-that it "used
formalism to justify its conservative biases," in turn ignoring or condoning human rights abuses at
the time of the military regime).
259. See id. at 595-96.
260. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Expanding the Zone, Tilting the Field: Zone of Interests and
Article III Standing Analysis After Bennet v. Spear, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 763, 764-75 (1997) (dis-
cussing recent Supreme Court jurisprudence on standing that "raises difficult separation of powers
and interpretation issues, and potentially results in even more skewed standing crite-
ria... disfavoring claims brought by the beneficiaries of regulation"); Edwards, supra note 1, at
907-09 (discussing the possible intentions behind the Supreme Court's approach to standing, section
1983, habeas corpus, class actions and implied private rights of action). "ITihe Supreme Court has
endeavored to alter the litigation-producing nature of prior doctrines and to replace those doctrines
with litigation limiting or door closing rules .... I "d. at 908.
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cion that these proposals are intended to make the courts less hospitable
to consumer and civil rights litigants, thereby reducing the participation
of these interests."'
The adversary process also establishes extensive individual control
over the character of participation. Adversarial procedural rules rely on
the adversaries to choose the judicial forum, to investigate independ-
ently, to control the collection of information, to structure litigation posi-
tions, to frame issues, and to present arguments supporting their respec-
tive party's position." In addition, adversaries possess ways of directly
influencing decision makers: arguments, questions to witnesses, selection
of jurors, use of experts, and the preparation of written briefs.' Appellate
261. See. e.g., EuzABm PLAPINGER & DONNA STIENSTRA, 14 ALTERNATIVEs To HIGH COsT
LMGATION 10-11 (1996) (discussing the impact of user fees in ADR); Alschuler, supra note 7, at
1814 (discussing how plaintiffs are adversely affected by increasing the costs of justice and that
"[wlrongdoers would be required to 'internalize' a smaller portion of the cost that their conduct has
inflicted on others"); Peter S. Chantilis, Mediation U.SA., 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 1031, 1033 (1996)
(arguing mediation as a rebuke of an inefficient adversary legal system in a state-by-state survey of
mediation provisions); Hensler, supra note 8, at 249 (noting that the Council on Competitiveness'
proposals "seek to change the current balance between individual plaintiffs and corporate defen-
dants, in favor of the latter"); Patrick E. Longan, Congress, the Courts and the Long Range Plan, 46
AM. U. L. REv. 625, 645-53 (1997) (discussing how the increased congressional regulation of
procedure is making practice in the federal courts more complex because of the use of different
procedural rules for different types of cases, particularly those arising under the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-I to
78u-4 (Supp. 11995))); Resnik, Failing Faith, supra note 113, at 531-33 (discussing how existing
rules and their interpretations by courts can harm civil rights litigants by reducing the number of
civil cases filed and tried); Tobias, supra note 123, at 832-33 (suggesting that local courts could
structure procedure unfairly to disadvantage certain counsel and litigants and such changes are likely
to affect litigants with the least financial and political power).
Mullenix notes the politically charged atmosphere that hovers over the Civil Justice Reform
Act:
mhe disguised political agenda is to remove disagreeable cases and disagreeable liti-
gants from the federal courts. The blatant agenda is to allow local groups to create inno-
vative procedural rules to enhance litigation efficiency; the disguised agenda is to foster
certain kinds of procedural rules that will favor certain types of litigants. The blatant
agenda is to "democratically" give procedural rulemaking authority to users of the sys-
tem; the disguised agenda is to strip the judicial branch of its traditional rulemaking
functions and transfer that function to unelected elite advisory groups dominated by busi-
ness interests and corporate and insurance civil defense attorneys.
Mullenix, Counter-Reformation, supra note 56, at 439. Edwards highlights the political issues sur-
rounding rationing plans:
[Riationing plans, like attempts to expand supply by creating new specialized courts,
must be designed to avoid conveying the impression that they are intended to limit disfa-
vored rights or to divert the business of the poor and powerless from the federal courts
[sic) in order to preserve a convenient forum for the wealthy and powerful.
Edwards, supra note 1, at 923.
262. See generally JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL Er AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE (2d ad. 1993) (examining
the tools available to attorneys who bring or defend civil suits including how they should frame their
cases in order to properly bring them before a particular court and how the case proceeds from its
inception to a final enforceable judgment).
263. See generally THOMAS A. MAuEr, TRIAL TECHNQUES at xix (4th ed. Aspen Law & Bus.
1996) (1980) (stating the effectiveness of a trial lawyer is based on the attorney's development of an
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briefs and arguments forcefully present the perspective of the adversaries
and can lay the grounds for other cases and other arguments. Because the
character of participation emphasizes attempts to influence judicial offi-
cials directly through a variety of formal means, social scientists recog-
nize litigation as a form of lobbying, analogous to the attempts to influ-
ence legislative and executive bodies.2 '
Finally, the Rules of Civil Procedure set the rules for the resolution
of conflicts between participants.' Commentators recognize that these
rules generally assume a formal equality between participants with the
anticipated result that groups representing lower social and economic
interests are disadvantaged.2' Still, in the context of the Democratic Pro-
cess Ideal, the adversary process seems a highly developed institution for
public participation in the judicial process.
The Civil Justice Reform Act adopts the language of participation.
In what is described as "bottoms up" decision making, the Act directs the
formation of local advisory groups composed of those affected by the
procedures of federal trial courts. ' The affected interests are given a
direct role in advising the courts in the development of rules to imple-
ment the goals of the Act.' Therefore, the Act involves the participation
of local interests in the development of procedural rules. This involve-
ment is substantially at odds with the uniform and national character of
existing rulemaking procedures. Linda Mullenix attacks these participa-
tion requirements, stating that they are the imposition of congressional
judgment on the courts and act to further the goals of specific interest
groups, particularly defense counsel representing the insurance industry
and the corporate bar. Although she believes that the Act reflects cen-
effective method for analyzing and preparing cases for trial and the attorney's technical ability to
present their side persuasively at trial).
264. See RONALD J. HREBENAR, INTEREST GROUP POLITICS IN AMERICA (1997) (discussing
judicial lobbying).
265. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. (articulating the rules for commencement of actions, plead-
ings and motions, parties, discovery, trials, judgments and remedies).
266. Cf. Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc'y REV. 95, 95-97 (1974) (suggesting redistributive reformation in the
legal system to facilitate equalizing change).
267. 28 U.S.C. § 478 (1994). Because the decisions of planning groups are only suggestions,
their participation may be illusory. Indeed, courts could use the process to validate a pre-existing
judicial agenda.
268. 28 U.S.C. §§ 471,472 (articulating the particulars of developing and implementing a civil
justice expense and delay reduction plan for the federal district courts in conjunction with the im-
plementation of advisory groups).
269. See Mullenix, Counter-Reformation, supra note 56, at 406-07 (arguing that in the Brook-
ings-Biden task force "business, corporate, and insurance industry litigators were heavily repre-
sented in comparison to other constituencies with interests in the federal courts'); id. at 438 ("Con-
gress's central preoccupation with protecting the special interests of business and insurance concerns
supplied the bill's rationale that litigation costs impair the ability of American corporations to com-
pete at home and abroad."); Mullenix, Separation of Powers, supra note 56, at 1287 (stating that the
Civil Justice Reform Act will "irretrievably politicize federal procedural rulemaking); see also
Lauren K. Robel, Grass Roots Procedure: Local Advisory Groups and the Civil Justice Reform Act
1998]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
tralized rather than participatory decision making, her fears of interest
group dominance of the process reconfirms the participatory aspects of
the Act; for, from this dominance follows the advantage that some
groups have over others.
Some literature suggests an advantage of alternative dispute resolu-
tion is its ability to increase the participation of the parties."' In ADR, the
parties are encouraged to interact early and often in the course of the
process. Such participation permits the parties to appreciate how their
efforts have contributed to the outcome or how they "own" the process
and its results.m Alternative dispute resolution also rests on the core of
the Democratic Process Ideal in another way. That core embodiment sees
governmental decision making as a political process where values are
selected through a bargaining process among affected private actors and
government officials that leads to some legally sanctioned result, a proc-
ess potentially satisfied by many forms of alternative dispute resolution.
Many forms of ADR could be seen in this same way. In fact, judge-
controlled settlements could also be viewed as a bargaining process in-
volving the affected parties and a government official leading to an out-
come to be given legal effect.
The participation, however, conceived in the Democratic Process
Ideal, focuses on participation in a forum that allows the presentation of
views to government officials responsible for decisions that affect the
interests of the persons or groups participating; it assumes openness and
broad public participation. It becomes difficult to define involvement in
private decision making as the participation conceived in the ideal.
Alternative dispute resolution also fails to fit within the Democratic
Process Ideal's conception of participation because ADR ignores values
of participation that exist independent of outcome. Feminist literature
stresses the importance of narrative and storytelling in order to legitimate
group values, to validate perspectives, and to recognize the dignitary
interests of individuals.m For example, the right of battered women to
of 1990, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 879, 893-96 (1993) (noting that although women and minority attor-
neys are underrepresented in the advisory groups to federal courts, the groups seem balanced be-
tween plaintiffs' and defendants' attorneys).
270. See Mullenix, Counter-Reformation, supra note 56, at 407 (stating that "the Civil Justice
Reform Act amounts to a superficial layer of local pluralism that disguises what is essentially con-
gressionally-dictated civil justice reform').
271. See John B. Attanasio, Foreword: Verstehen and Dispute Resolution, 67 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 1317, 1317-19 (1992) (discussing Max Weber's concept of "understanding" (Verstehen) in
light of increased interest and participation in ADR).
272. Cf. Resnik, Rereading the Federal Courts, supra note 29, at 1052 (discussing the possibil-
ity that the federal court system is increasingly at risk as individuals with resources opt out of the
federal system to "buy their own set of private judges").
273. Cf. Naomi R. Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, 81 GEO. U. 2475, 2477 (1993) (noting in the
context of reconstructing legal ethics how a function of the legal system is to sort through stories in
an "orderly, nonviolent, [and] civilized manner"); Richard Lempert, Telling Tales in Court: Trial
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tell their stories in a public forum before officials representing the power
and authority of a democratic community vindicates these other values of
participation.' In particular, the gender bias studies of certain courts
demonstrate that these values of participation are most important to
groups which are least likely to be able to participate in the judicial proc-
ess because of their lack of political or economic power or because of
discrimination or bias."
The antimajoritarian perspective of the Rule of Law Ideal and the
Public Purposes Ideal would be expected to create some dramatic con-
flicts with the institutions of participation. The Public Purposes Ideal in
particular would challenge existing forms of participation; for it sees the
insulation of judges from interest group politics as fundamental' The
literature suggests that these challenges are now critical to a discussion
of the future of the federal courts.'
Procedure and the Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 559, 559-73 (1991) (discussing trial proce-
dure in the context of the significance given to different interpretations of stories); Philip N. Meyer,
Will You Please He Quiet, Please? Lawyers Listening to the Call of Stories, 18 VT. L. REv. 567,
567-68 (1994) (describing legal culture as one of storytelling); Kim Lane Scheppele, Just The Facts,
Ma'am: Sexualized Violence, Evidentiary Habits, and the Revision of Truth, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
123, 127 (1992) (describing how reluctance to accept the revised or delayed stories of women re-
garding sexual harassment or abuse particularly disadvantages them as the legal system does not
recognize these stories as "singular, immediately apparent, and permanent" as the truth or reality).
See generally Jane B. Baron, Resistance to Stories, 67 S. CAL L. REV. 255 (1994) (examining the
growing trend of storytelling in legal scholarship). A "storytelling" rationale can also support alter-
native dispute resolution. In ADR, participants are entitled to tell their stories in their own ways,
unhindered by the rules of evidence. Therefore, one of the benefits of ADR is the sense that partici-
pants are able to speak in their own voices.
274. Cf. Baron, supra note 273, at 282 ("The point of these stories... is to demonstrate the gap
between the reality of the described experiences, on one side, and existing legal doctrine, on the
other.'); Florida Sup. Ct. Gender Bias Study Comm'n, Report of the Florida Supreme Court Gender
Bias Study Commission, 42 FLA. L REV. at i, xxxii (1990) [hereinafter Florida Gender Bias Study]
(underscoring the importance of victim participation in litigation).
275. Cf. Baron, supra note 273, at 266-67 (storytelling in legal scholarship is particularly
important for "outsiders" or "those who lack power or who represent those who do" because story-
telling becomes a critique of power). See generally MARYLAND SPECIAL JOINT COMM. ON GENDER
BIAS IN THE COURTS, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL JOINT COMMITrEE ON GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS
(1989); George Lange, 1Il, Second Circuit: Study of Gender, Race, and Ethnicity, 32 U. RICH. L.
REv. 703, 703 n.l (1998) (discussing the development of circuit gender bias studies based on the
1992 resolution of the Judicial Conference of the United States); Hon. Dolores K. Sloviter, Third
Circuit: Gender, Race, and Ethnicity--Task Force on Equal Treatment in the Courts, 32 U. RICH. L
REv. 707 (1998) (discussing the judicial councils' studies of gender bias in their circuits); Ricki
Lewis Tamen, Report of the Florida Supreme Court Gender Bias Study Commission, 42 FLA. L
REv. 803 (1990) (stating that gender bias affects many areas of Florida court system and affects the
availability of the courts).
276. See Sargentich, American Administrative Process, supra note 12, at 413-14 (arguing that
it is "irrational to seek to rely primarily upon courts in policing agencies' exercise of their peculiar
expertise").
277. Cf. Florida Gender Bias Study, supra note 274, at xv-xlvi (describing how judicial atti-
tudes can affect the outcome of court proceedings).
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In recent years, the civil jury has increasingly come under attack.'
Few convincing efficiency arguments seem to support civil juries. Jury
trials are more costly and time consuming and a similarity of jury deci-
sions and those of judges indicates that the additional costs may not be
worth the benefits.' Moreover, deviations between the decisions of ju-
ries and judges, particularly regarding damages, can be cast as evidence
of the improper bias of juries as decision makers." Supporters of civil
juries recommend a number of proposals to improve the fact finding and
decision-making ability of juries25 Still, constitutional provisions for
jury trials are often analyzed as impediments to the establishment of
more efficient dispute resolution procedures, particularly ADR.m
Moreover, managerial judging makes jury trials less important. Be-
cause managerial judging occurs principally at the pretrial stage, it is
judge centered.' To the extent that managerial judging seeks to resolve
disputes without trial, its success depends upon avoiding trials, particu-
larly jury trials.
Likewise, managerial judging increasingly casts doubt on the vi-
ability of the adversary process. Judges increasingly control the course of
the litigation, the extent of fact finding, and the likelihood of disposition
278. See, e.g., Gross & Syvenid, supra note 161, at 3 (noting that a system geared to settlement
avoids the jury); Judge Robert M. Parker & Leslie J. Hagin, "ADR" Techniques in the Reformation
Models of Civil Dispute Resolution, 46 SMU L. REV. 1905, 1920-24 (1993) (expressing concern
about the role of jury in hindering ADR and suggesting a balancing test for the right to trial by jury);
Rowe, supra note 8, at 854-55 (describing how the presence of the jury has a more pervasive and
widespread impact on trial procedure, preparation, and costs than is sometimes perceived).
279. But see Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the CivilJury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055,1072 (1964)
(defending jury decisions as similar to those reached by judges and stating that "debate about the
merits of the jury system should center far more on the value and propriety of the jury's sense of
equity, of its modest war with the law, than on its sheer competence").
280. See James K. Hammitt et al., Tort Standards and Jury Decisions, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 751,
754-56 (1985) (suggesting that the type of defendant influences the amount a jury awards). But see
Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Juries and Justice: Are Malpractice and Other Personal Injuries Created
Equal?, 54 LAW & CoNTEmp. PoBs. 5, 6 (1991) (summarizing literature and concluding no across-
the-board jury bias or antipathy to doctors existed in the malpractice awards studied).
281. See Weis, supra note 176, at 1391 (noting many limitations on juries are no longer justi-
fied and suggesting, for example, that jurors be permitted to submit questions and that restrictive
rules of evidence be reconsidered); see also supra note 52 and accompanying text.
282. See Magistrate Judge J. Daniel Breen, Mediation and the Magistrate Judge, 26 U. MEM.
L. REV. 100Y7, 1018 (1996) (discussing how "trial disincentive[s]" under the Civil Justice Reform
Act discourage requests for trials de novo following arbitration awards; for example, if the party
requesting trial did not obtain results at trial more favorable than arbitration, the cost of arbitration
would be assessed against the party; and noticing that in some state courts a party must pay costs of
arbitration in order to obtain trial); Eisele, supra note 214, at 1951-52 (discussing and rejecting the
position of advocates of mandatory alternative dispute resolution that greater disincentives to re-
questing a trial after arbitration be imposed).
283. Cf. Gross & Syvemd, supra note 161, at 2 ("We prefer settlements and have designed a
system of civil justice that embodies and expresses that preference in everything from the rules of
procedure and evidence, to appellate opinions, to legal scholarship, to the daily work of our trial
judges.").
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before trial. The cumulative effect of reforms, including those regarding
discovery and those advocated by the Civil Justice Reform Act, ques-
tions the appropriateness of extensive adversarial involvement. John
Langbein, for example, has argued that managerial judging has already
moved our procedure much closer to the continental inquisitorial
model-a model that conceives a much more limited role for attorneys.'
As importantly, managerial judging is deeply embedded in the normative
assumptions of the Public Purposes Ideal. These normative assumptions,
stressing judicial expertise, professional discretion, and political neutral-
ity, clash directly with those that conceive of the adversarial process as
an important institution for popular participation in the judicial process.
The language of bureaucracy helps to identify this clash of normative
assumptions.
2. Oversight
When the efficacy of participation is in doubt, Sargentich would
suggest consideration of political oversight by democratically account-
able institutions.' The Constitution creates methods of oversight both by
Congress and the President.' The President appoints federal judges with
the advice and consent of the Senate. ' The appointment power is an
important presidential prerogative, and the requirement for consent by
the Senate is likewise important for the legislature. The appointment
power seems the constitutional mechanism by which, over a period of
time, the attitudes and political perspectives of federal judges can be al-
tered. The last two decades have witnessed a number of bitter conflicts
between presidents and the Senate regarding the appointment of justices
to the United States Supreme Court.' Although lower federal court ap-
pointments are overwhelmingly partisan, with the President often ap-
pointing members of his own party, ' conflicts have rarely become pub-
lic. Procedures in the Senate, however, have begun to delay the appoint-
284. See Langbein, supra note 1, at 833-35 (emphasizing that continental inquisitorial proce-
dure preserves party interest by limiting adversarial influence in fact finding, but the adversarial role
is preserved in the attorney's positions on the evidence); see also Kipp & Lewis, supra note 8, at 309
(contrasting traditional American view of judicial involvement to "the activist model... pervasive
in continental Europe"); cf. LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 162, at 82-84 (anticipating an increasing
managerial role for the federal judge).
285. See Sargentich, American Administrative Process, supra note 12, at 431-32.
286. SeeU.S. CONST. art. I,§2,cl. 5;art. l,§3,cl. 6;art. I,§2,cl.2;art. LIU,§ l;art.,§2,
cl. 2 (setting the constitutional oversights of the judiciary by Congress and the President).
287. See id. art. II, § 2, cL 2.
288. See HERMAN SCHWARTZ, PACKING THE COURTS: THE CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN TO
REWRITE THE CONsTrTnON 48 (1988) [hereinafter SCHWARTZ, PACKING THE COURTS] (describing
controversial appointments prior to 1980); id. at 103-49 (discussing more recent appointments).
289. See WHEELEmt & LEVIN, supra note 57, at 6 ("Consistently, over 90% of any President's
judicial appointments have been of his own political party...."); see also Clark, supra note 1, at
137 (describing Nixon's appointment of primarily Republican judges).
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ment of new federal judges and have been accompanied by attacks on
"activist judges." -
The Constitution not only gives Congress, through the Senate, an
important role in the appointment of judges, but also provides for im-
peachment of judges by Congress."' In addition, Congress has extremely
broad, but not unlimited, authority to modify the jurisdiction of the fed-
eral courts' and to alter the structure of the courtsm ' Within the Consti-
tution, Congress also enjoys considerable discretion in the appropriation
of moneys for the judiciary."
A number of recent developments regarding federal procedure and
substantive reform indicate that congressional oversight of the judiciary
has become more extensive. Perhaps best known is the Civil Justice Re-
form Act of 1990, ' which some commentators see as congressional in-
tervention in the preeminence of the courts' procedural rulemaking."
The Act embodies a congressional view of procedural reform and im-
poses mandates to ensure that the judiciary follows that view. The sig-
nificance of this recent congressional action is demonstrated by renewed
interest in both the scope of the Rules Enabling Act' and constitutional
limits on the power of Congress in this field.'
290. See Schwartz, supra note 57, at M2. In his report on the federal judiciary, Chief Justice
William Rehnquist expressed concern about the Senate's delay in filling judicial vacancies: "The
Senate is surely under no obligation to confirm any particular nominee, but after the necessary time
for inquiry it should vote him up or vote him down. In the latter case, the President can then send up
another nominee." William H. Rehnquist, The 1997 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary
(visited Dec. 12, 1998) <http://www.uscourts.gov/cj97.htm>.
291. U.S. CONsr. akt. I, § 3, cl. 6.
292. See U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 2, cl. 2 ("In all the other Cases before mentioned [and not
subject to original jurisdiction], the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law
and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make."); cf Wil-
fred Feinberg, Constraining "The Least Dangerous Branch:" The Tradition of Attacks on Judicial
Power, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 252, 252-54 (1984) (discussing attempts by Congress to make changes in
the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary in response to decisions that they did not agree with).
293. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United State's, shall be vested in
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish.").
294. See, e.g., Longan, supra note 261, at 629-34; Tacha, supra note 55, at 1542-44.
295. 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1994).
296. Cf. Baker, Future of Judicial Federalism, supra note 32, at 779-82 (stating that the Civil
Justice Reform Act decentralized, destabilized, and politicized rulemaking and that more congres-
sional intervention is likely); Mullenix, Counter-Reformation, supra note 56, at 379 ("The central
importance of the Civil Justice Reform Act is this: the Act has effected a revolutionary redistribution
of the procedural rulemaking power from the federal judicial branch to the legislative branch.");
Mullenix, Separation of Powers, supra note 56, at 1288, 1314-22 (concluding that the Civil Justice
Reform Act violates the separation of powers).
297. Rules Enabling Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415,48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. §§ 2072-2074(1994)).
298. See, e.g., Longan, supra note 261, at 640-42; McCabe, supra note 123, at 1684-86; see
also supra note 296.
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Other commentators have expressed concern that modified im-
peachment procedures, motivated in good part by congressional conven-
ience, threaten to erase the constitutional limits on the exercise of this
power.' These procedures expedite the impeachment process by limiting
"trial" of impeachment charges to committees or groups within the Sen-
ate. To some, these changes, by making impeachment proceedings less
burdensome on Congress, may encourage its expanded use."'
Congress has also acted to reduce the discretion of federal judges in
important areas. One of these areas involves criminal, rather than civil,
justice reform, but nevertheless marks the direction that Congress has
taken with the courts. Perhaps best known are the Sentencing
Guidelines,' which were opposed by many federal judges as undue and
unwise interference with judicial discretion.' Although a Sentencing
Commission rather than Congress establishes the guidelines, the guide-
lines implement a congressional judgment to limit judicial discretion.
Tort reform proposals, although not principally directed at federal
courts, represent another manifestation of a congressional taste for
greater oversight over the courts. These proposals alter state tort law, an
area traditionally within the common law domain of the courts.' Some
critics suggest that Congress will become a court of appeals with nation-
wide jurisdiction over state courts, removing industry after industry from
substantive regulation by state common law.' Such an approach, which
brings interest group conflict directly to bear on the exercise of judicial
299. See Williams, supra note 57, at 856 (criticizing the Senate's use of shortcut procedures for
impeachment); Schwartz, supra note 57, at M2 (describing threats of impeachment for content of
opinions). See generally WHEELER & LEVIN, supra note 57 (discussing methods of judicial dismissal
and removal).
300. Williams, supra note 57, at 886-87.
301. Cf. id. at 886-88. The Senate Rule XI Committee only assembles facts for action by the
Senate. Cf. id. Congressional procedures are unlikely to be successfully challenged. The Supreme
Court has held that Congress may choose its impeachment procedures and that a challenge to these
procedures raises a political question which the judiciary will not adjudicate. Nixon v. United States,
506 U.S. 224,226 (1993) (addressing Rule XI procedures).
302. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (1997).
303. See Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits
on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE LJ. 1681, 1685-87 (1992). In instituting the sentencing
guidelines, Congress arguably adopted the vision of the judiciary contained in the Rule of Law Ideal.
This vision emphasizes a judiciary whose discretion is guided and controlled by legal rules. See
Sargentich, American Administrative Process, supra note 12, at 398. See generally Steve Y. Koh,
Note, Reestablishing the Federal Judge's Role in Sentencing, 101 YALE LJ. 1109 (1992) (discuss-
ing the effects of reduced judicial discretion due to the implementation of the sentencing guidelines).
304. See U.S. SE.TENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. I, pt. A.
305. See Andrew F. Popper, A Federal Tort Law Is Still a Bad Idea: A Comment on Senate Bill
687, 16 J. PROD. & Toxics LIAB. 105, 113-14 (1994) (discussing congressional attempts to feder-
alize state tort law).
306. See d.
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power, is unlikely to be limited to the state courts. Congressional as-
sumption of such "jurisdiction" over state courts implicates the tradi-
tional jurisdictional standards and practices developed by the federal
courts to regulate their relationship with state judiciaries. Looking at
recent legislation, commentators insinuate that Congress now treats the
judiciary less and less like an independent branch and more and more
like another government agency."
Some detect greater attention by Congress and the President to judi-
cial selections.' If the judiciary was to become a campaign issue, parti-
san political considerations might increasingly be brought to bear on
appointment and confirmation of trial and appellate judges. In the appro-
priate political climate, the line-item veto, with some changes in the ap-
propriation process, might give the President and factions in Congress
significant new power of fiscal oversight over the judiciary."' Given that
the President's political constituency does not necessarily reflect the
public's views on particular issues regarding the federal judiciary,
placement of such oversight authority in the President will allow the in-
volvement of some, but not all, affected interests. Likewise, Congress,
although a collective body, suffers from a similar disability. Because of
the crucial roles that particular committees and specific members of
Congress or their staffs play, this oversight is likely to be an exercise for
the benefit of some, but not all, affected interests.
Of the three ideals, the Democratic Process Ideal fits less easily into
the current discourse regarding the future of the federal courts. In part,
this difficulty flows from the dominance of the Rule of Law and Public
Purposes Ideals---both of which insulate judges from politics. Yet exist-
ing institutions and procedures of the federal courts serve to implement
this ideal as well. The way in which Sargentich and Frug speak about
307. See Baker, Future of Judicial Federalism, supra note 32, at 759-60 (stating that despite its
attempts to limit the impact on federal jurisdiction, national tort reform has clear implications for
congressional treatment of the federal courts).
308. Cf. Longan, supra note 261, at 668 (concluding that Congress is too involved with judicial
procedure, structure, practice, and policy). But cf Tacha, supra note 55, at 1555 (taking a more
optimistic view of the relationship, and seeing the necessity of dialogue, tolerance, and understand-
ing to gain more effective results).
309. Schwartz, supra note 57, at M2 (indicating recent attacks on the judiciary by members of
Congress). Professor Schwartz has also recognized the greater willingness of recent presidents to
guide selections by political criteria. See SCHWARTZ, PACKING THE COURTS, supra note 288, at 48-
49, 77. Schwartz, however, argues that the Reagan administration relied on political ideology in a
way previously unknown. See id. at 77. Historically, judicial appointments have been
overwhelmingly partisan with Democratic presidents appointing Democrats and Republican
presidents appointing Republicans. See WHEELER & LEVIN, supra note 57, at 10 ("Consistently,
over 90% of any President's judicial appointments have been of his own political party.").
310. Cf. Longan, supra note 261, at 635 (noting the fear that the line-item veto may "impair the
independence of the judiciary in cases involving the executive branch'). Constitutional scholar Louis
Fisher takes a similar view of the line-item veto arguing that oversight responsibilities over the
judiciary rest properly in Congress and not the executive because the executive branch has more
lawsuits in the federal courts than any other litigant. Fisher, supra note 55, at 53.
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bureaucracy allows a systematic consideration of a group of values often
obscured in the debate.
II. THE FUTURE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS
If I have been successful, the first Part of this article has demon-
strated that the analytical schemes of two prominent administrative law
scholars can organize and illuminate the debate regarding the future of
the federal courts. The Sargentich and Frug articles permit examination
of these proposals in ways that highlight the values at issue. In this sense,
these works, contemporaneous with one another, "' create a way of talk-
ing about bureaucracy applicable to the courts. In this Part, I seek to
show how this language about bureaucracy can be used in additional
ways to evaluate as well as to organize the debate. Such use requires a
reexamination of the Sargentich and Frug articles with greater attention
to their analytical approaches.
Sargentich and Frug write from different traditions, different per-
spectives that contain contrasts and conflicts. Despite these differences,
their articles contain a number of similarities that suggest approaches to
evaluating the debate. Specifically, these similarities indicate how to
assess a number of proposals as well as the arguments that can be mar-
shaled for and against a variety of proposals. Their approaches require a
recognition that combinations of arguments contain individual arguments
that reflect specific visions of the judiciary. Evaluation requires linking
each argument to the corresponding underlying vision or model from
which it comes. According to both Sargentich and Frug, this act alone
will expose the weakness of an argument and the possible inconsistency
of arguments that have been placed together."' As discussed in Part I,
Sargentich's methodology uncovers inconsistencies in arguments that
superficially appear compatible. Some specific examples from the debate
regarding the future of the federal courts illustrate these points.
The similarities between the two analytical schemes expose the
vagueness and indeterminacy of broad terms, such as "judicial independ-
ence" and "individual rights," that populate much of the literature. The
meaning of these terms shifts with the vision of the judiciary that uses
them. Frug highlights more general objections to the use of such terms in
resolving the conflict of values."' Again, the literature of judicial reform
elucidates these observations.
The Sargentich and Frug articles offer some general rules for the
evaluation of the methods of analysis used in the debate regarding the
future of the federal courts. For example, both are suspicious of analysis
311. The articles were both published in 1984.
312. See Frug, Ideology of Bureaucracy, supra note 19, at 1287-88; Sargentich, American
Adinistrative Process, supra note 12, at 394.
313. See Frug, Ideology of Bureaucracy, supra note 19, at 1287.
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that relies on the balancing of values seen to be in tension with one an-
other.!" Both recognize a paradox or contradiction at the heart of the
most certain of arguments and perceive arguments, particularly complex
combinations of arguments, as hiding rather than resolving that incon-
sistency."' Both accept that arguments alone cannot reconcile the con-
flicts that they represent."" These striking similarities in approach, de-
spite differences in perspective, emphasize the importance of the lan-
guage chosen to debate the future of the federal courts and affirm the
contributions of a language about bureaucracy to that debate.
Finally, these two articles require that evaluation look beyond the
specific arguments surrounding particular proposals to confront the im-
plications of conflicting normative visions of the judiciary. These articles
indicate that argument must, at some point, yield to judgment; that judg-
ment must address issues of value and politics. Such judgments will be
troubling, for this way of talking about bureaucracy suggests both the
necessity for and the difficulty of the choices required.
A. Evaluation of Arguments
Although a number of caveats should always accompany a limited
characterization of such broad works, the two articles reflect different
perspectives. Sargentich writes from a classical political and administra-
tive theory perspective.3?" At the heart, his ideals of administrative law
reflect classical political theory regarding the role of the state and of ad-
ministration. His article presents these ideals as representing broad theo-
ries in administrative and public law.IAs such, they have direct applica-
tion to the reformist debate regarding administration.
Frug writes from a critical legal studies perspective, particularly that
aspect of the movement that emphasizes contradictions arising from
prevalent but unsustainable concepts, such as the distinction between the
objective and the subjective!" The presence of this dichotomy in legal
314. See id.; Sargentich, American Administrative Process, supra note 12, at 441.
315. See infra note 341 and accompanying text.
316. See infra note 341 and accompanying text.
317. In his article, Sargentich identifies the ideals of administrative law with British and
American political theory. See Sargentich, American Administrative Process, supra note 12, at 397-
426. For example, the Rule of Law Ideal is associated with contractarian views of political life. See
id. at 397-98 (citing John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, in TWO TREATISES OF
GOVEItNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., 1960)). The Public Purposes Ideal is associated with an activist
state reflected by New Deal theorists. See id. at 411-12 (citing JAMES LANDIS, THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEsS (1938)). The Democratic Process Ideal "derives its intellectual force
from democratic theory." Id. at 425-26.
318. See Frug, Ideology of Bureaucracy, supra note 19, at 1288 (drawing on the work of
Jacques Derrida, particularly his idea of the "dangerous supplement" to develop the contradictions
contained in different models for the control of bureaucracy). For a general discussion of this aspect
of the critical legal studies movement, see James Boyle, Introduction to CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES at
i, xiii-xlvi (James Boyle, ed. 1992).
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theory and doctrine regarding bureaucracy drives much of Frug's cri-
tique. His models justifying bureaucracy are presented as more contin-
gent than Sargentich's ideals.19 His analysis of these models demon-
strates that supposedly objective legal doctrines are rhetoric designed to
assuage our fear of bureaucracy, and are devices designed to retard a
democratic agenda for reducing the power of bureaucracies tm
These differences in perspective explain the contrast in the character
of the projects undertaken by the two articles' and suggest conflicts re-
garding the reality of structures of arguments that form the focus of the
articles. For our purposes, however, the similarities are more important
than these differences. The similarities between the two articles, particu-
larly those evident in their conclusions and implications, offer guidelines
for evaluating arguments in the debate regarding judicial reform and the
future of the federal courts. Although both articles draw on historical
developments, neither employs historical or empirical analysis nor do
they focus on detailed examinations of specific proposals or doctrines.
Both, however, are concerned with the structure of argumentation. This
emphasis on broad structures of argumentation makes them particularly
useful in evaluating arguments in the debate about the future of the fed-
eral courts.
Each of the articles identifies a paradox or contradiction that lies at
the heart of the ideals or models that it analyzes." This contradiction or
paradox limits arguments flowing from each ideal or model. Although
Sargentich stresses that the pure vision of administration contained
within each of his ideals conflicts with the reality of the administrative
process, a reality that incorporates aspects of other inconsistent ideals,'m
he identifies a paradox within each ideal that also limits its application.'
319. For example, Fug does not assert that his models actually represent the state of legal
doctrine but rather expose the contradictions in attempts to persuade us that bureaucracy and its
potential for domination and alienation are appropriately limited. See Frug, Ideology of Bureaucracy,
supra note 19, at 1282.
320. See id. at 1278-79.
321. Sargentich seeks to show how the debate about reform of the administrative process has a
deep structure based on normative conflict that arises from conceptions about the role of government
and administration. See Sargentich, American Administrative Process, supra note 12, at 396-97. The
debate is "more self-contained and limited in scope than it may initially appear." Id. This project
contrasts with Frug's exposure of these models of control as an antecedent to the construction of a
democratically-based approach to our social and economic life. See Frug, Ideology of Bureaucracy,
supra note 19, at 1277-79.
322. Frug uses the inability to separate the objective and subjective as the basis for the contra-
dictions he identifies in each of his models. See Frog, Ideology of Bureaucracy, supra note 19, at
1286-87. His critique of the market/pluralist and judicial review models rests on his discussion of
the contradictions in the formalist and expertise models. See id. at 1297. Sargentich, as the following
discussion illustrates, relies on aspects of each normative vision that are self-defeating and paradoxi-
cal. See infra notes 323-28 and accompanying text.
323. See Sargentich, American Administrative Process, supra note 12, at 394 (discussing the
character of this limitation on the core embodiment of each ideal).
324. See id.
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As Sargentich puts it, the implementation of these ideals would require
reforms of administration that would undermine the ideal itself' 2' The
core embodiment of each ideal is therefore "self-defeating." "' Formal-
ism's drive to subject all administrative action to restraint by norms re-
quires norms of such indeterminacy that they no longer provide any re-
straint.' Instrumentalism's attempt to reach the optimal solution consid-
ering all relevant factors requires that virtually all factors be taken into
account, depriving analysis of any content and leading to indeterminacy
in outcome.' Finally, participation's desire to include all affected parties
in decision making either leads to the participation of all idiosyncratic
interests or the selection of participants by nondemocratic means."
Frug's critique rests on the necessity that the models justifying bu-
reaucracy separate the subjective from the objective.' Each of the at-
tempts, reflected in the models of control of the bureaucracy, finds it
impossible to draw such a line."' With respect to formalism's attempt to
set the goals of the bureaucracy by means external to it, the nondelega-
tion doctrine demonstrates that no effective standard can separate the
need to subject the bureaucracy to external standards from its need for
discretion or can separate the legislative need for discretion in delegation
of functions from the need to restrain that discretion?' The expertise
model fails to explain how professional standards intended to restrain the
discretion necessary to the exercise of expertise can act as restraints
when interpreted by the bureaucracy which they are designed to limit!'
In pluralism, the attempt to define those interests which will participate
in the administrative process and how they will participate implicates the
bureaucracy in the selection of those who will determine the outcome of
administrative decisions and raise the familiar difficulty of attempting to
separate the subjective from the objective? '
Frug's description of the weaknesses in these three stories or models
parallels Sargentich's description of the self-defeating character of the
core embodiments of his three ideals."' These similarities suggest that
arguments regarding judicial reform should be linked to the ideal or
model which they represent. Such a linkage identifies the theoretical
325. See id.
326. Id.
327. See id. at 403-04.
328. See id. at 415-16.
329. See id. at 428-30.
330. See Frug, Ideology of Bureaucracy, supra note 19, at 1287.
331. See id.
332. See i. at 1300-05.
333. See id. at 1321-22.
334. See id. at 1368-69.
335. Fnhg's fourth model, the judicial review model, permits him to demonstrate that the mix-
ing of models, formalism, and expertise does not avoid the contradictions contained in each of those
models. See id. at 1334-38.
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vision of the courts contained within it. That argument will be limited by
or "infected with" " the paradox or contradiction contained within that
vision. Although Sargentich and Frug would give slightly different crite-
ria for identifying the contradiction in the argument, the argument's
pedigree permits evaluation of it apart from the particular proposal that it
supports or opposes.
In the debate regarding the future of the federal courts, a number of
arguments will be presented in support or opposition of particular pro-
posals. These sets of arguments will combine arguments from different
ideals and from different models. Frug's discussion of the judicial review
model explores how arguments using both the formalist and expertise
models can be combined, but explains how once recognized, critique of
them within those specific models can be combined to deal as well with
the mixing of them.' Sargentich's analysis permits a similar approach
but emphasizes that arguments arising from different ideals will neces-
sarily conflict with one another because they reflect different visions of
the administrative process.""
Sargentich's recognition of a core embodiment and alternative ex-
pression of each ideal allows a more searching evaluation of multiple
arguments presented regarding a particular proposal. Although the core
embodiments of the three ideals cannot be easily combined without their
inconsistency becoming apparent, the alternative expression of one ideal
may be combined with the core embodiment of another without apparent
inconsistency. Still, a recognition of the vision reflected by the alterna-
tive expression allows identification of the inconsistency between argu-
ments placed together. '
The literature regarding the future of the federal courts illustrates a
number of these guidelines regarding the evaluation of arguments. Alter-
native dispute resolution provides one example. The previous discussion
of ADR introduced many of the arguments regarding the use of ADR in
336. Id. at 1330.
337. See id. at 1334-38.
338. See Sargentich, American Administrative Process, supra note 12, at 392-97.
339. Sargentich notes an overlap between the formalist core embodiment and the market, the
alternative expression of the Public Purposes Ideal. The core embodiment of the Public Purposes
Ideal, instrumentalism, also overlaps with political oversight, the alternative expression of the
Democratic Process Ideal. The core embodiment of the Democratic Process Ideal, participation, also
is linked to proceduralism, the alternative expression of the Rule of Law Ideal. See id. at 440-41.
"[Bloth approaches emphasize innovation in decisional processes, the language of fairness, and the
interests of affected parties in becoming involved in administration." id. at 440.
340. For example, the relationship between formalism and the market fails to appreciate that
they reflect different visions of the administrative process. The market approach permits, in the name
of market failure, administrative action far beyond the scope of the confining legal norms accepted
by formalism. Instrumentalism places a faith in agency expertise and the importance of "rational
decision making" that is at odds with the vision of public participation that supports political over-
sight. Participation accepts politics in the administrative process that would be anathematic to the
focus on legal roles that supports proceduralism.
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federal courts& That discussion also shows that a number of supporting
arguments arise from the Public Purposes Ideal. ADR proposals, how-
ever, oscillate between the core of instrumentalism and the alternative
expression of the market. Although tensions exist between these concep-
tions of ADR, both draw on a similar vision of the judiciary.
The fundamental incompatibility of the core embodiments of op-
posing ideals suggests that arguments representing the core of these vi-
sions could not be combined. Arguments resting on the core embodiment
of participation do not support alternative dispute resolution without re-
defining the term "participation" in ways that remove the definition from
the core vision that it represents, including its emphasis on transparency
of process.& ' To the extent that participation can be invoked to justify
political bargaining among affected parties and government officials, it is
at conflict with the Rule of Law's emphasis on legal formalism as the
legitimate method of official decision making. Likewise, arguments re-
lying on formalism cannot be combined with those arising from instru-
mentalism. For example, mandatory ADR, reflecting instrumentalism,
rests on judicial activism and discretion' contradicting the limited judi-
cial role conceived by formalism.
Sargentich, however, suggests that an unstable alliance can be
forged between the alternative expression of the market and the core
embodiment of formalism:" "[B]oth adhere to the notions that the public
and private spheres must be kept separate, that legal norms help provide
the necessary boundaries between the two realms, and more particularly
that public laws should preserve private entitlements from undue impo-
sitions by the state." '" Arguments regarding alternative dispute resolu-
tion do combine the types of arguments contained in this alliance. Argu-
ments supporting voluntary ADR not only emphasize placing dispute
resolution in the hands of private parties " but also seek to limit heavy-
handed judicial interference with private arrangements." However, the
alternative expression of the Public Purposes Ideal retains a part of that
vision of the judiciary. That vision emerges in the variety of arguments
that justify judicial involvement in these private arrangements, justifica-
tions analogous to ones supporting administrative intervention in the
market.' Formalism, on the other hand, would not permit judicial in-
volvement based on such broad and unbounded grounds. These argu-
341. See supra notes 209-16 and accompanying text.
342. See supra notes 271-74 and accompanying text.
343. See supra notes 215-16 and accompanying text.
344. See Sargentich, American Adminstrative Process, supra note 12, at 440--41.
345. Id. at 440.
346. See supra notes 209-13 and accompanying text.
347. See supra note 211 and accompanying text. This view is particularly apparent in the de-
bate regarding arbitration of employment discrimination claims. See supra notes 2 12-13 and accom-
panying text.
348. See supra notes 209-13 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 76:1
A WAY OF TALKING ABOUT BUREAUCRACY
ments for judicial intervention expose the inconsistent visions of the ju-
diciary that undermine this alliance.
A similar unstable alliance can exist between instrumentalism and
political oversight. "[Tihey both stress the multiplicity of goals and in-
terests that must be balanced in the context of administrative decision
making."' Part of the recent expansion of ADR follows the congres-
sional mandate that ADR be included in the delay reduction plans of
local federal district courts.' Of course, the arguments supporting this
action emphasize political oversight and congressional prerogative but
they also stress that Congress rather than the judiciary is the most com-
petent to make the broad balancing of costs and benefits necessary to
ensure that judicial procedure is more rational and efficient."' Congres-
sional oversight, however, shares the emphasis of the Democratic Proc-
ess Ideal on popular participation in establishing judicial policy, a view
at odds with instrumentalism's emphasis on judicial expertise and dis-
cretion.
This example, regarding ADR, demonstrates that this way of talking
about bureaucracy can help to evaluate, as well as to organize, arguments
and proposals by linking arguments to the vision of the judiciary upon
which they rely and by identifying inconsistent arguments that are placed
together. This method of evaluation can also be applied to other sets of
arguments and proposals. 2
B. Evaluation of Analysis
Both of the articles offer some similar guidelines for evaluation of
the forms of argumentation and analysis that occur frequently in the de-
bate regarding the future of the federal courts. The first of these guide-
lines questions the usefulness of broad concepts that often frequent the
debate about bureaucracy. Frug expressly attacks the use of abstractions
on the ground that appeals to abstractions seek to use them to deduce a
particular form of bureaucratic organization. ' "Instead, contradictory
forms of life can be consistent with the same abstract goal."' Abstrac-
tions are easy to manipulate and can hide alternatives and make particu-
lar forms of organizations seem natural.'
Sargentich's critique of abstractions is indirect but can be implied
from his analysis. His implied critique is quite similar to Frug's express
one. Abstractions, such as participation, openness or discretion, have
349. Sargentich, American Administrative Process, supra note 12, at 440.
350. See supra notes 215-16 and accompanying text.
35 1. See supra notes 296-97 and accompanying text.
352. For example, the debate about the size of the federal judiciary permits a similar analysis.
See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
353. See Frug, Ideology of Bureaucracy, supra note 19, at 1293.
354. Id.
355. See id. at 1294-95.
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multiple meanings; the key to understanding them is recognition of the
ideal or vision that they are used to support. The uneasy alliance between
the core embodiments of some ideals with the alternative expressions of
others rests in part on the ability to manipulate abstractions.'
The debate regarding the future of the federal courts contains two
abstractions that populate much of the debate-judicial independence
and individual rights. The critique of abstractions would suggest these
abstractions can support more than one vision of the judiciary and can be
used to make inconsistent visions seem the natural result of the abstract
goals suggested by the terms, judicial independence and individual
rights. The literature of judicial reform supports this suggestion. Judicial
independence is an abstraction repeatedly appealed to as a basic value of
the judiciary." The impact of proposals or practices on judicial inde-
pendence often forms the basis for support or opposition to the proposals.
Conceptions of judicial independence, however, vary and can support
differing visions of the judiciary.'
The Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts (Long Range Plan)
illustrates the elusive character of the abstraction, judicial
independence. ' The Long Range Plan identifies judicial independence
as a core value of the federal judiciary. Judicial independence is defined
in terms of the ability of federal judges "to perform their duties in an
atmosphere free from fear that an unpopular decision will threaten their
livelihood or existence," ' and links independence to tenure in office."'
The Long Range Plan uses judicial independence as an abstraction, a
broad concept that is used to deduce a particular form of judicial tenure.
The multiple meanings of judicial independence are both exposed
and explained by examining the term in the context of each of the visions
356. See Sargentich, American Adinistrative Process, supra note 12, at 440-41 (describing
how arguments obscure their normative inconsistency). His description of the overlap shows that the
inconsistency in arguments placed together in part is obscured by the use of abstractions, such as
protection of the private sphere, openness, presidential competency, and responsiveness. See id.
357. See, e.g., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 162, at 8 (identifying
judicial independence as a core value of the federal judiciary); RICHARDSON & VINES, supra note 2,
at 175 ('Certainly judicial independence in America does not mean an objective, nor detached,
judiciary. Rather, it broadens the range of possible political responses that a judge may make.");
Dakolias, supra note 209, at 175 (stating that "[pjersonal independence for judges can be achieved
through appropriate methods of appointment, removal and supervision"); Fiss, Forms of Justice,
supra note 151, at 43-44 (discussing judicial independence in terms of the ability to protect individ-
ual rights and civil liberties); Langbein, supra note 1, at 848-55 (equating judicial independence
with bureaucratic organization and hierarchical control of judges); cf. Resnik, Failing Faith, supra
note 113, at 540 (stating that, among other things, "minimal judicial decisionmaking will [hopefully)
produce just results").
358. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 162, at 8. The statement of this
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of the judiciary. The concept of judging changes with alterations in the
character of the judicial role. A brief examination of the core embodi-
ments, formalism, instrumentalism and participation, exposes the cha-
meleon nature of the term. Formalism conceives a limited role for the
judge, a limited role that renders vulnerable an unelected judiciary.
Therefore, this aspect of formalism could be used to argue for more lim-
ited tenure for judges. ' On the other hand, the obligation of judges to
apply formal rules to limit state interference in the private sphere sup-
ports arguments for greater protection of the tenure of judges. In other
words, formalism could support arrangements regarding tenure similar to
those now existing or it could support ones less protective of individual
judges.
Instrumentalism conceives a more active role for the judge, argua-
bly one calling for greater protection. This need for greater protection
from outside interference supports rigorous protection of judicial tenure.
The more expansive role for the judge, however, suggests the need for
methods of accountability that could radically transform the role of indi-
vidual judges by making them accountable to a hierarchical judicial bu-
reaucracy.' The conception of the judiciary as a powerful independent
bureaucracy challenges the authority and discretion of individual
judges.'
Participation conceives of a more democratically accountable judi-
ciary. This conception is the one most likely to resist life tenure for
judges, an approach that can be most easily justified under instrumental-
ism. To the extent, however, that the core embodiment of participation
emphasizes decision making by juries and control of the trial process by
the parties, it could coexist with an unelected judiciary. The more the
judge is removed from direct involvement as an actor in the process and
instead serves principally as an umpire, the less important the democratic
accountability of the judge.
In describing how the visions of the judiciary can support differing
views, the discussion above adopted the focus of The Long Range Plan
on judicial tenure as the principal indicator of judicial independence.' A
variety of other topics, however, could be considered crucial to judicial
362. If the formalist critique focuses on the political isolation of judges, one response is to alter
the tenure of judges; however, as distinguished below, this response would be inconsistent with the
formalist focus on the application by judges of legal rules that limit state interference with private
liberty. See infra notes 366-68 and accompanying text. In this regard, formalism can be of two
minds regarding judicial tenure and more ambiguously supports life tenure than instrumentalism.
363. See supra notes 175-79 and accompanying text.
364. Judges continue to exercise considerable discretion but would themselves become subject
to bureaucratic control.
365. 'The Long Range Plan, when referring to judicial independence, also states that "[tihc
federal court system must continue to be in control of its own governance, albeit within the limita-
tions set by the Constitution's system of checks and balances." JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, LONG
RANGE PLAN, supra note 162, at 8.
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independence including selection of judges, discipline, training, funding,
and relationships to other centers of political power. Examination of ju-
diciaries in Latin America questions whether a judiciary is independent if
it retains authority of many routine matters but cedes the punishment of
political dissenters to other branches.' Each of these other topics could
be analyzed similarly from the perspective of each of the visions of the
judiciary. Indeed, the ranking of these various topics in importance
would vary depending upon each such vision.' Judicial independence is
an abstraction that obscures a variety of issues and that can be used to
support inconsistent approaches to judicial reform.
Similar observations can be made regarding the use of the- abstrac-
tion, contrasting individual rights.' For example, that term carries sub-
stantially different meanings in formalism, instrumentalism, and partici-
pation. In formalism, the courts protect individual rights by adhering to
rules that establish the boundary between the state and the private sphere;
in instrumentalism, the courts protect individual rights by ensuring that
the individual is protected from abuse by both state and private bureauc-
racies. What formalism could perceive as the protection of individual
rights by limiting state interference in private affairs, instrumentalism
could see as the abandonment of the individual and the failure of the
courts to ensure the implementation of public values. Participation chal-
lenges formalism because in formalism the rules applied are not gener-
ated by direct democratic participation. The tension between the inde-
pendence of the jury as decision maker and the preservation of judicial
integrity in the service of the rule of law demonstrates this conflict.
Likewise, decisions resting on participation implicate a political process
that may exclude important public values in ways that are inconsistent
with instrumentalism.
Both articles suggest another guideline for the evaluation of argu-
mentation and analysis. Both articles are suspicious of analysis that relies
on the balancing of values seen to be in tension with one another. Frug
presents a strong general critique of balancing as a method of analysis or
argumentation.' In his specific discussion of the judicial review model,
he views balancing as a judicial technique that restates the problem to be
solved.' This critique of judicial balancing in the context of judicial
366. See Vaughn, Judicial Reform, supra note 94, at 601-07.
367. For example, instumentalism places great weight on the insulation of the judge. This
emphasis suggests that tenure in office and appointment procedures are likely to be of most impor-
tance. Formalism might place greater weight on rules and procedure that limit the boundaries of
judicial power.
368. Fiss captures the distinction between the conceptions of individual rights contained in
formalism and instumentalism when e decries an individualism that leaves the individual "at the
mercy of large aggregations of power." Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 15 1, at 43.
369. See Frug, Ideology of Bureaucracy, supra note 19, at 1291-95.
370. See id. at 1341-43.
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review is also more generally applicable to balancing as a method of
argumentation and analysis.
Sargentich's objections to balancing naturally follow from the
themes of his article. Again, these objections are quite similar to Frug's.
Balancing the values contained in the different ideals of administrative
law cannot resolve the conflicts between them because these values rep-
resent contradictory views of the administrative process." Balancing
simply restates the conflict and claims a certainty of outcome that belies
the normative inconsistency of the ideals. Within each of the ideals, Sar-
gentich's analysis suggests skepticism of balancing. For example, his
discussion of the problem of administrative discretion in the Rule of Law
Ideal would deny that the difficulty can be resolved by balancing in each
case the need for discretion against the requirement that administrative
action follow articulated legal norms.'
This guideline would caution that balancing is unlikely to resolve
the conflicts that arise from inconsistent visions of the judiciary. An ex-
amination of the literature supports such caution. Balancing does seem to
restate rather than resolve fundamental inconsistencies between differing
visions of the judiciary. The limitations of balancing become more ap-
parent when abstractions are balanced against one another because the
abstractions balanced can each carry a variety of meanings.!'
Of course, the two articles represent, in one sense only, a subset of
more general objections to balancing as a technique of analysis. A simi-
lar statement can also be made regarding the other guidelines as well.
The extraction of these guidelines from these two articles, however, is
particularly important and suggests an applicability beyond that provided
by more general methodological critiques. This article seeks to develop a
way of talking about bureaucracy from these two comprehensive analy-
ses of administrative bureaucracies. In this undertaking it is significant
that the guidelines arise organically from the analysis of Frug's and Sar-
gentich's theories about such bureaucracies. The context of their devel-
opment validates the subsequent application of these guidelines. Also,
the particular applicability of this way of talking about bureaucracy to
the debate regarding the future of the federal courts, discussed in Part I,
specifically recommends these guidelines to an evaluation of that debate.
CONCLUSION
The way in which the Sargentich and Frug articles talk about bu-
reaucracy permits the organization of the debate about the future of the
federal courts. This language about bureaucracy places the welter of pro-
371. See Sargentich, American Administrative Process, supra note 12, at 438-42.
372. See id. at 402-04.
373. Such balancing of abstractions include efficiency balanced against individual rights (or
efficiency balanced against justice), judicial independence balanced against judicial accountability,
or national standans balanced against local autonomy.
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posals within a normative framework that demonstrates that the debate is
more structured and self-contained than the number of proposals and ac-
companying arguments might suggest. As importantly, this language clari-
fies the perspectives that guide the debate and highlights a perspective, the
Democratic Process Ideal, that otherwise could be obscured.
The way in which the Sargentich and Frug articles talk about bureauc-
racy also permits evaluation of the debate. Particularly, it allows the
evaluation of specific arguments and proposals as well as combination of
sets of arguments. It also questions some approaches to analysis that popu-
late the debate. The language about bureaucracy suggested by the Sargen-
tich and Frug articles does not purport to resolve the debate regarding the
future of the federal courts. This way of talking about bureaucracy does not
recommend the choice of one proposal over another. Like any systematic
way of talking about a subject, these articles offer a useful perspective and
permit the debate to be structured in some new and enlightening ways.
The conclusions drawn from these articles provide no solace from un-
certainty and present no plan for the future of the federal courts. Indeed,
the language suggested by these analytical models of bureaucracy threat-
ens the grounds upon which some of the debate has been conducted. It
does so in several ways. No set of arguments can resolve the debate. This
failure results not simply from the lack of persuasive power of the argu-
ments but also from the limits of the arguments themselves. These argu-
ments and proposals reflect inconsistent alternatives. Not all visions can
guide the future. In addition, the visions represented by the arguments and
proposals contain contradictions that make it impossible to adopt fully any
particular vision. The lack of consensus about the future of the federal
courts results from conflicts between normative visions that inhere in mod-
em American public law. These conflicts will not disappear.
The application of these articles to the debate about civil justice reform
does not resolve that debate. The articles, however, do identify suppressed
normative visions, explain inconsistencies in argumentation as clashes be-
tween these normative visions, and demonstrate that civil justice reform is
inextricably intertwined with the most fundamental value conflicts in
American public law.
These articles demonstrate the highly contingent nature of the debate.
They deny resolution and certainty. They do, however, permit a clearer
appreciation of the conflict of visions and values. In this sense, the way of
talking about bureaucracy contained in the Sargentich and Frug articles is
encouraging. It permits us to see better the conflicts between values and
perspectives that will inform our decisions. It emphasizes the possible fu-
tures of the federal courts. It affirms that the choices are ours, painfully ours.
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COMMENT
MILLER V. ALBRIGHT. CONTINUING TO DISCRIMINATE ON
THE BASIS OF GENDER AND ILLEGITIMACY
INTRODUCTION
Today, with over three million U.S. citizens living and travelling
abroad,' many children are born in foreign countries to unwed parents.2
Should it be more difficult for a child born out of wedlock to receive
U.S. citizenship than it is for a child born to married parents? Should it
matter that the child's mother, rather than the child's father, is an Ameri-
can citizen? Contrary to the general antidiscrimination attitude prevalent
in today's society,' the answer to both of these questions is "yes, it does
matter." The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) allows either a
legitimate or an illegitimate child whose mother is a U.S. citizen to
automatically gain citizenship at birth.! Another section of the Act, how-
ever, provides that an illegitimate child born to a U.S. citizen father can-
not become a citizen unless the father establishes paternity and supports
the child while the child is a minor.!
In Miller v. Albright,' a plurality of the Supreme Court held that the
provision of the INA limiting the citizenship of an illegitimate child born
to a U.S. citizen father does not violate equal protection.' This Comment
reviews the history of the law surrounding Miller, describes the case, and
argues that the plurality incorrectly upheld the Act by applying too nar-
row a level of scrutiny and by failing to sufficiently justify the INA's
gender classification. Moreover, the Court ignored recent cases forbid-
ding discrimination based on gender or against illegitimate children. By
focusing on the distinction that the INA draws between mothers and fa-
thers, the plurality overlooked the discriminatory effects of the Act on
illegitimate children.
!. See Millerv. Albright, 118 S. Ct. 1428,1462 (1998).
2. See Raymond C. O'Brien, Illegitimacy: Suggestion for Reform Following Mills v. Hablu-
etzel, 15 ST. MARY'S LJ. 79, 110 (1983).
3. Cf. Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration, Equality and Diversity, 31 CoLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 319,319 (1993) (outlining the strides made towards ending discrimination).
4. Cf. Howard F. Chang, Immigration Policy, Liberal Principles, and the Republican Tradi-
tion, 85 GEO. L.J. 2105, 2107 (1997) (recognizing that the INA "continues to discriminate on the
basis of both sex and illegitimacy").
5. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 301(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (1994).
6. Id. § 309,8 U.S.C. § 1409, see also infra text accompanying note 83.
7. 118 S. CL 1428 (1998).
8. Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1428. Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, delivered
the opinion; Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas concurred in the judgment; and Jus-
tices Breyer, Ginsburg and Souter dissented. For a discussion of these positions, see infra Part II.B.
9. See id. at 1434-35 (distinguishing Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977), and refusing to
consider that opinion's treatment of gender-based distinctions).
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Part I of this Comment explains the level of scrutiny applied in
equal protection cases and the relevant cases in which courts have ad-
dressed statutes that discriminate according to illegitimacy and gender. It
also reviews the history and current status of U.S. immigration and na-
tionality law. Part II summarizes the plurality opinion, and each of the
concurring and dissenting opinions in Miller. Part III critiques the plu-




Although no explicit constitutional provision requires the federal
government to provide equal protection of the law, the Supreme Court
has extended the equal protection component of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.' Thus, in Fifth
Amendment claims dealing with federal statutes based on gender or ille-
gitimacy, courts must assess whether the governmental purpose justifies
the gender distinction at issue."
1. Level of Scrutiny
Depending on the circumstances of the case, a court applies one of
three types of equal protection review.'2 At a minimum, the statute must
be rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. When classifi-
cations affect fundamental rights or disadvantage a class of people who
have historically been the victims of discrimination, courts apply strict
scrutiny, the highest level of review, requiring the government to demon-
10. In relevant part, the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states: "No person shall
be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of the law." U.S. CONST. amend. V;
see HARRY D. KRAUSE, ILLEGmMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 102 (1971); MARTHA T. ZINGO &
KEVIN E. EARLY, NAMELESS PERSONS: LEGAL DISCRIMINATION AGAINST NON-MARITAL
CHILDREN IN THE UNITED STATES 41 (1994). See generally Michael Gunlicks, Note, Citizenship As
a Weapon in Controlling the Flow of Undocumented Aliens: Evaluation of Proposed Denials of
Citizenship to Children of Undocumented Aliens Born in the United States, 63 GEO. wASH. L REV.
551,559 (1995) (describing the standards of review applied in equal protection cases).
11. See Jennifer Anne Schimpf, Comment, Gender-Based Statute Conferring Citizenship Held
Unconstitutional: Wauchope v. United States Dep't of State, 18 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 381,
381 (1995).
12. See Shanon M. Gregor, Comment, Constitutional Law-Equal Protection-Gender Dis-
crimination: The Virginia Military Insitute Is Given the Opportunity to Create "Citizen Soldiers"
Out of Qualified Women-United States v. Virginia, 73 N.D. L. REV. 323, 328 (1997); John Galotto,
Note, Strict Scrutiny for Gender, Via Croson, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 508, 509 (1993).
13. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787,792-96 (1977); Wauchope v. United States Dep't of
State, 985 F.2d 1407, 1414 (9th Cir. 1993). See generally Schimpf, supra note 11, at 383-84 (stating




strate a regulation is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. 4
Intermediate scrutiny is a heightened standard, requiring that the classifi-
cation be "substantially related to important governmental objectives,"
and thus provides more protection than rational basis review but less
protection than strict scrutiny.'
During the past thirty years, the U.S. Supreme Court has struggled
to formulate an appropriate standard of review for statutes that classify
on the basis of gender or on the basis of illegitimacy."
2. Supreme Court Cases Concerning Gender-Based Discrimination
In Reed v. Reed,'7 decided in 1971, the Court recognized that equal
protection prohibits mandatory preference to members of either sex and
held (applying heightened scrutiny) that a statute giving preference to
male estate administrators over female estate administrators was uncon-
stitutional." Two years later, in Frondero v. Richardson," the Court was
presented with a challenge to a statute giving dependents of male mem-
bers of the armed forces greater access to benefits than dependents of
female members." The Court determined that sex is a suspect classifica-
tion, warranting strict scrutiny, and held that the statute was unconstitu-
tional based on equal protection principles.2'
The Supreme Court, however, has not consistently followed Fron-
tiero in cases that involve gender discrimination-applying the inter-
mediate standard rather than strict scrutiny.' In 1976, the Court in Craig
v. Boren,' formally adopted intermediate scrutiny as the standard of re-
14. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682-88 (1973) (using a strict scrutiny
standard for gender-based classifications); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 672
(1966) (applying strict scrutiny in a case involving a statute that classified persons according to
race). See generally Gaotto, supra note 12, at 537-38 (noting that "strict scrutiny is necessary to
'smoke out' racial classifications that are based on 'illegitimate notions of racial inferiority' or
illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype" (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469,492 (1989))).
15. See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Ho-
gan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-24 & n.9 (1982); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175-76
(1972). See generally Galotto, supra note 12, at 537-38 (observing that courts apply heightened
scrutiny in gender cases because of concerns about paternalism).
16. See David B. Howlett, Illegitimate Children and Military Benefits, 132 MIL. L REv. 5, 7-
17 (1991) (explaining that the level of scrutiny applied in determining whether a statute is constitu-
tional is crucial and identifying the results of lead cases); Collin O'Connor Udell. Note, Signaling a
New Direction in Gender Classification Scrutiny: United States v. Virginia, 29 CONN. L. REV. 521,
529-32 (1996) (describing the level of review applied in gender discrmination cases).
17. 404U.S.71 (1971).
18. Reed, 404 U.S. at 76-77.
19. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
20. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 678.
21. Id. at 688. Frontiero is the only case to date in which the Supreme Court has applied strict
scrutiny to a gender-based statute. See Udell, supra note 16, at 527.
22. See Galotto, supra note 12, at 522.
23. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976).
24. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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view for gender discrimination.' In this case, male plaintiffs between the
ages of eighteen and twenty-one sought injunctive relief against the en-
forcement of a statute that prohibited the sale of 3.2% beer to males un-
der the age of twenty-one and women under the age of eighteen.' Rec-
ognizing that "previous cases establish that classifications by gender
must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially
related to achievement of those objectives,' the Court determined that
stereotypes and generalizations characterizing men and women were an
insufficient justification for statutes distinguishing based on gender.'
In Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,' a 1982 case, the
Court was faced with a challenge by a male who wanted to pursue an
education at an exclusively female nursing school." In order to ensure
that the validity of a classification was not improperly determined ac-
cording to "traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions about the proper
roles of men and women,"' the Court further heightened the intermediate
standard in gender-based cases by requiring the government to prove an
"exceedingly persuasive justification" for the classification?2 Accord-
ingly, the Court determined that prohibiting males from enrolling in a
professional school violated equal protection!
In 1996, the Supreme Court, again requiring an exceedingly persua-
sive justification for the classification, determined that the benefits asso-
ciated with single sex schools did not justify Virginia's exclusion of
women from the Virginia Military Institute.? By applying the heightened
standard of review, the Court has consistently refused to uphold statutes
containing gender-based classifications."
3. Supreme Court Cases Concerning Discrimination Against Ille-
gitimate Children
The Supreme Court has considered the validity of various justifica-
tions for classifications based on illegitimacy in over twenty cases during
25. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197-98.
26. Id. at 190.
27. Id. at 197.
28. Id. at 198. Specifically, the Court refused to hear evidence (offered as a basis for uphold-
ing the statute) that young adult males were arrested for drunk driving more often than females. Id.
at 200-01.
29. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
30. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 727.
31. Id. at 725-26.
32. Id. at 723-24 & n.9.
33. Id. at 733.
34. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 516 (1996) (continuing to require an exceedingly
persuasive justification in the gender context).
35. See, e.g., id.; Hogan, 458 U.S. at 733; Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,200(1976).
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the past thirty years. ' While the Court did not expressly hold-until 1988
Clark v. Jeter'-that a heightened level of scrutiny should apply to a law
that classified people according to illegitimacy. Several--but not all-
cases addressing illegitimacy beginning in the 1970s implicitly applied
heightened scrutiny.3
In 1968, the Supreme Court first addressed the question of whether
illegitimacy may be used as the basis for a legislative classification in
Levy v. Louisiana." In addressing the standard for reviewing a legislative
act, the court recognized that while "we give great latitude to the legis-
lature in making classifications. ... we have been extremely sensitive
when it comes to basic civil rights and have not hesitated to strike down
an invidious classification even though it had history and tradition on its
side."' Finding that "[liegitimacy or illegitimacy of birth has no relation
to the nature of the wrong allegedly inflicted on the mother,"' the Court
held that a wrongful death statute denying recovery to illegitimate chil-
dren after their mother's death, but allowing legitimate children the right
to recover, violated the Equal Protection Clause.'2
Arguably, the Court did not consistently follow Levy's precedent. '
In 1977, the Supreme Court in Trimble v. Gordon,. addressed whether an
intestate succession law that allowed illegitimate children to inherit only
from their mothers violated the Equal Protection Clause.* Articulating a
standard of review similar to intermediate level scrutiny,. the court held
36. See ZINGO &EARLY, supra note 10, at 92-93 (discussing several cases in which the Court
has considered classifications based on birth status); Howlett, supra note 16, at 14 (describing the
Court's analytical method in cases involving illegitimacy classifications).
37. 486 U.S. 456,461 (1988).
38. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 772 (1977) (applying a standard that asks whether
the statute is "carefully tuned to alternative considerations" to examine the constitutionality of stat-
utes that distinguish between illegitimate and legitimate children); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
406 U.S. 164, 172 (1972) (indicating that the level of scrutiny applied to legitimacy classifications
should be stricter because "fundamental personal rights" are involved).
39. 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968).
40. Levy, 391 U.S. at 71.
41. Id. at 72.
42. Id.
43. In 1968, the Court invalidated another statute that discriminated against children born out
of wedlock. Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75-76 (1968). In 1971, how-
ever, the Court in Labine v. Vincent upheld a statute that denied intestate succession to an illegiti-
mate daughter. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 539 (1971) (basing its decision on the strong state
interest in regulating the disposition of property at death). A year later, in Weber v. Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co., the Court struck down a workmen's compensation statute that favored legitimate
children over illegitimate children. 406 U.S. at 165, 175-76.
44. 430 U.S. 456 (1977).
45. Trimbk, 430 U.S. at 776.
46. Id. at 766-67. As stated by the Court
"Mhis Court requires, at a minimum, that a statutory classification bear some rational
relationship to a legitimate state purpose." In this context, the standard just stated is a
minimum; the Court sometimes requires more. "Though the latitude given state economic
and social regulation is necessarily broad, when state statutory classifications approach
sensitive and fundamental personal rights, this Court exercises a stricter scrutiny..."
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that the law unjustifiably discriminated against illegitimate children.'7 In
Fiallo v. Bell, also decided in 1977, the Court upheld a section of the
Immigration and Naturalization Act which gave preferential immigration
status to a child born out of wedlock to an American mother but not to a
.child born to an American father." The Court refused to apply the inter-
mediate level of review and used the minimal review stindard because of
Congress's broad power over immigration and naturalization issues."
Moreover, the Court reasoned that illegitimate children should not re-
ceive preferential status because of a "perceived absence in most cases of
close family ties" ' and the difficulties involved in proving paternity.'
In contrast, in 1979, the Court found that an adoption law requiring
only the permission of a mother for the adoption of her illegitimate child
denied equal protection to fathers.- The Court determined that the law
failed to meet the heightened standard of scrutiny because the well being
of illegitimate children did not "serve important governmental objec-
tives" and therefore did not justify the distinction between unwed moth-
ers and fathers.' To further confuse the issue, the Court applied rational
basis scrutiny in Parham v. Hughes," also decided in 1979, and upheld a
wrongful death statute that discriminated against illegitimate children. '
Five years later, in Lehr v. Robertson,' the Court upheld a statute
that required an unwed father of an illegitimate child to take certain steps
... Despite the conclusion that classifications based on illegitimacy fall in a "realm
of less than strictest scrutiny," Lucas also establishes that the scrutiny "is not a toothless
one.,,
Id. at 766-67 (quoting Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172 (1972) and
Mathews v. Lucas, 724 U.S. 495, 510 (1976)) (first and second alterations in original).
47. Id. at 773-74.
48. 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
49. Fia//o, 430 U.S. at 791-92. The Court stated that Congress, not the courts, should make
decisions regarding immigration issues. Id. at 798.
50. Id. at 792-95. Specifically, the Court required the government to prove a "facially legiti-
mate and bona fide reason" for the distinction. Id. at 794.
51. Id. at799.
52. Id.
53. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979) (analyzing a statute containing gender-
based classifications). Like this Comment, Caban has been examined along with cases deciding
issues of discrimination based on illegitimacy because the Court discussed a state's interests in
illegitimate children and the differences between mothers and fathers of illegitimate children. See
RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSITUIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND
PROCEDURE § 18.14(2ded. 1992).
54. Caban, 441 U.S. at 388-91.
55. 441 U.S. 347 (1979).
56. Parham, 441 U.S. at 348-49. The statute at issue allowed the mother of an illegitimate
child, or the father of a motherless legitimate child, to *sue for the wrongful death of that child but
precluded the father of an illegitimate child from bringing such an action. Id. In the concurring and
dissenting opinions, five Justices advocated for the application of the heightened standard of review
because the statute included a gender-based distinction. Id at 359, 362.
57. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
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in order to receive notice of adoption." The father claimed that his equal
protection rights were violated, not the rights of his child. Applying the
intermediate standard to the potential violation of the father's rights, the
Court recognized that laws "may not subject men and women to dispa-
rate treatment when there is no substantial relation between the disparity
and an important state purpose." The Court upheld the law to encourage
adoption and promote the state's "preference for the formal family."
In the late 1980s, the Court heard Clark v. Jeter, a case in which
the petitioner claimed that a Pennsylvania law requiring an illegitimate
child to prove paternity within six years of her birth in order to seek sup-
port from her father was unconstitutional.6 ' Because a legitimate child
does not face these time limitations to obtain support from her parents,
the statute contained an unjustified classification based on illegitimacy
which violated the Equal Protection Clause.' In its decision, the Court
formally adopted the intermediate level of scrutiny for classifications
based on illegitimacy to ensure that illegitimate children are not punished
for their parents' conduct.'
Viewed together, these decisions represent the confusion of the
rights the Supreme Court allotted to unwed fathers and their children
born out of wedlock."
B. History Surrounding the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Laws
Under common law, children born abroad could only gain American
citizenship if their father had resided in the United States.' Congress's
amendment of section 1993 of the Revised Statutes by the Act of May 24,
1934" ended the discrimination against mothers of children born abroad. 7
58. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 267-68.
59. Id. at 258.
60. 486 U.S. 456 (1988).
61. Clark, 486 U.S. at 457.
62. Id. at 462-65.
63. Id. at 461 (stating that discriminatory classifications based on illegitimacy deserve the
intermediate level of scrutiny, which requires that the statute "be substantially related to an impor-
tant governmental objective").
64. See Howlett, supra note 16, at 14.
65. 7 CHARLES GORDON Fr AL., IMMIGRATiON LAW AND PROCEDURE § 93.04(2)(b) (1998).
66. Act of May 24, 1934, ch. 344,48 StaL. 797.
67. Id. § 1,48 Stat. at 797. Section 1993 was amended to read:
Any child hereafter born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, whose fa-
ther or mother or both as the time of the birth of such child is a citizen of the United
States...; but the rights of citizenship shall not descend to any such child unless the citi-
zen father or citizen mother... has resided in the United States previous to the birth of
such child. In cases where one of the parents is an alien, the right of citizenship shall not
descend unless the child comes to the United States and resides therein for at least five
years continuously immediately previous to his eighteenth birthday, and unless, within
six months after the child's twenty-first birthday, he or she shall take an oath of alle-
giance to the United States of America ....
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The Nationality Act of 1940r established different citizenship criteria for
children born out of wedlock.' 9 While a child could gain nationality from
an American mother at birth, an illegitimate child with an American father
would qualify for U.S. citizenship only if the father legitimized or received
the adjudication of paternity during the child's minority years."
Although the Constitution and its amendments provide no mention of
immigration' and do not define citizenship,' immigration law principles
are largely based upon the Equal Protection Clause:" In 1886, the Supreme
Court determined that the phrase "any person" in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Equal Protection Clause included aliens as well as citizens. '4 Con-
gress, however, has the authority to classify aliens and may opt to treat
them less favorably than citizens.' Consequently, even though the Consti-
tution protects individual rights of persons in the United States, Congress
may subject aliens living abroad to arbitrary classifications.'
Moreover, the plenary power doctrine provides "broad and often ex-
clusive authority" to Congress and the Executive Branch in deciding
immigration and naturalization issues.' Because of judicial deference to
this power, courts have limited review or applied rational basis scrutiny
to cases involving immigration and nationality.' In Plyler v. Doe," the
Court indicated that cases in the immigration context may warrant an
intermediate level of scrutiny.' The protections in Plyler, however, have
Id.; see 7 GORDON Er AL., supra note 65, § 93.04(2)(b). At that time, Congress did not distinguish
between children born out of wedlock and children born in wedlock. See Miller v. Albright, 118 S.
CL 1428, 1452 (1998).
68. Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876,54 Stat. 1137.
69. Id. § 205,54 Star. at 1139-40; see 7 GORDON ET AL., supra note 65, § 93.04(2)(b).
70. See Nationality Act of 1940 § 205, 54 Stat. at 1139-40; 7 GORDON Lr AL., supra note 65,
§ 93.04(2)(c). Section 205 stated: "The [citizenship provisions of this Act) hereof apply... to a
child bonm out of wedlock, provided the paternity is established during minority, by legitimation, or
adjudication of a competent court." Nationality Act of 1940 § 205, 54 Stat. at 1139. The Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163, repealed the 1940 Act in favor of mom
comprehensive legislation, but did not make any significant changes to the law in this area. See 7
GORDON ET AL., supra note 65, § 93.04(2)(b).
71. Louis Henkin, The Constitution As Compact and As Conscience: Individual Rights Abroad
and at Our Gates, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. It, 12 (1985).
72. Id. at 13-14.
73. John T. Ritondo, California's Duty to Educate the World: Proposition 187 and Mere
Rationality, 26 CuMB. L. REV. 1045, 1047 (1996).
74. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,369(1886).
75. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603-04 (1889); see also Henkin, supra
note 71, at 16-17.
76. lHenkin, supra note 71, at 27.
77. Hiroshi Motomura, Whose Alien Nation?: Two Models of Constitutional Immigration Law,
94 M1CH. L. REv. 1927,1939 (1996).
78. See, e.g., iallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787,795 (1977); Ablang v. Reno, 52 F.3d 801, 805 (9th
Cir. 1995); see also Chang, supra note 4, at 2107 (describing the level of scrutiny applied in Fiallo).
79. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
80. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217-18.
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been limited to cases where the people claiming citizenship have come to
the United States and developed ties with the country."'
Currently, 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) allows an illegitimate child with a U.S.
citizen parent to become a citizen at birth if that parent lived in the
United States for at least five years." Section 1401(g), however, does not
confer citizenship upon children born out of wedlock unless the require-
ments in 8 U.S.C. § 1409 are satisfied." As amended in 1986, section
1409 requires a child born out of wedlock to a U.S. citizen father to pro-
vide clear and convincing evidence of paternity and a statement con-
firming that the father will provide financial support until the child
reaches the age of eighteen."
II. MILLER V. ALBRIGHT
A. Facts and Procedural History
While serving in the U.S. Air Force and stationed in the Philippines,
Charlie Miller, an American citizen, met Luz Penero, a Filipino national,
and conceived Lorelyn Penero Miller.' Because Ms. Penero Miller was
born and raised by her mother in the Philippines, her father was unaware
of her existence until after her twenty-first birthday." In 1992, Mr. Miller
received a decree from a Texas court to establish his paternity." Assured
that Mr. Miller was her biological father, Ms. Penero Miller applied for
U.S. citizenship." The State Department denied her application because
the paternity decree did not fulfill the requirements of section 1409?'
81. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259,271 (1990).
82. INA § 301(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (1994). Section 1401(g) provides that an individual born
outside of the United States with "parents one of whom is an alien, and the other a citizen of the
United States who, prior to the birth of such person, was physically present in the United States or its
outlying possessions for a period or periods totaling not less than five years" is a citizen at birth. Id.
83. Id. § 309(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a). Children born abroad are U.S. citizens when one parent is
a U.S. citizen and the other is an alien if:
(1) [A] blood relationship between the person and the father is established by clear and
convincing evidence,
(2) the father had the nationality of the United States at the time of the person's birth,
(3) the father (unless deceased) has agreed in writing to provide financial support for the
person until the person reaches the age of 18 years, and
(4) while the person is under the age of 18 years-
(A) the person is legitimated under the law of the person's residence or domicile,
(B) the father acknowledges paternity of the person in writing under oath, or
(C) the paternity of the person is established by adjudication of a competent court.
Id.
84. Id. It is interesting to note that a U.S. district court determined that the distinction made in
section 1409 on the basis of both sex and illegitimacy failed to meet even the minimum rationality
standard. LeBnm v. Thomburgh, 777 F. Supp. 1204, 1211 (D.NJ. 1991).
85. 118 S. Ct. 1428 (1998).
86. Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1432-33.
87. Id. Ms. Penero Miller was born in June 1970. Id. at 1432.
88. Id. at 1433.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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Specifically, Mr. Miller failed to legitimate and support Ms. Penero
Miller while she was a minor."
In 1993, Ms. Penero Miller and her father filed a complaint in the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas to obtain a judgment
establishing that Ms. Penero Miller was a citizen of the United States. In
an amended complaint, Ms. Penero Miller alleged that the distinction in
section 1409 based on illegitimacy did not meet equal protection stan-
dards." The Texas district court transferred the case to the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia, where venue was proper.'
The district court found that Ms. Penero Miller suffered an injury in fact
and established a causal connection between her injury and the statute
she claimed was unconstitutional." The court held, however, that because
federal courts do not have the power to grant citizenship, she failed to
show redressability and therefore lacked standing to sue.
On appeal, the court of appeals held that the district court improp-
erly dismissed for lack of standing, but rejected her constitutional chal-
lenges to section 1409.' Finding the Supreme Court's decision in FWio
v. Bell dispositive," section 1409 did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause because the government's interests in protecting the child's ties to
the United States and to her citizen relatives presented a "legitimate and
bona fide reason" for the classification.' Judge Wald concurred in the
judgement because she believed the holding in Fiallo was binding, but she
also expressed concern that Fiallo was "out of step" with the Supreme
Court's current antipathy to classifications based on broad generalizations
regarding men and women.)" The Supreme Court of the United States
granted certiorari' and affirmed the decision of the court of appeals."
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Miller v. Christopher, 870 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1994).
94. Miller, 118 S. CL at 1433.
95. Miller, 870 F. Supp. at 3.
96. Id.
97. Miller v. Christopher, 96 F.3d 1467, 1471-73 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (upholding the statutory
distinction between illegitimate and legitimate children regarding the claims of several aliens seek-
ing special immigration preference).
98. Miller, 96 F.3d at 1471 (noting that Fiallo v. Bell must be followed because that case
involved an equal protection challenge to an immigration statute that discriminated according to the
status of the child and the sex of the parent); see also Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
99. Miller, 96 F.3d at 1470, 1472.
100. Id. at 1473, 1475-77 (Wald, J., concurring).
101. Miller v. Albright, 117 S. CL 1551 (1997) (granting certiorari). Certiorari was later limited
to the question of whether the distinction in section 1409 between illegitimate children of U.S.
citizen mothers and illegitimate children of U.S. citizen fathers violates the Fifth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution. Miller v. Albright, 117 S. Ct 1689 (1997).
102. Miller v. Albright, 118 S. CL 1428, 1442 (1998). Justice Stevens announced the judgment
of the Court and delivered an opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist joined. Miller, 118 S. Ct. at
1432. Justice O'Connor delivered a concurring opinion in which Justice Kennedy joined. Id. at 1442
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B. Supreme Court Opinion
1. Plurality Opinion
The U.S. Supreme Court explained that the issue in Miller v. Al-
bright turned on whether the distinction in section 1409 between ille-
gitimate children of U.S. citizen mothers and illegitimate children of U.S.
citizen fathers violated the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution."n
Ms. Penero Miller alleged that the INA's discriminatory treatment of
citizen fathers violated the equal protection component of the Fifth
Amendment.'" The government argued that the law was designed to en-
sure that the child develops ties to the United States and that the father
acknowledges and financially supports the child.'" Before discussing this
issue on its merits, Justice Stevens, the author of the plurality opinion,
disposed of a few initial points. First, the plurality decided that Fiallo v.
Bell was not controlling in Miller."° Fiallo involved a claim for immi-
gration status of aliens, not citizenship, and there the Court considered
the distinction between legitimate children and illegitimate children.
Miller, on the other hand, addressed the disparate treatment of mothers
and fathers of illegitimate children." The Court also determined that Ms.
Penero Miller had standing to bring this claim because she was contest-
ing the government's refusal to treat her as a citizen and because her
claim was based on discrimination against both herself and her father."
The plurality held that section 1409 did not violate the equal protec-
tion component of the Fifth Amendment, accepting the justification for
the classification made by Congress.'" Justice Stevens applauded section
1409(c), which automatically confers citizenship on the child of an
American mother, because it "rewards" a mother's decision to carry the
child to term."' In contrast, Justice Stevens noted that because an Ameri-
can father is not necessarily aware of the child' and is not burdened with
the obligation to care for the child, he should not be similarly rewarded."2
Justice Stevens explained that for this reason the father should be re-
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Scalia delivered a separate concurring opinion in which Justice
Thomas joined. Id. at 1446 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg delivered a dissenting opinion
in which Justices Souter and Breyer joined. Id. at 1449 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer
delivered a separate dissenting opinion in which Justices Souter and Ginsburg joined. Id. at 1455
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 1434.
104. Id. at 1432.
105. Respondents' Brief at 28-30, Miller v. Albright, 18 S. CL 1428 (1998) (No. 96-1060).
106. Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1434-35.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1436. Justice Stevens noted: "It is of significance that the petitioner in this case... is
not challenging the denial of an application for special status." Id.
109. Id. at 1432.
110. Id. at 1437 (stating that because mothers "must first choose to carry the pregnancy to term
and reject the alternative of abortion .... Section 1409(c) rewards that choice.").
11. Id. at 1430.
112. Id. at 1437.
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quired to comply with section 1409(a) by acknowledging his paternity
under oath while the child is still a minor."
3
The plurality believed that sufficient government's interests vali-
dated section 1409.2" First, the Court noted that the government desire to
ensure that the child has a blood relationship with an American citizen
and to deter fraudulent claims of citizenship justified the additional re-
quirements imposed on unwed fathers."" Second, Justice Stevens argued
that if the statute established gender-neutral criteria, such as requiring the
citizen parent to obtain proof within thirty days, it would have the practi-
cal effect of discriminating against the unwed father."' Pursuant to this
theory, a statute allowing a father a period of eighteen years to establish
paternity should be not be viewed as discriminatory.' 7 Third, the court
held that despite the reliability of genetic testing and the requirement of
proof of paternity by clear and convincing evidence set forth in section
1409(a)(1)," ' Congress was justified in requiring additional proof of pa-
ternity."9 Fourth, Justice Stevens suggested that the statute was upheld
because it promotes the government's interest in establishing relation-
ships between citizen parents and their children and between the children
and the United States."2 Finally, the plurality advocated that because
Congress was concerned that a large number of American military serv-
icemen who were stationed abroad may have fathered children, section
1409 guarantees that children who may not know or are not known by
their fathers do not automatically receive citizenship.'
The plurality rejected the plaintiff's argument that the statute is the
product of "overbroad stereotypes about the relative abilities of men and
women."'" Instead, Justice Stevens argued that the assumption that fa-
thers are less likely than mothers to develop a relationship with their
children, an assumption on which section 1409 relies, is based on bio-
113. Id.
114. Miller, 118 S. CL at 1437-40.
115. Id. at 1437.
116. Id. at 1438.
117. Id. at 1438-39.
118. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
119. Miller, 118 S. C. at 1438-39. Specifically, section 1409(a) requires that while under the
age of eighteen, the person must be legitimated by law, the father must acknowledge paternity in
writing under oath, or the person must establish paternity by adjudication. INA § 309(a), 8 U.S.C. §
1409(a) (1994).
120. Miller, 118 S. CL at 1439. Because an unmarried father may not know that his child exists,
it seems reasonable that he take the steps required to acknowledge his child. Id. at 1439 n. It.
Moreover, because a mother usually has custody at the child's birth, it is more likely that a child will
establish ties to the United States. id.
121. Id. at 1439.
122. Id. (quoting Petitioners' Brief at 8, Miller v. Albright, 118 S. CL 1428 (1998) (No. 96-
1060)). The plurality noted that a narrow standard of review should apply because the case deals
with the area of immigration and naturalization. Id. Even under heightened scrutiny, section
1409(aX4) "is substantially related to important governmental objectives." Id.
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logical differences between the sexes and is thus a justified basis for
classification.'" Furthermore, requiring fathers, and not mothers, to make
an "affirmative act" in order to gain rights associated with their children
followed the precedent established by the Supreme Court in Lehr v.
Robinson.'2 Finally, the plurality distinguished Miller from recent gen-
der-equality cases," noting that Ms. Penero Miller's citizenship request
rested on several factors, including her parents' conduct, and not merely
on her gender.'
26
2. Justice O'Connor's Concurrence
Justice O'Connor based her concurring opinion on the premise that
federal courts should not determine the rights of third parties who are not
parties to the litigation.'" The Justice believed that Mr. Miller had not
been substantially hindered in his ability to assert his own rights."l Mr.
Miller had the opportunity to take advantage of the appeals process but
did not assert his rights." Therefore, Ms. Penero Miller could not assert
her father's rights and instead must raise her own rights, which would
likely be unsuccessful because section 1409 does not classify people
according to the gender of the child.'" Although Justice O'Connor sup-
ported the dismissal of the claim, she advocated the application of ra-
tional basis scrutiny because the statute involves the area of immigration
and nationalization.'3 ' She also explained that even though the classifica-
tion would be upheld under a rational basis standard of review, it would
not withstand heightened scrutiny.'"
3. Justice Scalia's Concurrence
According to Justice Scalia, Ms. Penero Miller's claim was cor-
rectly dismissed because the Court had no power to confer citizenship on
a basis other than that established by Congress.'33 Because Ms. Penero
Miller did not qualify for citizenship based on section 1409, the Court
had no discretion to decide the case on its merits." Moreover, he ex-
123. Id. at 1442.
124. Id. at 1440. In Lehr v. Robinson, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a statute requiring an
unwed father, and not a mother, to prove his paternity by some formal act in order to receive notice
prior to the adoption of his children did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Lehr v. Robinson,
463 U.S. 248, 248-50 (1983).
125. Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1441 (distinguishing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996);
Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199
(1977); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1442 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
128. Id. at 1443-44.
129. Id. at 1444.
130. Id. at 1445.
131. Id. at 1446.
132. Id. at 1445-46.
133. Id. at 1446 (Scalia, J., concurring).
134. Id. at 1447.
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plained that Congress has significant authority in the area of immigration
and nationalization and courts have limited discretion. Justice Scalia
also emphasized that a court cannot "fix" the law by holding certain pro-
visions unconstitutional.
4. Justice Ginsburg's Dissent
Justice Ginsburg believed that the Court should have followed ear-
lier cases which rejected statutes that classified based on gender stereo-
types where more accurate and impartial distinctions could have been
made." The Justice recognized that American women have been dis-
criminated against throughout history in the areas of immigration and
nationalization." When the legislature amended section 1409 in 1986, it
continued to discriminate on the basis of gender. 3 According to Justice
Ginsburg, the government's rationale was based on generalizations con-
cerning the abilities of men and women.'" She concluded that because
the government could promote the interest of assuring close ties to the
United States without classifying based on gender,' section 1409 vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause.' 2
5. Justice Breyer's Dissent
Justice Breyer believed that the Court should have applied height-
ened scrutiny to determine the constitutionality of the provisions in sec-
tion 1409.'" Although the area of immigration and nationalization is tra-
ditionally subject to a more lenient standard of review, Justice Breyer felt
that Ms. Penero Miller belonged to a class whose rights had been deter-
mined based on the gender of their parents.'" When the Act is reviewed
under heightened scrutiny, the standard typically applied in gender dis-
crimination cases, Justice Breyer felt that it could not survive constitu-
tional analysis.'
135. Id. (citing Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S 787,792 (1977)).
136. Id. at 1449. Accoiding to Justice Scalia, "fixing" the law would require the Court to per-
form "radical statutory surgery," and disregarl "one provision or the other as unconstitutional." Id.
137. Id. at 1449-50 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 1450-53. Until 1934, a woman could not confer her U.S. citizenship on her children
born abroad. Id. at 1451-52; see supra notes 65-67.
139. Id. at 1453.
140. Id. at 1454.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1449-50.
143. Id. at 1457 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Initially, Justice Breyer mentioned that Ms. Penero
Miller may assert her father's rights because she has suffered an injury in fact, she had a close rela-
tionship with her father, and her father faced some hindrance in asserting his rights. Id. at 1456.
144. Id. at 1457.
145. Id. at 1460.
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Justice Breyer argued that the plurality inadequately justified the
gender classifications" and that the government failed to prove an "ex-
ceedingly persuasive justification,"'" for the distinction in section 1409
between men and women." Moreover, Justice Breyer contended that the
statutory distinction depends on the generalization that mothers are more
likely to care for their children and are better caretakers than fathers.49
The Justice also observed that the additional legitimation or acknow-
ledgement requirement is unnecessary to protect against false claims
because advanced DNA tests prove paternity with certainty.'" In addi-
tion, although Justice Stevens assumed in the plurality opinion that once
a father knows of his child he will establish a relationship with his child
and his child will therefore have ties to the United States, Justice Breyer
argued that these bonds will not necessarily be formed."! Justice Breyer
further indicated that section 1409 refers to all the American citizens
who live or travel abroad, not merely the 683,000 service personnel sta-
tioned in the Far East mentioned in Justice Stevens' opinion.:' Finally,
Justice Breyer's dissent suggested that Congress could substitute a gen-
der-neutral requirement for the current provision."u
III. ANALYSIS
In Miller v. Albright, the Supreme Court held that 8 U.S.C. § 1409
did not violate the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment
even though the statute classifies on the basis of gender and
illegitimacy.'" Five justices, however, agreed that the purported govern-
mental interests did not justify the distinction." This analysis argues that
the plurality applied an inappropriate level of scrutiny and overlooked
several controlling precedents. Moreover, the analysis further discusses
the plurality's failure to consider the discriminatory effects that the
Miller decision will have on illegitimate children.
146. Id. at 1455.
147. This language indicates the heightened scrutiny standard. See id.
148. Id. at 1460 (citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532-33 (1996)).
149. Id. at 1461.
150. Id. at 1461-62.
151. Id. at 1462.
152. Id.
153. Id. Justice Breyer'noted that requiring knowledge of the child's birth or distinguishing
between caretaker and noncaretaker parents could substitute for the gender-based classification. Id.
Justice Breyer also disagreed with Justice Scalia's opinion that the Court does not have the power to
grant citizenship. Id. at 1463. He explained that limitations on the Court's power to grant citizenship
are irrelevant because section 1401 confers citizenship at birth. Id.
154. Id. at 1432.
155. See id. at 1445 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 1455 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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A. The Plurality Applies the Incorrect Level of Scrutiny
Although the level of scrutiny applied in equal protection cases is
critical and often determines the outcome of a case,'" the plurality did not
initially specify the standard of review it was applying in Miller. Rather,
the Court briefly mentioned in a footnote that because deference should
be given to Congress in the area of immigration and nationality, Miller
warranted a narrower, rational basis standard of review." The plurality's
reasoning became further blurred when it indicated that even if the in-
termediate level of scrutiny was applied, section 1409 sufficiently relates
to important governmental interests and would survive such scrutiny."
Justice Stevens, however, failed to elaborate on the heightened scrutiny
standard's imposition on the government to establish an exceedingly
persuasive justification for the gender-based classification. '" According
to this reasoning, it is unlikely that he adequately applied an appropriate
level of scrutiny given recent Supreme Court precedent."w Because of the
ambiguity of the plurality opinion, it is difficult to determine which level
of scrutiny was actually applied in Miller. Moreover, the plurality's fail-
ure to hold that section 1409 violates equal protection indicates that the
plurality applied the minimum level of scrutiny."'
Recent Supreme Court cases clearly state that the heightened scru-
tiny standard applies without exception to all "gender based government
actions.'" Because the Court has expressly determined that the distinc-
tion between unmarried mothers and unmarried fathers constitutes a gen-
der-based classification, heightened scrutiny was required in Miller. In
addition, statutes classifying on the basis of illegitimacy have also war-
156. Cf., e.g., Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S 347, 351-52 (1979) (applying rational basis scrutiny
and upholding a statute that classified individuals by sex). See generally Howlett, supra note 16, at
17 (describing the importance of the level of scrutiny used in cases involving discrimination against
illegitimate children); Galotto, supra note 12, at 509 (indicating that the level of scrutiny applied to
gender-based discrimination cases often serves as an explanation for the outcome).
157. Miller, 118S. Ct. at1437n.ll.
158. Id.
159. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,723-24 (1982).
160. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532-33 (1996) (reiterating that the
government must demonstrate an exceedingly persuasive justification for gender-based classifica-
tions); Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724 (indicating that the burden of proof is demanding and rests entirely
on the state).
161. On the other hand, both Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer, in their dissenting opinions,
observed that the provisions of section 1409 must be subject to heightened scrutiny. Miller, 118 S.
Ct. at 1450, 1454, 1457-60.
162. See discussion supra Part LA.2; see also Galotto, supra note 12, at 508. See generally
Amicus Brief at 17, Miller v. Albright, 118 S. Ct. 1428 (1998) (No. 96-1060) (stating that Con-
gress's specialized judgments concerning the security matters at issue must be accompanied by
evidence and meet the heightened scrutiny standard if they discriminate on the basis of gender).
Moreover, the standard of review remains high when the statutory policy discriminates against
males rather than against females. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 723.
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ranted the intermediate level of review. '6 Therefore, because section
1409 distinguishes between illegitimate children and legitimate
children,'" the Court should have considered Miller under a heightened
level of review.''
Although courts have tended to limit the scope of review in the area
of immigration and naturalization,'" adherence to rational basis scrutiny
is outdated."7 Critics have advocated that the Constitution does not re-
quire courts to recognize Congress's plenary power'" and that immigra-
tion law must adhere to modem constitutional boundaries.'" Conse-
quently, the Supreme Court has held that deference to Congress does not
trump the heightened scrutiny standards of the Equal Protection Clause."
In addition, courts have expressly differentiated between the rights
afforded to citizens versus those granted to aliens.'' Similarly, the plu-
rality in Miller initially distinguished Miller from Fiallo v. Bell' because
Miller addressed the rights of an American citizen, while Fiallo involved
the immigration of aliens.'" The Supreme Court has held that the test for
citizenship should hinge on the individual's ties to the United States.'7'
Ms. Penero Miller's close connections to the country included the fact
that she was a child of an American citizen and she maintained a con-
163. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (stating that courts should apply the height-
ened level scrutiny to all illegitimacy cases); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175-76
(1972) (noting that the heightened level of scrutiny should be applied because fundamental rights are
concerned). See generally ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 53, § 18.14 (discussing legitimacy
classifications and the Supreme Court's use of such classifications).
164. Miller, 118 S. Ct. at1434.
165. Justice O'Connor argued that the Court should apply rational basis scrutiny because the
distinction is not based on the child's gender. Id at 1445 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Her argument,
however, seems unpersuasive because the main issue in Miller focused on the gender classification
of mothers versus fathers. Cf. id. at 1434.
166. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 796 (1977); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 82
(1976).
167. Miller v. Christopher, 96 F.3d 1467, 1474 n.2 (Wald, J., concurring). Current Supreme
Court doctrine indicates that a standard must account for Congress's power over immigration as well
as the constitutional rights of citizens. Id.
168. See Peter H. Schuck, The Re-Evaluation of American Citizenship, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. LJ. 1,
22-23 (1997).
169. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation ofAliens and the Constitution, 83 AM. J.
INT'L L. 862, 870-71 (1989); Legomsky, supra note 3, at 319-20.
170. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1981) (referring to Congress's deference to
executive authority over national defense and military affairs). Even if the standard of review is
limited, the Court must ensure that the rights guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment have not been
violated. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982) (holding that the denial of public education to
undocumented alien children violated the Equal Protection Clause).
171. See, e.g., Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 804-05 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339
U.S. 763,769-71 (1950).
172. Millerv. Albright, 118 S. Ct. 1428,1447(1998).
173. Fia//o, 430 U.S. at 796.
174. See, e.g., Landon v. Pasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982).
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tinuing relationship with her American father.'" Because Ms. Penero
Miller had a legitimate claim for citizenship, the Court was not obligated
to extend the same amount of deference usually given to Congress in the
area of immigration."6
Moreover, courts must apply a stricter standard of review to cases
involving fundamental rights or suspect classes.' Because the Supreme
Court has described U.S. citizenship as "a most precious right"' and
described noncitizens as a discrete minority,'' the Court may be required
to apply a stricter standard of review." ° If the plurality reviewed section
1409 under the stricter equal protection standard, the Court would have
likely held the provisions requiring an unwed father, and not a mother, to
take affirmative steps to transfer citizenship unconstitutional because it
violates the Equal Protection Clause."'
B. Section 1409 Relies on Suspect and Untrue Stereotypes
Even under rational basis scrutiny, the interests that the government
seeks to protect do not serve as sufficient justification for section 1409.2"
The plurality sought to justify the gender classification in section 1409
with the government's interest in ensuring proof of paternity and deterring
fraud." While requiring legitimization may have been reasonable before
the advances in genetic testing, it is no longer necessary because Congress
itself has acknowledged the reliability of current paternity tests.'"
The justification for statutory distinctions based on gender must be
genuine and cannot rely on "overbroad generalizations about the differ-
ent talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females."'" Section
175. See Amicus Brief at 15, Miller v. Albright, 118 S. Ct. 1428 (1998) (No. 96-1060) (brief in
support of petitioner).
176. Id.
177. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (stating that inherently sus-
pect classifications must be subjected to close judicial scrutiny); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
406 U.S. 164,173 (1972).
178. Miller v. Albright, 118 S. Ct. 1428, 1547 (1998) (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,
372 U.S. 144, 159 (1963)).
179. See Michael Scaperlanda, Partial Membership: Aliens and the Constitutional Community,
81 IowA L REv. 707,707 (1996).
180. See Gunlicks, supra note 10, at 560-61, 575; see also Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 682 (stating
that close judicial scrutiny is warranted where fundamental ights ae concerned).
181. See Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1455 (Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at 1445-46 (O'Connor, J., con-
curring); Miller v. Christopher, 96 F.3d 1467, 1473-74 (Wald, J., concurring); see also Howlett,
supra note 16, at 17 (noting that the level of scrutiny applied by a court often determines the outcome).
182. "It is unlikely... that any gender classifications based on stereotypes can survive height-
ened scrutiny .... Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1445-46 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
183. See id. at 1437-38.
184. Miller, 96 F.3d at 1474-75 (Wald, J., concurring) (citing H.R. REP. No. 98-527, at 38
(1983)).
185. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996); see also Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,
420 U.S. 636, 643 (1975) (noting that states "must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the
different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females").
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1409 relies upon the generalization that mothers are significantly more
likely than fathers to assume child care obligations or develop relation-
ships with their children." Even if unwed mothers were closer to their
children than unwed fathers, this generalization is an unacceptable basis
for legislative distinctions."
Justice Stevens's reasoning in Miller further supports his critics'
views that he will neglect historical sex role stereotyping underlying a
challenged statute and uphold gender-based discrimination if based on
reasoned distinctions."' Justice Stevens argued that section 1409 rewards
mothers for "reject[ing] the alternative of abortion" and caring for the
child after birth."' Not only does he inappropriately apply his pro-life
views and preference toward marriage and the traditional nuclear family,
but his argument fails to acknowledge the constitutional rights of the
father." Illegitimate children should not be burdened in order to encour-
age legitimate family relationships."' The plurality's alternative ration-
ales are wholly unrelated to the interests of promoting an illegitimate
child's ties to the United States and that child's citizen parent.
Moreover, because the governmental interests of promoting ties to
the United States and the citizen parent could be protected with a gender-
neutral classification, the additional requirements for unwed fathers are
unnecessary." The plurality rejected this idea after considering only one
such criterion. According to Justice Stevens, a requirement that the citi-
zen parent obtain proof within thirty days after the child's birth would not
eliminate the discriminatory effect because the unwed father is usually not
present during childbirth. '93 Again, the plurality's reasoning is based on
stereotypes and generalizations regarding the roles of unwed fathers.
The gender-based stereotypes underlying section 1409 are also un-
true." The Act assumes that fathers are less likely than mothers to de-
velop meaningful relationships with their children. '" However, not all
186. See Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1461 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
187. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392 (1979); see also Linda R. Crane, Family
Values and the Supreme Court, 25 CONN. L. REv. 427, 461-62 (1993) (discussing the Court's re-
fusal to accept such a generalization in Caban).
188. See William D. Popkin, A Common Law Lawyer on the Supreme Court: The Opinions of
Justice Stevens, 1989 DUKE LJ. 1087, 1115-16; Note, Justice Stevens' Equal Protection Jurispru-
dence, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1146, 1163 (1987).
189. Miller, 118 S. Ct. at3437.
190. See ZiNGO & EARLY, supra note 10, at 58 (discussing the Court's decision in Lehr v.
Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983)); Crane, supra note 187, at 443 (criticizing Justice Stevens' dis-
senting opinion in Caban v. Mohammed, in which he applied reasoning similar to his decision in
Miller).
191. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 53, § 18.14.
192. Miller, 18 S. CL at 1454 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 1438.
194. See Amicus Brief at 7, Miller v. Albright, 118 S. CL 1428 (1998) (No. 96-1060) (brief in
support of petitioner).
195. Miller, 138 S. C. at 1441. Interestingly, the plurality admitted this assumption. See id. at
1492.
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illegitimate child/father relationships lack the strength the government
attempts to instill and "there are undoubtedly many illegitimate
child/mother relationships that lack the closeness the Act attempts to
promote."'" In addition, denial of parental rights to unwed fathers solely
on the basis of sex is unsupported by social science research indicating
that fathers' child rearing abilities do not differ significantly from moth-
ers' abilities." Because the plurality insufficiently justified that the clas-
sifications and the stereotypes underlying the Act are no longer true, the
plurality should not have upheld section 1409 even under the rational
basis level of review.
C. Miller Ignores Precedent Indicating That Section 1409 Is Unconsti-
tutional
The plurality also improperly ignored several cases and other im-
portant indications that section 1409 violates the Fifth Amendment. First,
in the early 1980s, the Attorney General listed the Act under the category
of "uncorrected sex biases in federal statutes" in its Report to the Presi-
dent on Women's Equality'" and warned that it might violate the Equal
Protection Clause.'" Interestingly, when Congress amended the Act in
1986,.- although it allowed illegitimate children to acquire rights of citi-
zenship through an American father, Congress did not give those chil-
dren the same rights as children with American mothers. ' Instead, in an
effort to ease the determination of citizenship and paternity, Congress
amended the Act to require the father to take affirmative actions during
an illegitimate child's minority.' Therefore, section 1409 continued to
classify based on the parent's gender, and it now remains the only United
States law conferring nationality to children that distinguishes American
citizen parents on the basis of their gender.' In 1998, the Supreme
Court, once again, failed to eliminate the discrimination.'
196. Richard F. Hahn, Note, Constitutional Limits on the Power to Exclude Aliens, 82 COLUM.
L. REV. 957,988 (1982).
197. See Kara L. Boucher & Ruthann M. Macolini, The Parental Rights of Unwed Fathers: A
Developmental Perspective, 20 N.C. CENT. LJ. 45,61 (1992).
198. 128 CONG. REC. H5369,5376 (daily ed. Aug. 5,1982) (statement of the Attorey General).
199. Id.; see Leo Gross & Luke T. Lee, The Family in International Law: Some Emerging
Problems, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 202,203 n.1 (1983) (reviewing THE FAMILY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
SOME EMERGING PROBLEMS (THIRD SOKOL COU.OQUIUM) (Richard B. Lillich, ed., 198 1)).
200. Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-653, 100 Stat.
3655 (codified as amended is scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
201. Id. § 13, 100 Stat. at 3657 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (1994)); see GORDON ET AL., supra
note 65, § 93.04(2Xc).
202. Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1986, § 13, 100 Stat. at 3657 (codified at
8 U.S.C. § 1409). The 1986 amendment required a father, among other things, to agree "in writing to
provide financial support for the child." Id. § 13(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a).
203. Laurel Fletcher et al., Human Rights Violations Against Women, 15 wHrrnER L. REV.
319,344(1994).
204. Cf. Millerv. Albright, 118S. Ct. 1428 (1998).
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The plurality also overlooked several cases that have held that a stat-
ute "may not invidiously discriminate against illegitimate children by
denying them substantial benefits accorded children generally."
Moreover, the Court failed to consider cases that held statutes unconsti-
tutional that required only fathers to take actions to benefit their illegiti-
mate children.' Rather, Justice Stevens believed that Lehr v.
Robertson,' an adoption case, directly supported his decision in Miller.'
Miller and Lehr each required an unwed father, and not an unwed
mother, to take affirmative steps to receive rights associated with their
children." In Lehr, however, the strong governmental interest in the
adoption of illegitimate children provided sufficient justification for the
classification 2 --this government interest was not present in Miller.!"
Additionally, in Lehr, the father was asserting his rights, not the rights of
his child,," and courts have been more reluctant to strike down statutes
that deny rights to the father rather than those which deny rights to the
child."'
The Court was not persuaded by Wauchope v. United States Depart-
ment of State,"" which held that a statute conferring U.S. citizenship on
foreign-born children of citizen fathers, not mothers, violated the Equal
Protection Clause. 5 The U.S. government chose not to appeal Wauchope
because it "is consistent with modem developments in the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence concerning statutory distinctions based on
gender."' Because Wauchope parallels the structural setting of Miller
205. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535,538 (1973); see also Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762,766
(1977) (concluding that the statute at issue unconstitutionally discriminated against illegitimate
children).
206. See supra Part LA.2.
207. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
208. See Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1440. Justice Stevens also wrote the majority opinion in Lehr v.
Robertson. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 249-68.
209. Miller, I 1 SS. Ct. at 1440; Lehr, 463 U.S. at 266-68.
210. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 266; see also Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 395 (1979) (Stewart,
J., dissenting) (indicating that states encourage adoption and that courts use the strong state interest
as a justification for the classification).
211. Miller, 118S. Ct.at 1432.
212. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 257.
213. See, e.g., Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978) (dismissing an unwed father's
claim that an adoption law violated the Equal Protection Clause); see also Crane, supra note 187, at
427 (describing cases in which fathers sought to assert their rights and stating that they "face a
greater than average risk of denial").
214. 985 F.2d 1407 (9th Cir. 1993).
215. Wauchope, 985 F.2d at 1418.
216. Drew S. Days, I1, The Solicitor General and the American Legal Ideal, Alfred P. Murrah
Lecture at the Southern Methodist University School of Law (Feb. 2, 1995), in 49 SMU L. REV. 73,
81 (1995) (quoting Letter from Janet Reno, Attorney General, to Michael Davidson, Senate Legal
Counsel 2-3 (Oct. 15, 1993)); see also Miller v. Christopher, 96 F.3d 1467, 1475 n.3 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (Vald, J., concurring).
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(except that Wauchope involved discrimination against females) the
Court should have at least considered the case' 7
In LeBrun v. Thronburgh,1 ' a federal district court specifically de-
termined that the distinction made in section 1409 between legitimate
and illegitimate children was "unreasonable and arbitrary" and failed to
meet even the minimum rationality standard? 9 It appears that the opinion
of the district court in LeBrun was so well reasoned that the government
did not attempt an appeal to the circuit court.' Not only did LeBrun in-
volve the constitutionality of the same provision as was at issue in
Miller," but the facts were also remarkably similar, as each involved
daughters of American soldiers who did not discover their fathers before
reaching the age of majority. Despite the fact that Ms. Penero Miller
cited and explained that LeBrun presented an issue directly on point with
Miller the plurality failed to mention the case in its discussion.
D. Miller Ignored Section 1409's Unconstitutional Discrimination of
Illegitimate Children
In addition to classifying on the basis of gender, section 1409 also
distinguishes between legitimate and illegitimate children.' While chil-
dren born abroad and out of wedlock to an American father must prove
paternity and obtain the support of their father during the age of minor-
ity, children born to married parents do not face these hurdles in order
to receive citizenship.' Consequently, if section 1409 did not distinguish
based on illegitimacy, the distinction between mothers and fathers of
illegitimate children would not be present. By failing to consider the
INA's discriminatory treatment of illegitimate children,' the Supreme
Court incorrectly upheld the Act.
217. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 200 (1976) (applying equal protection principles in a
case involving discrimination against males). Although Wauchope is persuasive, the Supreme Court
is not bound by Ninth Circuit rulings. Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior
Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REv. 817,823-24 (1994).
218. 777F. Supp. 1204(D.NJ. 1991).
219. Lebrun, 777 F. Supp. at 1211.
220. See Petitioners' Brief at 12, Miller v. Albright, 118 S. Ct. 1428 (1998) (No. 96-1060); see
also Wauchope v. United States Dep't of State, 985 F.2d 1407, 1418 (9th Cit. 1993) (holding that a
statute conferring U.S. citizenship on foreign-born children of citizen fathers, not mothers, violated
the Equal Protection Clause).
221. LeBrun, 777 F. Supp. at 1207.
222. Miller v. Albright, 118 S. Ct. 1428, 1432-33 (1998); LeBrun, 777 F. Supp. at 1205. 'The
plaintiff in LeBrun was bom in France to unmarried parents--an American World War I soldier
father and a French mother. Id.
223. Petitioners' Brief at 11-14, Miller v. Albright, 118 S. Ct. 1428 (1998) (No. 96-1060).
224. See LeBrun, 777 F. Supp. at 1211.
225. INA § 309, 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (1994).
226. Id. § 301, 8 U.S.C. § 1401.
227. The Court narrowed the issue by limiting certiorari to the question, "Is the distinction in 8
U.S.C. § 1409 between 'illegitimate' children of U.S. citizen mothers and 'illegitimate' children of
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The outcome of an equal protection case in the foregoing context
often depends on whether the Court chooses to analyze the interests of
the illegitimate child or the interests of the parents.' In LeBrun, the court
found that section 1409 discriminated on the basis of both sex and ille-
gitimacy.' By contrast, in Miller, the plurality narrowed the issue to
whether section 1409 unconstitutionally distinguished between mothers
and fathers'm and failed to consider whether the statute also discriminated
on the basis of illegitimacy."' The plurality neglected to acknowledge
that the Supreme Court has recognized for several decades that classifi-
cations treating illegitimate children more harshly than legitimate chil-
dren violate equal protection.2 The plurality also failed to recognize that
other countries have completely eliminated the unnecessary distinction
between illegitimate and legitimate children. 3 Moreover, although the
Act seeks to reunite families, it reflects only the traditional view of the
family,' a view which is impracticable in today's society as illegitimacy
rates continue to increase and single parenthood is not uncommon.'
Although the Supreme Court has consistently held that children
should not be punished for the conduct of their parents or as a method of
deterring the parents' conduct, ' the decision in Miller to uphold section
U.S. fathers a violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution." Miller v. Al-
bright, 117 S. CL 1689, 1689 (1997).
228. See Howlett, supra note 16, at 14.
229. LeBrun, 777 F. Supp. at 1213; see also Gross & Lee, supra note 199, at 203 n.I (citing
128 CONG. REc. 15369,5376 (daily cd. Aug. 5, 1982) (statement of Attorney General)) (stating that
section 1409 may violate the Equal Protection Clause because it discriminates on the basis of sex
and against illegitimate children).
230. Millerv. Albright, 118S.CL 1428,1434(1998).
231. See LeBrun, 777 F. Supp. at 1213 (holding that section 1409 unconstitutionally discrimi-
nates on the basis of both sex and illegitimacy); see also HARRY D. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW 927-28
(3d ed. 1990) (stating that distinguishing between mothers and fathers has unnecessarily introduced
the subject of sex discrimination into the issue of illegitimacy).
232. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 388-89 (1979) (finding a requirement that
only the permission of an unwed mother, not an unwed father, to adopt a child violated the Equal
Protection Clause); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (holding for the first time that classifica-
tion based on illegitimacy violates equal protection); see also supra Part LA.2.
233. See Bernard Friedland & Valerie Epps, The Changing Family and the U.S. Immigration
Laws: The Impact of Medical Reproductive Technology on the Immigration and Nationality Act's
Definition of the Family, I I GEO. IMMIGR. LJ. 429, 442 (1997).
234. Id. at 429-30.
235. LeBrun, 777 F. Supp. at 1213; see also O'Brien, supra note 2, at 110 (recognizing the
increasing number of illegitimate children born each year).
236. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977) (stating that to punish children for the
conduct of their parents "does not comport with fundamental conceptions of justice"); Weber v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972) (noting that although legislatures may wish to
discourage premarital sexual relations, "visiting.. . condemnation [for such relations] on the head of
an infant is illogical and unjust'). See generally Note, The Birthright Citizenship Amendment: A
Threat to Equality, 107 HARv. L. REV. 1026, 1031-32 (1994) (giving an overview of Supreme
Court decisions involving statutes that classify according to illegitimacy). To deny or deprive a child
of rights strictly on the basis of a parent's marital status is contrary to the child's best interests.
Nicole E. Miller, Note, The Best Interests of All Children: An Examination of Grandparent Visita-
tion Rights Regarding Children Born Out of Wedlock, 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 179, 185 (1998).
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1409 will likely have a punitive effect on illegitimate children.' Ac-
cording to the INA, an illegitimate child cannot receive citizenship un-
less her American father agrees to take the steps required by section
1409.' Consequently, illegitimate children are disadvantaged because
few can locate or gain the support of their fathers. ' For example, only
fifteen percent of Filipino-Amerasian children with fathers who were
American service personnel have been able to receive citizenship based
on section 1409." In Miller, Justice Stevens reiterated the position that a
father may not receive equal protection rights associated with his child if
he fails to participate in raising the child." As a result, the Court de-
prived Ms. Penero Miller of her U.S. citizenship because her father failed
to take the appropriate steps to legitimate her while she was a minor.2'
IV. CONCLUSION
The plurality decision in Miller held that section 1409 does not vio-
late the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment.' Section
1409 of the INA imposes a burden on the children of unwed citizen fa-
thers, but not children of unwed citizen mothers, and is therefore the type
of gender discrimination banned by the Supreme Court in previous deci-
sions. ' As Part II details, the plurality opinion applied an incorrect level
of scrutiny and failed to adequately justify the classification made by
section 1409. Moreover, the Court ignored important precedent and the
discriminatory effects of section 1409 on illegitimate children.
In several immigration cases, the Supreme Court has failed to use its
authority to strike down a statute that violates the Equal Protection
Clause because it believes that Congress should make these changes.'
The Court's refusal to adequately review the constitutionality of federal
statutes makes immigration law a "constitutional oddity."'" Similarly, in
Miller, the plurality acknowledged that the additional requirements im-
posed on unwed citizen fathers are unnecessary in light of reliable ge-
netic testing, but believed that it was Congress's decision whether to
change the Act." The Court appears to use the deference given to Con-
237. Miller, supra note 236, at 193.
238. SeeLeirun,777F.Supp.at 1206, 1212.
239. See Joseph M. Ahem, Comment, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: United States Immigration
Law and Policy As Applied to Filipino-Amerasians, I PAC. RIM. L. & POL'Y J. 105, 112 (1992).
240. Id.
241. Miller v. Albright, 118 S. Ct. 1428, 1437 (1998); accord Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248,
267 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380,392 (1979).
242. Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1432-33, 1437-42.
243. Id. at 1440.
244. Lebunv. Thomburgh,777F.Supp. 1204, 1213 (D.NJ. 1991).
245. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 799 n.9 (1977) (stating that the issue "should be
addressed to the Congress rather than the courts").
246. Scaperlanda, supra note 179, at 713-14.
247. Miller, 118S. Ct. at 1438-39.
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gress as an excuse for not taking appropriate action.' Because Congress
has failed to eliminate the discriminatory classifications in section 1409,
the Court should have taken responsibility for ensuring that the statute
conformed to the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause in Miller.
One would hope, as critics' reactions to Miller have initially indicated,
that the decision will only "stand for the moment.'"
Nikki Ahrenholz
248. See Scaperlanda, supra note 179, at 716.
249. See Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REV.




INDIAN COUNTRY AFTER ANCSA: DIVESTING TRIBAL
SOVEREIGNTY BY INTERPRETATION IN ALASKA V. NATIVE
VILLAGE OF VENETIE TRIBAL GOVERNMENT
INTRODUCTION
The Alaska Native tribe of Venetie Indians has inhabited an area in
north-central Alaska' since before the United States Supreme Court was
even a sparkle in our forefathers' eyes. Yet the recent Supreme Court
decision in Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government,2 ar-
guably stripped the Venetie Indians of the inherent sovereignty and tribal
identity they have held since time immemorial. Ignoring widely accepted
canons of statutory construction intended to help Native American peo-
ple maintain their history and existence,- the Court took a significant step
toward assimilating all Native Americans into our national melting pot
and effectively terminating the only living history that remains in our
country today.
This Comment contends that the Venetie Court's interpretation of 18
U.S.C. § 1151(b)4 was erroneous and unjust. Through its finding that the
Venetie tribe did not inhabit Indian country because it was not a depend-
ent Indian community," the Court perpetuated the federal government's
tradition of systematically chipping away at the Indians' inherent sover-
eignty.6 This decision potentially denies not only the Venetie tribe, but
1. Nearly all inhabitants of the Native village of Venetie descend from the Neets'aii
Gwich'in, a group of Alaska Natives living near the East Fork of the Ciandalar River since before
recorded history. See Alaska ex ret. Yukon Flats School Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal
Gov't, 101 F.3d 1286, 1289 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't,
118 S. CL 948 (1998).
2. 118S.CL 948,955-56(1998).
3. See, e.g., Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684-85 (1942) (stating that courts should
read all federal action as protecting Indian rights and in a manner favorable to Indians); Alaska
Pacific Fisheries Co. v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918) (stating that statutes affecting Indian
rights "are to be liberally construed, doubtful expressions being resolved in favor of the Indians').
Among these canons is the rule that Congress's intent to abrogate Indian rights must be indicated by
a "clear and plain" statement. FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 224, (Rennard
Strickland et al. eds., 1982) (quoting United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 353
(1941)).
4. 18 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1994) provides that a dependent Indian community constitutes In-
dian country. Although this is a criminal statute, the definition provided applies to both criminal and
civil jurisdiction. Venetie, 101 F.3d at 1291.
5. Venetie, 118 S. Ct. at 955-56.
6. Those powers lawfully vested in an Indian tribe are not delegated powers granted by
express acts of Congress, but rather inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been
extinguished. COHEN, supra note 3, at 232. Prior to European settlement of North America, the
Indians governed themselves free of outside control. Id. As colonization progressed, the United
States recognized the Indian tribes as sovereigns and negotiated agreements to occupy the land. d
307
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:1
Native Americans nationwide of the rights and sovereign powers they
have held for hundreds of years. This decision arguably ignores the intent
of Congress' in creating the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
(ANCSA) 9 and is unjust in its effect.
Part I details the life of the term "Indian country" from its birth in
the mid-eighteenth century to its debatable death'° in Alaska on February
25, 1998. Part H then describes the specific events leading up to the Su-
preme Court's decision in Venetie. This historical path will provide an
understanding of the unique relational status between Native Alaska
tribes and the federal government over the past two hundred years. Part
III explores these relationships further, focusing on the methods by
which the Venetie Indian's tribal sovereignty and identity have been
stripped away. In Part III, the Court's disregard of widely accepted can-
ons of statutory construction is discussed, along with some of the future
implications of the Venetie decision. Finally, Part III describes the di-
chotomy created by the Court's interpretation of section 1151, wherein
the Indians' ability to maintain their sovereignty is dependent upon the
government maintaining a high level of superintendence. This intriguing
contradiction is discussed, as it continues a tradition of governmental
inconsistency throughout history with respect to Indian tribes.
This sovereignty has eroded over time as the government has limited Indian rights and powers. See,
e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1994) (prohibiting the distribution of tribal property without the consent of the
United States); 25 U.S.C. §§ 564, 691 (1994) (terminating the federal-tribal relationship with some
tribes and subjecting others to varying degrees of state authority); General Allotment Act, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 331-334, 339, 341,342, 348, 349, 354, 381 (1994) (providing for allotments to individual Indians
thereby diminishing tribal control over Indian land); The Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153
(1994) (extending federal criminal jurisdiction over Indians in Indian country); IMdian Civil Rights
Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341 (1994) (subjecting tribal authority to administrative and limited judi-
cial review). While this erosion of tribal sovereignty has continued, some statutes restricting tribal
authority and sovereignty have been repealed. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 1304-1310, 1313-1320, 1327-
1330, 1332-1340.
7. While the Venetie decision only directly affects the Venetie Tribe, it potentially may have
a secondary effect on the entire Native American community. Cf. infra note 189 (providing a histori-
cal examination of the federal government's treatment of Native American tribes).
8. The legislative history of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act states:
Under the committee bill all reservations in Alaska are revoked, unless the village corpo-
rations located within the reservation elect to take fee title to the reservation. If Natives
do elect to take title to the reservation, they will not participate in the land selection pro-
cedures of the bill, nor share in the monetary settlement.
117 CONG. REC. 46,967 (1971). This statement indicates Congress's intent that reservation status be
retained by tribes choosing this option, as did the Venetie tribe. By retaining such status, the land
remains "Indian country." Id.
9. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629e (1994).
10. While the effect of this decision on native sovereignty resounds nationwide, the purported
"death" of Indian country refers those areas within Alaska. The decision acknowledges only one
reservation in the state which still falls under the Indian country category. Venede, 118 S. Ct. at 955-56.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. The Origin of "Indian Country"
The term "Indian country," first officially employed in King
George's Royal Proclamation of 1763," established a boundary line sepa-
rating the lands of the Indians from those of the colonists." After the
Revolutionary War, Congress initially used the term in passing the In-
dian Intercourse Act of 1796.'3 This law contained the first statutory defi-
nition of Indian Country, tracing a line of boundaries throughout the
continental United States. The Indian Intercourse Act of 1834 further
defined "Indian country" as "all that part of the United States west of the
Mississippi."'4 In 1872 Congress specifically extended the definition to
encompass all of the mainland, islands and waters of Alaska following a
district court's finding that the term "Indian country" did not encompass
Alaska.'3 Soon after, the portion of the 1834 Act defining Indian country
was repealed,'" leaving the determination of what comprised Indian
country to the courts." Almost a century later, Congress expressly rede-
fined "Indian country" through its enactment of section 1151 as:
I1. See COHEN, supra note 3, at 57 n.60 (describing the Royal Proclamation of Oct. 7, 1763,
of King George); see also State ex rel. Yukon Flats School Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal
Gov't, No. F87-0051 CV, 1995 WL 462232, at *2 (D. Alaska Aug. 2, 1995).
12. Venetie, 1995 WL 462232, at *2. The British temporarily drew a line along the Appala-
chian mountain range, proclaiming "[elverything to the west of the mountains and east of the Missis-
sippi [to be] Indian Country." Id. At the time, the land west of the Mississippi was claimed by
France or Spain. Id. The British attempted to establish a detailed boundary line which continued to
move westward as the Indians were compelled to sacrifice more land through purchases and treaties. Id.
13. The Act of May 19, 1796, ch. 30, I Stat. 469, was the "third in the series of trade and
intercourse Acts" and the first to include a detailed definition of Indian country. COHEN, supra note
3,at 112.
14. Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, § 1,4 Stat. 729,729(1834).
15. Act of Mar. 3, 1873, ch. 227, 17 Stat. 510, 530 (1873). In United States v. Seveloff, 27 F.
Cas. 1021 (D. Or. 1872), the court held that Indian country was only that portion of the United States
or its territories which had been declared to be such by an act of Congress and land was not Indian
country just because it was inhabited or owned by Indians. Seveloff, 27 F. Cas. at 1022. The Indian
Intercourse Act of 1834, along with the subsequent revision in 1868, was originally developed as a
provision for liquor control Id. at 1024.
16. Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, § 17,4 Stat. 729, 731 (repealed, in part, 1859) (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. § 229 (1994)). In 1851, the federal government discontinued "removing"
tribes westward and began to locate Indians on tribal reservations within organized territories and
states, allotting reservation land to individual tribe members. COHEN, supra note 3, at 31. In 1874,
after these actions had all but rendered the 1834 definition of "Indian country" obsolete, the compil-
ers of the Revised Statutes omitted the definition altogether, effectively repealing it. Id. Despite the
obsolescence of the 1834 statute's definition of Indian country, an entire chapter of the new federal
laws was titled "Government of Indian Country." Id. "Without a statutory definition, the determina-
tion of what comprised Indian country was necessarily left to the courts." Id.
17. See United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535, 536-39 (1938); United States v. Pelican,
232 U.S. 442, 449 (1914); United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 37 (1913); Donnelly v. United
States, 228 U.S. 243, 268-69 (1913); Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 561 (1883); Bates v. Clark,
95 U.S. 204, 206-08(1877). Drawing on the definition from the Indian Intercourse Act of 1834, the
Rates Court concluded that Indian lands were Indian country as long as the Indians had title to it, but
when they parted with title, it ceased to be Indian country. Bates, 95 U.S. at 208-09. This definition
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(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the juris-
diction of the United States Government,... (b) all dependent Indian
communities within the borders of the United States whether within
the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof,... and (c) all
Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extin-
guished.'8
Four United States Supreme Court cases played a primary role in
establishing the basis of the section 1151 definition of Indian country."
1. Donnelly v. United State?
In Donnelly v. United States, a non-Indian convicted of murdering
an Indian within the limits of the Hoopa Valley Indian reservation in
California appealed his conviction' The Donnelly Court addressed the
issue of whether the killing of an Indian by a non-Indian, when commit-
ted on an Indian reservation, fell under the jurisdiction of the federal
courts.2 The defendant alleged the federal court, in hearing the case, im-
properly infringed on the state's jurisdiction. Knowing that federal courts
have jurisdiction over Indian country, the defendant contended that the
term "Indian country" was confined to those lands the Indians retain
through their original right of possession, and therefore did not apply to
those set apart as Indian reservations out of the public domain.D The
Court concluded that "nothing can more appropriately be deemed 'Indian
country' ... than a tract of land that... is lawfully set apart as an Indian
reservation." Section 1151 (a) codifies Donnelly, providing that all land
within the limits of an Indian reservation is Indian country."
2. United States v. Sandoval' and United States v. McGowan"
Subsection (b) of section 1151, codifies the "dependent Indian
communities" test as first established in United States v. Sandoval.' In
Sandoval, the Court held the federal government has the power to enact
was expanded to include reservation lands to which Indian title had not been extinguished in Ex
parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 561. In Donnelly, the Court specified that land must be "set apart" by
the government for Indians in oner to be Indian couatry. Donnelly, 228 U.S. at 269.
18. 18U.S.C.§ 1151 (1994).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 note (Historical and Revision Notes--1948 Act) (explaining that sub-
section (a) regarding reservation lands is a codification of Donnelly, subsection (b) is a codification
of the "dependent Indian community" concept as developed in McGowan and Sandoval, and subsec-
tion (c) is the codification of the holding of Pelican regarding allotments).
20. 228 U.S. 243 (1913).
21. Donnelly, 228 U.S. at 252.
22. Id. at 255.
23. Id. at 268.
24. Id. at 269.
25. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994).
26. 231 U.S. 28 (1913).
27. 302 U.S. 535 (1938).
28. Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 45-46.
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laws for the benefit and protection of all dependent Indian communities
within the United States." At issue in Sandoval was whether Congress
held jurisdiction to protect the Pueblo Indians by prohibiting the intro-
duction of liquor into Pueblo lands. The Court concluded that such pro-
tection is extended by the United States "over all dependent Indian
communities within its borders."'
In United States v. McGowan, the Court relied on Sandoval to sup-
port its holding that a dependent Indian community is Indian country and
that Indian country exists wherever two factors are met: Indian country is
land that has been (1) "set apart for the use of the Indians as such"" and
remains (2) "under the superintendence of the [federal g]ovemment.""
Again at issue was Congress's power to protect the Indians from the in-
troduction of liquor on the Indian lands. The Court recognized that the
Reno Indian Colony was composed of several hundred Indians residing
on a tract of land owned by the United States, created for the purpose of
providing land for Indians scattered throughout Nevada. 3 Applying San-
doval, the Court found the Reno Colony had been validly set apart for the
use of the Indians and was under the superintendence of the federal gov-
ernment; therefore, the government had authority to enact regulations
and protective laws respecting such territory'
3. United States v. Pelican"
The third classification of Indian country is described in section
1151 (c) as all Indian allotments.' those Indian titles which have not been
extinguished. In United States v. Pelican, the defendants were charged
with a crime occurring upon an Indian allotment.' The defendants ob-
29. Id.
30. Id. at 46.
31. Id. at 539 (emphasis omitted). The intended meaning of this phrase is that the land be set
apart to be utilized by the Indians for Indian purposes. See Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie
Tribal Government, 118 S. Ct. 948,954-55 (1998).
32. McGowan, 302 U.S. at 539 (quoting United States v. Pelican, 232 U.S. 442, 449 (1914))
(emphasis omitted).
33. Id. at 537.
34. Id. at 539.
35. 232 U.S. 442 (1914).
36. See Act of July 1, 1892, ch. 140, 27 Stat. 62 (creating the allotment at issue in Pelican).
This idea of "allotting" land debuted in 1887 when Congress passed the General Allotment Act.
General Allotment (Dawes) Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§
331-358 (1994)) (providing each Indian with a parcel of land in an attempt to break up tribes and
assimilate the Indians into white society by forcing them to acquire private land). The act was a
catastrophe from the perspective of both the Indian and the white man. STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE
RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES: THE BASIC ACLU GUIDE TO INDIAN AND TRIBAL RIGHTS 5 (2d ed.
1992). The Indians did not want to own land individually because they preferred to own land as a
tribal unit. Id. The white man thought the Indians would emulate the non-Indians who lived among
them thereby becoming mor productive ranchers and farmers. Id. Instead the Indians fell deeper
into poverty because they were unable to maintain their previous manner of subsistence, Id.
37. The term "Indian allotment" refers to "land owned by individual Indians and either held in
trust by the United States or subject to statutory restriction on alienation." COHEN, supra note 3, at
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jected to federal jurisdiction arguing that the crime was not committed
within Indian country." Since the specific allotted lands in this case were
to be held in trust by the United States for twenty-five years from the
date of allotment for the sole use and benefit of the allottee," the Court
concluded that the lands continued to be under the jurisdiction and con-
trol of Congress. ' Such allotted lands, therefore, remain Indian country
until the allotment expires.
The concept of Indian country as the dependent Indian community
has continued to develop in the courts' focusing on the question of
whether land has been validly set apart for Indians, under government
superintendence.' Still, today it is these two characteristics which must
exist in order for a court to recognize a dependent Indian community as
Indian country.'
B. Post ANCSA Indian Country
Prior to 1971, the Venetie Indian Tribe clearly subsisted subject to
active superintendence by the government to such a degree as to amount
to a dependent Indian community for the purposes of section 1151(b)."
However, with the enactment of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement
Act (ANCSA)' in 1971, Alaska Natives obtained ownership of approxi-
mately forty-four million acres of public land through corporations es-
tablished by the Act. In exchange, the government extinguished all Na-
tive land claims." As part of the ANCSA reorganization, Congress also
revoked all but one reservation in Alaska and included a special provi-
40. "Most allotments were originally carved out of tribal lands held in common." Ild. Since 1875,
however, a number of statutes have allowed Indians to obtain allotments out of the public domain.
Id. The General Allotment Act provided that title to land allotted to Indians would be held in trust by
the United States for twenty-five years. See supra text accompanying note 36. The 1906 amend-
ments to the Act authorized the President to extend the trust period on any allotment indefinitely.
Act of June 21, 1906, ch. 3504,34 Stat. 325,326 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 391 (1994)).
38. Pelican, 232 U.S. at 444.
39. Act of July 1, 1892, ch. 140, § 4, 27 StaL 62,63 (noting the provisions of the Dawes Act,
ch. 119,24 Stat. 388 (1887)).
40. Pelican, 232 U.S. at 447.
41. See United States v. South Dakota, 665 F.2d 837,839-43 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Martine, 442 F.2d 1022, 1023-24 (10th Cir. 1971).
42. State ex rel. Yukon Flats School Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, No. F87-
0051 CV, 1995 WL 462232, at *6 (D. Alaska Aug. 2, 1995).
43. See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potowatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 511
(1991) (concluding that the question of whether land constitutes Indian country turns on whether the
area was validly set apart for the use of the Indians, under the superintendence of the government).
44. Veneie, 1995WL462232, at*15.
45. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629e (1994). ANCSA "was designed to open Alaska quickly to oil
drilling and to provide a final determination of Indian land claims in the state, transferring millions
of acres of land to native corporations." Max Mimer, Note, Construction Work: The Canons of
Indian Law, 107 YALE LJ. 863 n.4 (1997).
46. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1603, 1611, 1613. ANCSA created a complex corporate scheme for Native
land administration and development in Alaska. It provided for the creation of thirteen Native corpo-
rations and conveyed 44 million acres of land. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1606, 1607, 1611, 1613.
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sion applicable to the Natives whose reservations were revoked. This
provision permitted members or stockholders of village corporations who
had previously inhabited a reservation to vote that their corporation take
fee title to the former reservation lands.'
ANCSA, therefore, clearly and explicitly extinguished aboriginal
land title in Alaska,' yet left in its wake a question as to the remaining
existence of "Indian country" in the state. As a result of ANCSA, the
status of the dependent Indian community became ambiguous and its
survival questionable.
II. ALASKA V. NATIVE VILLAGE OF VENETIE TRIBAL GOVERNMENTo
A. Facts and Procedural History
Virtually all members of the Native Village of Venetie descended
from the Neets'aii Gwich'in, the Native tribe historically inhabiting the
area." In 1940, the Neets'aii Gwich'in adopted a constitution under the
Indian Reorganization Act,' which established the Native Village of Ve-
netie as the governing authority of the tribe!' In 1943, the Secretary of
the Interior formed a reservation for the tribe, comprised of 1.8 million
acres of land that surrounded the village." In December 1971, ANCSA
revoked all but one Alaskan reservation and provided for corporations
47. 43 U.S.C. § 1618(b). This section provided the corporations the right to effectively "trade"
their corporate status and excess acreage for the land that comprised their original reservation. Id.
48. ANCSA provides:
All claims against the United States, the State, and all other persons that are based on
claims of aboriginal right, title, use, or occupancy of land or water areas in Alaska, or that
are based on any statute or treaty of the United States relating to Native use and occu-
pancy, or that are based on the laws of any other nation, including any such claims that
are pending before any Federal or state court or the Indian Claims Commission, are
hereby extinguished.
43 U.S.C. § 1603. Prior to ANCSA, rights of Alaska Natives to their aboriginal lands were unclear.
See Marilyn J. Ward Ford, Indian Coutry and Inherent Tribal Authority: Will They Survive
ANCSA?, 14 ALAsKA L REv. 443, 445 (1997). The Alaska Statehood Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-
508, 72 Stat. 339, amended by Alaska Omnibus Act, Pub. L. No. 86-70, 73 Stat. 141 (1959) (codi-
fied as amended at 48 U.S.C. §§ 21-488 (1994)), acknowledged that Alaska Natives had land
claims, but did not resolve them. As a result, the Alaska Natives claimed aboriginal title to almost
the entire state, filing claims with the Department of the Interior. The Secretary of the Interior
"froze" the transkr of title to public land to the State until this issue of native land claims was re-
solved. See id.
49. 118 S. Ct. 948 (1998).
50. Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats School Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 101
F.3d 1286,1289(1996).
51. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-383,48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1994)). See Venetie, 101 F.3d at 1289. The Indian Reorganization Act
enabled all then existing Indian tribes to organize and adopt a constitution. 25 U.S.C. § 476(a)
(1994).
52. Venetie, 101 F.3d at 1289.
53. Id.
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comprised entirely of Native shareholders.' ANCSA recognized two
Native villages within the boundaries of the former Venetie Reservation
and established two Native village corporations for the Neets'aii
Gwich'in: the Venetie Indian Corporation and the Neets'aii
Corporation.' Two years later, the shareholders of the Venetie and
Neets'aii corporations exercised their right, pursuant to ANCSA, to take
fee simple title to the former Venetie reservation.' In 1979, the tribal
membership, acting through the two corporations, transferred the former
Venetie Reservation land title to Venetie.f The shareholders then voted
to dissolve the two corporations.'
In 1986, Venetie enacted a Business Activities Tax, imposing a tax
on gains derived from commercial activities within the village." Shortly
thereafter, the state of Alaska contracted with a construction company to
build a new school within the boundaries of the Venetie Village.' Vene-
tie proceeded to impose the new tax and assess it against the construction
company." Alaska, the party responsible for payment of the tax, refused
to pay and the Village brought an action for collection in tribal court.'
Rather than answer the complaint in the tribal court, the state of
Alaska filed a claim in federal court seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief against the Native Village. ' Alaska claimed that Venetie had no
jurisdiction to impose a tax on nonmembers because (a) it was not an
Indian tribe empowered to exercise tribal sovereignty and (b) it did not
exist on an Indian reservation." The district court issued an order en-
joining the tribe's enforcement proceedings and Venetie appealed.'
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
preliminary injunction ruling." The appellate court concluded the tribe's
authorization to impose such a tax hinged on two factors: (1) whether it
54. Id. "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and except where inconsistent with the
provisions of this [Act], the various reserves ... are hereby revoked subject to any valid existing
rights of non-Natives." 43 U.S.C. § 1618(a) (1994).
55. Venetie, 101 F.3d at 1290.
56. Id. The Unites States conveyed the former Venetie Reservation land title to the Venetie
Indian Corporation and the Neets'aii Corporation as tenants in common. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. in 1981, the state of Alaska proceeded to officially dissolve the corporations for non-
payment of incorporation fees. Id.
59. Id. The power to tax is an inherent authority in any government and is therefore an aspect
of the retained sovereignty of Indian tribes except where it has been limited or withdrawn by federal
authority. COHEN, supra note 3, at 43 1.
60. Venetie, 101 F.3d at 1290.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats School Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie, 856 F.2d 1384,
1386 (9th Cir. 1988).
64. Venetie, 856 F.2d at 1386.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1391.
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was a federally recognized tribe, and (2) whether it inhabited "Indian
country."' The case was remanded back to the district court to resolve
these issues.'
The United States District Court for the State of Alaska found the
lands of the Venetie tribe were neither set aside for Alaska Natives, nor
under the superintendence of the federal government. Therefore the Ve-
netie Indians, although a tribe, were not a dependent Indian community
for purposes of section 1151 (b).' Based on these findings, the court con-
cluded the lands of the Venetie Indians did not constitute Indian country,
rendering the tribe without authority to impose a tax upon nonmembers."
The district court opinion stated, however, that the tribe did consti-
tute a dependent Indian community prior to the enactment of ANCSA."
The court determined that ANCSA significantly diminished the federal
government's power by prohibiting the government from exercising the
level of superintendence necessary to be the dominant political institu-
tion in the area, to the exclusion of the state 2 Implicit in this opinion lies
the court's unsupported assumption that a dependent Indian community
requires total superintendence by the federal government and leaves no
jurisdictional powers to the state. The Venetie tribe appealed, arguing
that the district court applied an unduly restrictive standardn to determine
whether their land was Indian country, that ANCSA did not extinguish
Indian country in Alaska, and that the Venetie tribe continues to occupy
Indian country.' The tribe asserted that based on these three factors, they
retained the inherent authority to tax activities within their territory.5
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
district court, holding that while a dependent Indian community requires
a showing of federal set aside and federal superintendence, these re-
quirements are to be broadly construed under a multifactored test.: Ap-
67. Id. at 1390.
68. ld. at 1391.
69. State ex rel. Yukon Flats School Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, No. F87-
0051,1995 WL 462232, at *20 (D. Alaska Aug. 2,1995).
70. Id. at *20.
71. Id. at*15.
72. Id. at*19.
73. The Venetie tribe argued for the application of a broad set of factors such as those set forth
in United States v. Martine, 442 F.2d 1022, 1023-24 (10th Cir. 1971), and United States v. South
Dakota, 665 F.2d 837, 839-43 (8th Cir. 1981). See infra notes 81-88 and accompanying text. The
district court, however, determined that the essential factors to be considered when assessing the
existence of a dependent Indian community were whether the Tribal Government holds land set
apart for the Indians and whether the Tribal Government is under the active supervision of the fed-
enl government. See Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats School Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal
Gov't, 101 F.3d 1286, 1292 (9th Cir. 1996). The Supreme Court ultimately applied this variation of
the test. See Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 118 S. CL 948, 953 (1998); see also
infra notes 94-113 and accompanying text.
74. Venetie, 101 F.3d at 1290.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1302.
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plying the test set forth below, the court concluded that ANCSA did not
extinguish Indian country in Alaska and that the Venetie village consti-
tuted a dependent Indian community whose territory satisfied the defimi-
tional test for Indian country.'
While agreeing with the district court that federal set aside and fed-
eral superintendence are the dominant elements of the dependent Indian
community analysis, the Ninth Circuit evaluated the following factors as
a means of broadly construing those requirements:
(1) the nature of the area; (2) the relationship of the area inhabitants
to Indian tribes and the federal government; (3) the established prac-
tice of government agencies toward that area; (4) the degree of fed-
eral ownership of and control over the area; (5) the degree of cohe-
siveness of the area inhabitants; and (6) the extent to which the area
was set aside for the use, occupancy, and protection of dependent In-
dian peoples.7
In formulating these factors, the Ninth Circuit relied heavily on two
circuit court decisions which played a leading role in shaping the law
regarding dependent Indian communities subsequent to the enactment of
section 1151. " Each of these cases set out a multifactored analysis of its
own to determine the Indian country issue.'
1. United States v. Martine
The defendant, Martine, was a Navajo Indian charged with invol-
untary manslaughter in an auto accident which occurred on land owned
by the Navajo Tribe.'3 In deciding that the land in question was Indian
country, the trial court considered the following three factors: "[1] the
nature of the area in question, [21 the relationship of the inhabitants of
the area to Indian Tribes and to the federal government, and [3] the es-
tablished practice of government agencies toward the area." The Tenth
Circuit concluded that this was the proper approach and upheld the trial
court's decision."
2. United States v. South Dakota"
The state of South Dakota appealed a district court decision declar-
ing a housing project located in the city of Sisseton, South Dakota, to be
77. Id. at 1293.
78. Id. at 1294.
79. State ex rel. Yukon Flats School Dist. v. Native Village of Venctie Tribal Gov't, No. F87-
0051 CV, 1995 WL 462232, at *6 (D. Alaska Aug. 2, 1995).
80. Id.
81. 442F.2d 1022 (10th Cir. 1971).
82. Martine, 442 F.2d at 1022.
83. Id. at 1023.
84. Id.
85. 665 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 198 1).
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a "dependent Indian community." Relying on Martine, the Eighth Cir-
cuit in South Dakota considered four factors: (1) whether the United
States retained title to the lands and authority to enact regulations re-
specting the territory; (2) the nature of the area and the relationship of the
inhabitants of the area to Indian tribes and to the federal government and
the established practice of the government towards the area; (3) whether
there was an element of cohesiveness among the people; and (4) whether
such lands were set apart for the use and occupancy and protection of
dependent Indian peoples." The Eighth Circuit concluded that the land,
held by the United States in trust for the Sioux Tribe, was a dependent
Indian community within the meaning of section 1151 (b)."
Based on an evaluation of its six factor test drawn from Martine and
South Dakota, the Ninth Circuit in Venetie found that ANCSA did not
extinguish Indian country, and that it specifically conferred the land at
issue to the Venetie Natives, clearly satisfying the set aside requirement
for a dependent Indian community!s' In addition, the Ninth Circuit cate-
gorically disagreed with the district court's analysis of federal superin-
tendence and its notion that federal supervision must be dominant to sat-
isfy this prong of the test.' The court stated that the test of federal su-
perintendence focuses on whether the federal government has abandoned
its trust responsibilities,9 ' rather than whether the state government has
been involved in tribal affairs.' The Ninth Circuit then concluded
ANCSA did not terminate the trust relationship between the federal gov-
ernment and the Venetie tribe and therefore the federal superintendence
prong of the test was satisfied."
B. Supreme Court Decision
The unanimous opinion, written by Justice Clarence Thomas, held
the term "dependent Indian communities" refers to a limited category of
Indian lands that are neither reservations nor allotments,"' and that satisfy
two requirements-first, they must have been set aside by the federal
government for the use of the Indians as Indian land; second, they must
be under federal superintendence." The Court concluded the Venetie
86. South Dakota, 665 F.2d at 838.
87. Id. at 839.
88. Id. at 838-41.
89. Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats School Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 101
F.3d 1286,1296 (9th Cir. 1996).
90. Venetie, 101 F.3d at 1297.
91. The trust responsibility requires the government to act in the best interests of the Indians in
every aspect of Indian life. PEvAR, supra note 36, at 26.
92. The trust responsibility may be vacated only by an express act of Congress. Id. at 30.
93. Venetie, 101 F.3d at 1297.
94. Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 118 S. CL 948, 951 (1998); see 18
u.S.C. § 1151(c).
95. Venetie, 118 S. CL at 953.
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Tribe's lands did not satisfy either of these requirements and therefore
were not Indian country."
The Court reasoned that by enacting section 1151(b), Congress
codified the federal set aside and superintendence requirements which
the Court had previously held necessary for a finding of "Indian country"
generally.' The Court referred to its previous holdings in Sandoval,"
Pelican," and McGowan," indicating Indian lands that were not reserva-
tions could still constitute Indian country, and the federal government
could therefore exercise jurisdiction over such lands.'
In all of these cases, the Court relied upon a finding of both a fed-
eral set aside and federal superintendence to conclude that the Indian
lands in question constituted Indian country. In addition, the Historical
and Revision Notes to section 1151 declare that its definition is based on
the Sandoval, Pelican, and McGowan holdings.'" With those two points
in mind, the Court chose to ignore the standards set forth by the Ninth
Circuit, drawn from Martine and South Dakota, determining that Con-
gress intended only that the federal set aside and superintendence require-
ments be satisfied prior to the finding of a dependent Indian community."w
Based on these findings, the Court concluded that as a result of
ANCSA, the Venetie Tribal lands were not validly set aside for the use
of the Indians, nor were they under the superintendence of the federal
government.'" The Court opined that ANCSA's revocation of the exist-
ing Venetie reservation, and all reservations in Alaska set aside by legis-
lation or Executive or Secretarial Order for Native use," manifested a
clear departure from Congress's traditional practice of setting aside In-
dian lands." Rejecting the Tribe's argument that the ANCSA lands were
specifically set aside, the Court cited the portion of ANCSA stating that
lands are transferred "without any restraints on alienation or significant
use restrictions, and with the goal of avoiding 'any permanent racially
defined institutions, rights, privileges, or obligations."'" The Court con-
96. ld. at 955.
97. Id. at 953.
98. 231 U.S. 28,46 (1913).
99. 232 U.S. 442,449 (1914).
100. 302 U.S. 535, 537 (1938).
101. Venetie, 118 S. CL at 953.
102. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151 note (1994) (Historical and Revision Notes--1948 Act) (explaining
that subsection (a) regarding reservation lands is a codification of Donnelly, subsection (b) is a
codification of the "dependent Indian community" concept as developed in McGowan and &mdoval,
and subsection (c) is the codification of the holding of Pelican regarding allotments).
103. Venetie, 118 S. Ct. at 954.
104. Id. at 955.
105. 43 U.S.C. § 1618(a) (1994). The Alaskan Annette Island Reservation was expressly ex-
empted from revocation by ANCSA. Id.
106. Venetie, 118 S. CL at 955.
107. Id. (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1601(b) (1994)).
[Vol. 76:1
1998] ALASKA V. NATIVE VILLAGE OF VENETIE TRIBAL GOV'T 319
cluded that because Congress contemplated that non-Natives could own
the former Venetie Reservation, and because the Tribe was free to use it
for non-Indian purposes,"~ the federal set-aside requirement was not met."r
The Court also concluded that ANCSA ended federal superinten-
dence over the Tribe's lands."" Citing Congress's intention that
ANCSA's settlement provisions work to avoid a "lengthy wardship or
trusteeship,""' the Court decided that any remaining federal protection of
the Tribe's land is quite limited and does not approach the level of su-
perintendence necessary to meet the requirement as intended by Con-
gress."2 Conceding that ANCSA's attempt to instill self-determination
undercuts the federal superintendence requirement, the Court stated that




Hopefully Congress will heed the Court's call, as it did when its
first "Indian country" definition was misinterpreted in 1873."' Through-
out history, both Congress and the executive branch have been inconsis-
tent in their maintenance of the federal government's unique relationship
with, and responsibility to, Indian tribes and to the Indian people as a
whole. While ANCSA supports Native autonomy and disavows any
lengthy wardship and trusteeship, an understanding of the origin of the
unique relationship between the Native Americans and the federal gov-
ernment reconciles the seemingly contradictory status the Venetie Indi-
ans seek.
The Supreme Court began to recognize the existence of a trust rela-
tionship between the federal government and Indian people in Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia,"' and Worcester v. Georgia,"" two decisions inter-
preting Indian treaties. Between 1787 and 1871 the government entered
into hundreds of treaties with Indian tribes in which the Indians gave up
108. The tribe used the land exclusively for Indian purposes. Under the original statute,
ANCSA restricted membership in its corporations exclusively to Natives for 20 years. 43 U.S.C. §
1606(h)(1) (1982) as amended by Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act Amendments of 1987, Pub.
L. No. 100-241, 101 Stat. 1788 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1629c (1994)). However, the 1987 Amend-
ments allow each corporation to extend this restriction indefinitely. 43 U.S.C. § 1629c(c)(!)(B)(i).
109. Venetie, 118 S. CL. at 955.
110. Id.
Ill. 43 U.S.C. § 1601(b).
112. Venetie, 118 S.Ct. at956.
113. Id.
114. Congress revised the definition of "Indian country" to expressly encompass Alaska after
the court held otherwise in Seve/off. United States v. Seveloff, 27 F. Cas. 1021, 1024 (D. Or. 1872).
The Indian Intercourse Act of 1834, along with the subsequent revision in 1873, incorporated the
revised definition. Act of Mar. 3. 1873, ch. 227, 17 Stat. 510, 530 (1873); see supra Part LA (dis-
cussing the early development of "Indian country").
115. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1(1831).
116. 31 U.S. (6Pet.)515(1832).
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their land in return for promises made by the government."7 The Supreme
Court has held such promises, including guarantees that the United States
would create permanent reservations and protect the safety and well-
being of tribal members, create a trust relationship resembling that of a
ward to his guardian."' This "trust responsibility imposes an independent
obligation upon the federal government to remain loyal to the Indians
and to advance their interests.""' 9 A trust relationship, however, may be
terminated without a tribe's consent by an express act of Congress.'"
In 1970, President Nixon enunciated a federal policy of self-
determination toward the Native Americans without termination of the
trust relationship. 2 ' The President denounced terminating the trust rela-
tionship because it would ignore the moral and legal obligations between
the Native American tribes and the federal government.In In the abstract,
President Nixon's statements indicate some historical support for the
argument that the federal government is not abandoning its trust relation-
ship when it supports and advocates Indian self-determination. '" Rather
the government is working to fulfill these trust responsibilities.' There-
fore, ANCSA, a statute enacted only one year later, should be construed
with this policy in mind. ANCSA provided the Venetie tribe with meth-
ods of enhancing its self determination while maintaining the federal
government's trust responsibilities toward the Venetie Indians.
A. Meeting the Requirements for a Dependent Indian Community
1. Federal Set Aside
The Supreme Court, in Venetie, determined the Venetie tribal lands
did not meet the federal set aside requirement for two reasons. First,
117. PEVAR, supra note 36 at 26. From the onset of colonization until the War of 1812, the
United States and the Indian tribes negotiated treaties as relative equals. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 548-
49. The end of the war also brought an end to the threat of British intervention in United States
affairs and friendship with the Indians became less valuable. As a result, post-war Indian treaties
were usually coerced. For example, in 1835, President Andrew Jackson forced the Cherokees to sign
the Treaty ofNew Echota, Dec. 29, 1835, 7 Stat. 478, in which the Cherokees gave up their land east
of the Mississippi River in exchange for five million dollars. COHEN, supra note 3, at 84. After the
signing the treaty, the government compelled the Cherokees to march to Oklahoma, on what came to
be known as the "Trail of Tears." COHEN, supra note 3, at 92. In 1871, Congress enacted a law
prohibiting the making of treaties with Indians, declaring that Indians were not sovereign nations
with whom the United States could make treaties. 25 U.S.C. § 71. For a comprehensive discussion of
Indian treaties, see COHEN, supra note 3, at 62-105.
118. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 16.
119. PEvAR, supra note 36, at 27.
120. Id. at 30.
121. COHEN, supra note 3, at 185-86 (citing Special Message to the Congress on Indian Af-
fairs, 1970 PUB. PAPERS 564 (July 8, 1970)).
122. Id. at 186.
123. Id.
124. Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats School Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 101
F.3d 1286, 1298 (9th Cir. 1996).
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Congress contemplated that non-Natives could own the former Venetie
Reservation and second, the Tribe was free to use the land for non-Indian
purposes.'" In reaching this conclusion the Court dismissed the Tribe's
contention that lands acquired pursuant to a specific ANCSA provision
were set aside for the use of the Tribe. This provision allowed Natives to
take title to former reservation lands in return for forgoing all other
ANCSA transfers.'" The Congressional Record for ANCSA states:
Under the committee bill all reservations in Alaska are revoked, un-
less the village corporations located within the reservation elect to
take fee title to the reservation. If Natives do elect to take title to the
reservation, they will not participate in the land selection procedures
of the bill, nor share in the monetary settlement.'
It is evident from the language of the record that the legislature in-
tended that village corporations electing to take fee title would retain res-
ervation status. While this legislative commentary should clearly indicate
an intent to "set aside" land for the Native tribes who wish to maintain
their current tribal land status, the Court disregarded the legislative history.
In addition, the corporations established under ANCSA are different
from ordinary business corporations in that only Natives may own stock
in the ANCSA corporations. Under the statute, membership in the corpo-
rations was originally restricted to Natives for twenty years; ' however,
this membership may now be extended indefinitely." The Act also pro-
vides for each village corporation to be comprised of Natives from a par-
ticular village," and each village corporation gained estate to the land on
which it was already situated."3 ' It is impossible to ignore the connection
between the Native tribal lands and the method by which they were con-
veyed under ANCSA, yet this significance was overlooked by the Su-
preme Court. Congress specifically conferred the land at issue to the
Venetie Tribe by statute, and this clearly satisfies the federal set aside
requirement.
2. Federal Superintendence
Although the concept of "Indian country" rings of independence,
the statutory definition requires the existence of a dependent Indian
125. Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 118 S. Ct. 948,955 (1998).
126. Brief for Respondent at 40-41, Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, I I8 S.
CL 948 (1998) (No. 96-1577) (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1618(b) (1994), in support of their contention that
the lands had been set aside specifically for Indian use).
127. Id. at 42-43 (quoting 117 CONG. REC. 46,967 (1971)).
128. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(h)(1) (1982).
129. 43 U.S.C. § 1629c(c)(!)(B)(i) (1994).
130. 43 U.S.C. § 1607(a) (1994).
131. 43 U.S.C. § 1611 (a)(l) (1994) (conferring on each corporation the right to select all of the
township in which any part of the village is located, plus an area that will make the selection equal to
the acreage to which the village is entitled).
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community.'32 This dependency standard requires federal superinten-
dence; as a result, the ability of the Indians to maintain their tribal sover-
eignty remains conditioned on the requirement of federal superinten-
dence. Is it possible for the Indians to truly maintain sovereignty under
such circumstances?
The concept of sovereignty with superintendence originated in the
Supreme Court opinion of Johnson v. M'Intosh.' The Court held that the
United States acquired title to all of the land in North America by dis-
covery and conquest and, in turn, the Indians necessarily lost title to their
land."M Although the Indians lost title, they retained a "possessory inter-
est" in all their land unless and until Congress takes that interest away." '
With this in mind, even land that is "Indian country" does not truly be-
long to the Indians. It belongs to the United States government and must
remain under the superintendence of the government.
The Supreme Court concluded that in order to meet the federal su-
perintendence requirement, the federal government must actively control
the lands in question, effectively acting as a guardian for the Indians."
The Court concluded that after ANCSA, the federal protection of the
Tribe's land' did not approach the level of superintendence over the
Indians' land that existed in prior cases." This conclusion is problematic
because it assumes the requisite federal superintendence must be over
land. The Supreme Court, however, clarified this issue by expressly
stating in United States v. John"9 that the "Indians" must be under federal
supervision, not the land."
The federal government has maintained a course of protective deal-
ings with the Venetie Tribe over the past 130 years."' The Department of
132. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994).
133. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
134. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat). at 592.
135. Id. A possessory interest recognizes aboriginal title but no ownership right in the land. The
land cannot be sold nor is a tribe entitled to compensation when the government "takes" their pos-
sessory interest. Id. Although the Indians retain no ownership interest in their land, they retain a right
of occupancy of their ancestral lands. Id. at 574.
136. Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tnrbal Gov't, 118 S. Ct 948,956 (1998).
137. The Court stated that federal protection was "limited to a statutory declaration that the land
is exempt from adverse possession claims, real property taxes, and certain judgments as long as it
has not been sold, leased, or developed." Venetie, 118 S. Ct. at 956.
138. Id.
139. 437 U.S. 634 (1978).
140. John, 437 U.S. at 649.
141. Since the purchase of the Alaska Territory in 1967, Alaska Native tribes have been under
the same legal regime that applies to all other Native American tribes. See Brief for Respondent at 8,
Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 118 S. Ct. 948 (1997) (No. 96-1577). The 1867
Treaty of Cession, subjected the tribes to "such laws and regulations as the United States may, from
time to time adopt." Treaty of Cession, Mar. 30, 1867, U.S.-Russ., 15 Stat 539, 542. As a conse-
quence, courts early on upheld the obligation of the federal government to protect the Natives in-
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the Interior continually issued guardianship and protection to the Venetie
Tribe, ultimately setting aside a reservation for their protection and bene-
fit in 1943."2 Since then the government has consistently exercised its
trust responsibility to the Venetie Tribe by providing government serv-
ices and programs, such as allocating federal Indian Health Service
monies,'" money for housing and development projects, and grants for
self-governance projects.'"
The federal government's superintendence role over the Venetie
Tribe was not weakened, rather it was preserved by the enactment of
ANCSA.'" ANCSA's measures concerning stock and alienability, voting
rights and land protection" reflect Congress's intent to maintain that
role. ANCSA's provisions preserving the federal government's trust re-
sponsibility to provide desperately needed health, social, welfare and eco-
nomic programs for the Tribe and imposing extensive controls over the
activities of the corporations prior to their dissolution" underscore the
federal government's continuing superintendence over Venetie as well.
In addition, there is no support for the Supreme Court's conclusion
that the superintendence of the federal government must be dominant.'"
State supervision over some aspects of Indian life "does not eviscerate
Indian country."'" Despite Congress's delegation of partial jurisdiction to
the states over some areas inhabited by Indians, such areas remain Indian
country. 5
Finally, since the enactment of ANCSA, Congress does not exclude
Alaska Natives from any programs available to other Native Americans,
and has specifically included them among those eligible for programs
under all new major Indian legislation."" Such recognition further evi-
dences the federal government's intent to maintain its trust relationship
cluding the ejection of non-Natives encroaching on aboriginal lands. See Respondent's Brief at 8,
Venede (No. 96-1577).
142. See Respondent's Brief at 27, Venetie (No. 96-1577).
143. For example, Venetie's allocation of federal Indian Health Service capital for 1992 totaled
$445,000. See id. at 28 n.24.
144. Id.
145. 43 U.S.C. § 1601(c) (1994). This section provides that " no provision of the chapter
shall... relieve, replace or diminish any obligation of the United States or of the State of Alaska to
protect and promote the rights or welfare of Natives." Id.
146. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1606-1607,1611 (1994). These sections require stock, voting rights and land
to be held by Natives. Id.
147. Id.
148. Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 118 S. CL 948,956 (1998).
149. Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats School Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 101
F.3d 1286, 1297 (1996).
150. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1994) (granting certain states extensive criminal jurisdiction
over Indian country).
151. See Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. § 450b(e) (1994);
Indian Health Care Improvement Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1603(c), (d) (1994); Tribally-Controlled Commu-
nity College Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1801(2) (1994); Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §
1903(3), (8) (1994).
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with the Natives, thus satisfying the federal superintendence requirement
for a dependent Indian community.
B. Assimilation
Alternatively, there is a glaring likelihood that Congress intended all
along for ANCSA to have a disabling effect on Indian country and tribal
sovereignty. The government arguably often has developed innovative
ways to take land and rights from the Indians. While treaties were exe-
cuted throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, many
were entered into by force or fraud." Similarly, twentieth-century U.S.
statutory law has often revealed itself as a wolf in sheep's clothing.-'
ANCSA was touted by its creators as pro-Indian legislation,'" yet ap-
pears to have had the opposite effect on the Venetie tribe. Over the years,
the government and the Indians have notoriously had different views on
what is best for the Indians. ANCSA is another example of Congress's
attempt to assimilate a group of people many of whom may not want to
be assimilated into non-Indian society."
C. Canons of Construction
Because congressional pronouncements in the area of Indian law
have traditionally been broad and often contradictory," a number of Su-
preme Court decisions have announced fundamental canons for constru-
ing these acts!" Paramount to any analysis is the principle that the intent
of Congress to extinguish Indian country must be reflected by language
that is clear and plain." As a result, any Indian right that is not expressly
extinguished by a treaty or federal statute is reserved to Indian tribes.'" In
152. See Nell Jessup Newton, Compensation, Reparations and Restitution: Indian Property
Claims in the United States, 28 GA. L REV. 453,459 (1994) (comparing the fraud and coercion used
in Indian treaty execution with modem statutory law); see also supra note 117 and accompanying text.
153. See, e.g., Indian Removal Act of 1830, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411 (authorizing the President to
negotiate with tribes for their removal from the east); The General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887,
ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 25 US.C. §§ 331-358 (1994)) (providing parcels of land
to individual Indians in an attempt to break up tribes and assimilate the Indians into white culture).
154. See Kathryn A. Black, et. aL, When World's Collide: Alaska Native Corporations and the
Bankruptcy Code, 6 ALASKA L. REv. 73, 77-78 (1989); Donald Craig Mitchell, Alaska v. Native
Village of Venetie: Statutory Construction or Judicial Usurpation? Why History Counts, 14
ALASKA L. REv. 353,440 (1997).
155. Beginning with the General Allotment Act of 1887, many Indians have been reluctant to
accept the govermunt's attempts to assimilate the Indians into white culture. This is evidenced by the
numenrous tribes who ate maintaining their tribal culture into the twenty-first century. See supra note 39.
156. See Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning and the Dynamic Nature
of Federal Indian Law, 78 CAL L REV. 1137, 1138 (1990) (discussing the congressional inconsis-
tencies with respect to Indian law).
157. Id. at 1141.
158. United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339,354 (1941).
159. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313,323 (1978).
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addition, any ambiguities in statutes and treaties are to be interpreted in
favor of Indian tribes."
There is no clear language in the ANCSA legislation of Congress's
intent to extinguish Indian country. Since such clear and plain language
is required, if Congress had intended ANCSA to extinguish Indian coun-
try in Alaska it would have expressly done so. Absent such language,
Alaska Natives must retain their inherent tribal rights and governmental
autonomy.
While there is no express language in ANCSA extinguishing Indian
country, there is express language regarding the obligations of both the
federal government and the state of Alaska.' ANCSA explicitly did not
"relieve, replace or diminish any obligation of the United States or of the
state of Alaska to protect and promote the rights or welfare of Natives."'"
Therefore, ANCSA contains a provision specifically pointed toward
maintaining the federal protection of Native rights, one of which is the
right of the Natives to retain their tribal lands.
In general, courts can either rely on canons of construction to de-
termine cases or reject them by claiming that legislative intent is unam-
biguous.'" However, the Court in this case did not even mention these
canons;' instead the Court ignored its own precedent in this decision."
If ANCSA is unambiguous, it must contain clear and plain language ex-
pressing intent to extinguish Indian country, and it contains no such lan-
guage. Alternatively, if ANCSA is ambiguous, it should be interpreted in
favor of the Venetie tribe. Such an interpretation would have the Venetie
tribe enjoying their sovereign powers through the implementation of
their Business Activities Tax, within Indian country. Either way, it is
evident that in light of these canons of construction the Venetie Tribal
land should maintain its Indian country status.
160. See, e.g., County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226,247-48 (1985) (stating
that the canons of construction applicable in Indian law are rooted in the trust relationship between
the United States and the Indians and that it is well established that treaties should be construed
liberally in favor of the Indians).
161. See43 U.S.C. § 1601(c) (1994).
162. Id.
163. DeCoteau v. District County Cowl, 420 U.S. 425,447 (1975).
164. See State ex rel. Yukon Flats School Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, No.
F87-0051 CV, 1995 WL 462232 (D. Alaska Aug. 2, 1995); see also Mizner, supra note 45. Mizner
contends that these canons do not apply to ANCSA, observing that most of the major recent Su-
preme Court cases involving statutory analysis of Indian law can only be read consistently if the
canon is interpreted to apply only when congress acted in its role as tribal trustee. Id. at 864. This is
because the canon arises from the trust relationship as embodied in the conception that the federal
government holds lands on behalf of the tribes and must manage these lands for the tribe's benefit.
Id. Mizner compares the Court's application of the canons in County of Yakima v. Confederated
Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992), and Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe,
471 U.S. 759 (1985), with its application in Andrus v. Glover Construction Co., 446 US. 608 (1980).
Id. at 865-67.
165. See Oneida, 470 U.S. at 247-48; United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978);
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 447; United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339,354 (1941).
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D. Implications of the Decision
The Supreme Court's holding in Venetie was persuaded in part by
perceived, yet unfounded, implications of a finding of Indian country.'6
M
Fear that such a ruling would potentially and seriously disrupt the en-
forcement of state law throughout Alaska plagued the decision."' The
possibility that the state of Alaska would be required to compete with
potentially hundreds of independent entities for governmental authority
within the State also loomed large." More specifically, the Court was
concerned that Native tribes across the United States would begin exces-
sive taxation of non-tribal members based on the Tribes' status as de-
pendent Indian communities. In reality, the warnings and predictions of
legal and cultural chaos expressed by the state of Alaska and other states
were misleading and highly exaggerated."
In fact, contrary to the argument of the state of Alaska, the Ninth
Circuit Venetie decision was very narrow." It did not hold, or even im-
ply, that Indian country existed in all Native Villages in Alaska."' Nor
did it hold that all ANCSA village corporation lands are Indian country
and subject to tribal jurisdiction.'" The Ninth Circuit established a six-
prong test" to be satisfied in order for a community to constitute Indian
country."' The court's decision emphasized that all six elements must be
satisfied by any Native community in Alaska seeking to show that it oc-
cupies Indian country.'" The Venetie satisfied the sixth prong"6 by dem-
onstrating that the land in question was created pursuant to ANCSA."
166. The possibility of a decision in favor of Indian country raised fears of unlimited tribal
authority which would requie the state to compete with tribes for governmental authority within
Alaska. See Joseph D. Matal, A Revisionist History of Indian Country, 14 ALASKA L REv. 283, 348
(1997).
167. See generaUy it (arguing that section IStI was meant to define only the scope of federal
laws that apply to Indian country and contending that there is no Indian country in post-ANCSA
Alaska).
168. Id. at 348 (discussing the potential of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Venerie ruling to
disrupt the enforcement of state law throughout Alaska).
169. Ward Fon, supra note 48, at 467-68 (refuting the concerns of the petitioner and amici
curiae that the Venetie decision could enlarge the scope of tribal authority and threaten the state's
ability to enforce state laws).
170. ld. at 468.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See supra text accompanying note 78.
174. Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats School Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 101
F.3d 1286, 1292 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd, Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 118 S. Ct.
948(1998).
175. Venetie, 101 F.3d at 1300-02.
176. The sixth prong is "the extent to which the area was set aside for the use, occupancy, and
protection of dependent Indian peoples." Id. at 1292.
177. Id. at 1301-02. A close reading of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Venetie indicates that it
only discusses the status of Native Village lands. It is questionable whether the six-prong test is also
applicable to regional corporation lands that form a part of a Native community in Alaska. See id at
1302.
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Although the Venetie tribe also satisfied the other five prongs of the test,
there is no basis for the belief that every Indian community would satisfy
all six prongs. Thus, there is no credible evidence to support arguments
about the ominous impact of the Venetie decision and assertions of legal
chaos.
1. The Venetie View
On May 6, 1998, the Alaska Inter-Tribal Council and the Rural
Alaska Community Action Program organized a rally and subsequent
conference in response to the Venetie decision three months before.'
Tribal leaders organized the conference in order to develop a plan to re-
invigorate and expand tribal authority in Alaska." Over 3,000 Alaska
Natives marched through the streets of Anchorage in protest of the gov-
ernmental assault on Native rights." Some speakers at the rally criticized
the current legislature, urging Natives to register to vote and remove
hostile legislators from office,"'
While the rally showed a general feeling of unrest among Alaska
Natives, many do not expect much to change in the wake of the Venetie
decision. Some tribal members defiantly contend that they still have their
land and sovereignty regardless of the interpretation of the Supreme
Court." Alaska tribes seem to be turning their attention to defining their
authority over internal tribal matters" in an attempt to at least maintain
sovereignty over their own people. Undoubtedly, Alaska Natives will be
taking their cause to Congress in an attempt to realize and emphasize
their sovereign rights,"' and lawyers predict the necessity of further law-
suits to clarify the limits of these sovereign powers. '"
The Venetie decision seems to be seen by the Alaska Natives as a
minor set back. They have not lost their continuing battle to maintain
their rights, because they will absolutely not give up what is rightfully
theirs; their land, their sovereignty, their way of life.
178. Don Hunter, In the Wake of Venetie Tribes Gather to Regroup, Re-Energize, ANCHORAGE
DAILY NEWS, May 6, 1998, at Al.
179. Id.
180. Tom Kizzia, et al., 4,000 Rally for Rights of Natives, March Sets Downtown to Ringing,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, May 8, 1998, at Al.
181. Id.
182. Tim Bristol, Supreme Court Rejects Alaska Tribe's Indian Country Claim, NATIVE
AMERICAS, Mar. 31, 1998,available in 1998WL 1803950
183. Tom Kizzia, Town Sites Keep Alive Native Hopes, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Mar. 22,
1998. at BI.
184. T'ina Kelley, Courts vs. Native Alaskans: The "Last Indian War," CHRISTIAN S.
MONITOR, Mar. 13, 1998, at 14.
185. Liz Ruskin, Venetie Is Only the Start, Self-Governance Is Still Main Goal, ANCHORAGE
DAILY NEWS. Feb 27, 1998, at Al.
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2. One Outsider's View
The implications of the Supreme Court's decision on the Venetie
Indian tribe and Native Americans as a whole are potentially devastating.
The reverence the Native Americans hold for the sovereignty of their
tribal governments is tremendous.'" This sovereignty has been taken
away from the Venetie tribe.
American Indian tribes and tribal governments existed long before
the framers of the Constitution." They have ruled themselves and their
land for hundreds of years.'" After hundreds of years of swinging back
and forth in the realm of Indian rights,' the pendulum once again swings
toward oppression with the ultimate goal of assimilation. The United
States has attempted to steal the land, leadership and way of life from the
Native Americans.
IV. CONCLUSION
A dependent Indian community exists when land has been set aside
by the federal government and is under federal superintendence."0
Through ANCSA, Congress specifically set aside land for the Venetie
186. Ward Ford, supra note 48, at 468-69.
187. See supra note I and accompanying text.
188. North America was inhabited by over four hundred independent Indian nations when it
was "discovered" by Columbus in 1492. PEVAR, supra note 36, at 2. Each nation had its own lan-
guage, government and culture, and controlled its own territory. Id.
189. Since the "discovery" of the Americas in the late-fifteenth century, our forefather's treat-
ment of the Indians has fluctuated depending on the political mood of the day. PEVAR, supra note
36, at 2-9. From 1492 to 1787, treaties and agreements were made amicably between the settlers and
tribes. Id. at 2-3. Following the Revolutionary War, Congress began enacting laws which affected
the Indians, such as forbidding settlers from forcibly taking Indian land. Id. at 3-4. It was not long
before the government began overlooking such laws however, and eventually federal Indian policy
changed to the Indian's detriment. Id. In 1828, Andrew Jackson became President and Congress
passed the Indian Removal Act, which forced the Indians westward. Id. at 4. From the latter half of
the nineteenth century, into the early twentieth century the Indians were forced to assimilate into
white society through the passage of the General Allotment Act. Id. at 5. In the 1930's, federal
Indian policy changed for the better when Franklin D. Roosevelt took office as President and Con-
gress passed the Indian Reorganization Act. Id. at 6. Among other provisions, this Act prohibited
further allotment of tribal land to individual Indians and authorized the Secretary of the Interior to
add land to existing reservations and create new reservations for landless tribes. Id. Between 1935
and 1953 Indian landholdings increased by over two million acres and federal funds were allocated
to programs intended to enhance the Indians' quality of life. Id. at 7. The economic well-being of the
Indians began to decline again during the 1950's when Congress abandoned the goals of the Indian
Reorganization Act and adopted a policy of "termination," terminating federal benefits and support
services and forcing dissolution of a number of Indian reservations. Id. In 1968, Indian policy began
another upward swing with Congress repudiating the termination policies of the 1950s thereby
promoting tribal self government. Id. at 8-9.
190. See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505,
511 (1991) (holding that the question of whether land comprises Indian country depends on whether
the area was validly set apart for the use of Indians, under the superintendence of the government);
United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535, 539 (1938).
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tribe, in the form of a corporation." ' Pursuant to ANCSA, the tribe chose
to convert their corporation back to tribal land and maintain their status
as a dependent Indian community. The federal government continued to
provide financial assistance and health programs, thus meeting the fed-
eral superintendence requirement necessary for the legal existence of a
dependent Indian community.
The designation of an area as Indian country is extremely important
to Native Americans. It allows them to maintain their inherent sover-
eignty, including the rights of self-government and self-determination. In
Indian country, for example, a tribal government has the power to enact
and impose taxes; to adopt and enforce internal tribal laws; to issue mar-
riage licenses; regulate land use; adjudicate disputes and minor criminal
offenses; and regulate affairs of non-Natives on tribal land.'9 Through its
decision in Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Governmen" the
Supreme Court moved toward divesting the entire Native American
community of its inherent right of sovereignty. The Court's decision was
misguided in its process and is unjust in its effect.
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